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ABSTRACT 
Islamic law never achieved unity but expressed itself in, at least, 
four surviving schools. More interestingly, contemporary Muslim 
communities are still divided among themselves on a number of issues 
related to their laws. This work describes how problem of legal conflicts 
have been tackled by Muslim jurists. It is an attempt to examine closely 
the phenomenon of conflict in Islamic law from the standpoint of usul 
al figh or Islamic legal theory. In fact, much is heard nowadays of the 
contradiction in the body of Islamic law. Whilst in contrast, little is 
presented in terms of the methodology of removing this conflict. The 
present work therefore, attempts to redress this balance. The emphasis of 
the work will be concerned primarily with tarj ih methodology ; how to 
give preference to one piece of evidence or argument over the other when 
they conflict. Nevertheless, considerable concern is given to investigating 
the background to the conflict of law in the Shari'ah. 
This study of a neglected area in Islamic legal scholarship will 
be an important source of reference to students, both practising and 
theoretical jurists or to anyone who merely wishes to increase his 
knowledge of legal themes, particularly legal conflict. The very aim of 
the work is to argue that conflict is a natural and unavoidable 
consequence of legal study because legal conflict is only conflicting 
principles and arguments adduced by both the classical and modern 
jurists to reach what is actually intended by God in the target case. 
Therefore, conflicts are inevitable in most of the cases in JIgh owing to 
the variety of principles set out to deal with one piece of legal evidence, 
let alone with all the pieces of legal evidence in question. 
11 
Tarj ih is therefore, an important and workable instrument in 
the re-examination of these conflicts and in arriving at the most accurate 
principle for establishing the law for as long as this is possible. It is 
hoped that the discovery of new facts and the increase of knowledge 
which results from the broadening and deepening of the research will 
positively contribute to the process of unification of Islamic law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many Muslims understand that Islamic tradition places great 
emphasis upon the centrality and the uniformity of the Shari'ah, the 
revealed law of Islam. At the same time, they also comprehend that 
Shari'ah was not given to man ready-made. Hence, Shari'ah is regarded as 
subject to human involvement. This human involvement might take the 
form of interpreting and applying the revealed institutions or of deducing 
new rules from the revealed component of the Shari 'ah. All interpretative 
efforts aim to arrive at what is actually intended by the Law giver. 
Disagreement and conflict are therefore but a phenomenon common to 
the students of figh. "Conflict of law and the methodology of tarji h: a 
study in Islamic legal theory", is therefore the most appropriate topic for 
examining the above. 
Needless to say, the present study is aimed at re-examining the 
issue i. e. conflict of law, critically, studying diversity of opinions among the 
jurists and evaluating their arguments for two purposes, namely for 
determining the most acceptable opinion in a particular case of 
disagreement and for - the major purpose - establishing methodologies of 
taijih in consideration of their conformity to principles, sources and broad 
objectives of the Shari'ah. This topic is important as well as interesting for 
it poses a number of significant and challenging tasks for the student to 
address. Thus, it is not surprising, that many primary discussions of usul al- 
figh will be carried out to the extent that the work will cover almost all the 
contents of usul cil fcgh. To make the discussion easy to follow, well- 
structured and balanced chapters have been adopted. Before going into 
the general outlines of each chapter, mention should be made that the 
present wor'c is divided conceptually into three aspects. The first part 
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(contained in three chapters) deals primarily with the theoretical 
foundation of the topic which covers the introductory remarks on Islamic 
legal theory as well as on conflict and preference. The second part of the 
thesis (comprising of four chapters) is exclusively confined to the 
methodological aspect of tarji h. The third part is the summary and 
concluding remarks of the study. 
In the first chapter, I discuss briefly some preliminary 
considerations of usul al figh and of the topic of the thesis i. e. ta'arud and 
tarj i h. I considered some brief accounts of ujul ai figh as worthy of 
inclusion since ta'arud and tarj ih is nothing other than an integral part of 
jd ai-figh. In the second part of the chapter, purpose, need and sources, 
as well as the methodology of the work, are briefly outlined. 
In chapter two, considerable discussion is devoted to undertanding 
the meaning as well as the hukm of ta'arud. This is folllowed by a lengthy 
elaboration of the causes of legal conflict that can be categorised into two 
kinds; those which inevitably exist and those that are relatively "man- 
made". The purpose of this chapter is to show that legal conflict is not 
actually intended by the Law giver. The following chapter is concerned with 
tarji h and related discussions. The meaning, hukm, condition of tarj ih is 
fully elaborated in the first part of the chapter. An attempt to distinguish 
between tarjih and some terms similar to it is made in the second part of 
this chapter and finally the chapter-is closed with a close examination of 
the position and the significance of the principle of tarjih in usul al-figh 
particularly in the course of legal conflict. These three chapters represent 
theoretical foundations of the topic. 
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The second part of the thesis, as previously mentioned, is directed 
towards dealing with methodological aspects of tar, jih. - Four chapters 
(starting from chapter four to seven) are devoted to undertaking this task. 
As a logical requirement, all areas of legal evidence should be put into 
detailed examination for legal conflicts are, as a matter of fact, the product 
of usui al-figh ; evidence of figh. Chapter four describes the methodology of 
tarj i tj in matn conflict. In this regard, only the Qur'an and the Sunnah are 
deliberately examined for they are texts. Almost all kinds of wording and 
their conflict are brought forward which cover four distinct areas of the 
nature of legal text in the eyes of the jurists. 
Chapter five undertakes to study the conflict of isnad. Many types 
of isnad from many different standpoints are discussed in this chapter. The 
following chapter i. e. chapter six, is divided into two parts. Part one 
discusses how tarjih operates in conflict as to ijma'. Discussion of conflict 
followed by the methodology of tar, j ih in qiyas conflict is carried out in the 
second part of this chapter. The final chapter in the second part of the 
thesis i. e. chapter seven, is entitled "tarj ih based on external factors". It 
discusses various methods which did not fit under other previous headings 
and chapters. Since it is not possible to devote a whole chapter to each of 
these various methods, they are combined within this chapter to ensure 
that all relevant methods of tarjih are adequately treated in the study. In 
the last chapter, I will try to provide a summary or a conclusion to the work 
and some suggestions that deserve to be taken into account seriously so as 
to relate the findings with practical purposes. 
In conclusion, it is re-affirmed that conflict is a natural 
phenomenon in legal study. It occurs from the inability of the jurists to 
determine precisely the intended interpretation of the texts and their 
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applicability to cases arising in Muslim life. It is hoped that this work can 
offer considerable tentative, if not practical and comprehensive, methods of 
preference for reviewing legal conflicts in Islamic law. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
PART A 
A PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION OF USUL AUFISH 
A Brief Survey of the Historical Development of Usul al-figh 
In the treatment of this question, it is useful to identify two 
major elements in order to draw a proper view of the development of usul 
al-figh. These two elements are the emergence and the developmental 
aspects of this science. Only through this historical approach is it possible 
to gain an understanding of a long-established legal system, that is the 
Shari `ah, the revealed law of Islam, and to appreciate the issues with which 
the present work will be concerned later. 
A. The Emergence of `rim Usul al-figh 
`Ilm usul al fqh or simply `ilm al-usul or usul al figh or just usul 1, 
like other sciences and fields of scientific study developed gradually. 
Although modern scholars have made extensive and valuable contributions 
to the history of Islamic law in most of its aspects, there remains room for 
further inquiry and investigation about the early history of usul al figh and 
its development (particularly of the chronological developments of concepts 
and doctrines within usul al-figh ). 
1 The main terms preferred by Muslim bio-bibliographers and historians are 
the first three terms. Ai-usus, unlike the others, reveals the difficulty of 
deciding whether it is meant to refer to usul at-figh or to kalam (theology 
principles) since the same word i. e. al-usul, was also used to describe usul al- 
din (the principles of religion). The present work however, has used all these 
terms to indicate usul al-figh. For the principles of religion, the phrase u-: Eul 
al-din will be adopted. 
3 
As far as the emergence is concerned, al-Shafi'i (d. 204 A. H. ) has 
been credited with having been the first scholar to write systematically on 
the subject of usul al figh. Muslim and Western scholars are alike in 
assigning to al-Shafi'i the role of father of Muslim jurisprudence. 2 
However, Abu al-Wafa' al-Afghani in his introduction to Usul al-Sarakhsi 
has credited Abu Hanifah (d. 150 A. H. ), the founder of Hanafi school of 
law, as the first who spoke about this discipline in his book entitled Kitab 
al-Ra'y. 3 On the other hand, however, al-Khaib al-Baghdadi believed 
that Abu Yusuf (d. 182 A. H. ) was the first to complete a book on usul at- 
figh. 4 The same primacy was credited to Imam al-Bagir (d. 114 A. H. ) by the 
Shi'is. 5 
Having established that the starting point of Muslim 
jurisprudence lies in the practice of the late Umayyad period, some 
Westerns scholars led by Professor Schacht have suggested that usul al figh 
as a discrete discipline did not exist during the life time of the Prophet or 
for the greater part of the first century of Hijrah. 6 To this effect, it is said 
that the Qur'an contains comparatively little legal matter and that which it 
2 Ibn Khallikan, Wafayat al-A'yan, vol. 4. p. 165 ; al-Tamhid, p. 45 ; Coulson, 
A History, pp. 60-61 ; Origins, p. 1. 
3 Abu al-Wafa' al-Afghani , Introduction to Usul al-Sarakhsi. vol. 1, p. 3. 
4 Al-Baghdadi, 7 . rikhBaghdad. vol. 14, pp. 245-246. 
See also al-Kawthari, 
Abu Yusuf, p. 33. 
5 Abu Zahrah, Usul, p. 14; al-Khin, Ikhtilaf, p. 123. 
Abu Zahrah clarified that it was possible that early jurists before al-Shafl'i 
might have had systematic thought on usul al figh but al-Shafl'i's 
contribution i. e al-Risaiah, was eminently superior in terms of systematic 
composition. (UsuL pp. 14-16) 
6 Origins. pp. 1.5,190,191,230 (note no. 1) ; idem, Introduction. p. 19; EI 2. 
vol. 2, pp. 887-888. See also Hurgronje, Selected Works, pp. 269,278. 
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does contain is entirely unsystematic and haphazard.? Also, significantly, 
it has been argued that the Prophet himself made no attempt to devise any 
comprehensive legal system. 8 Yet Schacht's point of view proposing that 
us L al-JIgh was known to the Muslims only after al-Shafi'i's time is highly 
disputable. In what follows, an attempt is made to argue the contrary. 
The traditional Muslim point of view maintained that the content 
of usul al-figh, like other religious disciplines, was based on the Qur'an and 
the Sunnah from the very beginning. 9 As regards the Qur'an, it seems that 
Schacht has ignored its significant role in providing materials for usui at- 
figh. In his book "The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence ", Schacht 
devoted no more than four pages to discussing 'The Kuranic element in 
early Muhammadan law". 10 The Qur'an in terms of Islamic legal theory, 
however, constitutes the most reliable source of reference in terms of 
legal rulings for many cases as well as metholodogies of interpretation. 11 
7 Goitein, "The birth-hour of Muslim Law ? An essay in exegesis", in MW, vol. 
50,1960, p. 24 ; Coulson, A History, p. 17. Cf. Mustansir Mir, "The nature of 
Qur'anic legislation". in IJIAS, vol. 2 (2), 1985, passim; Weeramantry, Islamic 
Jurisprudence. p. 6. 
8 Anderson. "Recent development in Shari'a law ". in MW, vol. 40,1950. p. 
245 (cited after as "Recent Development") ; Schacht. "Problems on modern 
Islamic legislation", SI, vol. 12,1960, p. 106 (cited after as "Legislation") 
This contention is acceptable when this is viewed from the Western 
conception of legal activities. The Muslims, however, view the problem 
differently. For details, see Ansari, "Some reflections on the Qur'anic legal 
verses", in HI, vol. 4, no. 2, passim, particularly p. 19 ; idem, "The contribution 
of the man and the Prophet to the development of Islamic figh ". in JIS, vol. 
3 (2), 1992, pp. 156-171. (cited after as " The Contribution") 
9 Masud, Islamic Legal Philosophy, p. 11 : Doi, "Islamic law: Western tyranny 
by terms", The Search, vol. 3,1982, pp. 69,71. (cited after as "Islamic Law") 
10 Powers, Studies, p. 7. Cf. Origins, pp. 224-227. 
11 Al_FVcr al-Sam i, vol. 1, p. 25 ; Ansari, "The Contribution", pp. 143-147. 
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Regarding the Prophet's role, it is commonly acknowledged that he 
was often approached by the Companions for his decision in a particular 
legal case or problem. The Prophet answered these questions either 
personally or by direct revelation, namely the Qur'an. No question of 
methodology yet arose as it was not necessary for the Companions to know 
the reason of regulations, since the law was what the Prophet proclaimed. 
Nevertheless, the possibility of the Companions encountering 
unprecedented problems was not ignored by the Prophet. This was 
indicated in his posing of the question to Mu'adh b. Jabal on the 
occasion of the latter's departure to Yemen as a judge and a teacher. The 
Prophet is reported to have asked Mu'adh: 
"What will you do if a matter is referred to you for judgement? " 
Mu'adh said: "I will judge according to the Book of Allah". The 
Prophet asked: " What will you do if you find no solution in the 
Book of Allah? ". Mu'adh said: "Then I will judge by the Sunnah of 
the Prophet". The Prophet asked: "And what if you do not find it in 
the Sunnah of the Prophet? ". Mu'adh said: "Then I shall come to a 
decision according to my opinion (ytihad ) without any hesitation". 
The Prophet patted Mu'adh's chest and said: "Praise be to Allah who 
has guided the Messenger of His Prophet to what which pleases Him 
and His Prophet". 12 
This way of deciding cases was pursued by the Companions and by the 
jurists in later generations. 13 Moreover, we find the Prophet himself 
12 Al-Shafi't , Ibtal al-Istihsan, p. 300 ; Musnad vol. 5, p. 230 ; 
Ibn Sa'd, al- 
Tabagat al-Kubra, vol. 3, p. 584. 
In addition, much valuable information about the Prophet's own judgement 
can be derived from al-Qurtubi, Agddiyah Rasul Allah, passim. 
13 Hufat Allah, vol. 1, p. 149. 
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sending judges to different towns and localities. The judges who were 
appointed were instructed to base their judgements on the law revealed by 
Allah and the Sunnah of the Prophet. 14 
Now I propose to show that the emergence of any science, 
including usui al figh, cannot be determined or judged on the use of the 
specific terms such as usul al-figh regarding Islamic legal theory. Even al- 
Shafi'i himself did not use the term usul al figh, either in the title of his 
work or anywhere in the body of the text. He simply called his book ai- 
Kitab or Kitabi or Kitabuna. 15 The title al-Risalah, meaning epistle or 
letter, is later attributed to his work owing to the fact that the work is a 
letter sent to Ibn Mahdi (d. 198 A. H. ). 16 This fact is also observed in all of 
the sciences known to the people because it is the practice which occurs 
first, then the theory. 17 Therefore, the question of defining a discipline or 
even a particular principle generally comes after it had been fully developed 
and applied. 
Hence, the denial of the existence of usul al; figh long before the 
two-word term for it was established is unfounded. That is to say, the 
absence of certain terminologies does not necessarily signify the non- 
14 For details on the judicial activities of the Prophet, see M. Hamid 
Allah, al-Watha'iq al-Siyasiyyah. Beirut, 1968. 
15 Al-Risalaii, paras. 96,573,625,709, ect. 
16 Khadduri, Islamic Jurisprudence, pp. 20-22; al-Shalabi, al-Madkha. i, p. 
198. 
The work of al-Shafl'i was sent through al-Harith b. Surayj (d. 236 A. H. ), 
known as al-naqqal. i. e. the transmitter. (ibid). 
17 Ahmad Yusuf, al-Shafi'i, p. 34 ; Makdisi, "The juridical theology of Shafi'i : 
origins and significance", in SI, vol. 29.1984, p. 9 (cited after as "Juridical 
Theology" ). 
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existence of the concept intended by these terms. Al-Shafi`i's stand in 
relation to usul al figh, indeed, is similar to the position of Aristotle with 
respect to logic and of al-Khalil ibn Ahmad with respect to prosody in that 
both the logic and the prosody, like usul ai figh, had been in use for a 
considerable time before they were later arranged by these two scholars. 18 
Moreover, there were several books written before al-Shafi`i which 
dealt with one or other of the fundamental discusssions which later 
came to be recognized as the science of usul al figh. In this context, the 
well-known bibliographer, Ibn al-Nadim (d. 435 A. H. ) cited the works of 
Abu Yusuf in the following terms; " Abu Yusuf has the following works on 
tLsul 19 and amali (dictations)20 : the book on ritual prayer, the book on 
alms tax......... 21 Ibn al-Nadim continues as follows: ".... and among those 
who reported on the authority of Abu Yusuf is Mu`alla ; he transmitted his 
legal thought, his legal principles and his books". 22 Futhermore, Abu 
18 Ahmad Yusuf, a1-Shafi'i, pp. 34-35; Abu Zahrah, al-Shafi'i, p. 159. 
19 Nabil Shehaby writes that "L sul in this regard is used to denote a limited 
number of cases and judicial judgements, those found in the Qur'an and the 
traditions as well as cases decided upon by a few authorities. This may be the 
sense in which Ibn al-Nadim used the word when he mentions Abu Yusufs 
writing on usul al-ftgh. It Is presumably evident when Ibn al-Nadim lists 
works having such titles as Wills. Trusteeship and Alms tax". See Nabil 
Shehaby, "'lila and qiyas in early Islamic legal theory", in JAOS , vol. 102, 
1982 , p. 28 ( cited after as 
"'lila and Qiyas " ). See also Ahmad Yusuf, ai- 
Shafi'i . p. 37 note no. 
2. 
20 Amali, the plural of imla', implies what is expressed by a particular teacher 
directly from his heart or mind where the pupil will in turn record this saying. 
See al-Zuhayli, al-Figh, vol. 1, p. 49; al-Shalabi, at-Madkhal, p. 183, note no. 
3. 
21 Ibn al-Nad im, al-FZhrist, p. 286. 
22 Ibid.. p. 286. 
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Yusuf in his book, al-Radd 'ala Siyar al-Awza'i, has criticised the scholars 
of Syria for their ignorance of usul al figh23 
In addition to this, the list of al-Shaybani's works as mentioned 
by Ibn al-Nadim may demonstrate the existence of some principles of t4§, -ui 
al Ah at that time. Among his books are Kitab al Istihsan and Kitab 
al-Radd 'ala AN al-Madinah. 24 Having traced the so-called istilis an 
application in the early history of Islamic law, Goldziher considered Abu 
Hanifah as the founder of the principle of istihsan. 25 What concerns us 
here is the statement of Schacht which challenged Goldziher's point of 
view. Schacht noted that the principle of istihsan already existed even 
before the time of Abu Hanifah as a part of Iraqi legal reasoning, even 
though, as Schacht said, the technical term for istihsan appeared later 
for the first time in Abu Yusufs work. 26 
These instances which occurred before the appearance of al- 
Shafi`i's Risalah show that the early jurists in general had some sort of 
principles of law but they left behind no systematic works as did al-Shafi'i. 
It is interesting to cite here the argument adduced by Khadduri in his 
introduction to his translation work of al-Shafi'i's Risalah. He says, 
"finally, we may raise the question of the sources from which al-Shafi'i 
drew inspiration and information. This is not an easy question to answer 
precisely, since al-Shafi`i makes no reference in the Risalah to books which 
he may have consulted. In his other works, Kitab al-Umm in particular, he 
devotes whole sections to discussions with other jurists such as Abu 
23 Abu Yusuf, al-Radd p. 21. 
24 Ibn al-Nadim. a1-Fi1irist p. 288. 
25 Origins, p. 112. 
26 Ibid. 
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Hanifah, al-Awza'i, Malik, Abu Yusuf and al-Shaybani which clearly 
indicate that he had studied the works of these eminent jurists with 
care". 27 
Futhermore, he argues that "the vocabulary of the Risalah itself 
raises questions not only of legal nomenclature but also of literary and 
philosophical terminology. What is obvious is that al-Shafi`i rarely defines 
his terms, assuming that both his followers and readers will be familiar 
with the general and technical words from the content of his writings or 
from the common usage of the time". 28 
In any case, the science of usul al figh, as we know it from the 
book of al-Shafi'i, existed long before the two-word term for it was 
established. As concluded by one scholar, "by the time al-Shafi`i appeared, 
much had already been derived. On the basis of the rules he now drew up 
he found in the techniques and methods of his contemporaries and their 
predecessors much to criticise". 29 Al-Shafi'i's Risalah is basically a work 
on methodology. Therefore another scholar has said that "on the whole 
and notwithstanding the evidence of its development, traces of the 
influence of earlier doctrines and occasional inconsistences, al-Shafi`i legal 
theory is a magnificently consistent system and eminently superior to the 
doctrines of the ancient schools". 30 
27 Khadduri, Islamic Jurisprudence, pp. 25-26. See also Abu Zahrah, al- 
Shaft'i, pp. 36-43. 
28 Ibid., p. 28. 
29 Burton, The Sources, p. 15. 
30 Origins, pp. 136-137. Also see 'Atiyyah, al-Taniiral-Fighi. p. 23. 
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B. The Development of Usul al-fcgh 
As previously mentioned, usul al figh developed gradually 
throughout the generations of the early period of Islam. Al-Shafi'i's Risalah 
marked the beginning of the systematic work on usul al tqh The birth of 
usul al figh as the science of jurisprudence in Islam appears to have 
occurred sometime prior to the death of 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Mahdi in 198 
of the Hijrah. Ibn Mahdi is said to have written to al-Shafi'i asking him 
to compose a work explaining the legal significance of the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah. 31 What is clear is that no definite knowledge is available as to 
the precise date and place in which al-Shafi'i composed ai Risalah32 
In short, al-Risalah is a well written document which reflects not 
only the legal thought and theories of sources of those jurists current in 
the time of al-Shafi'i but also of the past. 33 The question of the precise 
sul al figh remains undecided, a factor which, date of the emergence of u. 
however, does not harm or affect this interesting field of study in Islam. 
The reason for this problem, I believe is that the development of a specific 
branch of knowledge in Islam cannot be easily separated from other related 
subjects. Not only are they closely related but sometimes overlapping and 
interchangeably used. With this in mind, I suspect a researcher would 
face great difficulty in confirming the precise date of the emergence of any 
specific discipline as far as Islamic knowledge is concerned. 
31A1-9aghdadi, TarikhBaghdad, vol. 2, pp. 64-65; idem, at-Shafi'i, p. 82 
Khadduri, Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 19. 
32 Ahmad Yusuf, al-Shafi'i, p. 38. 
33 Ai-F kr al-Sam i, vol. 1. pp. 402-403. 
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Schacht states that al-Shafi`i's personal achievements in legal 
theory consist (1) of the development of a new theory of interpretation 
applied to the two principal sources of the revealed law : the Qur'an and 
the Prophetic traditions ; (2) of the almost complete identification of 
Sunnah with traditions Ladi ths) and (3) of the hierarchy of the four 
sources of law including consensus and giyas. 34 
. 
After Risalah's appearance, there is no definite knowledge of the 
development of this science for two or three centuries after al-Shafi'i. 
Biographical and bibliographical works persistently reflect a gap in the 
literature of usul between al-Shafi'i and Abu Bakr al-Sayrafi's (d. 330/336 
A. H) treatise on this subject. 35 Al-Sayrafi, indeed, also a Shafi'i, was the 
first jurist who wrote after al-Shafi'i. His work however, was no more than 
a commentary on the Risalah. 36 Yet, al-Subki, also a Shafi'i, has given 
the list of works on usul after al-Shafi'i. The list begins with al-Shafi'i's 
Risalah, followed by the commentaries but none of them are extant. 
According to this list, the first independent and comprehensive works on 
usul are by authors who died at the dawn of the fifth century of Hijrah. 
two centuries after al-Shafi'i's death. 37 
From this brief explanation of these two aspects of the historical 
development of usul al figh, it is certain, in my opinion, that the science 
developed gradually from unwritten work, or unsystematic written work, to 
34 Origins, pp. 56,77,134. 
35 Hallaq, "A tenth-eleventh century treatise on judicial dialectic", In MW. 
vol. 72,1987, p. 197, note no. 5. (cited after as "Judicial Dialectic") 
36 Ibid. 
37 The full list of al-Subki can be found in Makdisi's "Juridical Theology". pp. 
30-3 1. See also al= Alwan i, Usul, pp. 45-54. 
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systematic written work. From the fifth century onwards this discipline 
was the exclusive concern of the contemporary jurists. However, following 
these developments, particularly after the seventh century of Hijrah, the 
scholars seem reluctant to explore new dimensions in this subject. 
Perhaps, they believe the previous achievements to be sufficient. That is 
to say, they may perceive all essential questions of law and its usul as 
having been throughly discussed and thus further deliberation was deemed 
unnecessary. Hence, their contributions are limited to the explanation of 
only some words and phrases found in the earlier books. 38 This 
phenomenon is not, however, a positive indication that no 'original' 
books on usul al ftgh were witten in this period. Al-Shatibi (d. 780 A. H. ) 
and al-Shawkani (d. 1225 A. H. ), for example, composed their well-known 
books "at-Muwafagat fi Usul al-Figh " and "Irshad al-F'Uhul i1a. Tahgiq al- 
Hagq min 'Em Usu1 at-Figh " which are considered among the most profound 
books written in the later period. 39 
THE DEFINITION OF USUL AUFIQH. 
Obviously, one cannot find a strict definition or even the term of 
usul al figh in the early literature as previously shown. Even al-Shafi'i 
simply called his work al-Kitab although the actual subject matter seemed 
to be well established. This may have been for a particular reason. In this 
regard, a satisfactory explanation has been provided by one scholar who 
noted a marked lag between the conceptual and terminological aspects of 
the development of ftgh. A number of concepts remained in use for a long 
38 Al-Alwin i, 'The crisis in figh and the methodology of ijtihad', in AJISS, vol. 
8.1991, p. 317. (cited after as'The Crisis") 
39 Al-Dari n i, al-Monahi, p. 20, note no. 4; Badran, Usul. p. 20. 
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period of time before they could acquire a standard, precise legal technical 
phraseology for their expression. 40 
It seems that the term usul al figh became established among the 
scholars only in the fifth century of Hijrah. The first independent and 
comprehensive work on usul al-figh, after al-Shafi'i's Risalah, which has 
come down to us and is now in print is the Mu'tamaci of Abu al-Husayn al- 
Basri al-Mu'tazili (d. 436 A. H. ). He used the term usul ai fcgh in his 
work to refer specifically to this science. Futhermore, he gives a detailed 
explanation of the term. 41 
Initially, it is necessary to note that the term usui al-figh has two 
words combined together to indicate a specific meaning. Therefore, it is 
important to define these two words independently before attempting to 
define them as a combination. The reason for that as indicated by 
Makdisi, is "to distinguish between the science of Ah and that of usul al- 
fiqh and thus put an end to the equivocal use of the latter term in the 
sense of elements or rudiments of fiqh, reserving the two-word term to 
designate the methodology of the revealed law". 42 
It is common among scholars who wrote on usul al fzgh to clarify 
its meaning in three stages. They begin by explaining the word usul then 
40 Ansari. "Islamic juristic terminology before Shafi'i :a semantic analysis 
with special reference to Kufa". in Arabica, vol. 19.1972, p. 255. (cited after 
as "Islamic Juristic") See also Faruki, "al-Shafi'i disagreements with the 
Maliki and the Hanafi schools", in IS , vol. 10,1971, p. 131. 
(cited after as 
"Disagreements") 
41 Al-Mu'tamad, vol. 1. pp. 8-11. 
42 Makdisi, "Juridical Theology", p. 9. 
14 
the word figh and finally usul alffigh. 43 Usul which is the plural form of 
aal, literally means root. 44 The jurists describe usul in its literal sense 
as something built upon. 45 In technical terms, asl has a variety of 
meanings : 46 
(a)It is used to mean evidence or dalil particularly the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah. At the later stage, yma' and qiyas are called usul also. The 
common phrase "at-asl ft hadha al-hukm Kitab Allah", means the 
evidence for this rule is the Qur'an. 
(b)It is also used to mean "root" or "origin". For example, "al-ab asl at- 
ibn ", meaning "the father is the origin of his son" and "al-khamr asl al- 
nabidh " meaning the ruling on ai-nabidh is derived from or 
originated in the ruling on wine drinking. 
(c)Another meaning for asi is the original or more preferred one as in 
"al-asl fi al-kaIam al-hagiqah ", meaning the original and the preferred 
meaning of the speech is the hagiqah as contrary to majaz. 
(d)Continuance or presumption is another meaning for asl. In strictly 
technical terminology, it is well known as al-istishab. Therefore, it is 
said, "al-asl fi al-ashya' al-ibahah" which translates as the original 
status for everything is permissibility. 
(e)Lastly, it is used for principle or qa'idah 
Broadly speaking, usul al figh is commonly understood as evidence of Ah 47 
where the figh is what is built upon them. 
43 See Jalal al-Din, al-Ulut pp. 20-48. 
44 Lane, Lexicon, part 1, pp. 64-66. 
45 AL-Mu'tamad, vol. 1, p. 9; al-Talwil3, vol. 1, p. 13 ; Irshad, p. 3; al-Jurjan i, 
at-Ta'rifat, p. 16 ; Badran, Usul, p. 22. 
46 Ibid., al-Hakim, al-UUul, p. 39; Zuhayr, UUul, vol. 1, pp. 6-7. 
47 Ai-Luma', p. 4: al-Hakim, al-Usul, pp. 40-41. 
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As regards fiqh, it means literally "understand"48 or "to 
understand what is intended by the speaker". 49 Therefore, it is said 
'fagahtu kalamaka " meaning, "I understand what do you mean by such 
and such". 50 Moreover, the word fiqh or its derivatives in the Qur'an 
carry the same meaning as above i. e. being used to denote understanding 
of any matter. 51 Obviously, such a meaning is not intended in the 
technical sense of figh as will be shown later. But what is clear from the 
previous illustration is that the figh based on its original meaning was not 
applied in the legal sense alone, but carried a wider meaning covering all 
aspects of Islam, namely theological, political, economic and legal 
questions. 52 
A book known as al-Figh al Akbar attributed to Abu Hanifah was 
the best example of this. This book deals with the principles of Islam such 
as faith, unity of All h, His Attributes, Prophethood, the Life Hereafter and 
so on. 53 It appears that fulh until the second century of Hijrah embraced 
theological problems as well as legal issues. Owing to its comprehensive 
and generic status, Abu Hanifah is reported to have defined figh as 
48 Al-Mustass f'a, vol. 1. p. 4; al-Amid i, al-Ihlcam. vol. 1. p. 5. 
49 Al-Mahsul, vol. 1. p. 9; al-Ibhaj, vol. 1. p. 28. 
According to some authorities, 'figh " is more specific than 'fahm " though 
both constitute the meaning of understanding. See Ibn Qayyim. I'lam, vol. 1. 
p. 219, al-F'ikr al-Sam i, vol. 1, p. 4. Cf. Ahmad Hasan, The Early, p. 1. 
50 Al-Mu'tamad, vol. 1, p. 8; al-Amidi, al-Ihkam, vol. 1, p. 5. 
51 Ahmad Hasan. The Early, p. 1; EI 2. vol. 2. p. 886. 
See the following Qur'anic verses : 4: 78 ; 6: 25.65,98 ; 7: 178 ; 8: 65 ; 9: 81. 
87. 
52 Ahmad Hasan, The Early, p. 1. 
53 Ibid. p. 3; Schacht, Theology and Law, p. 4: Ibn al-Nadim, al-Fihrist p. 285. 
For details, see Wensinck. The Muslim Creed, pp. 104.110-112. 
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"ma'rifat al-nafs ma laha wa ma 'alayha (a soul's knowledge of its rights 
and obligations). 54 Alongside the term figh, several other terms were also 
common among the early Muslim scholars such as lim, shari'ah, ra'y, etc., 
which are not sharply defined. 55 Accordingly, these terms were used 
interchangeably as they had not yet acquired distinct technical 
meanings. 56 
Consequently, it is difficult to draw a sharp distinction between 
them. However, from the beginning of the second half of the second century 
of Hijrah, the term Ah was gradually narrowed down and ultimately came 
to be applied only to the legal problems. The works of Abu Yusuf and 
especially those of al-Shaybani were the first systematic attempts to write 
exclusively on figh. 57 Henceforth, books began to be written independently 
on that particular field of study. 
Fiqh, as a technical term, has been confined to a specific 
religious science called furu` (branches) as opposed to usul (roots). 58 
Accordingly, the word Ah in the mind of the jurists means a compendium 
of legal rulings. 59 Or rather, figh is a science that determines the legal 
rulings, assigning them to one of the five categories of ahkam such as 
obligatory, recommended, prohibited, disapproved and permissible. It 
concerns itself only with whether an individual deed is lawful or not. 
54 Since Abu Hanifah's al-F1gh al-Akbar is not available to me, my knowledge 
of this definition is taken from al-Taw iij. vol. 1. pp. 16-18. 
55 Ahmad Hasan, The Early, pp. 3-8. 
56 Ibid., p. 8. 
57 Ibid., p. 9. 
58 El 2. vol. 2, p. 887. 
59 AI-Mu'tamad, vol. 1. p. 8; al-Burhan, vol. 1, p. 85. 
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As previously mentioned, usul al figh generally means the 
principles of fiqh. Thus, it is an area of knowledge that can be roughly 
translated as "legal theory". Accordingly, it deals with legal theories, 
principles in the interpretation of legal texts, methods of reasoning and of 
deduction of rules and other such matters. 60 In brief, usul al figh, in the 
words of Gibb, is "a science of interpretation or roots of jurisprudence". 61 
Obviously, usul al-figh unlike figh, is not concerned with individual cases 
of law on their own but only with principles and proofs on which the rules 
of the individual cases are formulated. It is, certainly, an Islamic legal 
theory devised to identify and to interpret the sources in order to establish 
the law i. e. it provides methodological principles from which legal rules 
might be legitimately derived. 
THE SUBJECT MATTER OF USUL AUFIQH 
Usul al figh generally concerns itself not only with the law proper 
but also with questions of linguistics, logic, methodology, epistemology and 
theology. 62 Al-Amidi , however, has restricted the subject matter of usul al- 
figh to the sources of evidence itself and related discussion. 63 By this, he 
60 Mas'ud, Islamic Legal Philosophy. p. 24. See also al-Dasuqi. "Wasa'il al- 
ytih. ad fi al figh al-Islam i", in MA, vol. 63,1991. p. 1106 ( cited after as 
Ijtihact') 
61 Gibb, Muhammedanism, p. 93. 
For classical definitions of usul al-figh, according to many different viewpoints, 
see Jalal al-Din, al-Usul, pp. 32-48. 
62 Al-Mankhx4 p. 4; Muntaha, p. 4; Nabil Shehaby. "'Ilia and Qiyas ", p. 
27; Hallaq, " Usul al-figh : Beyond tradition ", in JIS, vol. 3 (2). 1992, pp. 179- 
181(cited after as "Usul al figh ") ; al= Alwa n i, Usul. pp. 3-4 
63 Al-amid t, al-ltlkam, vol. 1, p. 6. 
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means that usul al-figh discusses only those principles which are 
immediately necessary for reaching the figh. In other words, it does not 
concern itself with those less immediate subjects such as language and 
syntax or dogmatics (kalam) although they are necessary. Nevertheless, 
al-Amid-ii on another occasion, did concede that the other kind of sciences 
which have an intimate relationship with jurisprudence are also essential 
for deriving legal rulings. Hence, he says, "the knowledge of the meaning of 
the verbal directives in the Qur'an, the Sunnah and the statements of 
authoritative scholars (ahl al-hall wa al-`aqd) depends on a knowledge of 
what has been established in language studies with respect to them". 64 
It seems to me that al-Amidi attempted to distinguish between 
two types of usul subject matter. No doubt usul al-figh, as inspired by the 
title itself, is confined exclusively to the bases of fiqh and how they are 
manipulated to arrive at figh. However, in a practical sense, one is unable 
to identify the law intended by the Lawgiver through legal texts by merely 
basing oneself solely on the knowledge of legal evidence. As sources of 
evidence vary from one to another and are open to many possible 
interpretations, a jurist has little choice but to commit himself to and seek 
assistance from other related knowledge that would help in arriving at the 
proper legal conclusion. Subjects such as linguistics, logic, epistemology, 
etc., though not evidence, are very crucial in governing the accurate 
understanding of legal texts. Therefore, it seems that the disagreement 
between al-Amidi and the other jurists is insignificant since they all 
agreed upon the necessity of language study in deriving the law. But, the 
attempt of al-Amidi to divide usul subject matter into two groups on the 
Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
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basis of their immediate significance to the raison d `etre of usul study 
appears to be more appropriate. 
Familiarity with the Arabic language (philology) is a prerequisite 
to understanding the foremost sources of law, namely the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah, since both have come to Muslims in the language, grammar and 
morphology of the Arab. This led al-Shafi'i to introduce significantly in 
the Risalah several chapters concerned with the linguistic aspects. Among 
these is the discussion of general ('amm) and particular (khans ). 65 The 
later jurists such as al-Jassas and al-Ghazali have added some extensive 
discussions of language as with haqiqah, majaz, sarih, kinayah, amr, 
nahy, etc. 66 On the other hand, from the very beginning, usul al-figh also 
had close ties with rhetoric. Subsequently, knowledge of the rhetorical 
principles was deemed to play a principal role in legal reasoning. In the 
chapters of usul ai; figh which explained the rules for reasoning used when 
dealing with the Qur'an and traditions, rhetorical considerations 
constituted the major part of the discussion. 67 
Theological problems and legal philosophy are also treated in 
most of the books on usul al figh although not mentioned by al-Shafi'i in 
the Risalah. The determination of good and evil, the relationship between 
reason and revelation, the qualifications of acts before the advent of 
revelation, the imposition of responsibility or obligation beyond one's 
65 Al-Risalah, paras. 179-235. 
To see how al-Shall'! emphasises the importance of Arabic language in legal 
interpretation, see ibid., paras. 143-178. 
66 Al-Jassas, Usul, vol. 1, passim ; al-Mustas/a , vol. 1. pp. 
318-364. 
67 Modaressi. "Some recent analyses of the concept of majaz in Islamic 
jurisprudence". in JAOS . vol. 106,1986, p. 787 (cited after as "May= "). 
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capacity are among the theological problems which have been frequently 
discussed by the jurists. 68 
All these are tools to be used by the jurists in understanding legal 
provisions especially in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Therefore, linguistics, 
theology and rhetoric are used in usul al figh works in order that every 
argument has a proper basis. However, the major concern of usul al figh 
is in relation to the sources or the bases of law such as the Qur'an, the 
Sunnah, yma' and giyas. The jurists also discuss the authority of other 
principles which are not fully approved by the jurists such as masalih 
mursalah, istihsan, istishab, 'amal, sadd al-dharaV , 'urf , etc. 
THE FUNCTIONS OF US UL AUFIQH 
Ideally, "the goal of Muslim jurisprudence was to reach an 
understanding (fiqh) of the Shari `ah. Its primary task, therefore, was to 
formulate the principles or sources (usul) from which such an 
understanding might be achieved". 69 That is to say, the main objective of 
usul al-figh was to lay down a coherent system of principles through which 
a qualified jurist could extract case decisions. From the third century 
onwards this was universally recognized by the jurists to be the sacred 
purpose of usul at-iqh. This is ordinarily stated at the beginning of usul 
works. 70 
68 Hurgronje, Selected Works, p. 287 ; Makdist, "Juridical neology'. p. 16. 
69 Coulson. Conflicts, p. 3. See also F. Rahm-an, Islam, p. 115. 
70 See al-Luma'. p. 4; al-Mustasfa, vol. 1, p. 5; al-Amidi . al-IFjkam, vol. 1, 
p. 6. 
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According to one scholar, discovering the law of God through a 
highly systematic and logically sophisticated methodology was therefore 
considered by Muslims the primary if not the only function of legal theory. 
Theorists have repeatedly declared that in effect this function is the raison 
d'etre of usul al figh 71, whilst continuing to assert that assigning this role 
to usul al figh was indeed justified by the very fact that events are endless 
and new problems that require solutions may arise at any moment. 72 
Professor Badran, in another perspective, has outlined the 
functions of usui al figh as follows: 73 
(1) to use its principles and its general rules which are based on textual 
proofs in order that the individual cases have proper Shari'ah values. 
(2) to realise the bases upon which legal values are formulated and to 
realise the objectives of their implication. 
(3) to be able to derive correctly legal rulings through giyas or other 
methods of ytihad for cases whose rules are not textually available. 
(4) to understand the methods of deriving legal rulings employed by earlier 
scholars and to compare their opinions on the case at issue and hence, to 
give preference to the opinion showing stronger proof. 
In short, usul al-figh principally aims at discussing legal evidence 
that forms the basis of figh, in so far as they may be used as evidence for 
the establishment of legal rulings for legal cases. It does not discuss, 
however, what the legal rulings are in particular cases, that being the 
71 Hallaq, "Considerations on the function and character of sunni legal 
theory ", in JAOS, vol. 104,1984, p. 681. (cited after as "Considerations") 
72 Ibid. 
73 Badran, Usu1. p. 37. 
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function of ftgh. If it does, it is merely an explanatory note of how legal 
rulings are constructed from legal evidence. 
THE CONTENTS AND STRUCTURE OF USUL AL-FIQH. 
Having established now that many early scholars had already 
dealt with one or another subject of usul ai figh, it must be noted that the 
contents as well as the organization of these early works were not so highly 
detailed and organised as in the later works. This is indeed a natural 
phenomenon of every new and fresh effort in terms of literature74 (as well 
as in other fields of life). 
Al-Shafi'i's Risalah, the first systematic book on usul ai-figh, 
marked the beginning of a particular structure of usui al fcgh. Al-Shafi'i 
in his initial chapter. introduces some general terms which call for 
clarification such as 'ilm (knowledge), bayan (elucidation) and 'adalah. He 
then proceeds to elaborate in terms of the perspectives of the meanings of 
these terms. The second part of his Risalah concerns the discussion of 
the Qur'an as a major source for Islamic law together with the technical 
meanings of exegetical terms such as general, particular, explicit, 
implicit, abrogation and so on. The following part deals with the 
authority of the Sunnah followed by the discussion of the other 'sources' 
74 Jalal al-Din, al-Qadi al-Baydawi, p. 295. 
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such as jjma`, qiyas, gtihad and istihsan. 75 It is readily acknowledged that 
no theological problems are discussed in the Risalah. 76 
However, the later achievement in usul al figh bears testimony to 
a considerable difference between it and that of the early scholars in terms 
of content and structure. It is obvious that the latter works are often 
loaded with too much Ah or kalam, or logic or grammar, depending on the 
special interest of the individual author. 77 A detailed analysis of the 
contents of usul al-figh discussions throughout the centuries reveals that 
the contents of usul al-fcgh were developing. Al-Jassas's (d. 370 A. H. ) 
treatise for instance, entitled Usul al-Jassas, is the first known to us 
that provides a new stage in the rationalistic explanation of usul at-figL78 
Moreover, his book is full of linguistic considerations which make it quite 
different from earlier works. 
On the whole, the contents and stucture of usul aI figh were not 
fixed rigidly but were constantly developing. Though the Risalah covers 
several main subjects, its contents are not so well organised in comparison 
with those of the later works particularly of al-Jassas. Similarly well 
organised contents were followed by other leading jurists like al-Shirazi (d. 
75 This summary is taken from Ahmad Yusuf, al-Shaf'i, pp. 39-46; Khadduri, 
Islamic Jurisprudence, pp. 28-32. 
76 Mention should be made that aI-Risalah did not mention any theological 
problem except in the discussion of analogy (paras. 1327ff. particularly para. 
1332) where al-Shafi'i raised a question common to the theologians that is 
whether a jurist is required to arrive at actual (batinan) or only at an apparent 
truth (gahiran) as far as the result of legal reasoning is concerned. 
77 See Hallaq. "L sul al figh ", pp. 179-181. 
78 Remand. "Hanafi usul al-ftgh through a manuscript of al-Jagsas ", in 
JAOS, vol. 105,1985, pp. 623,634 (cited after as " Hanafi usul al figh') 
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476 A. H. ), al-Juwayni (d. 478 A. H. ), al-Bazdawi (d. 483 A. H. ) and al- 
Sarakhsi (d. 490 A. H. ). 79 
Following these developments, the celebrated Shafi'i jurist, al- 
Ghaz li (d. 505 A. H. ) then, organised the contents of usul al figh in a 
more satisfactory manner and consequently his structure has been 
generally adopted by most modern scholars in their writings. 80 It is 
interesting to recall what he said about his book, al-Mustafa, particularly 
of its distinct structure. ".... I composed my book in such a manner as to 
allow all those reading it for the first time to understand (from the very 
beginning) the whole contents of the book because when someone cannot 
understand it from the very beginning, he certainly will not continue 
reading". 81 
It should be noted also that most of the works of Western 
authorship on this subject are, broadly speaking, primarily concerned with 
the history of jurisprudence whereas the judicial subject-matter of usul a1- 
jIqh does not receive the same level of attention as is given to its historical 
development. 82 Muslim writers tend, however, to treat the historical 
development of usul al-figh separately from usul ai 'tqh itself in a discipline 
known as Tarikh al-Tashri'. 83 
79 'Atiyyah, al-Tani it al-Fighi, p. 44. 
80 Jalal al-Din, al-Qadi al-Baydawi, p. 302. 
81 AI-Mustas a, vol. 1. p. 4. 
82 Kamal i, Islamic Ju isprudence , pp. xii-xiii. 
83 Ibid. For an account of such a tendency, see the following: 
a. al-Nubhan, at-Madkhal ila al-Tashri' al-Islami : Nash'atuhu, 
Adwaruhu al- TarikFryyah, Mtastagbaluhu. Beirut, 1981, pp. 342-402. 
b. al-Qattan, al-Tashri' wa al-FYgh al-Islami : Tarikhan wa Manhafan. 
Beirut, 1985. pp. 331-335. 
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To be brief, I shall outline the dominant structure adopted 
in usul literature with special reference to the contemporary works on this 
subject particularly by Muslims. 84 The contents of usul are divided into 
four main sections or chapters. The first chapter usually deals with the 
concept of the hukm and related discussions such as al-hakim, al-mahkum 
'alayhi and al-mahkum fi hi. The second chapter concentrates on the 
sources of law irrespective of whether they are fully accepted or not. 
Whilst the third chapter concerns the methods of interpretation of rules 
from the sources discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter, 
therefore, provides a set of methods to be followed in interpreting the rules 
systematically. The issues of ytihad, taqlid, noskh, tarj i h, etc., are usually 
discussed in the last chapter of books on usul al figh 
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO DOCUMENTING USUL AL-FIQH. 
In his Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldun (d. 808 A. H. ) differentiates 
between two kinds of writings on usul al-figh. ß5 The first includes works 
written by theologians and then identified as the method of the 
theologians or mutakallimun. Works written by the jurists, on the other 
hand, are known as the method of the jurists (fugaha' ). 
This classification has been eventually accepted by most of the 
modem scholars. 86 George Makdisi, however, considers this classification 
as incorrect for two reasons. One error consists in characterizing such 
84 See for example Abu Zahrah, Usua ; Khallaf, Usu 1; Zuhayr, Usus 
85 A1-Mugaddimah, vol. 3, p. 28. See also Kashf a! =Zunun. vol. 1. pp. 110-111; 
al-Dasuq i, "al- jtihad", p. 1106. 
86 See for example, Hitu , Introduction to at-Mankh. ul, pp. 6-12. 
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works as belonging to one of two categories; the usui of the Shafi'is or the 
usul of the Hanafis and the other problem (the major error) lies with the 
listing of al-Shafi'i and his Risalah at the head of a category entitled 'the 
method of the mutakallimun '. 87 This is because usul alu gh, as originally 
conceived by al-Shafi'i, is a juridical theology, a study of God's law, as 
distinguished from kalam, the study of God Himself ; it is a study of God's 
commands and prohibitions, not of whether God is or what He is. 88 
In response to what has been said by Makdisi, we may say that 
although al-Shafi'i disagreed with the 'ilm kalam, his method of writing 
was an abstract and rational method as adopted by the theologians after 
him. 89 On this basis, one may see that the classification made by Ibn 
Khaldun and modern writers was basically confined to the written 
approach and not to the theological consideration. 90 For this reason, the 
first mode of writing is also well known, apart from the method of the 
Shafi'is, as the method of the mutakallimun for both of them adopt the 
same mode of writing which is abstract and rational. 
87 Makdtsi. "Juridical Theology". p. 42. 
88 Ibid., pp. 43-44. 
Al-Shafi'i's significant statement to the theologians appears in the khutbah, 
introduction, to his Risalah (para. 3) which reads as follows: 
"Praise be to God.... those who describe Him cannot attain to the utmost of 
His greatness. which is as He has described himself (in the Qur'an) and above 
what His creatures can attribute to Him". Al-Shaii'i, in contrast to alt al- 
kalam 
. accepts God's own description of Himself, His own attributes as He 
himself has revealed them in His book and through His Messenger. 
89 See Abu Zahrah, al-Shafi'i, p. 48. 
90 Khali fah, Manahy. p. 11. 
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A. The Method of the Mutakaiiimun 
This method is identified as a purely theoretical method and thus 
not influenced by any derivative (furze') rules. 91 According to this method, 
the principles of Ah i. e. usul al-figh must be based on logical and rational 
argument and supported by sound evidence. Whether these principles are 
against pre-determined branch rules or not, does not affect the 
establishment of a particular principle or asl (singular of usuO. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that a particular principle, established by one jurist, 
perhaps even a leading one, has been openly argued by another jurist who 
equally based his writing on his personal rational argument rather than by 
adhering to what has been established in the books of figh. Al-Shafi'i for 
instance, opines that neither the Qur'an abrogates the Sunnah nor the 
Sunnah the Qur'an but al-Ghazali, who is also one of the Shafi'is, on the 
contrary, argues that abrogation between them is not only valid but has 
also actually taken place. 92 
Al-Shafi'i adopted this method in the writing of his Risalah. It is 
obvious that many scholars, whatever their school of law, have followed 
the same method in their writings. Thus, this is the method followed by 
the majority of jurists, simply called the jumhur. 93 Many works have been 
carried out in accordance with this method94 but as remarked by Ibn 
91A1-Mugaddimah, vol. 3. p. 28 ; Badran, Usul, p. 15 : al-'Alwani, Usul. pp. 
54-55: al-Hakim, al-Usul, p. 84 ; Abu Zahrah, Usul, pp. 18-19. 
92 Al-Risalah, para. 314 ; al-MustasJa , vol. 1, p. 124. 
93 Al-Mugaddimah, vol. 3, p. 28; al-'Alwani, Usul. p. 54 ; Jalal al-Din, a[- 
Q' ad i at-Baydaw i, p. 298. 
94 For the list, see al-Mugaddimah, vol. 3, pp. 28-29 ; Badran. Us4 pp. 15-16 
Hitu, Introduction to at-Mankhut. pp. 6-11. 
28 
Khaldun, there are four treatises, in the kalam-oriented qýs-ul al figh which 
became the cornerstone of later writings or the most influential works as 
follows: 95 
(1)Al-'Umd / al-'Ahd of al-Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar (d. 415 A. H. ) 
(2)Al-Mu'tamad of Abu al-Husayn al-Basri (d. 436 A. H. ) 
(3)A1-Burhan of Imam a1-Haramayn al-Juwayni (d. 478 A. H. ) and 
(4)Al Mustasfa of al-Ghazali (d. 505 A. H. ) 
These four books became the starting point for later scholars of usul al figh, 
and many commentaries and abridgements have been composed based on 
these works. 
B. The Method of the Jurists. 
This method, as opposed to the method of the mutakallimun, is 
chiefly based on observing and extracting cases of figh as proof for the 
reliability of a particular principle(asl). 96 This deductive approach is 
mainly attributed to the Hanafis therefore, known as the method of the 
Hanafis. 97 One might ask why the Hanafis committed themselves to this 
method and not to another. This is mainly due to the nature of the 
Hanafi school of law. We know that leading Hanafi jurists, including Abu 
Hani fah himself, left no systematic book on the theory of sources or usul 
al-figh as did al-Shafi'i. Instead, they left a number of books that are full 
of cases of figh containing the opinion of Hanafi leading jurists such as 
95 Al-Mugaddimah, vol. 3. pp. 28-29. See also Aghnides. Theories, p. 173 
Hitu, introduction to al-Mankhul. p. 9. 
96 Al-Mugaddimah, vol. 3, p. 28; Hi tu, introduction to al-Mankhul. p. 7; al- 
Mansur, Usut p. 44. 
97 Badran, Usul, p. 17 ; al-Hakim, al-Usut, pp. 83-84 ; Jalal al-Din, al-Qadi 
alBaydawi, p. 304. 
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Abu Hanifah, Abu Yusuf, al-Shaybani, Zufar, etc. Hence, the later Hanafi 
jurists have little choice but to establish principles and theories of sources 
by observing cases pre-determined by their imams. In consequence, 
principles of figh in Hanafi school of law are formulated in the light of its 
applicability to relevant cases where cases are the proof of the rationality of 
a particular principle. 98 This attitude is most evident in their long- 
standing argument on the validity of a particular principle by saying, 'This 
is indicated by a number of rules pre-determined by our imams ". 99 
Naturally, cases of law are often discussed in order to justify the soundness 
of a particular principle. Consequently, many of the principles are no 
longer valid when these principles are not supported by what has been 
determined in figh. 100 
Professor Badran points out an excellent example of this. In 
principle, the Hanafis had opined that a word, though it is a mushtarak, 
has no authority to carry both literal and metaphorical meanings. It must 
refer to just one of them. In their ftgh they found however, two contrary 
fatawa. First, one is not permitted to marry those women with whom 
one's father had sex by relying on Qur'an (4 : 22), "And marry not those 
whom your fathers married (ma nakaha aba. 'ukum )". On this occasion, the 
word nikah refers to sexual intercourse. Another fatwa is found in their 
Ah indicating that a marriage is also invalid with those women with whom 
one's father had made a contract ('aqd) even without having any sex. 
98 Khal i fah, Manatdj. p. 15 ; Badran. Usul, p. 17 
99 See Usul al-Bazdawi on the margin of Kashf, vol. 1. p. 291 ; al-Sarakhsi, 
Usul, vol. 1, pp. 241-243. 
100 Badran, Usul, p. 17. 
Al-Hakim observes that this method is more directed towards a historical 
study rather than rational discussion. (al-Usul, p. 83) 
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Here, nikah according to the Hanafis, means marriage metaphorically. 
Thus, the word nikah comes to denote both sexual intercourse and a legal 
contract. Accordingly, the earlier principle must be altered to the following 
"A word may refer to both meanings i. e. hagiqah and majaz when it is 
mushtarak provided that this word is found in a negative statement 
(siyaq al-nafi )", 101 as is the case in the Qur'anic verse cited above. 
Some of the well known jurists who adopted this method102 are 
the following: 
(1) Al-Karkhi (d. 340 A. H. ) who wrote a book called Usul al-Karkhi. 
(2)Al-Jassas (d. 370 A. H. ) who wrote a book known as Usul al-Jassas. 
(3)Al-Sarakhsi (d. 490 A. H. ) who wrote a book called Usul al-Sarakhsi. 
It should be noted that there are scholars from other schools of law who 
have followed this method. They included Imam al-Qarafi al-Maliki (d. 
684 A. H. ) in his "Tangih al-Fl sul fi 'Em al-Us-Us" and Imam al-Isnawi al- 
Shafi'i (d. 777 A. H. ) in his "al-Tamhid fi Takluij at- F1uu' ala al-Usul ". 103 
C. The Combination Method 
Apart from these two methods, another approach is adopted by 
the jurists in their writings on usul al-figh. Some jurists have attempted to 
combine these two afore-mentioned methods, namely the theologian's and 
the jurist's methods into an integrated method. 104 This has influenced the 
works of both the Shafi'is and the Hanafis as well as the jurists of the 
later period. 
101 Ibid. (note no. 1) 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
, p. 18. 
104 Ibid., p. 18. 
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Badi' al-Nizam al Jami' bayn Usui al-Bazdawi wa al-Ihkam by 
Imam Muzaffar al-Din al-Sa'ati (d. 694 A. H. ), al-Tangih and commentary 
al-Tawdih, written by the same person, i. e. Sadr al-Shari'ah (d. 747 A. H. ) 
and Jam' ai Jawami' by al-Subki (d. 771 A. H. ) are among the works based 
on this method. 105 This sort of writing has, to a certain extent, dominated 
the modem writings on usul al figh as evident in the currently available 
works on this subject. 
THE TREATMENT OF TA`ARUD AND TARJIH IN USUL LITERATURE. 
In general, we have no definite knowledge of how and when 
ta'aruci and tarj ih were treated for the first time as a technical term in 
usul al figh. Even al-ShafiTs Risalah, as the first systematic book on usul, 
did not include a chapter called "al-ta'arud wa al-tarjih" or any other title 
similar to this. 106 Like the Risalah, the Mu'tamad which is the first 
independent and comprehensive work available on usul at-figh after the 
Risalah, has no special chapter entitled "al-ta'arud wa al-tarjih'. However, 
to the best of my knowledge, the earliest reference to tarj i h. with a 
considerable section of discussion is in the Burhan of al-JuwaynT 
(d. 478 A. H. ), one of the leading Shafi'i jurists. 107 This conclusion may 
be taken as valid until some evidence to the contrary comes to hand for 
many usul manuscripts remain unpublished. 
105 Ibid., p. 19. 
106 Al-San'ani for example, has used the term tashih as equal to tarjilj. 
(Ijabah, p. 417) 
107 See al-Burhan, vol. 2. pp. 1142-1292. 
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The above illustration does indeed raise at least two points to be 
closely considered. Firstly, we have seen that the terminological aspect 
was adopted as the determining point to judge whether a particular idea is 
established at a particular time or not. In other words, the absence of the 
"term" was used to argue that the concept which is later attributed to that 
"term" was also absent or was not in use. 
Nevertheless, as is readily acknowledged, the existence of any 
science including tad ih which is part of usul al figh, cannot be determined 
or judged on the basis of the use of the specific term, since it does not 
apply to the early period of literature. 108 To this effect, as shown before, 
the scholars, though they knew that the Risalah does not carry the specific 
term usul al figh, still held that al-Shafi'T was the father of usul al Ah 
and acknowledged his book as the first systematic work on usul al flgh. 
This was mainly motivated by the fact that the subject matter of usul alfigh 
seemed to be well established in the Risalah to the effect that no one 
cannot fail to notice the nature of the discussion embodied in the Risalah. 
Accordingly, one should try to trace the treElment of ta'arud and 
tarj'ih in the early usulliterature by considering, instead of the 
terminological aspect, the conceptual meaning of ta'arud and tarjih 
which is the preference of one piece of evidence over the other when they 
conflict. By doing so, one can clearly see, as will become evident later, 
that ta'arud as well as tarj ih already occupied a significant place in the 
discussion in usui literature, even before the appearance of the Risalah 109 
108 An_*ari, " Islamic Juristic" 
, pp. 255.299. See also Fitzgerald, "Nature 
and sources of the Shari'a", in Law in the Middle East, ed. M. Khadduri And 
H. J. Liebesny, Washington, 1955, p. 90 (cited after as " Sources") 
109 See for example, Abu Yusuf. at-Radd, passim. 
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By the time al-Shafi'i appeared, much work had already been 
done on ta'arud and tarj i h. Apart from his long discussion on Islamic 
legal theory, ranging from linguistic consideration to personal reasoning in 
the Risalah, his encyclopaedic work i. e. Kitab al-Umm, preserves a number 
of treatises such as Ikhtilaf al-Hadith, Ikhtilaf Malik wa al-Shäfi'i, etc., that 
are full of instances of ta'arud and tarjih. Not only that, he also provides 
reasons for the superiority of a particular piece of argument. For example, 
in the case where more than one tradition is reported concerning 
tashahhud, al-Shafi'i declares his preference for the one reported on the 
authority of Ibn 'Abbas, saying that it contains more words (i. e. al- 
mubaralmt) than the other version thus implying that it is the most 
complete one. I 10 Hence, it is not surprising that Schacht outlined one of 
al-Shafi'i's personal achievements in legal theory as consisting of the 
hierarchical ordering of the four sources of law. "l This achievement is 
related partly, if not wholly, to the phenomenon of ta'arud and tarjih 
in one way or another. 
As for al-Mu'tamad, though it did not contain a specific 
chapter on ta'arud and tarj ih as later introduced in most of the subsequent 
literature, there are many instances where ta'arud and tarjih have been 
treated well in the light of usul al figh. In the "Book of judicial giyas "112, 
al-Basra discussed preference in cases of giyas contradiction and he 
110 Al-Risalah, paras. 737-757 particularly para. 757 ; idem, Ikhtilaf al-faditk 
p. 489. Cf. Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Ggawa'id, pp. 41-42. 
Regarding taijih in the writings of al-ShafiI, see M. Husam al-Din, "FYgh al- 
khilaf, in MA, vol. 64.1991. pp. 497-500. 
111 Origins, p. 134. 
112 AI-Mu'tarrmad, vol. 2. pp. 1031-1050. 
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named his discussion "a chapter concerning the preponderance of causes 
and a section concerning the preponderance of qiyas ". 113 In addition, he 
has dealt with the subject in a chapter called "contradictory traditions" 
followed by another chapter immediately following called 'bases on which 
one of two contradictory traditions prevails". ' 14 These works show that 
ta'arud and tarj ih have been dealt with in the Mu'tamad on occasions 
which naturally involved conflict and as a result, tarjih is frequently 
employed to support one of two conflicting pieces of evidence. The 
treatment of ta'arud and tarj ih in this way can also be traced in other usul 
works even before al-Juwayni's al-Burhan, such as in al-Shirazi's (d. 476 
A. H. ) al-Luma' ft Usul al-Figh. 115 
From the fore-going study, we can suggest that tarj ih was treated 
in two ways before it came to be finally entitled to a whole special chapter. 
In the earliest period of the literature particularly in the Risalah, tarjih is 
merely found as a concept of preference, having no special chapter or at 
least, section which deals with tarjih. The works of al-Basra and al- 
Shirazi also represented this sort of tarjih treatment in usul literature. 
In the following period, tarj ih is discussed in a "book"(kitab) or at least in 
a section (fasl) instead of being discussed under no special title, which 
suggests that the subject matter has developed and gained a special 
consideration amongst the jurists. 
The second observation is that tar i h, particularly from the 
sixth century of the Hijrah onwards, was never treated as a single 
phenomenon but always discussed together with the phenomenon of legal 
113 Ibid. pp. 1040.1047. 
114 Ibid., pp. 672-688. 
115 AI-Luma', pp. 49-50,69-70. 
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conflict in the so-called "chapters on al-ta'arud wa al-tarj ih ". 116 This 
form of treatment was adopted by most of the modern scholars who wrote 
on usuL 117 This may be due to the intimacy of the relationship between 
ta'arud and tar ft h to the extent that without the one, the other is 
incomplete if discussed. 
Wahbah al-Zuhayli ,a contemporary 
Muslim jurist.. 118 has 
offered a valuable observation regarding the treatment of tarjih in usul 
literature. He observes that some of the jurists have placed tarjilj 
discussion before the problem of ytihad and taqlid but after the 
discussion of legal evidence. They do so because they might think that 
tarj ih is more applicable to legal evidence since the evidence is 
overwhelmingly speculative. By contrast, the vast majority of writers on 
usul have treated the question of tarjih after the chapter on ijtihad 
which hints that only a mujtahid can undertake the task of removing any 
legal conflicts. Having supported the second treatment of tarjih, al- 
Zuhayli asserts that this type of organisation is more consistent with the 
fact that conflict is merely apparent and not actually intended by the Law 
giver. In short, it shows that tarj ih is nothing more than an attempt to 
remove an apparent conflict between two pieces of evidence by employing 
legal reasoning or ytihad. Accordingly, as will be shown later, a murajjih 
has to be a mujtahid. 
116 See for example al-Mustasfa, vol. 2. pp. 392-407: al-Taw¢ih, vol. 2. pp. 
205-236. 
117 See for example Abu Zahrah, Usu1, pp. 308-314 ; Zaydan. al-Wajiz, pp. 
393-398 ; Khallaf, Us tel. pp. 229-232. 
118 Al-Zuhayl i, Usul, vol. 2, p. 1171. See also 'Iwad, Dirasati p. 5. 
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Mention should be made that although tar ih is frequently 
treated under a special heading or chapter, the relevant discussions and 
informations about it, together with examples, are available in detail only 
throughout the contents of usul books and not exclusively presented in 
one particular chapter. Accordingly, one might easily notice many 
fundamental principles or methods of tarj ih in that particular chapter but 
they are lacking in terms of an adequate and satisfactory explanation and 
example. Methods like hagiqah prevailing over majaz, or a Sahitý. 
tradition being superior to hasan or da'if traditions, are briefly 
mentioned without detailed arguments and instances. As suggested above, 
the details of conflict and tarj ih in these two areas are obtainable only in 
chapters concerning hagiqah-majaz and isnad respectively. Thus, the more 
we familiarise ourselves with the whole discussion of usul al figh, the more 
we learn of the details regarding tarj i h. l l9 Relatively speaking, however, 
among classical books, I agree with the opinion that regards al-Amidi's al- 
Ihkam, as the most comprehensive and organised work adequately to 
discuss the so-called conflict and tarj ih in Islamic legal theory. 120 
Tarj i h, on the other hand, has also been treated in another way 
and in another field of discipline e. g. in hadith criticism. 121 In this area 
of study, it is considered a major part of hadith criticism which aims at 
distinguishing the reliable from the unreliable traditions by examining, 
among other things, the transmitter's qualification. For example, a hadith 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. 
As far as al-Amidi is concerned, he has listed more than 180 methods of 
tarjih relevant to the entire discussion of conflict in usul alfcgh, (al-Ihkam. 
vol. 3, pp. 256-295) 
121 pl-9asimi, Qawa'id, passim, particularly pp. 313-314. 
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whose transmitters are recognized as 'adl is accepted while a hadith with 
an opposite character of transmitters is rejected, especially in cases of 
contradiction. 122 To this effect, the study of hadith criticism seems to 
cover part of tarj ih methodology especially in Sunnah contradiction with 
special reference to isnad. 123 Hence, one should take this into 
consideration in an attempt to trace when and how tarj i th is treated in 
usul literature since the study of such is also applicable to our present 
study because it offers several methodologies of hadith preference based on 
isnad. 
In another perspective, tarj ih has not only been treated 
in pure usul literature but also in the field of positive law (fur-u') designed 
as a comparative study of madhahib. This study is known at the present 
time as fiqh muqaran. 124 Obviously, each of the works has to indicate a 
bias for one particular legal view when there is more than one reported 
view on the subject. The preferred opinion often belongs to the author's 
school of law and very rarely to another contrary point of view outside his 
madhhab. As far as tail ih between madhahib is concerned in fiqh mugaran, 
the methodology of tarj ih appears to merit remarkable consideration 
throughout the study since one is unable to express a preference unless 
provided with the proper basis to do so. Ibn Khaldun rightly remarks that 
"the disputation clarified the sources of the authorities as well as the 
motives of their differences". 125 Apart from fiqh mugaran, tarjiis' 
122 Ibid. 
123 Chapter five will be fully devoted to examining ta. rjih methodology in isnad 
conflict. 
124 For example, see al-Zuhayli, al-Flgh, passim. 
125 Al-Mugaddimah, vol. 3. p. 31. See also Tangih, p. 419; M. Husam al-Din, 
"F iigh al-Khilaf, pp. 500-501. 
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methodology can be easily found in two other fields of study namely tafs ir 
ayat al-abkam and sharp ahadith al-abkam. 
I believe that a brief account on the topic enables us to 
note that tad ih was established, in written works, from the very beginning 
of Islamic literature not only in those works restricted to uuul study but 
also in other disciplines which deal with whatever contradiction was 
said to occur in the Shari 'ah. It was only at a later stage of Islamic 
literature that tarj ih together with ta'arud was treated more systematically. 
The present study is a further attempt to re-examine the methodological 
aspect of tarj ih in Islamic legal theory by considering first with particular 
emphasis, the causes that make legal rulings contradictory before 
commencing the task of assigning superiority to one over the other. 
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CHAFFER ONE 
PAFFT B9 
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
The only guidance for Muslims is the Shari'ah (literally the path to 
the watering place); the sacred revealed law of Islam. It is the command of 
Allah, revealed to the Prophet. This means that Allah is the actual legislator, 
who. revealed the Shari'ah. ' This revelation determines the norms and basic 
concepts of Shari'ah. To be successful in this life and Hereafter, one is obliged 
to fulfil all the obligations, and in turn to refrain from all the prohibitions laid 
down by the Shari'ah. 2 In a further step, to understand the Shari 'ah, the 
knowledge of usul al-figh is a prerequisite. Thus, in order to identify God's will, 
His command and the precise formulation of His law, one must confine oneself 
to what is known as usul al figh or Islamic legal theory. It is the latter that 
explains to Muslims whether an action is approved or not. Above all, its major 
function is to govern how legal rulings should be extracted from legal sources. 3 
Every single Muslim believes that Allah, the Most Knowledgeable, is 
the only one who revealed the Shari `ah. No other 'elements' co-operated with 
Him in establishing and enjoining the Shari'ah on mankind. In other words, 
the Creator, the Almighty Allah shares his absolute power with no one. One 
who believes in another way is unanimously regarded to be against the 
fundamental principles of Islamic belief or Iman. 4 Since the actual Legislator 
I Coulson, A History, p. 20 ; Idem, Conflict, p. 1; Fitzgerald, 'The alleged debt of Islamic 
to Roman law', in LgR, vol. 67.1951, p. 82. 
2 Burton, The Sources, p. 11. 
3 El 1, vol. 4, p. 1055. 
4 Coulson, Conflicts, p. 1; Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 1. 
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is only Allah, conflict or contradiction in His law is unimaginable and 
unacceptable. In turn, figh should be one and there should be no discrepancy 
in it other than in minor details. In other words, it is impossible that one case 
would have more than one rule, since the law was extracted from one source 
namely the Shari'ah. To this effect, Allah has said in Q. 4: 82; "Will they not 
then ponder on the Qur'an ? If it had been from other than Allah they would 
have found therein much incongruity". 5 
However, it remains surprising that the majority of cases in Islamic 
law have more than one legal rule and this is not only common in the present 
time but also in the early Islamic literature or even during the Companion 
periods Nowadays, a Muslim, particularly a mugallid Muslim, can easily find 
himself in a deep problem when reading the first page of a book on fiqh. He 
certainly will encounter conflicting views on a single case in his own madhhab, 
as is the case when he attempts to read a book of figh which contains more 
than one madhhab's legal view i. e. Ah muqaran, for then the conflict is wider 
and greater. Hence, any student of figh is aware of the existence of these 
disagreements. 
The above illustration may confuse some students of Islamic law. As 
we may know, conflict of law cannot be referred to j'cgh itself because the Ah 
is built upon certain principles called usul al; Iqh The figh is only the product 
of the latter. Its conflict or even its unity is mainly due to the principles which 
5 Allmad Fahmi Abu Sinnah, "Min figh al-Kitab wa al-Sunnah', in MA. vol. 63.1990, p. 29. 
Concerning this particular verse, al-Tabari has recorded the remark of Ibn Zayd who says 
that the contents of the Qur'an do not contradict each other (for the conflict) is merely due 
to the ignorance and the lack of human ability. (Jami. vol. 5, p. 179f. ) 
6 See e. g. al-Tabari, Ikhtilaf, passim. 
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govern the methods of interpretation. In short, usul al figh is the element 
responsible for making figh contradictory.? Naturally and simultaneously, the 
present work is an attempt to tackle this problem based exclusively on the 
discipline of usul al-figh from which the conflicts come to exist. 
The first task of the present study is to explain in great detail how 
legal disagreements occur in the body of Islamic law. Since all the causes of 
legal disagreement, as we shall see, can be summarised as the conflict of 
sources or elements of evidence8, I shall place particular emphasis on that 
specific question throughout the work. 
Not only that, I also wish to examine some of the methodology of 
tad ih as one of the legal solutions adopted by the jurists to remove conflict of 
law. No doubt a discussion of the phenomenon of ta'arud, followed by an 
examination of the methodology of tarjih would be unwieldly in scope. There 
are many methodologies which are prominent but I wish to examine only some 
that are of primary importance. This limitation will be personal in 
consideration. 
To do so, I will concentrate my discussion on the reliability of every 
single method or procedure used by each school of law or jurist in order to 
make its or his legal opinion "weightier" than the others i. e. preferable. This 
means every preference will be extensively examined in the light of purely 
rational argument which is not influenced by any derivative rules called furze`. 
7 AL-MankhuL p. 3. 
8 See page 89. 
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By this, only that which is supported by sound evidence will be proposed as an 
applicable method of tad ih to appropriate cases of conflict. 
It is certain that in the course of conflict, the competition between 
Islamic schools of law and pressures to adhere to the legal rulings and legal 
sources of one of the established schools of law is obvious. Accordingly, most 
scholars adhere to the legal sources as well as to the legal rulings of the school 
they follow. In other words, it was an extremely common practice of the 
ancient schools that whenever two pieces of evidence contradicted each other, 
the one adopted by them was said to be "more reliable". 9 However, it Is very 
rare, I believe, that a jurist, when giving preference to a particular evidence or 
legal ruling over the other argues on the ground that it is the one that his 
school of law adheres to. He often argues and attempts to prove that his legal 
opinion and his madhhab's methodology is the most reliable and well- 
founded way of extracting the law. It is quite clear that each of the opposing 
groups would claim to be on the right side, which may however, turn out wrong 
and vice-versa. Nevertheless, arguments and counter arguments in this regard, 
would offer a considerable potential source for the study of the methodology of 
tarjih. 1o 
The present study does not intend to consider preference on the basis 
of madhhab influence as genuine and solid. I l Only what is proved to be the 
9 See Bataina, "Islamic methodology; an approach to flqh", in Islam Today, vol. 
5. July. 1987, p. 62. 
10 See al-Misri, a1-Khüaf, pp. 80-83; Jalal al-Din, al-Qa¢i al-Baycawi, p. 277. 
11 Even, if we decide to regard a particular school of law as more reliable e. g. 
the Shaff i school of law, the problem remains as legal opinion within one 
school is not always the same especially when it has adherents of different 
regions. The Shafi'is in Arabia and East Africa, for example, prefer the 
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most reliable method of preference is taken into account. In doing so, I have 
restricted myself to a discussion which carries a genuine conflict and a sound 
preference. On the whole, this study attempts to provide the methodology by 
which one can determine which, of two conflicting pieces of evidence, is most 
worthy of approval and which of the two interpretations is closer to that which 
is intended by the Lawgiver. 
I have concluded, it seems to me, that legal disagreements arise 
mainly from the variety of interpretations and are not originally intended by 
the Shari `ah. Conflict is due to the varying abilities amongst those who 
interpreted the law. 12 An attempt at tadih, in the present study, is similarly 
based upon my personal point of view. Thus, any preference proposed here is 
not a final or a clear cut conclusion to the extent that it excludes further 
argument or re-consideration. However, it must be kept in mind that every 
conclusion made here has been formulated from a great deal of detailed study 
such that it is the most likely or the most probable method of preference as 
far as I am concerned. Finally, I remain hopeful that this work can fill the gap 
left by other writers by presenting most, if not all, of legal conflicts together 
with "how to prefer" in one exclusive study. It is hoped that at the end of the 
thesis, some tentative, if not proper, methods can be formulated as far as 
tarjih is concerned in all cases of conflict in Islamic legal theory. 
commentary on al-Nawawi's Minhaj al-Talibis. written by Ibn Hajr while those 
in the East prefer al-Ramli's commentary. ( Snouck Hurgronje, Verspreide 
Geschrt en. vol. 3. p. 387f. cited from de Bellefonds, " The formal Sources". IS, 
vol. 15, pp. 191-192). The same would apply to other schools of law. (at- 
Mugaddimah, vol. 3, p. 15) 
12 Zaydan, al-Khilaf, pp. 277-280,301. 
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NEED FOR THE WORK 
Despite the great interest shown in usul al-figh, whether by modern 
Arabic or Western scholars, no specific or systematic work dealing with this 
crucial aspect has been carried out. I know of many works that treat the 
phenomenon of conflict and the methodology of tar, j ih, but not in an in-depth 
manner and not systematically. Hence one can find these works in usul 
literature or figh and also in books of tafs ir or ahadi th or in others which 
have some information on how the scholars removed the conflict in their 
respective studies. A few systematic books, however, have emphasised legal 
conflict but instead of tarjih, other legal solutions are examined such as ta'wil 
and naskh. 13 Moreover, their discussions are confined to only one particular 
area of conflict e. g. conflict of matn or in particular, conflict of isnads. The 
present work however tends to examine not only these two areas of conflict 
but also other possible areas of conflict that are relevant to the selected theme 
of the work, namely conflict and tarj ih in Islamic legal theory. 
Briefly, I have chosen to examine this topic for several reasons: 
(1) Islamic law has been criticised for conflict and contradiction. The present 
study hopes, as the first stage, to ascertain some causes leading to legal 
conflict before suggesting some principles to remove that conflict. 
(2) To continue what has been thus far-achieved by the ancient jurists in this 
particular question such as by al-Shafi`i in Ikhtilaf al-Hadith, Ibn Qutaybah in 
Ta'wil Mukhtalaf al-Had ith and Ta`w il Mushkil al-Qur'an, al-Tahawi in Sharh 
Ma'ani al Athar, Ibn Rushd in Bidayat al Mujtahid, etc. 
13 For example, see Ibn Qutaybah, Ta'wil, passim and al-I'tibar. passim. 
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(3) To combine all the relevant informations concerning conflict and preference 
in one systematic work. 
(4) To argue that there is no genuine conflict in the Shari `ah. Rather, it is an 
attempt to show that the law which Allah has revealed in the shape of Islam 
could not be contradictory. 
(5) To show that taýih is the most practical and profound way to remove legal 
conflict compared to other legal solutions such as naskh, istthsan, etc. 
(6) To arrive at some tentative methods of tar, j ih so as to contribute not 
only to usul studies but also to the process of the codification of Islamic law 
throughout the Muslim world which demands only the selected legal point of 
view in every single case in Islamic law for the sake of unification and 
uniformity. 14 
SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
I rely heavily upon primary sources in my work on conflict and 
preference. An attempt has been made to consult all the classical books of 
usul and other related disciplines as they are available to me, which have 
special devotion to our purpose. Hence, our examination is not only restricted 
to those books of usul, but rather to many other references such as fiqh 
particularly figh mugaran, tafsir and ha. dith particularly tafsir ayat al-abkam 
and sharh ahadith al-ahkam as well as those disciplines which aim at 
reaching a conclusion upon the reliability of one of the many conflicting 
traditions such as 'ilm at -ijadith and the like. 
14 See the relevancy of this notion to the practical problem in the 
contemporary Muslim state in al-Zuhayli, al-Figh, vol. 1, p. 27 and Hakim 
Mohammad Said, "Enforcement of Islamic Laws in Pakistan", in H1, vol. 2. no. 
2.1979, pp. 66-67. 
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In respect to the methodology of the present work, I would like to 
introduce it by quoting what has been said by one scholar15 ;" Scholars may 
advance the general stock of knowledge in a variety of ways ; by the discovery 
and publication of hitherto unknown source materials ; by placing their entire 
subject in a wholly novel perspective on the basis of extensive re-examination 
and analysis of available sources ; or finally by applying the new perspectives to 
the elucidation of a single long-recognised problem". The present work is of the 
second type. It seeks to re-examine in one comprehensive work all the 
arguments used by the ancient jurists either to support and strengthen their 
legal views or to weaken and undermine the opposing legal views in cases of 
conflict. 
Accordingly, I shall begin my study by identifying the causes of legal 
disagreement. To be certain of the meaning of tarj ih and its legal background, 
an attempt shall be made to identify the key-word to the problem. For this, 
conflict as well as the methodologies of tarj ih will be keenly studied and 
closely examined from the perspective of various subject matters. Matn 
conflict will be discussed first followed by isnad conflict. The third problem 
concerns conflict in yma' and giyas application and the following question 
deals with conflict in those areas other than the prescribed scope of studies. 
In the last chapter, a conclusion and some suggestions are made in order to 
summarise the whole work, its results and findings. 
15 Burton. The Collection of the Qur'an, pp. 4-5. 
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More precisely, in order to achieve what has been proposed, the study 
I am conducting is primarily based on a critical study in such a way that every 
argument must be extensively analysed and criticised first. When certain of its 
reliability and applicability to those relevant cases of conflict, it Is accepted. In 
turn, if I do not have enough and clear evidence and argument. I will still 
proceed to suggest that a particular method of tarj i h. be applied in a 
particular case but not in the strictest form because of the lack of adequate 
argument. As regards the method of presentation in this work and its relation 
to usui - oriented study, I have to say that both methodologies, as previously 
discussed, will be utilised. It is natural to do so because one cannot offer a 
proper evaluation of legal conflict unless one has at one's disposal certain legal 
and rational arguments as well as cases that are conflicting. A study of 
theoretical arguments and case study are both useful as far as tarji h is 
concerned in the present work. 16 
16 See al-Burhan, vol. 1, pý 84.. 85 
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CHAPTER TWO 
AL-TA`ARUD (CONFLICT OF EVIDENCE) 
It is obvious that if there is no conflict then there is no question 
of devising a method to remove such conflict. As far as taij i, lh is concerned, 
the question of causes leading to disagreement must be examined. On the 
other hand, the knowledge of ikhtilaf is extremely important, for anyone 
who is not familiar with the science of ikhtilaf ought not to be permited 
to pass judgement and to exercise giyas. I To make the discussion more 
organised, I intend to study the question of conflict in Islamic law by first 
trying to ascertain the meaning as well as the hukm of conflict and its 
related discussions before committing myself to causes leading to what is 
commonly known in usul al, figh as ta'arud. 2 
The Meaning of al-Ta'arud. 
Broadly speaking, ta'arud or conflict occurs when two pieces of 
evidence of equal strength require two contrary rulings to be applied to the 
same case at the same time. 3 Put differently, conflict takes place 
whenever what is implied by one piece of evidence is opposed by another 
for one reason or another. In usul terminology, this phenomenon has 
been called by more than one title. Apart from ta'arud, it is sometimes 
called tanaqud, ta'adul, tagabuI, etc. 4 It is not difficult to find examples of 
1 Al-Shawl. lbinl al-Ist san, pp. 301-302. 
2 See a1 Mustafa, vol. 2, p. 393. 
3 See al-Sarakhsi, Ugu1, vol. 2, p. 12. 
4 See the following: 
a. Raw%fak p. 208. 
b. al-Sarakhsi, U. 2L vol. 2, p. 12. 
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conflict as this is very common in figh as will become evident throughout 
the thesis. A reader of figh finds no difficulty at all in extracting many 
examples of such conflict even in the first few pages of a book on fiqh. 
More significantly, differences of opinion arose among the followers of 
Islam soon after the demise of the Prophet and on many occasions, ikhtilaf 
took place among the Companions even in the lifetime of the Prophet. 5 
Before we move to another sub-discussion however, it will be useful to 
point out some of the technical meanings attached to ta'arud together 
with relevant examples in order to crystalise what has already been said. 
Al-ta'aruci is the common title used to denote any contradiction 
of evidence in usul al figh. Literally, conflict is said to take place when two 
elements contradict each other to the degree of rendering both elements 
inapplicable. Hence, the phrase 'ta'aruci a1-bayyvurt ' i. e. conflict of pieces 
of evidence, means that one piece of the evidence opposes the other which 
makes both pieces inapplicable6 i. e. simultaneous application of both is 
impossible. I ma' or ittifaq (agreement) is its exact antonym. 7 
Conventionally, ta'arud has various definitions but remains 
relevant to a common and central concept of conflict as indicated by the 
literal sense. The Hanafis have generally opined that ta'aru, L comes to 
exist when one of two dalil or JUijah of equal strength contradicts what 
c. al-Mustcjfa. vol. 2. p. 395. 
d. Nihayah, vol. 3. pp. 202-203.. 
5 Ma'sumi, "Imam laijaw i's ikhlilaf al fugaha' ", in IS, vol. 8.1969, p. 199 
idem, "Disagreement of the jahaba and early, jurists", in HI, vol. 3,1979, passim. 
6 Lane, Lexicon. part 5, p. 2006 ; al-Munj4 p. 519 ; Irshad, p. 273 
Badran, Tarjih, p. 19; al-As'adi, USu4 p. 255; 'Iwa, Dirasat, p. 13. 
7 El 1, vol. 1, p. 1061. 
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is implied by the other in cases such as an opposition between 
permissibility and prohibition on the one hand and between positive 
(ithbat) and negative (nafi) on the other. 8 Other jurists tend to confine 
ta'arud to the conflict that arises merely between two speculative pieces 
of evidence (amarat) instead of between two dali L9 That is, two dal-il or 
two hujjah, according to the latter jurists, are held to be unable to 
contradict one other since both are definite (gati) for they accept no other 
possible interpretations. 
This difference seems to be merely theoretical and verbal because 
neither the Hanafis nor the other jurists have at their disposal a clear cut 
and agreeable principle by which they may decide with certainty whether a 
particular piece of evidence is gat'i or otherwise. On many occasions, 
evidence is not sharply classified and sometimes inconsistently valued 
even within the same school of law. l° As we shall see, disputes in figh are 
always caused by these two classifications for they are neither constant nor 
certain. From this conclusion, the consideration of whether or not gat'i 
evidence can contradict another gat'i evidence becomes worthless since 
principles to distinguish between gat'i and 'anni are widely variable. An 
8 Al-Sarakhsi, UUul. vol. 2. p. 12 ; Kashf. vol. 3. p. 77 ; al-Tagrir, vol. 3. p. 2; 
al-As'ad i. UsuI p. 255. 
9 Nihayah vol. 3. p. 211 ; al Mustafa, vol. 2. p. 393; Irshad p. 273 
Although the word dalil applies to both definite and probable proofs, some 
jurists, however, apply the word daUl to definite proofs and amarah (signs) to 
probable proofs. See Ajlmad flasan, "The sources of figh :a general survey". 
In IS, vol. 29,1990. pp. 110-111 (cited after as "The Sources") ; Tagnin. pp. 
19-20,36. 
10 See the following three notes. 
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explanation of this question will be elaborated upon further in chapter 
three under the heading of "the condition of tarj i ih". 
However, some brief examples might be useful at this stage. As 
we shall see in chapter six, ijrna. ' enjoys a considerable position as legal 
evidence to the effect that it is not liable to any cancellation or alteration 
(as often occurs in legal texts). In other words, consensus, generally 
speaking, is gaa'i evidence. Nevertheless, the jurists are divided amongst 
themselves as far as the details are concerned. Al-Shafi'i considered only 
the consensus of the whole community as gat'i, while other jurists, 
including leading jurists in the Shafi'i school of law extend this degree of 
strength to cover both the consensus of the community and of the legal 
specialists(nwjtahidun). 1I Not only that, having contended that a principle 
which leads to certainty must be based on equally certain evidence (gat'i), 
they disagreed on the details. In the case of consensus, its basis must be 
derived from revelation. Rational evidence, according to some of the jurists, 
cannot serve in religious matters12 whereas it is acceptable to the other 
jurists. 13 Such matters would make the discussion of conflict between 
gat'i and qa, 'i or between gat'i and Zanni void of certainty. It is not an 
error, however, to accept the classification of legal evidence into two 
categories of strength, namely gai'i and Zanni, but it should not prevent a 
mujtahid from re-examining the accuracy of both since the principles by 
which legal evidence is classified are relatively variable and accordingly 
liable to cross-examination. 
11 Al-Risalah. paras. 1312,1320 ; 41-Mustafa. vol. 1. p. 181 ; Irshad p. 71. 
12 Al-Burhan. vol. 1, p. 683 ; Tang ih. p. 322 ; Badran, U§ut p. 124. 
13 Al Mustafa, vol. 1. p. 196; Badran. USuL p. 125. 
For details, see Shaban. Dirasat pp. 98f. 
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This discussion also shows that the jurists, notwithstanding the 
schools of law, have demanded certain strict conditions to ensure that 
only certain situations will be genuinely treated as actual cases of 
conflict, such as when both pieces of evidence are of equal strength. 14 
Both pieces of evidence must also confine themselves to the same subject 
matter at the same time. 15 Otherwise, it may render conflict only apparent. 
It is precisely on this ground, that the prohibition of approaching (i. e. 
sexual intercourse with) one's wife in her period of menstruation, does 
not contradict the 'order' to do so when one's wife has purified herself. It 
is clearly evident from Q. 2: 222, "They question thee (0 Muhammad) 
concerning menstruation. Say: It is an illness, so let women alone at such 
time and go not in unto them till they are cleansed. And when they have 
purified themselves, then go in unto them as Allah hath enjoined upon 
you... ". The alleged conflict is not genuine for it is assigned to two 
different times or conditions. 
The genuine example16 of conflict may be illustrated by the 
following three traditions. The first says that the Prophet performs an 
ablution and washes his feet. '7 The second reports that the Prophet wipes 
over his feet18 and the third tells us that the Prophet sprinkles water 
14 pl-Sarakhsi. USul. vol. 2, pp. 12-13 ; al-Tawwill. vol. 2, pp. 205-206 ; 
Irsho4, p. 273. 
15 Ibid. 
16 What is intended by the genuine case is merely the one which apparently 
fulfils all the conditions laid down by the jurists though it is not necessary to 
be actually genuine for many conflicts can be eventually removed by one 
means or another. 
17 AI-Shafi'i. Ikhtilaf al-Had ith. p. 522. 
18 Ibid. 
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over his feet. 19 Surely, they adequately provide a considerable conflict in 
the eyes of the jurists whose task is to remove this conflict by any possible 
means. 
Remark should also be made upon the fact that the present 
discussion is restricted only to conflict of law as it is discussed by the 
usulists in classical usul literature. We have no interest in, and concern 
with, the so-called conflict of law dealt with by many contemporary 
jurists whose task is exclusively confined to the problems of conflict of law 
between Muslim and non-Muslim in Islamic territory. The aim of this 
contemporary study is to seek solutions from a jurisdictional point of view 
whenever dispute arises in an Islamic state between members of two 
different sects or religions, which is frequently concerned with personal 
status law or the so-called private internationallaw. 20 
19 Ibid. 
Having preferred the first report. al-Shall'i rejected the other two reports for 
the isnad of one of them is unreliable. Although the isnad of the other 
badl h is reliable (lhasan), since its content (sprinkling) is contrary to what is 
more established (akthar wa athbat minhu), it should therefore also be 
rejected. (ibid) 
20 See Cardahi, "Conflict of law", in Law in the Middle East. passim ; David 
Pearl, A Textbook on Muslim Law, pp. 174-195: Mahma an i. Falsafah. p. 11. 
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The Hukm 21 of al -Ta`arud 
As regards the hukm of conflict in the Shari 'ah, I would like to 
introduce what has been recorded between al-Shafi'i and his interlocutor in 
al Risalah. The interlocutor puts a question to al-Shafi'i as follows, "I 
have found the scholars, in former and present times, in disagreement on 
certain (legal) matters. Is it permissible for them to do so? " Al-Shafi'i 
replies that ikhtilaf has two aspects. From one point of view, ikhtilaf is 
forbidden but "I would not say the same regarding the other". Ikhtiiaf is 
forbidden in all spheres where God has provided a huljah in his Book or on 
the tongue of his Prophet, textually and explicitly. But with regard to such 
texts as permit of interpretation (ta'wil) or are to be understood by qiyas 
in such a way that the interpreter or qa'is accepts what is implied by a 
khabar or giyas, even if another differs from him in his interpretation, in 
such a case, "I do not hold that (disagreement) of this kind constitutes 
such strictness as that arising from textual (evidence)". 22 To conclude, we 
may say that ikhtilaf may be forbidden or permissible according to causes 
leading to ikhtilnf. 
21 The arabic word hukm (singular of ahkam) is used with various slightly 
different meanings which no single English word will render exactly. At least, 
two words will be used to express the arabic hukm. the word value (as in this 
case) and the expression "legal result". (see Aghnides, Theories. p. 24) 
In jIghi terminology, hukm is the rule that a mujtahid arrives at, based on the 
Shari'ah sources and in accordance with their general principles. ( See 
Jjarnmad, "Ghazali's juristic treatment of the Shari 'ah rules in al-Musta. /h", 
in AJISS, vol. 4,1987, p. 160 
22 Al-Risalah, paras. 1671-1675. See also Idem, Ibal aI-Isthsan, pp. 302-303. 
The translation is taken from Khadduri, Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 333. 
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This shows that al-Shafi'T is of the opinion that conflict may 
occur and sometimes must unavoidably exist in the Shari'ah. But this is 
restricted to the second classification of ikhtilaf. Al-Shafi'i presents an 
example of this, saying that two judges may judge one affair, one by 
accepting, one by rejecting. This is ikhtiiaf but each one has acted as was 
incumbent upon him. 23 Furthermore, there is a hadith confirming the 
validity of gtihad which states that, "If a judge makes the right decision 
through ytihad, he shall be doubly compensated; if he errs, he shall be 
compensated once". 24 Not only that, he offers another example which 
might add weight to his doctrine. He says, if two people differ in facing 
the qiblah, though they are both 'right' by ytihad, yet while they differ in 
aiming for the same point, they cannot both be right with respect to the 
point, but they are right with respect to ijtihad. 25 In other words, 
paradoxically all are 'right'. To summarise al-Shafi'i's attitude towards 
disagreement, we can simply say that al-Shafi'T acknowledges disagreement 
as the necessary result of ytihad. Referring to the tradition that prescribes 
one and two rewards, he denies the existence of a fundamental 
disagreement even when there are contradictory opinions because every 
mujtahid fulfils his duty by drawing the conclusions which he considers 
right. Thus, a variety of views is permissible and acceptable provided that 
they do not go beyond the second category of ikhtilaf. This point of view 
has been shared by the vast majority of jurists from different schools of 
law throughout the centuries and seems to be the proposal most 
acceptable to contemporary jurists and scholars. 26 
23 A[-Risolak paras. 1404-1407, particularly para. 1407. 
24 Ibid., para. 1409. 
25 ibid., paras. 1425-1426; idem, Ibtal al-Istgsan, p. 302. 
26 See Zaydan, "at-Khilaf, passim particularly pp. 288-290 and 292. 
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Some of the scholars are of the contrary opinion. 27 They 
criticised the idea that there are any divergent opinions in the Shari'ah. 
Al-Sha'rani, for instance, takes the extreme position denying that there is 
any controversy whatsoever and seeks to defend his position arguing that 
the whole of the Shari'ah provisions may be reduced to two categories, 
commandments and prohibitions, each of which admits a double 
construction - one for the case of want of excuse ('azimah) and the 
other for the case of excuse (rukhah). The apparent contradiction and 
divergence of provisions and views in the Shari 'ah, is then only a 
consequence of the fact that while some of these provisions and views refer 
to cases of want of excuse, others refer to cases of excuse. 28 
Similarly, al-Shatibi, in his work, al-Muwafagat, has strongly 
denied that genuine conflict can occur either in the principles (uiul) of 
Shari'ah or its branches (furu1. To support his thesis, he argued that no 
one could find two pieces of evidence that contradict each other to the 
extent that both must be abandoned. He concludes that the conflict is due 
to the weakness of the mujtahid. 29 In other words, whatever the conflict 
is, it is merely apparent and cannot actually take place in the body of the 
Shari 'alt. He then discussed some aspects of ikhtilaf which are not 
The details of arguments put forward by those who support the existence of 
ikhWaf in Islamic law can be found in al-Muwafagat. vol. 4. pp. 123-131. 
27 See Ibn jazm, al-Ijlkam. vol. 2, p. 166ff ; Ibn al-Qayyim, I'lam, vol. 1, p. 
367. 
28 Al-Sha'ran t. al-Mizan al-Kubra, p. 6, as cited in al-Mawsu'ah al-F ighiyyah. 
vol. 2, p. 295. 
29 AI-Muu)afagat, vol. 4, pp. 118-131,294f ; Masud, Islamic Legal Philosophy, 
p. 214. See also Ibn jjazm, al-Ilhkam, vol. 2, p. 166. 
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supposed to be called ikhtilaf for certain reasons. 30 On the whole, the 
standpoint of the second group is relatively identical to the first. In spite 
of their denial of existence of any conflict in the Shari'ah, their disapproval 
is primarily directed, it appears to me, towards genuine contradiction 
called taniqud i. e. mutual cancellation. As a matter of fact, even the first 
group of jurists have shared the same notion that ikhtiiaf is permissible, as 
will be shown later, as long as one has possible means to remove that 
apparent contradiction ( ta'aý. Otherwise, it is called tan . qud which is 
unacceptable to all of the jurists. 31 
Others, however, have attempted to differentiate between the so- 
called 'major and minor conflict'. Minor ikhtiiaf is permissible while major 
ikhtilaf is condemned for it is a dangerous type of ikhtiGf. 32 A conflict is 
regarded as minor when the disagreement exists in a dispute of whether a 
particular action is obligatory or recommended on the one hand and 
whether it is forbidden or disapproved on the other. This is permissible, 
although some prefer to do a particular thing instead of another. This 
demonstrates the flexibility offered to the people. 33 Relatively speaking, 
30 A1-Muuxifagat. vol. 4. pp. 214-220. 
For the summary, see al-Mawsu'ah al Fighiyyah, vol. 2. pp. 292-295. 
31 Ai-Tagrir, vol. 3. p. 2; Fawat . vol. 2, p. 189 ; al-flafnawi, al-Ta'aryd pp. 
55-61 particularly p. 61. 
32 Al_ ki, Ikh ilaf. pp. 27-29. For example, see Ibn Taymiyyah, aL-Qawa'id, 
p. 41. 
33 Ibid. See also Kamali. " The approved and disapproved variety of ray 
(personal opinion) in Islam". in AJISS, vol. 7,1990, p. 59. (cited after as 
"Ra'y 
Examples of this can be found in al-Shafi'i's Ikhtilaf a! Jiadith. pp. 488- 
490 (whereby al-Shafi'i himself acknowledged the permissibility of this kind of 
ikhtilaf) and JJujjat Allah. vol. 1, p. 138. 
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this view tends to evaluate the problem from the standpoint of the figh 
which is quite irrelevant to our discussion. As mentioned earlier, usul al- 
figh has less interest in what is proclaimed in jIgh than in the bases of 
fiqh themselves. Likewise, it is not accurate, in my mind, to pass 
judgement on the question discussed by adopting Ah considerations. It is 
true however, that a dispute on whether a particular order is obligatory or 
merely recommended is more reasonable and acceptable compared to a 
dispute between what is obligatory and prohibited on the same subject. 
But this is not a concrete argument from which to justify the classification 
of ikhtilaf to either major or minor where only the latter is acceptable. It is 
inaccurate to accept this classification since minor ikhtilaf may contradict 
evidence which is regarded as explicitly provided by the Shari 'ah. Hence, I 
am of the opinion that conflict can be accepted as long as one of its 
elements is not based on explicit evidence though it might even be 
considered as major ikhtilaf e. g. wajib vs. cram. 
I am more inclined towards the viewpoint proposed by al-Shafi'i 
but with some alterations and additions. It is true that cases containing 
speculative evidence or having no definite evidence at all are most likely 
open to ikhtilaf (as is the actual case in figh). However, it does not 
necessarily signify that cases with precise and distinct evidence would 
encounter no possibility of disagreement. This is found even in al-Shafi'i's 
treatise when he asserts that differences of opinion among the Companions 
exist even on points where there are explicit rules in the Qur'an or the 
Sunnah. 34 To add to al-Shafi'i's proposal, I have to say that, although 
ikhtdaf is an historical phenomenon, one should aim to reduce it to a 
minimum. In other words, figh should be one and there should be no 
34 gi_Shafi'i. lid f Malik. p. 243. 
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major ikhtilaf other than in minor details. Clearly, efforts must be made to 
eradicate any major ikhti1 f in figh if one has an adequate means of doing 
so. Hence, al-Shafi'i on other occasions has asserted that no conflict is 
acceptable betwen two reliable atjadith unless means for either' tarjih or 
naskh are available. 35 This assertion shows that ikhtilaf is not acceptable 
between two reliable texts when this conflict cannot be removed by any 
means of legal solution which reveals that ikhtilaf is actually genuine and 
intended by the Law giver. Therefore, the dispute seems to be apparent and 
merely verbal since all of the jurists believed and held that genuine 
conflict i. e. tanaqud, cannot possibly take place in the Shari'ah. Only 
apparent conflict is always expected to occur in the Shari'ah, motivated, 
as we shall see, by the following causes or reasons. 
Causes of Legal Disagreement. 
The Muslims are divided into groups differing from one another 
on legal issues. At this stage, an attempt will be made to clarify causes 
that are believed to bring legal rulings into conflict. As mentioned before, 
conflict, or even unity of law, is not due to the figh, rather, to usui ai figh 
which governs the interpretations of figh from various sources and 
bases. Since usul figh is a human intellectual effort there is little 
certainty of covering all the arguments produced by usui al figh. 36 Therefore, 
it is not surprising that causes of legal disagreement are many and 
unlimited in number and cannot be fully described37particularly within a 
limited number of pages. Also, it would prove too much of a digression to 
35 Ibid.. p. 191; idem. al-Risalah, paras. 574-590. See also Irshad p. 275. 
36 Al-ski. Ikhblaf. p. 2; al-Zuhayli. Uja- vol. 2, p. 1188. 
37 Ibid. 
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discuss here in detail all the questions which might produce ikhtilaf in 
figh. For convenience, only those causes which are common and of capital 
significance will be thoroughly examined. 
Many have held that cases which received a great deal of 
explanatory attention by the Lawgiver such as ritual, succession or 
personal laws, are not subject to great conflict other than in minor 
details, for they are related to those laws that are unchangeable 
throughout time and because, in consequence, they have been detailed to 
the extent that they carry clear cut principles to administer their 
application. 38 Other similar statements are also available giving the 
impression that conflict is unlikely in those prescribed laws. In a practical 
sense, we often encounter, however, the contrary situation where conflicts 
remain great in number in those fields of law, a fact which leads to the 
belief that they too have been variously understood or implemented. 
Perhaps the dispute over the requirement of guardianship in marriage 
might shed some light on this problem. In brief, some of the jurists argue 
in favour of the requirement and others argue against it. Ibn Rushd, 
whose book, Bidayat at-Mujtahid is designed to analyse and explain 
conflicts of laws in Islamic jurisprudence, concludes his analysis on this 
point by saying, "the cause of the difference of opinion is that there is no 
verse of the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet which clearly stipulates 
guardianship as a condition for the marriage contract, let alone any 
explicit text on the point. Rather, the verses and the Sunnah cited by the 
proponents of guardianship and their opponents are equally ambiguous 
and probable. The authenticity of the cited a. diths is also debatable". 39 
38 pl_'Ilirkt. Ikh Uaf. p. 2; Bannerman. Islam in Perspective. P. 34. 
39 gicl-ayak vol. 2. pp. 9-10. 
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This, in my opinion, was due to the fact that, although certain topics are 
dealt with at considerable length, there is no single comprehensive 
exposition of the topic. As a preliminary conclusion, we may state that if 
there appears to be a conflict, irrespective of whatever the cases are, 
surely, one or the other piece of evidence has been incorrectly understood 
or applied, for the conflict is largely created by our very human inablity to 
estimate correctly the precise implications of legal texts. 40 
Many causes of ikhtUaf have been listed and are regarded by both 
the ancient and contemporary jurists to be the most influential ones. 
These, I believe, can be reduced to just five distinct causes41 which are 
most prominent and sufficient in themselves to cover other remaining 
causes. Our discussion therefore, will be devoted to these five causes only. 
On the other hand, after accepting four elements as the agreed sources of 
law, namely the Qur'an, the Sunnah, jma' and giyas42, the jurists are 
divided not only between two schools of law but also within one school of 
law in regulating the principles on which the rulings must be extracted or 
established from these four sources. This is also said to be one of the 
significant factors which lead to legal disagreement. It is therefore 
necessary to commit ourselves to these two types of causes. Some of 
them, as in the latter case, are related to various principles laid down by 
every school of law in establishing the law from its sources, while others 
The translation is taken from Mas'ud, "The sources of the Maliki doctrine of 
ijbar ", in IS, vol. 24,1985, p. 227. (cited after as "Ijbar') 
40 pl_Sarakhsi, U. Eui, vol. 2, p. 12. 
41 The number of causes of legal disagreement varies from one scholar to 
another. See for example al-Khan, Ikhtilaf, (7 causes) pp. 38-118 ; al- 
Bajalyawsi, al-In af, (8 causes), passim ; al-Misr-i. a1-Khilaf, (14 causes). pp. 
88-116. 
42 Fitzgerald. "Sources", p. 87 ; F. Rahman. Islam. P. 68. 
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are concerned with the original problems which inevitably cause divisions 
amongst the jurists. Both types therefore will be equally regarded as 
causes of legal conflict in this discussion. 
I would like to begin with problems which make ikhtilaf itself 
inevitable. Ikhtilaf of this kind is originally caused by certain factors 
which are `natural' and not influenced by any tendency of thought in 
Islamic legal theory, as distinguished from the second type of ikhtilaf i. e. 
"man-made principles". Included in this category is the absence of the 
relevant texts in a particular dispute, the different readings of the Qur'an., 
the use of words that carry more than one meaning, the texts which are 
liable to many interpretations and the fact that not all the relevant 
traditions reach every single jurist. These causes are `natural' for they 
are, to a certain extent, beyond human will which makes ikhtilaf of the 
jurists unavoidable. 
With respect to the first cause, it is of interest to note that the 
whole phenomenon of Islamic law, in its basic formation and composition 
has two major components, namely that which is believed to have been 
revealed by God and that which is assumed not to have been revealed. The 
first component handed down to man ready-made, was only to be passively 
received and applied. On the other hand, the second component, which 
was not ready-made, was in fact, to be constructed. Regarding the latter, 
we often find the jurists, or even the Companions, differing amongst 
themselves in matters personal and social concerning which they found no 
indication in the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet. `Umar ibn 
al-Khattab and 'Ammar b. Yasir, for example, differed on a journey, 
concerning the mode of tayammum for major impurity Uanabat) 
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necessitating the major ablution i. e. ghusL 'Umar abstained from prayer 
while 'Ammar performed his prayer after performing tayammum for ghusl 
by rubbing (besmearing) himself with dust. 43 
Therefore, in matters that demanded an immediate decision in 
which texts were not available to the Companions or they were not able 
to seek guidance from the Prophet owing to distance or some other reason, 
they had to use their reasoning and then report to the Prophet their 
agreement or disagreement. 44 The point is that, when a particular case in 
question has no relevant legal or semi-legal texts, disagreement is likely 
to occur, for the absence of the relevant texts would lead the jurists to 
resort to reasoning or other speculative elements of evidence. 
As regards the different readings of the Qur'an, it is commonly 
understood that on many occasions, a particular verse can be recited in 
two ways which sometimes create two contrary implications. One of the 
most distinct examples of this is found in Q. 5: 6, "0 ye who believe! 
When ye rise up for prayer, wash your faces and your hands up to the 
elbows, and lightly rub your heads and (wash) your feet up to the ankles". 
The case in point is concerned with the feet and whether they are required 
to be washed or wiped to make ablution valid. What makes this point 
contradictory is the existence of two readings where both readings are 
legitimate because they are mutawatir. 45 The first reading adopted the 
43 Nil ai Aw. ar, vol. 1, p. 333 ; Raj' al-Mulam4 p. 14. 
44 Ma'sumi, "Ikhtilaf ". p. 202 ; idem, " Disagreement", pp. 23-24. 
45 Al- ]Cabari. Jami' , vol. 6, pp. 126-132 ; al-Qurjubi, a -Jami', vol. 6, 
pp. 91-96; Ibn Mujahid, Kitab al-Sabah fi al-Qira'at, pp. 242-243. 
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accusative for the feet (wa arjulakum) which gives the impression that 
they should be washed also as in the case of the face and hands. Others 
who adopted the reading in the genitive (wa arjulikum) opine that the feet, 
like the head, need only be wiped. 46 Whichever of these is taken, the 
ruling of the text would differ from the other. 
As with the above, it is said that the singleton reading (gira'ah 
sh&lhah) also plays a considerable role in making legal implications oppose 
each other. The difference between this and the former case is that both 
types of reading in the former case are legitimate and acceptable to the 
Muslims while the latter involves a conflict between what is acceptable and 
what is not. For example, Professor Schacht has quoted Q. 65: 6, ("Lodge 
them where ye dwell, according to your wealth, and harass them not so as 
to straiten life for them. And if they are with child, then spend for them 
till they bring forth their burden"), in order to illustrate how different 
ideas and practices could result from the early transmission of the Qur'an 
in variant readings. 47 The relevant variant reading, as argued by both 
Schacht and Coulson, is attributed to Ibn Masud who inserts, "and expend 
upon them (wa anfiqu 'alayhinna )" after "according to your wealth (min 
haythu sakantum )". 48 By this, the meaning of the first part of the verse 
Al-Qurjubi adds that apart from the different readings, the dispute is also 
credited to the word "mash " for it is believed to be mushtarak. (see al-Jami', 
vol. 6, p. 92 ) 
461bid. 
47 Origins, p. 225. 
For the main differences between the Uthmanic codex of Qur'an and those of 
some companions e. g. Ibn Mas'ud and Ubayy. see Cooper. Introduction (al- 
labari). p. xocii ; EI 2, vol. 5, pp. 406-408. 
48 Ibid. ; Coulson. A History, p. 31. 
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would be, "Lodge them where ye dwell and maintain them according to your 
wealth". 
Dealing with these two readings of the same verse, the jurists 
have reached two contrasting opinions. For ease of clarification, it seems 
reasonable to restrict our discussion to these two readings only and not to 
open up the entire argument on the issue of legal rights preserved for those 
who are irrevocably divorced. Obviously, if basing oneself on the common 
reading, the verse clearly indicates that no right of maintenance need be 
provided for such a divorced woman. However, the Hanafis have taken 
the variant reading into consideration which produces a ruling contrary to 
the other jurists who do not consider the relevancy of this reading in 
establishing the legal ruling. 49 As is evident from al-Sarakhsi's al Matsu. , 
the author has contended that such a woman is entitled to both lodging 
and maintenance, arguing that both are prescribed in Ibn Mas'ud's 
reading. -90 I should however, mention that this cause will be more relevant 
under the subsequent part of the discussion for it is largely due to jurists' 
legal thought concerning whether the singleton reading is of authority or 
not. It is not of 'natural cause' of conflict. 
The mushtarak, literally a compound idea or a homonyms', has 
allegedly created conflict in figh. 52 Mushtarak is nothing other than two 
49 See Ibn al-Lajul am. al-Qawa'id. pp. 155-156. 
50 Al-Sarakhsi. al-MabsuL vol. 5, p. 202. 
For details on this conflict, see Hawting. "The role of man and hadith in the 
legal controversy about the rights of a divorced woman during her waiting 
period ('idda)". in BSOAS. vol. 52.1989, passim. 
51 fie. Lexicon. part 4. p. 1543 ; Ani ni, Ijähad, p. 92. 
52 Al-KhIn. Ikhtilaf. pp. 70i% 230: Tawana. Ijtihad, p. 340. 
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or more equal meanings implied in a single word or a sentence at one 
time. 53 Attempts were made to investigate how this feature came to exist. 
No convincing explanation is yet available except for the suggestion that a 
particular word was in use among two or more ancient tribes to denote 
contrary meanings. 54 More surprisingly, mushtarak often occurs in both 
the Qur'an and the Sunnah without any direct explanation from the Law 
giver. It is in trying to determine the precise meaning of these words that 
disagreements amongst the jurists themselves have emerged. A significant 
example of this is the word nikah which may be variously interpreted as 
shall be further elaborated in chapter four under the heading "Tarj ih in 
mushtarak conflict". 55 
To understand how significant conflict could be caused by a 
mushtarak word, I quote Q. 2: 228, "Women who are divorced shall wait, 
keeping themselves apart, three quru' ". The verse announces that divorced 
women have to pass three quru' before they can marry another person. 56 
The word quru', plural of qar', is unanimously understood as 'time'. In 
other words, three quru' is identical to 'three times'. 57 However, the 
jurists, as well as the linguists, hold differing views as to whether these 
'times' refer to menstruation or to the period between two menstruations. 
For the word qar' , as it is evident from the statement of the linguists such 
53 Ibid., p. 70 ; Ibn ManZur. Lisan, vol. 10, p. 449; al-Sarakhsi, U'Ju1, vol. 1, 
p. 126; Kashf. vol. 1, p. 37. 
54 Abkam. vol. 1, pp. 430-433 al-gurtubi, al-Jami'. vol. 3, p. 113f. 
For details, see al-Nashm i in his edition to al Ja aa' UAu1 al-FYgh, vol. 1, p. 
47, note no. 1 and al-Zuhayli, Ukul, vol. 1, pp. 284-285. 
55 See pages 185-189. 
56 Ahkarm vol. 1, pp. 430-433 al-gurtub i, al lami, vol. 3, p. 113 ; Bidayah, 
vol. 2, pp. 88-91. 
57 Ibid. 
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as al-Asma'i, Abu Zayd, Abu 'Ubayd, al-Akhfash, etc, was originally used 
among the Arabs to denote both meanings. 58 The conflict occurs when 
some of the jurists request three periods of menstruation while others 
determine upon three periods of purity which is shorter than the former in 
terms of the 'iddah for a divorced woman. 59 Arguments and counter 
arguments over this problem can be found in books of figh and tafs ir ayat 
al-abkam, for the word actually carries two original but contrary 
meanings. Some of the jurists are able to make a preference between these 
two meanings not solely on the basis of mushtarak but on the account of 
gara'in which might clarify what is actually intended by the word quru' in 
this particular case. 60 This is because a mushtarak offers nothing other 
than a variety of meanings which equally apply to a single word. In 
short, it needs gara'in to help in selecting what is preferable and intended. 
Besides being a mushtarak, a word or perhaps a sentence may be 
variously interpreted if it is open to more than one interpretation. 61 This 
is different from the mushtarak problem because the variety of 
interpretations in the mushtarak case is due to different 'original' meanings 
whereas the variety of interpretations in the present case occurs because it 
is subject to many possible interpretations. I hope that through one 
example this particular cause of conflict can be understood. I would like 
to bring forward the dispute over the zakat of associates (zakat al- 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. ; al -abuni, Tifsir, vol. 1. pp. 328-33 1; Tawana, Ijtihad, pp. 340-341. 
60 Al-Khin. Ikhtilaf; pp. 72-77 ; al-Dar-in-t. al-ManahU. pp. 89-90 ; al-As'adi. 
UUul, p. 73. 
61 AI-Khin, Ikhtilaf, p. 62ff ; Mab_maajani, "Muslims : decadence and 
renaissance, adaptation of Islamicjurisprudence to modem social needs ", in 
MW, vol. 44,1954, pp. 194-195. (cited after as "Renaissance") 
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khali. tayn) to demonstrate the idea. The jurists unanimously agreed that a 
person whose property if of zakatable amount (nisab) is required to pay 
zaka. t. However, the jurists disagreed upon whether zakat is obligatory 
on property which is of zakatable amount only when the said property is 
distributed between two persons or associates. The cause of legal conflict 
is said to be a phrase in a tradition which reads, 'Mose separated should 
not be gathered together, nor should those gathered together be separated 
in order to avoid paying zakat ; those gathered together must be equally 
divided between two owners". 62 
As regards the first part of the tradition, "Those separated should 
not be gathered together", al-Shafi`i interprets it by citing the example of 
two persons; one of whom owns one hundred sheep, while the other has 
one hundred and one sheep. The amount of zakat to be paid is three ewes 
when the sheep of both are gathered together but only two ewes, one from 
each, if they are separated. However, it is clear from the tradition, al- 
Shafi'i argues, that each of them has to pay zak at for himself 
independently, for what is separated should not be gathered. 63 That is so 
because it is commonly understood that if the sheep number between 
forty and one hundred and twenty head, the owner has to pay one ewe 
only. On anything above that, up to two hundred head, two ewes. On 
anything above that, for every one hundred, one ewe. 64 Al-Shafi'i then 
interprets the second part of the tradition by giving the example of three 
owners who possess collectively one hundred and twenty sheep or goats. 
They have to pay one ewe only to fulfil the zakat requirement. 65 However, 
62 Bidayaht vol. 1. p. 263; Nayl a[ Aw. Lar vol. 4, p. 187. 
63 Al-Shaß'i, a[-Umm, vol. 2. p. 14. 
64 Ibn Majah, Sunan, vol. 1. p. 577 ; Nayl aIAwlar, vol. 4, p. 183. 
65 A1-Shafi'i, al-Umm, vol. 2. p. 14 ; Bidayah, vol. 1. p. 264. 
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when this collective amount is equally divided between these three owners, 
every one of them must pay one ewe each which makes the total to be paid 
three ewes. In this case, al-Shafi'i opines that this collective ownership 
should not be separated, as is implied by the second part of the tradition, 
"those gathered together cannot be separated", 66 provided that the sheep 
share one herdsman, one male animal, one pasture and one watering- 
place. 67 
Malik has another interpretation. The phrase "Those separated 
should not be gathered together", according to him, means, for instance, 
that if there is a group of three men, each of whom has forty sheep and 
goats, each of them thus has to pay zakat. Then, when the zakat collector 
is on his way, they gather their flocks together so that they owe only one 
ewe between them. They are forbidden to do so. 68 By the phrase, "nor 
should those gathered be separated", he means, for instance, that there are 
two associates, each of whom has a hundred and one sheep or goats, and 
they must therefore pay three ewes by virtue of collective property. Then, 
when the zakat collector is on his way, they split up their flocks so that 
they have to pay only one ewe each. They are forbidden to do so. 69 
The Hanafis also come out with their own interpretation. 
According to them, the first part of the tradition refers to the separation of 
ownership and not to place i. e. farm. For instance, if two persons possess 
forty sheep each, they are not allowed to gather their sheep so as to avoid 
paying two ewes. Instead, each of them is responsible for the amount of 
66 Ibid. 
67 A1-Shafi'i, al-ihnrm vol. 2. p. 13 ; NaylalAwfar, vol. 4, p. 188. 
68 A1-Muwaga' (Y). vol. 1, p. 263 ; Nay1 al Awwar . vol. 4, p. 187. 
69 Ibid. 
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sheep he possesses. For the other part of the tradition, they quote the 
example of one who possesses eighty sheep. In this case, he is not required 
to separate his sheep into two groups which would require two instead of 
one ewe in terms of paying zakat. 70 As we have seen, the statement of the 
Prophet in this tradition has produced many possible interpretations 
followed by different examples. This shows adequately how some words or 
sentences in legal texts could leave the way open to disagreement. 
The last major cause of ikhtilaf however, is intimately related with 
the second source of Islamic law, namely the Sunnah of the Prophet. 
Although the rule that the Sunnah must be followed was a basic part of 
Islamic belief accepted among Muslims, different methods of testing 
whether a particular transmission was actually the Sunnah were in 
existence. As a matter of fact, conflicting views in figh are largely due to 
the Sunnah and its discussion. Conflicts are due sometimes to the 
contradictory principles laid down by the jurists to assess the reliability of 
every individual tradition and sometimes by the natural weakness of 
human ability to know all the traditions concerning legal precepts. This 
stage of discussion concerns the latter case only since this is an inevitable 
cause. 
Ibn Taymiyyah, in his excellent work entitled Raf ' ai-Mulam 'an 
aI A'immah al A'lam, has succesfully drawn a clear example of how the 
jurists should be excused for their lack of knowledge of all the traditions 
from the Prophet which would lead to legal disagreement. He has 
emphasised that even the great Companions were not acquainted with 
70 Al-Sarakhsi, aL-Mabsu/, vol. 2. p. 154 ; Nat'l al Awlar. vol. 4. p. 188 ; 
Bidayah, vol. 1, p. 263. 
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detailed knowledge of the Sunnah of the Prophet, as is evident from many 
cases and incidents. 71 Therefore, many legal decisions were eventually 
found in conflict with many ahadith for these ahadith were unknown to 
those juristconsults. Many relevant examples of this will appear 
throughout the following chapters. 72 To be fair to the discussion. I shall 
cite one example which might shed some light on this matter. The case 
belonged to the Companion period after the demise of the Prophet. Ibn 
'Abbas and 'Ali b. Abi Talib were reported to have opined that a woman 
whose husband has died while she is pregnant must observe the longer 
period of two 'iddahs i. e. the longer between the 'iddah of those whose 
husbands have died which is four months and ten days (Q. 2: 234) or the 
`iddah in the case of pregnancy which is determined only by giving birth 
(Q. 65: 4). 73 This view appears to be the most preferable among some 
jurists for it provides an intermediate solution (i. e. reconciliation) between 
71 Raf a[-Mulam, pp. 5-11. See also Ikhtilaf aI jjadith, p. 479 ; ffujJat AUak 
vol. 1, pp. 141-144 ; Tawana. Ijtihad. p. 345. 
Ahmad Muhammad Shaldr, the editor of al-Risalah, has pointed out one 
example where al-Shafi'i knew one reliable transmission but was ignorant of 
other reliable ways of transmission on the same issue. See al-Risalah, p. 228, 
note no. 2. 
72 The anecdote of the exchange between Malik and the Caliph al-Man2ur or 
Harun al-Rashid is an obvious example of this. Malik refused to make his 
MuwaLa. ' a compulsory reference for the entire urnmah arguing, among other 
points, that since the Companions had spread, some had heard aFjadith of 
the Prophet that were unknown to others in other localities. (See 1 gUatAllah, 
vol. 1. p. 145) 
For details, see Guraya, "Historical background to the compilation of the 
Muwata' of Malik b. Anas", in IS, vol. 7,1968, pp. 384-386. (cited after as 
"Compilation") 
73 Rar al-MuIam. p. 9; al-Sarakhsi, al-Mabsc vol. 6. p. 3; Origins, p. 225. 
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two contrary 'iddahs prescribed in the Qur'an. 74 Even so, this conflict, 
strictly speaking, is impossible to exist in fiqh, since there is a clear 
evidence from the Sunnah of the Prophet to indicate the contrary. It has 
been reported that a woman from the tribe of Aslam known as Subay ah al- 
Aslamiyah whose husband died, came to the Prophet after giving birth, 
shortly after her husband's death, seeking permission to marry another 
person and the Prophet had no objection. 75 This report gives the clear 
impression that "the longer period of two 'iddahs" was of no legal 
significance in this case since the Prophet himself did not impose any 
such prescription. The conflict occurred, from my point of view, because 
the jurists, including these two eminent Companions, were ignorant of 
this report. 
As regards our study of inevitable causes of conflict, I must say 
that more explanations and examples of them are available in a variety of 
situations throughout the following chapters. Leaving aside this part of 
the discussion, we can proceed to another part. This part is too wide and 
complex a topic to be able to discuss here in detail all the principles which 
might produce ikhtilaf in figh. Again, our discussion will be limited to an 
examination of the major principles which are believed to be common and 
obvious. 
The first problem which often poses itself is the so-called 
hierarchical order of legal sources. The absence of a standard and agreed 
hierarchical order of legal sources would create conflict in figh for the 
74 See al-5abun1, To sir. vol. 1, p. 364 : Zaydan. a1-Wgji2. p. 397. 
75 Musnndut vol. 6. p. 375; al-Nasa'l. Sunan. vol. 6. pp. 191-192 : Ibn Majah. 
Sunan, vol. 1. p. 653. Raf al-Mulam, p. 9. 
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schools of law and even the individual jurists often had a view of a 
hierarchy for confirmation of the materials they used. Priority was given, 
as is apparently observed, to those materials which would make their 
respective views prevail in cases of conflict.. Al-Shafi'i, for example, 
throughout his treatises, came to conclude that the cause of legal 
conflicts was the unsystematic method employed by his predecessors, in 
handling the materials they used to document their doctrines. 76 He 
asserted that figh doctrine should be based on or derived from the four 
sorts of evidence namely the Qur'an, the Sunnah, yma' and qiyas and that 
the hierarchical order of these elements should be strictly observed. 77 
Hence, we find him on many occasions criticising his opponents for taking 
the evidence from the bottom and not from the top of the hierarchy. 78 
Al-Shafi'i's proposal appears to be ideal in theory but not in 
practice. In the practical sense, however, one finds great difficulty in 
confining oneself to this hierarchical order of evidence for they are neither 
sharply defined nor constantly applied. His theory was no longer followed 
generally by his adherents let alone his opponents. For instance, he 
places yma' below the khabar al-wahid 79 while some of his eminent 
followers such as al-Ghazal i consider Uma' as the most important source 
of religion even over the Qur'an and the Sunnah. 80 More surprisingly, on 
many occasions, al-Shafi'i himself was inconsistent in applying this 
76 Oth man, at-Shaft' i and the Interpretation of the Role of the man and the 
L-ladith. Ph. D thesis. University of St. Andrews, 1976, p. 368. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Abu Zahrah, a! -Sha, fi' i, p. 28. 
79 Al-Risalak para. 1816f (see particularly note no. 10) 
80 AL-Mustasa. vol. 2, p. 393. See also Irshad, p. 78. 
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hierarchical order. 81 We have no intention of studying this hierarchical 
order in depth, rather we will suggest that the absence of this order may 
cause many conflicts in JIgh. It is hoped that the comprehensive result of 
the present work, as will be suggested in the last chapter, will contribute 
to the re-systematisation of the proper hierarchical order of legal sources 
for the sake of tarj ih or even for the benefit of fresh ijtihad on new cases. 
The second problem is related to ra'y. 82 Even though ra'y or 
gtad holds a significant position in terms of legal interpretation, its 
application is somewhat vague and controversial. It is true that ra'y or 
ytih d is the well-considered and balanced opinion of someone who aspires 
to reach a correct decision. In other words, it is a decision which the 
mind arrives at after contemplative thought and a genuine search for truth 
in a case where indicators are conflicting. 83 Its application however may 
lead to different conclusions which makes al-Shafi`i emphasise that the 
decisions taken on the basis of ytihad are all correct ostensibly (zahiran) 
although not really (baainan). 84 It is exactly on this ground that the 
Shafi'is and the Malikis were in disagreement regarding the compensation 
for killing an animal during the pilgrimage. Q. 5: 95, "Oh ye who believe! 
Kill no wild game while ye are on the pilgrimage. Whoso of you killeth it of 
set purpose he shall pay its forfeit in the equivalent of that which he hath 
killed... " demands that the obligatory compensation be the equivalent of 
the animal. The apparent meaning is, therefore, that if two persons jointly 
kill a deer, the compensation to be exacted is one goat regardless of the 
81 See page 337. 
82 Al-Darf ni, al Manahy. p. 10: Khan, Islamic Jurispruderuae, p. 121. 
83 Ibn Qayyim, I'lam, vol. 1. p. 66 Also see Karnali, "Ray ". p. 40. 
84 Al-Risa(ak para. 1332. 
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number of people involved. This was the view of the Shafi'is. In contrast, 
the Malikis decided that the compensation in this case should be two 
goats, one from each killer. They based this decision on analogy with the 
case where two persons are jointly involved in a single unintentional 
murder. In such a case, each of them is obliged to free a slave. 85 
Further disagreement arose as a result of reliance on the 
controversial qiyas as well as on the more speculative isti! 1san, istislätj and 
istishab. 86 Though speculative, ra'y or ijtih d possessed a crucial role in 
usul al-figh for many reasons. This is largely due to the relatively small 
legislative element in the Qur'an. That is, of the whole Qur'an, no more 
than about eighty verses could be considered as having legal import. 87 
Then the Sunnah of the Prophet further proved to be inadequate for the 
needs of the expanding society where fJtihad is the only means to cope 
with new unprecedented cases. 88 Mention should be made that even in 
cases which are provided with legal texts, ra'y or ytihad remain necessary 
in order to arrive at the intended meaning. In response to these, the 
schools of law employ different methods of reasoning which can be 
discriminated from each other. As will be elaborated later, methods of 
85 Al-Shafi'i, Ikhtlaf Malik. pp. 240-241. 
86 AI-Mugaddimah, vol. 3. p. 3; al-Zuhayli. aL-Flgh. vol. 1. p. 71; Coulson. A 
History. p. 60. 
87 Anderson and Coulson, "Islamic law in contemporary cultural change" , in 
Saeculum . vol. 18,1967, p. 15 
(cited after as " Islamic law"). Cf. Goitein, "The 
birth hour of Muslim law ", p. 24. 
For details, see Khallaf USuL pp. 32-33; lahir Majlmood. "Law in the Qur'an - 
a draft code". in ICLQ. vol. 7.1987, passim. 
88A1- Mugaddirnah, vol. 3. p. 3; Ahmad liasan. The Early, p. 53 ; Coulson. 
Conflicts, p. 4; al-As'adi. UEul. p. 264; Muslim, "Islamization of laws in 
Pakistan : problems and prospects". in IS, vol. 26,1987. p. 71. 
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reasoning such as giyas, ta'wil, istihsan, istisläh, etc., are often critically 
disputed for they might suggest an arbitrary argument. 89 
Alongside these two major causes, lies, however, the most 
influential cause leading to legal conflict. As a matter of fact, this has 
dominated the discussion of ikhtilaf throughout the centuries. It concerns 
the second source of Islamic law namely the Sunnah of the Prophet or 
more particularly the so-called khabar ahad of the Sunnah. The rationale 
behind this is that the Qur' an, being the first source of law is well known 
to all jurists especially those verses which directly treat legal aspects. The 
situation, however, is different with hadith. Some jurists dispute the 
authenticity of some particular ihadi th for one reason or another or they 
are not aware of some had: ' ths, which obviously leads to different legal 
conclusions. 90 We have to admit that a large number of the traditions are 
a)3ad 91 and therefore are unanimously considered as speculative (zanni) 
in terms of isnad or meaning or both. 92 Transmitted by a small number of 
transmitters, as opposed to the mutawatir, its degree of transmission is 
merely probable, as error is possible on the part of transmitters. Besides, 
its implication is also probable when it is susceptible to a variety or may 
give rise to a multiplicity of views. We should have a clear picture in our 
mind that the overwhelming number of legal traditions are aljad and 
therefore any dispute or conflict that arises over their authenticity should 
89 See the second part of the coming chapter. 
90 See Raf al-Mulam, passim ; al-Shalabi. aI-Madkhal, pp. 244-245 ; 
Mahma ani, Falsafah. p. 63. For examples. see al-Khan. Ikhtlaf, pp. 53-61. 
91 AI-Muswaddah, p. 520 ; Weiss, "The primacy of revelation in classical 
Islamic legal theory as expounded by Sayf al-Din al-AmidI ", in SI, vol. 59, 
1984, p. 90. 
92 Al-'lurki, Ikhtilaf, p. 26 ; Calder, "IkhtUaf and yma' in Shafl'i's Risala" , 
in SI. vol. 58.1983. pp. 60,61 (cited after as "Ikhtilaf ) 
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not surprise us. It is precisely to. this effect, that every school of law 
required certain conditions to confirm the reliablity of this sort of 
tradition. 
We may begin with the Hanafis. Among other things, they 
contend that the narrator's action should not contradict his narration. 93 
It is on this ground, for example, that they do not rely on the following 
tbadith, narrated by Abu Hurayrah, " When a dog licks a dish, wash it seven 
times, one of which must be with clean sand"94 for Abu Hurayrah has not 
acted upon it himself. 95 They also demand that the subject matter of alhad 
is not such that would necessitate its knowledge by a vast number of 
people. The argument is that if the hadith were true, it would not have 
failed to attain wide circulation or general use, considering that it concerns 
a matter which was supposed to be known by hundreds or thousands of 
people. The hadf th, for example, "Anyone who touches his penis, must 
retake a fresh ablution"96 is not accepted by the Hanafis for it would have 
become an established practice among all Muslims which is not the case. 97 
93 Al-Nasafi, KashJ vol. 2, p. 79 ; a1 Fikr aI Sami. vol. 1, p. 51. 
94 Muslim, 50h ih. vol. 1. p. 161. 
95 Al-IaCaWI, Sharb, vol. 1, pp. 2-23; Abu Zahrah, U§ul, p. 109. 
96 Ibn Majah, Sunam vol. 1, p. 161. 
97 Ibn jlazm, al-Ihkarm vol. 1, p. 104; al-Zurgan I. Sharp, vol. 1, p. 130 ; a! - 
Darnri, vol. 1, p. 55. note no. 2. Hitu, a! -Wa/iz, p. 302. 
This argument is known as 'urnum a1-ba[wa. It argues that the subject matter 
of the tradition which would necessitate the knowledge of a vast number of 
people, should be reported by many reporters accordingly. Otherwise, it is 
suspected. See aI-Mustafa , vol. 1, p. 171f ; Ibn jjazm, a(-Ihkam, vol. 1, p. 104f 
; Musallan . vol. 2, p. 126. 
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In addition, they further maintain that if his narration 
contradicts giyas, the narrator of Jd must be a fagih. Otherwise, his 
narration is abandoned in favour of giyas. 98 For example, they do not 
take the following hadith into consideration for it contradicts giyas. The 
bad i th - reported by Abu Hurayrah - reads, "Do not retain milk in the 
udders of a camel or goat so as to exaggerate its yield. Anyone who buys a 
musarrät has the choice, after having milked it, either to keep it, or to 
return it with a quantity i. e. a sa' of dates". 99 This hadith is held to be 
contrary to analogy with the rule of equality between indemnity and loss. 
Abu Hanifah opines that the sa' of dates may not be equal in value to the 
amount of milk the buyer has consumed. Hence if the buyer wishes to 
return the beast, he must return it with the cost of the milk which was in 
its udders at the time of purchase, not with a fixed quantity of dates. 100 
All of the above legal conclusions constructed by the Hanafis are 
found to oppose other schools of law owing to the special conditions laid 
down by the Hanafis alone. In other words, jurists other than the Hanafis 
accept all the prescriptions in these cfjadith because they did not examine 
these ahadith from the standpoint of the Hanafis. 101 This feature is very 
common in figh. These principles have been widely adopted by the Hanafis 
either to select or to reject a particular hadith. On the other hand, the 
98 Al-Sarakhsi. Us-u4 vol. 1. pp. 340-342 : al-Muswaddnk p. 239 ; al jjafnawi. 
Dimsat. pp. 267-269. 
99 A1-MUghni 
. vol. 4. PP. 1508 ; Ahmad fiasan. "The Sources", p. 126. 
10() Ibid. ; Kashf. vol. 2. p. 381. 
One scholar attempted to justify this by saying that the hadith did not reach 
Abu flanifah. Otherwise. he would have regarded the qiyas as istihsan since 
the analogy contradicted the hadith (Khadari, Tarikh al-Tashrt', p. 147, as 
cited in al-Thagafi, al-Fiqh al fanbaii, vol. 1. pp. 44-45 ) 
101 Ibid. 
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Malikis also have another method to confirm the reliability of khabar 
at . They say that if a tradition of the Prophet is transmitted by only one 
transmitter and was found to be in opposition to an established practice in 
Medina, the Medinese practice was preferred and regarded as being more 
authoritative, 102 because the practice is a continuous tradition from the 
Prophet which represents the narration of thousands upon thousands of 
people until it reaches the Prophet. 103 The Malikis were thus reported to 
refuse to follow the lhadith regarding the option of cancellation (khiyar ai- 
majUs) which provides that " parties to a sale are free to change their 
minds so long as they have not left the meeting of the contract". 104 It has 
been said that the reason behind this is that the implication of the 
hadith is contrary to the practice of the people of Madinah. 105 
On reflection, however, it seems that these conditions are 
directed towards dealing with conflict between two khabar ahad as well as 
to examining the reliability of solitary traditions. In conflict between two 
sorts of tradition related on the authority of the Prophet; the tradition 
accompanied by practice should be adopted over the one which is not 
accompanied by the practice. 106 This applies, to some extent, to the 
conditions held by the Hanafis as well. In other words, we can say that 
these conditions are frequently adopted as a means to preferring a 
particular tradition over the other. 107 I will look in detail at this critical 
phenomenon in chapter seven. It should be noticed also that tarjih, by 
102 Origins, p. 64. 
103 Al-Mugaddima]L vol. 3, p. 7; al-Fikral-Sams, vol. 1, p. 51. 
104 Ai-Muwq a' (y). vol. 2. p. 671. 
105 Al-Shafi' i, Ikhtilaf Malik p. 219-220. 
106 Al-A''am j. On Schach4 p. 58. 
107 Ibid. 
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this explanation, though originally designed to remove legal conflict, is 
also one of the major causes leading to legal disagreement and accordingly 
legal conflict. 108 
Anyone looking deeper into this problem will find that causes of 
this type are totally unlimited. Many legal schools have their own 
'procedures' in establishing the law. Among other procedures, the Hanafis, 
for instance, have arrived at two degrees of legal rulings namely fard 
(extra obligation) and wajib (normal obligation). In short, they hold to a 
special legal thought that fard can be formed only through the Qur'an. 
Obligation established through the Sunnah is merely wajib which is 
lower than that of fara. 109 Precisely on this ground, they contend that to 
recite the Fatihah in the ritual prayer is merely wajib ; the prayer of those 
who did not recite this particular chapter, remains valid. But to recite any 
verse of the Qur'an is obligatory to the effect that ritual prayer is invalid 
if any verse of the Qur'an is not recited purposely in that prayer. They 
argue so, because an order to recite the Fatihah is established merely by a 
hadith whereas an obligation to recite any verse is extracted from the 
ßa. 110 
Also, the Hanafis are renowned for their principle that the 
generality of the Qur'an (umum al-Qur'an) cannot be specified or restricted 
108 Al-Zuhayli, a[-Figk vol. 1. p. 71; Tawana. Ijtiluul, p. 350 ; al-Shalabi, al- 
Madkhat p. 210. 
109 See al-As'ad i. Uvu4 p. 257. 
For details. see Ibn al-Lahham, aL-Qauxi'id, pp. 63-65. 
110 N(yi al Awjar, vol. 1. p. 230. 
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by a tradition which is 4tad. 111 Therefore when a had i th is reported to 
have permitted one witness and the oath of the plaintiff in terms of legal 
procedure of evidence in the courts, the ljadi th is left aside because it 
contradicts the Qur'anic provision that fixes the minimum number of 
witnesses at two men or one man and two women. 112 However, on other 
occasions, the Hanafis may either qualify or restrict the Qur'anic 
injunction by a single narration even though this procedure, theoretically 
and in principle, is not accepted by them. On the question related to the 
punishment for adultery in enemy land, Abu Hanifah qualified Q. 24: 2, 
"The adulterer and the adulteress, scourge ye each one of them (with) a 
hundred stripes", arguing that this punishment cannot be carried out 
when adultery took place in enemy territory, for the verse has been 
modified by the following tradition, "The divinely prescribed punishments 
will not be enforced in an enemy land". 113 Though the had i th is a11ad, the 
Hanafis have accepted this restriction but called it a well-known hadith 
(mashhi r) instead of a single narration-114 These procedures and the like 
(particularly inconsistency in applying them) would naturally bring many 
contraditions in figh. 
The Hanbalis also have these special procedures. Among others, 
they prefer to take any weak hadith into consideration for it is believed to 
be more reliable than human legal opinion. 115 Ahmad b. Hanbal is 
111 AL-Mankh ul, p. 173, note no. 1; al-Baj i, Ijjkam, p. 167, note no. 3; al- 
Thaqafi. "al Ziyadah 'ala al-nan ", in AS, vol. 15.1404 H. p. 257 (cited after 
as" al Ziyaciah" 
112 See Coulson, A History, p. 90. 
113 qm ini. Ijtihad. p. 74. See also a[-Hidayah, vol. 2, p. 390. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibn Badran, al-Maclkhal, p. 43: al-Zuhayli, al-Fligh, vol. 1, p. 39 ; Ibn al- 
Qayyim, 1'lonm vol. 1, p. 31 ; al-Thagafi, al-Figh al-jjanbali , vol. 1, p. 54. 
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reported to have said that "a weak liadith is better for us than the ra'y of 
men". 116 The remaining jurists are not of the same view, however. 117 
Again, this variety of procedures would bring conflict. As regards principles 
or procedures of other jurists, increasing numbers of relevant examples 
will appear in the coming chapters. 
Before we proceed to discuss the so-called "ever lasting cause of 
conflict" i. e. masla! jah, I have to indicate that there are sources of law and 
principles of legal reasoning which some of the Sunni schools accept and 
others do not. Regarding those sources which they all accept, each school 
agrees, for example, on the definition of what the Qur'an is. However, 
when they consider other sources of law and principles of legal reasoning 
such as jadith, yma', giyas, istilIsan, istisldh or me latjah, 'urf, qawl al- 
sahabi, sadd al-dharai', naskh, takhsi. and so forth, we find differences 
among them in definition, not to mention differences regarding 
authoritativeness, interpretation and application of each. 118 Accordingly, 
disagreement is bound to take place in figh. For example, the Hanafis 
approve "bay' al-wafa-' (i. e. a sale subject to future redemption) on the 
account of people's need for it. This was done in contradiction to the 
principle of analogy and in accordance with the principle of istLhsan -a 
116 Ibn al-Qayyim, I'lam. vol. 1, p. 76 ; Ibn Badran, al-Madkhal, p. 43 ; al- 
Qasimi, al-Qawa'icL p. 117. 
117 See al-Qasimi, al-Qawa'id, pp. 113-114. 
118 See Ismail, al-AdtUah. passim ; Zaydan. al-Khilaf. p. 301: al-Zuhayli, 
al-Figk vol.. 1. p. 71 ; al-Bayanun i, "Athar al-ikhti(affi al-gawa'1d a! -uauliyyah 
fi ikhtilaf aL-fugahain AS, vol. 6,1395 A. H., passim. 
It is interesting to point out that al-Dawalibi was aware of this phenomenon 
to the extent he named various chapters in his book as "al-khilaf fit al- 
Sunn. ah', "al-khüaffi al-ray ". etc. (Usui, pp. 256-346) 
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principle peculiar to the Hanafi school of law". 119 On the whole, there 
have always been fundamental and distinctive differences between the legal 
theories of the four Sunni schools that would open the way for 
disagreement in the body of Islamic law. Another example refers to the 
Zahiris who do not regard giyas as a source of law. Other schools which 
regard giyas as a source accept rulings and judgements made from giyas 
which may lead, therefore, to conclusions different from those of the 
Zahiris. 120 
The problem of maslahah, regarded as one of the capital causes 
of legal disagreement, will be the last concern of the present study. We 
have to say that maslahah is an intermediate type in terms of the 
nature of causes of legal conflict, for it is inevitable from one point and is 
widely affected by principles held by the jurists from another. No doubt 
the jurists are concerned with the observance of the maslahah which 
differs according to time and place. It has been stated that there is no 
objection to the change of the hukm to accord with the changes in time, 
place, circumstance, intention and custom. 121 More significantly, custom, 
although not recognised theoretically as a major source of Islamic law122, 
has been observed by scholars to have not only played an important role in 
119 Majlma an i, Falsafah, pp. 85-86. 
120 See ibid. ; al-Mugaddimak vol. 3. Pp. 4.30 ; al-Khin, Ikhtilaf. pp. 383-392. 
For details on this problem and the problem of the rejection of gfyas by the 
Zahiris, see Ibn jlazm. Ib. tal al-Qiyas. passim ; Fadel I. Abdullah, "Notes on Ibn 
Fiazm's rejection of analogy (qiyas) in matters of religious law". in AJISS, vol. 
2.1985, passim. 
121 Ibn Qayyim. 11arm vol. 3. pp. 14-70; al-Dasugi. "al-Ijtihad', pp. 753-754. 
122 Schacht. Introduction. p. 62 ; Tahir Ma}j mood, "Custom as a source of law 
in Islam". in JIll. vol. 7.1965. pp. 102f 
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the growth of Islamic law but also to have always coexisted with the 
law. 123 
Similar to the above, the failure to study and to consider the 
effective causes of legal rules may invite disagreement in JIgh. Many jurists 
like Ibn 'Abd al-Salam, Ibn al-Qayyim and al-Shaiibi agreed that legal 
rules are based on causes and purposes "all of which are founded on the 
interests of human beings in this life and the life here-after". 124 
Consequently all rules, even those based on legal texts, should cease to 
apply when the effective cause on which they are based, no longer 
exists. 125 As a logical result of this principle, legal rules are altered with 
the change of their effective causes and purposes. Therefore, since legal 
rulings are largely constructed on the basis of maslahah and causes that 
are variable according to many factors such as custom, conditions and 
circumstances, we find many scholars changing their decisions whenever it 
appears that these no longer suit public welfare. The fact that al-Sha- 
fi' i who is famous for his 'old doctrine' and his 'new doctrine' (the latter 
constructed when he moved to Egypt after leaving Iraq) may be mainly 
related to the change of the mastahah in these two different geographical 
localities. 126 
The same consequence would apply to other jurists in other 
different locations since needs and circumstances vary from country to 
country. 127 As a result, conflict is easy to understand. By way of example, 
123 Ibid. ; Ibn Qayyim. I'lam, vol. 3. p. 89. See also Rayner. Contract. p. 34. 
124 Mahmaan i. "Renaissance", p. 197. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Mahma, an i. Falsafak p. 107. 
l27Isma'il. alAdi/Iah. pp. 405 if. 
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I will cite the problem of testimony in terms of witnessing before the 
courts. Abu JLa ni fah, in accordance with his time, did not require 
anything except an apparent 'adalah i. e. acceptability as witness, in cases 
other than al-hudud and al-gisas. His two distinguished disciples, Abu 
Yusuf and al-Shaybani, however, required additional procedures whereby 
every witness should be recommended by a reliable person (tazkiyyah) 
before he or she could appear before the courts to give his or her witness. 
It is necessary to impose such a procedure for the conditions in their time 
were not the same as in that of Abu Hanifah. People were no longer to 
be immediately accepted as qualified witnesses. In order to safeguard 
people's interests, this procedure was adopted to meet the changing needs 
and interests. 128 
In terms of concluding remarks, I would like to note that ikhtilaf 
or ta'arud are inevitable in many cases for several reasons. Some of them 
are totally unavoidable such as the different readings of the Qur'an, the use 
of reasoning and the like as previously mentioned. We have seen also that 
in some cases, ikhtilaf is caused by two conflicting pieces of evidence but in 
other cases, it is motivated rather by consideration of two different times 
and conditions. Therefore, as in the latter case, it is not a conflict of 
evidence but a conflict of time and circumstance. 129 Mention should be 
made also that disagreement might sometimes be apparent for the variety 
of opinions are all acceptable in the view of Islam. This sort of 
disagreement is known as "al-ikhtdaf min jihat at-mubah". 130 Many examples 
128A1-Zuhay1i Uju1, vol. 2, pp. 835-836. For other examples, see 
Mahma ani, Falsafah p. 108. 
129 Ibid., p. 837. 
130 A1-Risalah paras. 752-756 ; idem. Ikhtilaf aI ffad i th. p. 488: Ljujjat Allah 
vol. 1. p. 138. 
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could be adduced here but one example might be sufficient. In the case of 
conflicting traditions on the number of time that one should wash in 
ablution i. e. one or three times, the jurists have opined that one is free to 
wash three times or just once. 131 
Others are relatively 'man-made' but they deserve no 
condemnation. For people differ from one another in knowledge, reasoning 
and the capacity to understand the texts and their attendant problems. 132 
In addition, these conditions are laid down by every school of law to 
ensure that every argument has a proper foundation. 'Whether these 
principles actually lead to something more accurate is another question, 
the point is that great efforts were made to work out methods of 
interpretation which were presumed suitable for application in Ah and its 
usul. This is very common not only in figh but also in modern law, for 
both assume, though on different grounds, that men are capable of 
learning the true nature of right and wrong and that having done so, they 
can elaborate their knowledge rationally and apply it to concrete 
situations". 133 
Thus, the declarations of the jurists, authoritative as they may 
be, are not characterized as being absolutely definitive. At most, they are 
statements of the jurists' opinion, a personal expression of what jurists 
This is, in fact, the title of one section in al-Shafi'i's Ikhtüaf alljadith 
(ibid) 
131 I fal j[adith, p. 488. 
132 gl_Zuhayli, al-Flgk vol. 1, p. 68 ; Ma's-um-l. "Ikhtilaf. p. 203. 
133 Kerr, Islamic Reform, p. 57. 
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think to be the Law of God. 134 This is because the law requires 
interpretation of what is not self-evident. If all law were self-evident, there 
would be no need for interpretation; as there would be nothing to 
interpret. 135 Thus, law contained in the great juristic works of Sunni 
Islam is at most a human approximation, albeit a close one, to the ideal 
Law of God. 136 Since the fiqh is man's attempt to Identify God's 
command, the detailed rules and regulations and principles are not 
necessarily immutable. Though not necessarily immutable, they are equally 
not to be ignored since they were best placed to offer authoritative 
interpretations consistent with the needs of their age. We have come to 
know that conflict is nothing other than two or more contrary opinions or 
arguments of the jurists attributed to a single case and not originally 
intended by the Law giver. Arguments and counter arguments therefore 
are not only natural but also a necessity to convince others that a 
particular legal conclusion is stronger and more relevant to what is 
actually intended by the Law giver. 
I have to say also that all the causes discussed above have 
eventually led to a central problem which is ta'arud or conflict itself. To 
put it differently, two different readings or two methods of reasoning or 
two considerations of maalalhah, etc., would bring legal implications into 
conflict. Hence, conflict is one of the major discussions throughout the 
work. It is of interest also to re-emphasise that whenever there appears to 
be conflict in fLqh, one should know that one or the other conflicting 
134 Weiss, " Interpretation in Islamic law : the theory of ytihad ", in AJCL, vol. 
206,1978. p. 203 (cited after as "Interpretation"). See also Coulson, Conflicts, 
p. 3; al-Zuhayli, a! -Figh, vol. 1, pp. 71-72. 
135 Weiss. "Interpretation ", p. 203. 
136 Ibid. See also al-Zuhayli, a[-Flgh, vol. 1. p. 72. 
89 
pieces of evidence has been incorrectly understood or applied. This is a 
conviction of the imperfection of human reasoning and its ability to 
apprehend by its sole power the real nature of evidence implication. 
Therefore, it is the task of a murajikk to detect this fault, which also 
represents the major discussion in the present work i. e. tarjih. Naturally 
and spontaneously, before any attempt to favour one evidence over the 
other is made, a considerable effort should be made first in looking closely 
for the cause of that conflict. Hence, the examination of conflict and its 
related discussion is not ended or limited in this particular chapter but will 
be extended throughout the following chapters. 
In general, disagreements among schools were not on the whole 
related to basic principles and doctrines but rather to details138 as a 
result of diversity of interpretations and differences of views in applying 
principles to practical cases. 139 Rather, the difference does not concern 
the faith itself, since there is no difference in regard to the Oneness of Allak, 
that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah and that he is the last of the 
Prophets, nor are there any two opinions concerning the Qur'an that it is 
from Allah, and that it is the greatest miracle of the Prophet, nor on the 
fact that it has been handed down to us generation after generation 
through the ages unanimously, neither in the fundamentals like the five 
daily prayers, zakat, al-hajj and fasting, nor is there any big difference in 
the way they are performed. In short, there is no difference in any of the 
138 Gibb. Islam. p. 7; Juynboll, "Law (Muhammadan)". in Encyclopaedia of 
Religion and Ethics. vol. 7. p. 866 (cited after as "Law"). See also Introduction 
to al-Mawsu'ah a! -Fighiyyah, p. 19. Cf. Coulson, Conflicts, pp. 24-25. 
139 Ma}Jmaman i. "Renaissance", p. 196. 
For the list of literature on '11m al-lkhtilaf see al-Miari. al-Khilaf pp. 122- 
126 ; Ma'sumi. "Ikhtilaf. pp. 215-219. 
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principles (al-arkan) of Islam, nor in what is regarded as purely religious, 
such as unlawfulness of wine, pork and carrion, or the general laws of 
inheritance. The difference only lies in matters which have no bearing on 
any pillar of din or the general principles of Islam. 140 
After all, in a constantly evolving world, the arrival of new 
occurences requiring rulings which are not specified in the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah is immanent. With these circumstances, it should not be 
surprising that today's jurists will differ on some issues, such as economic 
and sociological concerns and so on. Regardless of the reasons that lead 
to diverse fighi opinions, the differences themselves should not be looked 
upon as being inherently evil; on the contrary, they can be a great help to 
overcome the unyielding rigidity which has stunted the growth and the 
contribution of the contemporary Muslim nation. In matters that needed 
to be looked at from a different angle and with different rational views in 
accordance with the teachings of the Qur'an and the Sunnah, re- 
interpretation and re-examination of sources of law are deemed 
necessary. 141 Moreover and above all, the existence of diversity of opinion 
was a reason for flexibility in Islamic jurisprudence as well as a cause 
of relief to the people. Thus, it was said, "Disagreements among jurists 
is the nation's bliss". 142 
14 0 Ma'sumi, "Disagreement", p. 30; Idem. "Ikhtilaf, p. 201. 
141 Esposito, "Muslim family law reform : Towards an Islamic Methodology ", in 
IS. vol. 15,1976, p. 46. (cited after as "Reform") 
142 Majima ani, "Renaissance", p. 196 ; Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, Jami', vol. 2. pp. 
79-80. 
'All al-Qari explained, "Divergence of opinion as to juridical matters Is a 
mercy, as to matters of dogmatic and Islam it is error and innovation". 
(commentary of aL-Fiqh al Akbar, vol. 2. p. 100, as cited in The Muslim Creed, p. 
113) 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CHAPTER THREE 
PART A 
THE MEANING, HVKM AND CONDITIONS OF TARJIH 
The Meaning of Tarji h. 
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Being a derivation of the root word rajaha, tarjih. literally means 
to make preponderate. I In Arabic, it is described as an infinitive noun for 
the transitive verb ; rajjaha, as clearly indicated in an Arabic expression 
"raljaha hadha 'aia dhaka ": he made this outweigh that. 2 Thus tarjih 
indicates preponderation or preference which makes the balance of one 
thing heavier than the other. Accordingly, one scholar has mentioned 
that tarjih literally means al-tamkin wa al-taghlib. 3 We understand from 
the above that tarj ih involves two sides of a balance, one being arjah 
which is heavier and the other marjuh which is outweighed, the latter in its 
proper usage meaning surpassed or excelled. 4 
Tarjih in a technical sense, as well as other terms in Islamic legal 
theory, remained strictly undefined during the first stage of the 
development of usul literature. 5 Although tarji h is nowhere explicitly 
mentioned in early Islamic literature, I believe that the general concept of 
1 Ibn Manzur, Lisa. n, vol. 2, p. 445 ; Lane. Lexicom part 3. pp. 1034-1035 ; al- 
Raz i. a1-it j. p. 234. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Nihayah, vol. 3, p. 212. See also Irshaci. p. 273 ; al-Turki, Ikhtilaf,, p. 198. 
The opposite literal meaning of tarjib is al-tai/if. (Kash, vol. 4, p. 77) 
4 Lane, Lexicon, part 3, p. 1035. 
5 See pages 6-7 ; 32-34. 
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tarj i h, in preferring what is more reliable was already well-known to the 
early scholars as previously indicated in chapter one. 
Again in this context, we need to refer to the first available 
systematic book on usul al figh in our attempt to trace the historical 
background as well as the meaning of tarjih. In the Risalah, particularly in 
the discussion of the contradictory traditions, al-Shafi'i gives a general 
view of tarj ih although his major theme is ta'aruu. It is clear that al- 
Shafi'i used "rejected and accepted" instead of "preferred" when dealing 
with two contradictory traditions. 6 
In any case, we are able to acknowledge that such an 
understanding of tad i h, i. e. to prefer one particular evidence over the other 
when they conflict, was acquired by al-Shafi'i or even by the earlier 
scholars before the appearance of the Risalah. 7 Futhermore, other works 
of al-Shafi'i such as Ikhtilaf al-Hadith and Ikhtilaf Malik wa al-Shafi'i, etc., 
suggest a similar impression. The major factor behind the absence of a 
strict legal term of tarj ih was that many terms were in use for a long time 
before they acquired a standard and technical mould of expression in the 
later stage. 8 
Referring to usui writings, we find that the jurists have defined 
tarjih variantly because they took different clues into their respective 
accounts. To begin with, I just quote what the jurists said about tarjitj. 
6 A[-Risalah, paras. 710,735 ; Khadduri, Islamic Jurisprudence. pp. 202-205. 
7 See for example. Abu Yusufs Kitab al-Kharaj and al-Radd. 
8 See page 13, note no. 40. 
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According to al-Rani , tarj i tj technically is the strengthening of one side 
(1araf) over the other side so that the superior (between) them can be 
known and applied while the other is discarded. 9 However, al-Armawi who 
wrote an abridgement of al-Razi's al-Mahsul defined tarji h as the 
strengthening of one method (tariq) instead of one side (taraf). lo 
Likewise, the Hanafis also share the same point of view in terms 
of tarj ih being a strengthening. Having said this, most of them have 
added to the definition a clause that makes it differ significantly from the 
above. They contend that a strengthening must be determined by reference 
to the evidence itself. 11 Otherwise i. e. when it is referred to extraneous or 
additional factors which might tip the balance in favour of either of them, 
it is not an appropriate tarj i h. 12 
Alongside the approach taken by those scholars, some jurists 
described ta['i h as the accompaniment of one of the two contradictory 
9 Al-MaflSuI. vol. 2. pp. 443-444. See also Nihayah, vol. 3, pp. 211-212. 
10 Al-Tahsil. vol. 2, p. 257. 
11 Kasllf. vol. 4, pp. 77-79 ; al-Sarakhsi, UsuL vol. 2, pp. 249,251 ; al- 
Taw. di_k vol. 2. p. 206: al-Taqrir, vol. 3, p. 3. 
12 Ibid. ; al-As'adi, Uuul. pp. 256-257. 
Ta. rrjih, according to them, should be bi waif tabi'ýor "bima la yastagilt'. 
Therefore, in a conflict, for example, between two hadiths, an attempt to 
prefer one over the other by considering another Fhadith (i. e. the third hadith) 
which confirms the meaning of the preferred i1adith is not valid. However, to 
prefer the one transmitted by a faq ih or a well-known over non faq ih or 
suspected transmitter is a valid methodology of taijih. Further details, see 
Kashf, vol. 4, p. 79; al-Taqrir, vol. 3, p. 3 and al-Sarakhsj, Usul. vol. 2, p. 
250fL 
Further explanation can be found in pages 323.331. 
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pieces of evidence by some characteristics which led to the accompanied 
evidence being applied while the other was left. 13 By these two approaches 
of defining tad i h, we can say that tarj i h, generally speaking, provides the 
methodology from which one can find out which of two parties is worthier 
of approval and which of two interpretations is closer to what is intended 
by the Lawgiver. 
Most certainly, there are many observations to be taken into 
account before proceeding into greater depth. It appears that the jurists 
held different views regarding tarji h. Thus, their definitions are purposely 
designed to suit their particular viewpoint regarding the nature of tarjih. 
From linguistic point of view, the strengthening (taqwiyyah) and 
the accompaniment (igtiran) indicate a clash of meanings, as the former 
considered tarj ih as an action exercised by the mujtahid while the latter 
held that tarj ih is merely an attribution, or, put another way, a 
characteristic attributed to one of the two contradictory pieces of evidence 
which might tip the balance in its favour. In this regard, one scholar 
attempted to distinguish these two views by saying that the former belongs 
to the Hanafis and the latter to the Shafi'is. 14 This statement, however, 
contradicted the actual attitude taken by the jurists when they showed 
that they were not bound to commit themselves to the approach adopted by 
13 JJ_gmidi, ai-Ihlaun4 vol. 3, p. 256: Muntaha, p. 222. 
14 Taysir, vol. 3. pp. 153-154. 
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their fellows in a particular madhhab. Therefore, they had their own 
wording for tarj ih. 15 
To conclude, as we shall see, it is certain that tad 'i h, theoretically 
and practically, is an external practice performed by a qualified person, 
known as mujtahid. Hence, one should adhere to the point which states 
clearly that tarjih is a practice exercised upon two contradictory pieces of 
evidence (i. e. taqwiyyah ). However, the above disagreement, in my 
opinion, is merely superficial and of no real significance. 16 No doubt, a 
mujtahid is unable to tend towards one evidence rather than the other, 
unless he has a proper basis to do so. Therefore, it is clear that both 
elements, namely the mujtahid and characteristics of a particular piece of 
evidence, are necessary in the process of tarj ih for one is baseless or 
useless without the other. However, the primary difference between the 
Hanafis and the Shafi`is is accredited to the clause adduced by the Hanafis 
in the last part of the definition of tarjih. Inspired by this clause, the 
Hanafis admit no validity of preference by virtue of "many". This difference 
will become more clear in chapter seven in which preference based on 
"many pieces of evidence" will be thoroughly examined. 
It is apparent also that some of the jurists opine that 
contradiction does not occur between two dalils. 17 Therefore, they have 
adopted words such as tariq (method), taraf (side) and amarah (sign or 
15 Note for example al-Juwayni, an eminent Shall'i jurist, who defined ta. rji, j 
as a practice undertaken by a mujtahid which resembles ifanafi definition of 
tarjill. (see al-Burhan, vol. 2. p. 1142) 
16 See Ijabak p. 417 ; al-Badakhshi. Manahy. vol. 3, pp. 211-212. 
17 See al-TaJi1 vol. 2, p. 258; al-Burhan. vol. 2. pp. 1144-1145. 
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mark) instead of dali l in their definition of tarj i h. 1ß This gives the 
impression that these words were utilized by the jurists because they 
indicate speculative implication known as zanni which contrasts with 
definitive implication known as gat'-i. Here tarjih is inapplicable since it 
has only one meaning and admits of no other interpretations. 19 Hence 
the only evidence that is applicable to tarjih is the one which has not yet 
acquired a binding implication. The question of whether tan i lj is or is not 
applicable to gat'i evidence has been briefly discussed in the foregoing 
chapter. As will be further elaborated soon, tarj i h, strictly speaking, is not 
applicable to gat'i evidence (at least in theory). However, as will be shown 
throughout the thesis, both gat'i and zannf evidence are neither sharply 
defined nor constantly applied in the works of usul. Moreover, the 
distinction between the two, on many occasions, is influenced by 
madhhab contention rather than by concrete argument. 
It is interesting also to note that the jurists have stated, as is 
evident from the definition, that tarj ih aims at reaching the strongest 
certain legal opinion (li yu'lam al-agwa). By this, they appear to contradict 
themselves when they first stated that tan ih is only confined to the zanni 
evidence whose result cannot be regarded as gat'i. In my opinion, the 
results of tarj ih in any cases of contradiction are no more than a 
presumptive or more probable implication thus liable to be argued. 
Accordingly, I would like to suggest the definition advanced by al-Juwayni 
as the most precise definition for it is more relevant and parallel to the 
nature of tarjih. He clearly stated that tarjih is merely a speculative 
18 Irshaci, p. 273. 
19 tali, Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 26. 
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preferability of some amarat (signs) over the others. 20 This means that a 
particular conclusion reached by tarj i h, in one way or another, could be 
challenged and rejected by another contrary strengthening because its 
implication is merely more likely or probable. In conclusion, tarjih is 
nothing other than a systematic effort by a mujtahid called a murajjih to 
show that one of the two conflicting pieces of evidence or arguments should 
be given more credence than the other for it is the more likely legal 
consequence. 21 
Before moving to other parts of the discussion, it seems necessary 
to devote some paragraphs to the relationship between tarjih and the so- 
called figh mugaran i. e. comparative study of Islamic law. On the one 
hand, one may argue that the latter is only another name for tar, jih, for 
both are interchangeably used to Indicate a process of evaluation or 
refinement of different legal rulings to arrive at the most acceptable. Or 
one may argue the contrary. Generally speaking, figh mugaran has two 
distinctive meanings in legal study. The first lies in the fact that it is 
merely collection and composition of varying legal opinions of cases in figh 
without attempting to evaluate the bases of these rulings. The second goes 
beyond this phenomenon whereby the collection of different legal rulings is 
always followed by an evaluation of legal bases of these rulings seeking a 
proper opinion (arjah ). 22 
The second meaning of ftgh muqaran, to a greater extent, is 
identical to tarj'ih in the point that the two share the same subject matter 
20 A[-Burhun, vol. 2, p. 1142. See also al-Ibhaj, vol. 3, p. 209. 
21 Al-Mankhul, p. 426. 
22 AI-1_1akim, al iiI. pp. 13,15. 
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i. e. figh. Also, both involve a process of evaluation. 23 Nevertheless, it is 
tarjih that constitues the kernel of figh mugaran for without tarjih i. e 
evaluation, figh is no longer comparative. In short, tarji h is the tool or 
instrument required to access a comparative study of figh. The relationship 
between the two can be illustrated by saying that, since tarji ih is a 
comparative study of usul al figh, 24 it is devoted to discussing comparative 
study of figh. Many classical works have been carried out to undertake 
the task of comparative study of fiqh in Islam. At the later stage, it 
becomes a distinct study of figh in the way that only some of the jurists 
are capable of producing this type of composition. Those who are qualified 
are commonly known as ashab al -tarj ih or ashab al-tashi h. 25 By this, it is 
quite clear that figh muqaran is a reflection of tarj i h. or rather, it is the 
practical implementation of tarj ih to conflicting cases in Islamic law. In 
other words, the difference between the two is an epistemological one 
tarjih is the mechanism through which comparative study of fiqh is 
conducted. 
23 Ibid., pp. 46-47. 
24 This is my personal conclusion since tarjij, from the viewpoint of legal 
thoery, would dominate the entire discussion of al figh al-mugaran See ibid. 
In this respect, one scholar has noted that in order to produce a qualified 
muraj/i1j, faculties of Shari'ah in Egypt have now introduced the subject of 
figh mugaran to the students. See Ahmad Fahmi Abu Sinnah, "Taqdim al- 
maslahah al-mutlagah 'ala al-Qur'an wa al-Sunnah', in MA, vol. 62, Mei 1990, 
p. 1026. 
25 See Abu Zahrah. U§uL p. 386. 
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The Hukm 26 of Tarjih 
In this part of our discussion, we shall examine the question of 
the validity of tarj i h. as viewed by the jurists. Our main aim will be the 
clarification of this principle in terms of validity or invalidity in removing 
any cases of legal contradiction. For this purpose, we shall consult the 
ideas which were expressed in the classical books of usul. 
Generally speaking, a detailed survey of this matter has revealed 
that the jurists were not of the same view regarding the matter. This 
prompts us to elaborate this disagreement more and the arguments 
adduced by each side in order to justify their points of view. In this 
context, it has been said that disagreement occurred between the majority 
and some unnamed jurists. 27 
The majority of jurists or simply the Jumhur were of the opinion 
that tarj ih is legally valid and moreover, an obligatory practice to be 
undertaken with reference to the most explicit indication, called raji. 28 
Some unnamed jurists who contended that tarjih is an unacceptable 
method of solving conflicting pieces of evidence have raised however, an 
26 For the meaning of F, ukrn. see page 55, note no. 21. 
27 AL-Tc il, vol. 2. p. 257. 
28 Al-Amidi, al-IFjkam, vol. 3. p. 257; Iyabah. p. 418; ol-Muwafagat, vol. 4. 
13,140-147 ; Muntaha. p. 222. 
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objection to the applicability of tarji h. 29 Instead of tarj i h, the so-called 
takhyir and/or tawaqquf should be applied in such cases. 30 
To arrive at a sound judgement, the primary task is to study all 
the arguments presented by both sides. The jumhur , in order to maintain 
their point of view, have referred to the practice of the Companions. Their 
aim is to show that tar, j ih was commonly accepted and practised by the 
Companions arguing that if tarjih was illegal, the Companions would 
certainly have abstained from practising it. 
To this purpose, several instances and incidents have been 
frequently quoted. 31 One scholar has remarked that the salaf were 
unanimously agreed on the need to grant preference to some solitary 
tradition i. e. transmitted by a single person, over other transmissions for 
example, in a case when it is reported on the authority of the Prophet's 
wives over the one reported by other women or even over the report which 
came through a well-known transmitter like Abu Hurayrah, provided that 
all the contradictory ahadith concern the Prophet's family affairs. 32 
'Ä'ishah and Umm Salamah, for example, reported that the Prophet used 
to start fasting in the morning when he was still in a state of janabah 
(ritually impure). 33 Abu Hurayrah, however, reported from the Prophet that 
29 See; d(-Ibhaj, vol. 3. p. 209 ; a! -Taj il, vol. 2, p. 257; a! -MahuL. vol. 2, p. 
444 ; Irsha4 p. 273. 
30 Ibid. 
31 See Al-Amidi, al-Iijkam, vol. 3. p. 257 ; al-Tajii, vol. 2, p. 257 ; al- 
Mankhui, p. 426. 
32 Al-Amid!, al-Ihkam. vol. 3, p. 257 ; al-Baji. Ihkam. pp. 645-646. 
33 [bid. ; al-TaF it. vol. 2, p. 257. 
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such a fast is invalid; "man asbaha junuban faia sauma iahu ". 34 The 
jurists, however, preferred the one which is reported by the Prophet's wives 
because as stated by al-Amidi, the Prophet's wives were the persons most 
likely to know what is actually said or done by the Prophet particularly in 
such private matters. 35 
The case of the "grandmother's succession" which happened in 
Abu Bakr's time was fully exploited in favour of the validity of tarjih. It 
was reported that Abu Bakr refused to give a "grandmother" any portion of 
the estate in terms of the law of succession even though he had been 
reminded of a hadith from al-Mughirah informing him of the Prophet's 
decision. However, after this particular hadith had been strengthened by 
Muhammad b. Maslamah's testimony, Abu Bakr gave her one-sixth of the 
property of the deceased. 36 Another similar event occurred between 'Umar, 
the second Caliph, and Abu Musa al-Ash'ari concerning the salam 
(greeting) and permission to enter the house. Abu Musa is reported to have 
gone to 'Umar's house and asked three times for permission to enter the 
house but there was no reply. Then, Abu Musa went away without entering 
'Umar's house. On the next day, 'Umar asked him about his failure to 
come to the house and Abu Musa simply replied with a hadi th that the 
Prophet had obliged those who had not been permitted after asking 
permission three times to enter one's house to return home. This report 
did not convince 'Umar. However, when this report was further supported 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. See also Subul al-Salam. vol. 1, p. 165. 
36 Al-TatlSiL vol. 2, p. 257. 
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by similar report from Abu Said al-Khudri, 'Umar accepted the excuse of 
Abu Musa. 37 
The jumhur have concluded from the above incidents that the 
zanni evidence i. e. h. a. dith ahad prevails and must be taken into account 
when it is strengthened by another element as shown by the agreed practice 
of the Companions. 38 In addition to what has been presented, the jumhur 
also based their argumentation on external considerations. According to 
them, one is required to prefer the most explicit indication (raji) or arjah ) 
in cases of conflict. This attitude, indeed, is supported by a legal 
inspiration conveyed by a hadith ; "What is considered good by the 
Muslims is also good in the eyes of All7ah". 39 Futhermore, any abstention 
from such a practice may necessarily signify preference for the 
preponderated (ma. rjuh ). Obviously, to prefer marjuh is unreasonable and 
unacceptable because the Shari'ah was not based on marjuh but on the 
most reliable evidence, called arjah40 
As previously mentioned, some unnamed jurists have suggested 
that takhyir and/or tawaqquf be applied whenever there appears to be a 
conflict. Tad i h, in their view, is invalid. Accordingly, I have looked through 
most of the available books on usui but the only name mentioned as the 
representative of this point of view was al-Basra, the author of al- 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ai-pmidi, al-IFjkam, vol. 3, p. 257. 
This is often quoted to be a F3adith of the Prophet. It is. however, more likely 
to be a saying of lbn Masud. (See Ahmad Hasan, Ijma', p. 37) 
40 Muntaha, p. 222 ; Irshad, p. 274. 
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Mu'tamad. 41 It became more complicated when al- Juwayni openly refuted 
this claim by saying that he himself could not find such an opinion in any 
of al-Basri's writings even though he had attempted to trace it. 42 
In spite of our ignorance about those who held this view, I still 
intend to examine all the arguments used to invalidate tarji i. as a 
legitimate solution in legal conflict. The principal argument was based on 
what "they" called the similarity between tarjih and shahadah or 
bayyinah. 43 The latter is the process of reporting or justifying a case in 
court which is considered as zanni evidence. To this effect, tarj ih and 
shahadah are alike. Thus, since a single shahadah, in terms of the 
Islamic law of evidence should not be approved over another, the same rule 
applies to tarj i h. As a result, a qad i in court must pass judgement based 
on even a single complete shahadah without any hesitation as long as 
that particular shahadah is valid in accordance with the shahadah 
requirements. 44 Similarly, a mujtahid is allowed to select and adopt any 
conflicting legal opinions without looking first for any strengthening or 
extraneous support as long as that particular opinion has an adequate 
legal basis. In other words, there is no harm in doing so since tarj th is 
equivalent to testimony. 
41 At-Mankhul, p. 426 
Al-Jaburi, the editor of al-Baj i's Itjkam, has explained that the attribution of 
this attitude to al-Bari was made by al-Ghazali alone in his MankhuL 
According to many uiul works, this attribution, however, should go to Abu 
'Abd Allah a1-Baari al-Mu'tazili known as aI-Ju'L, and not to al-Baari, the 
author of al-Mu'tamad. (see al-Baj i, IFjlazm. p. 645, note no. 2) 
42 AI-Burhan, vol. 2. p. 1142. 
43 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 1143; al-Amidi, al-IfLkarm vol. 3, p. 257. 
44 Ibid. 
105 
It is also recorded that the opponents of tarj ih claimed that even 
the Prophet himself had passed judgement based on the zahir when he 
said ;" We pass our judgement based on the zahir (nahkum bi at - 
zawahir )". 45 Moreover, they have interpreted the word zahir as marjuh 
and therefore, the tradition clearly shows the validity of applying the 
marjuh instead of the rajah or arjah. 46 Not only that, a Qur'anic verse 
(Q. 59: 2) which reads as follows: "So learn a lesson, 0 ye who have eyes", is 
quoted to support their viewpoint. The verse urges Muslims to take stock 
of everything or to take i'tibar on any matter. According to them, the verse 
obliges us only to have a general consideration without any futher 
searching for the purpose of strengthening. 47 
Nevertheless, the jumhur rejected all the above arguments. The 
claim of the similarity between tarj ih and shahadah is baseless because 
the latter is totally different from the former. As stated in the Islamic law 
of evidence, shahadah must be performed in court in a strict verbal manner 
and by a fixed number of persons. Otherwise, that particular shahadah is 
deemed invalid. 48 Tarjih, on the contrary, is not subject to such 
conditions. Therefore, it has been argued that shahadah, unlike tarj i h, is a 
purely legal imposition (ta'abbud) that has been detailed by the Shari'ah 
from the very beginning. To this effect, they are not equivalent. 49 
45 A1-Tahs il, vol. 2, p. 258. 
46 Al-Amid i. al-1h m, vol. 3, p. 257. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Muntahq p. 222 ; al-Baja, Ihkam. p. 646. 
49 Al-Mustafa, vol. 2, p. 394 ; Badran, TarjiFj, p. 67. 
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Regarding the issue of zahir, al-Ämidi explained that zahir 
occurring in the tradition carries the meaning of "preference for something 
over the other". In other words, when there appears to be more than one 
report or evidence in the court, the one which is supported by another 
element is then considered as zahir while the other is no longer valid as 
zahir. 50 The Qur'anic verse used by the opponents of tad 7i h is irrelevant to 
the question concerned since the verse has no connection with tarjih 
Assuming that the verse has some relation to tarjih, it remains incapable of 
invalidating tarj ih because the verse amounts only to probability i. e. zanni, 
while the basis of tarjih is gat'i as constituted by the consensus of the 
Companions. 51 Moreover, it is clear too that the obligation to take i'tibar 
did not necessarily indicate that the practice of tarjih was prohibited. 52 
Finally, we can state that tarjih is permissible in Islamic legal 
theory and has been practised by Islamic scholarship throughout the 
centuries especially in the so-called figh muqaran. The zanni indication of 
tarjih, however, does not work against its validity because Sunni 
On the other hand, al-Basra and al-Juwaynt have pointed out respectively 
that Malik did prefer one of two testimonies by considering the large number 
of those who witnessed ( al-Mu'tamad. vol. 2. p. 676 ; al-Burhan. vol. 2, p. 
1143) 
50 Al-Amid i. al-Ibkam. vol. 3, p. 258. See also Badran. Tarjijj. p. 66; 'lwaj. 
Dirasa , p. 423. 
51 At-Mustasfa. vol. 2, p. 394; al-Burhan, vol. 2. p. 1142 ; Irshad. p. 274. 
52 Al-midi, al-IFjkam, vol. 3, p. 257. 
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jurisprudence has affirmed the principle that considered opinion Lzann) is 
binding in matters of law ; "al-tann wajib al-Mbar fi al-Shan"'. 53 
The Conditions of Tarjih. 
Having approved the application of tarji h to remove legal 
contradiction, the jurists have demanded, however, that certain conditions 
be met before tarjih is counted as approved. As mentioned, tarjih will in 
one way or another overthrow one of the conflicting pieces of evidence; the 
marjuh. This phenomenon appears to clash with the principle commonly 
accepted amongst the jurists that legal evidence is revealed to be fully 
applied and any opposite attitude is strongly resisted. 54 However, according 
to them, a mujtahid is allowed to have recourse to tarj ih only in cases of 
da. rurah. 55 Hence, the conditions laid down are necessary to ensure that 
tarj ih is applied at the correct time and in the correct situation. In short, 
resort to tarj ih is permissible only when it is necessary. 
By examining the definition of tarj i h, one can easily discover 
certain conditions which are prerequisite to its application. Contradiction 
(ta'arud) of evidence is believed to be the most explicit condition requiring 
resort to tar- iii. Indeed, this subject has been frequently discussed together 
53 A-Zuhayli, UUui, vol. 2. p. 762 ; idem, Taqnin, p. 16 ; Weiss 
"Interpretation", p. 204. 
It is interesting to note that even in common law, the validity as well as the 
necessity of preference in order to maintain conflicting interpretations arising 
from a precedent case is acknowledged. For further details, see Glanville 
Williams, Learning the Law, London, 1982, pp. 97-111. 
54 Hitu, al-Waji4 p. 474. 
55 Ibid. 
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with tarjih in a chapter called al-ta'arud wa al-tarjih. 56 Contradiction 
occurs when each of two pieces of evidence of equal strength requires the 
contrary of the other. 57 Some scholars have added to this particular 
condition saying that equal contradiction must occur in respect of time 
and place i. e. at the same time and place. 58 This additional condition, in 
my opinion, is no more than a further explanation of an equal 
contradiction itself because two different elements of evidence which are 
contradictory to each other but whose respective rulings refer to different 
circumstances are not in actual contradiction. 
Regarding the occurrence of contradiction in the same time and 
place, the jurists have held that the opposite situation will change the 
contradiction to an apparent conflict (i. e. not genuine). 59 The prohibition 
of sale or any contract during the call to Friday prayer60 is the best 
example of the above. This prohibition is deemed to be confronted by the 
general validity of sale. 61 This contradiction, however, as stated earlier, is 
unreal because prohibition as well as permissibility refer to a different time 
and situation; prohibition of sale is restricted only to a particular time. 
56 See for example al-Mustasfa, vol. 1, pp. 392-407; al-Ibhaj. vol. 3, pp. 199- 
246 ; Zaydan, al-Wajiz, pp. 393-398. 
57 Kamali, Islamic Jurisprudence. p. 450. 
581rshad p. 273. 
Ibn Amir al-Häjj notes that conditions which are laid down to ensure the 
genuineness of conflict are merely superficial since there is no real conflict in 
Islamic law. (al-Tagrir, vol. 3. pp. 2-3) 
59 Ibid. 
60 This rule is based on Q. 63: 9. 
61 On the contrary, the validity of sale is confirmed by another verse i. e. Q. 2: 
275. 
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namely Friday prayer, while at all other times, sale is absolutely valid and 
permissible. 62 Since there is no genuine contradiction, tarj ih is invalid if 
applied. 
Going back to the question of equality of two pieces of evidence 
involved in conflict, we may simply say that two unequal pieces of evidence 
which apparently contradict each other are not in genuine conflict. 
Consequently, tarjih is unnecessary in this situation owing to the fact that 
the stronger of them would naturally prevail from the very beginning even 
without any recourse to tarj i h. 63 Accordingly, no genuine contradiction 
takes place between gat`i and zanni or between nass and ijma' or qiyas 
since the text is qat' i and therefore, always prevails. 
On this occasion, I shall discuss the above condition in greater 
detail. Broadly speaking, there is nothing worthy of review on the problem 
of equality of evidence. As would be expected, the stronger always 
supersedes because it is the rule (or even the nature ) of the evidence. 
But, when one scholar, basing his viewpoint on the problem of equality of 
evidence, clarifies that there is no contradiction between 'amm and khass 
or between mutlaq and muqayyad and other similar subjects which are 
commonly discussed in the course of conflict and tarj i h, one is forced to 
understand precisely what is intended by the equality of evidence in terms 
of tarj ih condition. According to this scholar, as far as equality of evidence 
( tasawi al-adillah) is required, the previous cases are not entitled to be 
62 Al-lab ari. Jami', vol. 28, pp 101- 102 ; al-Qurtubi, al-Jami'. vol. 18. pp. 
107-108; Irshad. p. 273. 
63 mal t, Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 450; 'Iwad, Dirasät, p. 32. 
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removed by tarjih. 64 Suprisingly, however, one can see that most of the 
cases of conflict and tarj ih throughout the works of usul are typically taken 
from the aforementioned discussions such as 'amm - khans conflict and the 
like. Hence it warrants further investigation. 
To begin with, I must say that the general statement that no 
contradiction exists berween gaa'i and zanni is merely acceptable in theory 
but not in the more practical sense. As stated previously, the individuals 
as well as the schools of law do not have a commonly agreed criterion at 
their disposal to distinguish these two categories of evidence accurately. 65 
Thus, a gaf'i for one school of law is not necessarily a qat'i in another 
school of law or even in the same school of law among its individual 
jurists. 66 Presenting the case of 'amm -kha, FA contradiction as an 
example, we may say that, even though it is true that khass prevails in 
most cases of conflict, the prevalence of khan is not necessarily based on 
its definitive implication (gaa'f) but may be on other factors. Moreover, 
as we shall see, the determination of the strength of both 'amm and khan 
varies from one school to another67 which renders preference, on the basis 
of the qaf' i and , dann 
i consideration, inaccurate. 
A further point is that 'amm- kho, contradiction and other 
similar contradictions, in my opinion, are to be removed by tarj ih for at 
least, one major reason which justified the application of tarjilh. First of 
all, the classification of the words followed by the knowledge of their 
64 Al-? lagrir, vol. 3, p. 3. 
65 See page 51-52. 
66 See page 52. 
67 See pages 168-171. 
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strength or the grades of the isnad attributed to them can be known to 
the mura,, jjih only after an attempt has been made to sift out from many 
possible meanings the one interpretation that is the most likely 
interpretation or to decide the most reliable isnad. Before that, one is 
uncertain as to the degree of strength of the words or isnads involved in a 
conflict. It is the role of murajjih to examine whether a particular word or 
isnad is stronger or otherwise. 68 Consequently, we can conclude that 
whenever there appears to be a conflict between two pieces of evidence, a 
solution is immediately required to remove this conflict regardless of 
whether the contradiction is genuine or not. 
Similar to the above question, it is widely proposed that tarp' ih is 
not valid in the case of the gat'i - gat'i contradiction since gat'i cannot 
contradict gat'i. 69 It is explained that gat'i evidence is not open to any 
alternative meaning or interpretation except its definite meaning. In 
consequence, the conflict between two pieces of gat'i evidence is impossible 
unless in case of abrogation. 70 In other words, tarjih which aims at 
strengthening one of two conflicting pieces of evidence is confined to zanni 
evidence only because its indication is uncertain and therefore, open to 
being strengthened by any indication. In turn, if there appears to be a 
contradiction between two elements of gat'i evidence, there Is no room for 
tarjih to remove this conflict because the case is applicable only to naskh 
as previously mentioned. Again, in this particular condition, we are 
confronted with the same problem which is how to make an accurate 
68 Al-ffafnawi, al-Taijiji, p. 45 ; 'Iwad. Dirasc-t, pp. 32-33. 
69 AL-Burhan, vol. 2, pp. 1143-1144; a1-Mustas/u, vol. 2, p. 393 ; Nihayak vol. 
3, p. 213 
70 A[ Mustc fa, vol. 2. pp. 392-393 ; RauwaJi, p. 208. 
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judgement upon whether a certain evidence is gat'i or tannt and therefore, 
tarjih is or is not applicable. In my conclusion, I agree that a gat'i 
cannot contradict another gat'i but this does not prevent us re -examining 
the classification attributed to each single evidence when they are 
conflicting. 7' Also, in my opinion, as will be evident later, naskh is invalid 
in its application as long as tarjih is capable of removing the conflict 
whether the evidences involved in that conflict are zanni or qa. 'i. 
The following condition, to some extent, does no more than 
explain the details of contradiction. It is said that the two conflicting 
pieces of evidence must be proved first to be incapable of being reconciled. 72 
If they can be distinguished from each other whether in respect of their 
subject matter or time or any other perspective, there is no need for tarj its. 
The previous case i. e. prohibition of sale at the Friday prayer time suffices 
to illustrate the process of reconciliation. In other words, tarjih is invalid 
unless the process to reconcile two confllicting pieces of evidence failed. 
Reconciliation (al jam') always prevails because other legal solutions such 
as naskh, tarjit., takhyir, etc., lack the authority to remove any conflicts 
whatsoever as long as aljam' is capable of doing so. 73 
71 In this regard, al-Isnawi has said that" a general statement that tarjih is 
not valid in definite matters is questionable". (see Nihayah. vol. 3, p. 214) 
72 Ghayat al-U§ul, p. 141; a1-Matýsul, vol. 2. P. 449 ; Nihayah. vol. 3, pp. 214- 
215. 
73 Al-Mbar, pp. 9-11 : Nihayah, vol. 3, p. 215. 
113 
For it to be valid, tarji 1j must also be accompanied by an 
indication that a particular evidence is superior to the other. 74 The reason 
why this is believed to be necessary has been supplied by one scholar. He 
says it is the general rule that every attitude that is not original in 
character should be supported by an indication to make it valid and 
acceptable. On the contrary, everything which is original needs no such 
requirement. Since tarjih is not originally intended in terms of evidence 
application because tarji h will necessarily abandon one of two 
contradictory pieces of evidence, it requires a clear justification in legal 
practice. 75 Accordingly, it is not sufficient or acceptable to justify a 
preference on the basis of sport (lahw) or in order to satisfy the murajjih's 
whim and fancy. Therefore, in the course of conflict and preference, a 
muraijih must clarify his basis for awarding the approval to a particular 
evidence. 76 In this context, if a jurist cannot find a solid indication from 
which to make a preference, he simply quotes these conflicting rulings as 
well as their bases and arguments without giving any strict preference. 
Al-Shafi'i himself, for example, faced certain legal conflicts which lack 
relevant indications of tarj ih and accordingly, these cases are recorded 
together with their different legal decisions without any preference at all. 77 
74 Al-Burhan, vol. 2. p. 1145 ; Khalfan, a1-Usu1. p. 359 ; Jalal al-D in. al- 
Qa. di a1 Baysjaw i. p. 4; 'iwad. " Baiith fi at- ta'arud wa al-tarj ih ". in AS, 
vol. 8.1397 H. p. 286. (cited after as "al T. 'arud 1 
75 See al-Darini, alManahij, p. 199. 
76 See page 33. 
77 A[-Loma pp. 77-78 ; al-Badakhshi. Manahij, vol. 3. p. 208; Abu Zahrah. 
aL-Sha. T'i, pp. 157-158. 
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On the other hand, the jurists have noted also that tarji h is 
relevant only to the so-called abkam 'ama. liyyah (practical rules). 78 Hence, 
tarj ih is inapplicable to theological and logical ('agliyat) conflicts. 79 This 
means that ta['fII is unnecessary in a conflict which does not lead to any 
practical action. For this reason, I believe, the jurists had already 
mentioned it when they explained the meaning of tarjih 80 in order to 
maintain from the very beginning that tarji h is concerned only with 
practical rules called figh. This condition is commonly accepted on the 
grounds that tad7ih is not an independent discipline but an integral part 
of usul al-figh which is primarily concerned with of al al-mukallaftn. 81 
It would be better to sketch briefly some "pre-conditions" that are 
equally important to the muraijitj. I consider the following matters to be 
merely pre-condition or "Glob " for they are neither stated in the definition 
of tarjith nor deliberately discussed by the usulists. They are important to 
ensure that the findings and the result of tarji h application will not 
contain any possible room for error as well as to make the findings more 
objective and more probable. In this regard, four elements are believed to 
have a significant role to play. A murajjitj, first of all, should be as 
objective as possible in examining legal conflict. No other interest should 
78 Nihayah, vol. 3, p. 212 ; al-Badakhshi. ManahU. vol. 3, p. 211 ; Hitu, al- 
Waj iz, p. 473 ; Iwan, " al-TZa. 'anu". p. 286. 
79 Al-Burhan. vol. 2, p. 11444 ; a1-T Ithil. vol. 2. p. 258 ; a! -MankhuL p. 427. 
80 See page 94. 
81 Al-Mugaddimah, vol. 3. p. 3; Aghnides. Theories, pp. 26-29. 
The question of preference of one madhhab over the other is also discussed in 
uu1 books. Al-Juwayni, for example, argued that the u. Eul of al-Shaß'i is 
superior to those of others. (a-Burhan, vol. 2, pp. 1148-1155) For details, see 
at-Mankhul'. p. 427 ; Badran. Tarj ih. p. 70. 
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co-exist in his purpose of examining legal conflict than to arrive at what 
is the most likely interpretation to deserve full adherence. Then, he himself 
should avoid having a pre-conceived and pre-determined bias for a 
particular legal ruling or madhhab. Also important is that the murajih 
should be well versed in the skill of argumentation and counter 
argumentation (dialectics) and with the hierarchical order of legal evidence. 
The final element requires a murajfih to be familiar with the so-called fiqh 
mugaran, 82 
Finally, it is noticeable that these conditions, most of which are 
extracted from the definition of tarjih, remained widely debated amongst 
the jurists and thus, still lead to great dispute. This was caused by their 
long discussion about the classification of legal evidence i. e. whether a 
particular evidence is gati or zann7i. 83 As we shall see in the following 
chapters, cases in figh are filled with this kind of dispute. 
82 See al-Mugaddimah. vol. 3, p. 32 ; al-Hakim, al-U5ul. p. 19. 
83 For details, see chapter four particularly pp. 166f . 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PART B 
A COMPARISON BETWEEN TARJIHAND OTHER SIMILAR TERMS 
Introduction: 
This section seeks to draw a proper distinction between tarjih 
and some terms similar to it, namely tafsir /ta'wil, to fiq, istihsan and 
naskh. It is necessary to do so because tarjih might be confused with 
these terms which are also common in terms of preference. It is true also 
that these terms were not sharply defined in the early period of usul 
literature but were used interchangeably. Not only that, but they 
coincide with one another even in current writings on this discipline. For 
these reasons, I feel that an explanation of the similarity and dissimilarity 
between tarj ih and these "confusing" terms is vital for the purpose of 
comparison i. e. in order not to confuse tad ih with others which to a 
considerable extent, bear the same idea and concept. These 'confusing' 
terms are as follows. 
Tafsir and Ta'wi 1. 
The verbal form of tafsir is fassar, to explain. I Explanation and 
clarification are quite synonymous and equivalent to tafsir. 2 According to 
the lexicographer Lane, tafs ir means clarification of the meaning of the 
mushkil (unclear) word. 3 Before tafsir became a technical term for 
1 Ibn Manzur, Lisan, vol. 5. p. 55, al-Rani, al. Sihah. p. 503. 
2 See Q. 25: 33 ; Badran, Bayan, p. 97. 
3 Lane, Lexicon, part 6, p. 2397. 
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Qur'anic exegesis, it was used to refer to the explanation or commentary of 
any book. 4 Later, when religious knowledge had already been divided into 
various branches, tafs ir as well as other terms acquired a standard 
meaning. In this regard, tafs ir has been defined as an explanation of a 
verse's meaning together with its situation and its occasion of revelation. 5 
According to al-Zarkashi, tafs fr is knowledge necessary to the 
understanding of the Qur'an revealed to the Prophet and to explain its 
meaning as well as to deduce its rulings and wisdom. 6 This knowledge 
comes through the study of language, principles of jurisprudence and also 
the science of recitation. A knowledge of the background of the revelation 
and of abrogating and abrogated verses is also necessary in tafsir. 7 
In addition to tafsir, another word, ta'wi1 is frequently used by 
scholars particularly the mufassirun. Ta'wil literally indicates the sense of 
returning. 8 Technically, it has been distinguished on the basis of the 
usage of the earlier scholars, called sauf and the later called khataf which 
is commonly attributed to jurists and theologians. 9 Ta'wil according to 
the former is merely an explanation of the speech, whether it suits the 
4 Julandri, "Qur'anic exegesis and classical tafsir ". in IQ, vol. 12,1968. p. 
73 ; Hughes. Dictionary of Islam. p. 264. 
5 Al- Jui jan i, Kitab at-Ta'rifat, p. 65. 
6 Al-Zarkash i, al-Burhan fi 'UIum a[-man. vol. 1. p. 13. 
7 Grunebaum, Islam. P. 88. See also Demonbynes, Muslim Institu ris, p. 65. 
8 Lane, Lexicon, part 1. p. 125 ; Ibn Manzur. Lisan. vol. 11, p. 32 ; al-_, ciabun1. 
al-Tibyar4 p. 62. 
9 AI-Dhahabi, a! -Tafsir. vol. 1, pp. 17-18 ; al-Darini, al-Manahij, p. 177. 
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apparent meaning or not. 10 It is presumably on this basis that ta'wil is 
identical with tafs fr where both have the meaning "explanation". 11 
The chief argument that tafsir and ta'wil are synonymous is that 
it has been reported that the Prophet prayed for Ibn 'Abbas; "May Allah 
make him comprehend religious matters and make him know the 
ta'wil". 12 Since 'Abd Allah ibn 'Abbas is widely recognised as the best 
commentator on the Qur'an, ta'wii in the tradition clearly refers to tafsir. 
Furthermore, many of the mufassirun have used ta'wil instead of tafsir 
and vice-versa where al-Tabari's tafsir is one of the most excellent 
examples of this. 13 
The khalaf, however, maintains that ta'w iI is a diversion of the 
word or phrase from its literal and apparent meaning to another meaning 
indicated by an indication. 14 In other words, it reads the word or phrase 
in a way that is not implied by its linguistic structure and upholds this 
"new meaning" . 
15 
10 Ibid 
11 Ibn Manzur Lisan. vol. 11. p. 33 ; Lane, Lexicon. part 1. pp. 126-127. 
12A1-Dhahabi, al-Tafsir. p. 18 ; al-, Ejabuni, al-Tibyan. p. 62. 
The text and translation of the 1jadith are quoted from Hughes, Dictionary of 
Islam, p. 197. 
13 AI-, 5abuni, al-Tibyan. p. 62. 
See also Cooper in his Introduction to the translated work of al-Tabari's Jami' 
al-Bayan. p. xiii. 
14 Al-Bäji, Ihka. rn, p. 49 ; Abu Zahrah, Usul, p. 135. 
15 A]-Dar-in-i, al-Manahij, p. 18. 
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Accordingly, efforts were made to distinguish between these two 
words. Al-Asfahani, for instance, prescribes that tafsi r is more general 
than ta'wil ; whereas tafsir is usually used with reference to the words, 
ta'w il is used of the sense. In addition, tafs ir is commonly used in all 
types of book, while ta'wil is widely used in theology books only. is Al_ 
Maturidi, on the other hand, believes that tafs r deals with the definitive 
meaning of words while ta'wil is concerned with selecting one of the 
presumptive meanings over the other. 17 For some scholars, tafsir 
primarily concerns the sanad or chain of transmission and ta'wil on the 
contrary, deals with matn or text. 18 
In my opinion, the above illustrations in one way or another, do 
distinguish between tafsir and ta'wil. However, the distinction made by 
al-Sabuni, a modern scholar in tafsir is more accurate. According to 
him, tafs ir refers to the explicit meaning of the Qur'an, while ta'w ii is 
concerned with the unclear meaning of the Qur'an. 19 Obviously, the later 
demands an interpretative effort i. e. ytihad , to undertand what is intended 
by such a word since it usually goes beyond the literal meaning of its 
linguistic capacity. 20 To put it differently, although both share the same 
basic purpose of clarifying the law and discovering the intention of the 
Shari 'ah in the light of certain indications, tafs ir in particular, is 
16 AI-Itgan, vol. 2, p. 173. 
17 Ibid. 
18 AI-Dhahabi. al-Tafsir. vol. 1. p. 22. 
19 AI-Sabun i, al-Tlbyan pp. 62-63. 
20 According to al-Darini, ta'wil constitutes the most creative method of 
gtihad particularly in cases of conflicting indications. At the further step, 
takte, i. s Is the most frequent type of ta'wil used in ijitihad (see al-Manahij/, p. 
212) 
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based on definitive indications in the text which provide the necessary 
explanation to a legal text. Beyond this, all other interpretations are 
based on reasoning which is assigned to ta'wi1.21 Moreover, in the 
context of usul aI-figh, especially in relation to tad iih, it is ta'w ii rather 
than tafsir with which we are primarily concerned. 22 
Let us examine one of the most distinguished cases in figh for. 
the purpose of comparison. A companion, Firus al-Daylami, who 
embraced Islam while he was married to two sisters, was ordered by the 
Prophet to retain (amsik) one of the sisters as he wished and to separate 
from the other. 23 The Hanafis have interpreted this tradition in 
accordance with ta'wil. They said that al-Daylami was asked to re-marry 
one of the sisters and to separate from the other. 24 This particular rule of 
interpretation, called ta'wi1 is employed by the Hanafis on the ground 
that Islamic law does not permit two sisters to be married in a single 
contract or at the same time. Other jurists, however, disagreed with this 
conclusion because this sort of interpretation is not confirmed by the 
wording of the tradition. The wording is clear to show the continuity of the 
existing marriage, even it was illegally concluded, when the Prophet 
simply said; "amsik ma tasha' wafariq al-ukhra ". 25 In other words, had 
21 Kamal i. Islamic Jurisprudence, pp. 111-112. 
22 Ibid. p. 112. 
23 AI-Amid-i, al-I. Jaan vol. 2. p. 54 ; al-Bayhagi. al-Sunan. vol. 7. p. 183 
al-Tibrizi. Mishkat, vol. 3. p. 56. 
24 AL. Mank U4 p. 187. 
25 Ibid. 
A lengthy explanation of the bases underlying this preference can be found in 
al-Mesta b., vol. 1. pp. 389-394) 
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the Prophet wanted him to divorce both two sisters, and only marry or re- 
marry one of them, he would have said so explicitly. 
A more satisfactory example occurs in the Prophetic statement 
that is "For every forty sheep, one has to pay one ewe". The tradition in 
question, according to the Shafi'is, requires those who possess forty sheep 
to pay their zakat, that is, one ewe. One Is not permitted to pay the 
"value" of this one ewe simply because the word "sheep" specifically 
excludes any possibility of other interpretations such as the "value" of the 
sheep. This view is shared by the Hanafis but instead of paying one ewe, 
one can also fulfil the zakat requirement by paying the "value" of this one 
ewe. The Hanafis have re-interpreted the hadith in question (i. e. ta'wii) 
based principally on the purpose behind the requirement of zakat in 
Islam. Its foremost purpose, no doubt, is to meet the need of the poor 
and the needy in society. The value or the money can, as it appeared to 
the Hanafis, fulfil this purpose more significantly because by money, the 
needy can buy the necessities of life such as clothes, foods, medicines, 
etc. 26 
Judging by the foregoing argument, it seems that the Hanafi 
contention is more acceptable since it not only suits the purpose, or the 
hikmah, of zakat legislation but also has been supported by a precedent 
at the time of the Prophet. Mu'adh, the judge appointed by the Prophet in 
Yemen, collected clothes from the people of Yemen whose property i. e. 
wheat and barley, were of zakatable amount. These clothes were later 
distributed among the people of Madinah. Mu'adh did this arguing that 
26 Al-Dart ni, al-Manta; j, pp. 209-211. Cf. al-Burhan vol. 2. p. 1150. 
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clothes were more suitable to the people of Madinah at that time because 
they were in great need of clothes and not of wheat or barley. 27 
As far as comparison is concerned, we can see how ta'wil was 
used by the Hanafi jurists for their legal interpretation to prevail. This 
conclusion certainly helps us to clarify that tafs ir or ta'w it in particular, 
are used to support a legal interpretation i. e. to make a commitment 
between two conflicting legal interpretations. Hence, as will be evident 
later, ta'w il is fully employed as a form of tarj ih particularly in matn 
contradiction. Therefore, ta'w il is no more than a method of tarj i h. 
Taiflq. 
As a term in Islamic legal theory, talfiq can be found only in the 
modern literature of Islamic law, particularly among the so-called 
"reformers". 28 Literally, it signifies picking things up from different places 
or sewing two things together to produce a complete article or cloth. 29 
Therefore, in relation to u6ul al-Ah, taifiq suggests a kind of selection 
between different varying opinions of Muslim jurists in order to recognize 
only the best juristic opinion. This suggestion has been confirmed by 
many scholars when they stated that talfiq is an eclectic selection of 
27 Ibid. 
These have led al-Ghazali, one of the leading Shafi'is, to argue In favour of the 
jianafi legal opinion. (see al-Mustafa, vol. 1, pp. 395-399) 
28 See for example, Kerr, Islamic Reform. pp. 216-217 ; Esposito, "Reform". p. 
20 ; Layish, "The contribution of the modernists to the secularization of 
Islamic law". in MES, vol. 14.1978, p. 263 (cited after as "The Contribution") 
29 AI-MunJid. p. 777 ; al-Bustani. Mutji. vol. 2. p. 1908 ; al-Razi . al,. ihaLl p. 
601. 
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provisions from several of the four Sunni schools or even from the 
opinions of medieval jurists outside the schoool. 30 
According to this doctrine, one might adopt the opinion of any 
recognized faq ih which appears to be the most authentic and correct 
ytihad. 31 As a matter of fact, to fiq according to Coulson is the third 
and final aspect of takhayyur ; the process of selection adopted by the 
Ottoman Majaüa. 32 The first and most natural step is to consider the 
dominant doctrine of one of the three other Sunnite schools as a possible 
alternative to the existing Hanaff law. The second stage of selection is the 
consideration of any individual jurist's opinion which had preceded or was 
in conflict with the dominant doctrines of the four Sunnite schools as a 
whole. 33 It should be noted that this selection is restricted to the 
establishment or the codification of the Ottoman Majalla which Is 
restrictively based on the Hanafi standpoint. According to Coulson, 
however, talfiq as a part of takhayyur is the selection of views on the 
basis of their suitability for modern conditions. 34 In both situations i. e. 
irrespective of whether to fiq selects what is the most reliable legal 
interpretation or the one that suits the modern implementation most, 
talfiq involves only a limited ijtihad. 35 
30 Kerr. Islamic Reform, p. 216. 
31 guadri, "Traditions of taglid and taifiq", in IC. vol. 57. no. 2.1983, p. 
123. (cited after as "Talft 4" 
32 Coulson. A History, p. 197. 
33 Ibid., p. 185. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Kerr, Islamic Reform, p. 217. 
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The exercise of talfiq however, remained a controversial question 
amongst the scholars from two perspectives. As regards validity, one 
scholar has maintained that talfiq was commonly practised by the 
Muslims prior to the formation of the different schools of law. 36 At the 
present time, this doctrine, as applied to Islamic jurisprudence, is the best 
means of solving probems arising in modern Muslim life. 37 A Muslim is 
permitted to follow the views of various great jurists in different 
particulars but only on condition that his motive in picking and choosing 
between the rules of different jurists must not be to make a mere sport of 
the law or to satisfy his every whim and fancy. 38 On the contrary, some 
scholars declared that it is invalid and illegal for anyone to adopt any legal 
opinion from outside his school of law particularly after the formation of 
the four orthodox schools of law. 39 Naturally, to follow strictly a 
36 Quadri, "Talfict', p. 123. 
37 Ibid. 
The doctrine of talfiq has been totally employed in the present civil code in 
many Middle-East countries. Talfiq, however, in certain circumstances has 
been applied in a wider sense of selection. For instance, the present Eyptian 
civil code was the product of a group of jurists headed by 'Abd al-Razzaq al- 
Sanhuri based on (I) appropriate features of European codes particularly the 
French and German, (ii) juridical precedent in Egypt since 1850 and (iii) Islamic 
law. (see Kerr, Islamic Reform. p. 218) Further details can be found in al- 
Sanhürl's "Widub tang ih al-ganun al-madani wa 'ala ayy asas yakun hadha al- 
tangih2 ", in Majalla. t al-Qanun wa al-Igtj o4 1936, vol. 6. pp. 3-144 
38 Anderson, "Recent Development ", p. 250. See also al-Mawruw i, al-Qawl at- 
Sad id. pp. 44,79-84. 
39 See Shah Wali Allah, al-Irzaf, as cited in Quadri, 'Traditions of taglid and 
talfiq", in IC, vol. 57, no. 1.1983. p. 39. 
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particular madhhab is obligatory for anyone who is incompetent to 
exercise ytitwd i. e. laymen. 40 
The second disputation lies in the valid scope of exercising talfiq. 
Broadly speaking, one might follow one school of law in marriage 
procedure, another in determining inheritance and still another in 
performing prayers or in other sections of Islamic law. 41 This attitude has 
been fully approved by those who are of the opinion that talff q is 
permissible and may validly be practised. For those who invalidate talfiq 
from the very beginning, such an attitude would be null. The actual 
disagreement intended here is related to the question of whether one is 
allowed to adopt any legal opinion in a single process e. g. marriage 
procedure. In this regard, Schacht has told us that according to some 
scholars, one Is allowed to follow the doctrine of the chosen school only 
in all aspects until the act's completion. 42 In the case of marriage, for 
instance, it would not be acceptable to follow Hanafi rules governing 
consent and Shafi`i's rules on the dowry. 43 On the other hand, the 
modernists have disregarded this restriction. According to them, even in a 
single procedure, one is allowed to adopt different legal views from different 
jurists or schools of law without any hesitation. 44 
40 Ibid. See also EI 1, vol. 4. p. 630. 
41 Kerr. Islamic Reform. p. 216. See also Mahmas an i, Falsafah. p. 98. 
42 Schacht, Introduction. p. 68. note no. 1. See also al-Zuhayli, al-FIgh, vol. 1, 
p. 65 (citing the view of Ibn fjajr) 
43 Kerr, Islamic Reform. p. 216. 
44 Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Fhtawa, vol. 2, p. 387 (as cited by Coulson, Conflicts, p. 
34) ; Schacht, Introduction, p. 68, note no. 1. 
For details, see Nyazee, " The scope of taglid in Islamic law", in IS, vol. 22, 
1983, pp. 24-26 (cited after as "Taglid') 
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One of the talfiq examples as recorded by Coulson, where many 
more are available, 45 is that of a Bombay High Court case of "Muhammad 
Ibrahim v. Ghulam Ahmad (1864) ". 46 Here, the marriage of a girl who 
had been brought up a Shafi'i and who had married without her father's 
consent, was held to be valid on the girl's assertion that she had become a 
Hanafi and had married as such. Hanafi law in fact is the only doctrine 
which permits an adult girl to conclude her own marriage contract without 
the intervention of her guardian. 47 
Generally speaking, talfiq coincides with tarjih or vice-versa. 
Some similarities between both could be summarised as follows. 
Obviously, both are formulated on the comparative study of different 
schools of law and the differing ytihads of the various recognized jurists. 
Moreover, the rules selected through talfiq are caused by mutually 
contradictory interpretations of the textual sources. 48 In addition, the 
role of to fiq is merely to choose between already existing rules of the four 
schools of law. 49 Again, this and that are also applicable to tarjih. 
No doubt, to fiq is merely concerned with the selection of certain 
rulings that already exist, to be applied to certain cases. To this effect, 
talfiq and tarjih are alike. However, the primary distinction between them 
refers to the bases of their respective operation. Most of the selections 
45 Coulson, A History. pp. 182-201. 
46 Ibid., p. 183 ; idem. Conflicts. p. 35. 
47 Ibid. See also Masud. "Ijba.? '. p. 224. 
48 Anderson, "Recent Development", p. 255. 
49 Kerr, Islamic Reform, p. 217 ; Muslim, "Islamization", p. 77. 
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made by talfiq, unlike tarjih, are not based on any methodological 
consideration of usul alJIgh other than maslahah. 50 On the contrary, 
tarj ih has a more significant role for it concerns the methodological 
aspects of Islamic legal theory in deducing the rulings. In other words, 
to. lfiq as suggested by its linguistic terminology simply signifies the 
process of selection and combination of the various legal opinions51 while 
tarjiii is more progressive having many potential discussions in the entire 
usul al-figh 
The above mentioned case; "Muhammad Ibrahim v. GhuIam 
Ahmad ", for example, can be reconsidered and re-examined in the light of 
tarjih methodology. Talfiq as previously mentioned, has selected the 
Hanafi point of view. Tarj i h, however, may prefer another point of view or 
perhaps the same rule as viewed by the Hanafis. The ruling itself is not 
the major concern of tarj ih rather it is how this preferred opinion can be 
achieved. In conclusion, tarji h is naturally centred upon the 
methodological arguments of Islamic legal theory and of course, certain 
methods are to be considered in practising tarj ib other than maslahah. 
Istihsan. 
As long as the major discussion of the thesis is tarjih, there is 
no need to give any special consideration to the so-called istilis an. 
50 Ibid. 
Another restriction. if it can be added. is that talfiq is applicable merely to 
family and property laws. See al-Mawruwi. al-Qawl al-Sadid, pp. 82-84; 
Muslim, "Islamization", p. 77. 
51 Ibid. 
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However, istihsan, which is an expression of personal preference, was 
eventually regarded as belonging to the category of tar. jih, the acceptance of 
one of two conflicting rules as "weightier" than the other. 52 Futhermore, 
many scholars have described istihsan as a juristic preference. 53 Thus a 
clear distinction between the two is necessary since both convey the 
meaning of preference. 
As a term used in usul al; figh, istihsan is frequently confused with 
the so-called istisiah as a result of their mutual relationship. Accordingly, 
no one ever seems to have reached a clear and lucid definition of either. 54 
However, I shall restrict myself solely to the principle of istihsan for it is 
more confusing to one considering tarj i h. Literally, istihsan comes from 
the root "hasuna " meaning "beautiful", "comely", "good", "pleasing" and 
other similar words. 55 However, in a broader sense, it means the 
application of discretion in a legal decision56 i. e. to think something 
acceptable. Hence the saying; "sarf hadha istihsan wa al-man' al-qiyas " 
52 AI-Muswaddah, p. 454 ; al-Loma'. p. 70 ; al-Amidi. al-Ijlkam, vol. 3, p. 
201 ; Weiss, "Interpretation", p. 202. 
53 G. Makdisi, "Ibn Taymiyya's autograph manuscript istihsan: materials for 
the study of Islamic legal theory". in Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of 
Hamilton A. R. Gibb. Leiden. 1965, p. 446 (cited after as "Istijsan") ; J. 
Makdisi, "Legal logic and equity in Islamic law". in AJCL, vol. 32.1985, p. 73 
(cited after as "Equity") 
"Preferential interpretation" or "equitable preference" are other translations for 
IstitJsan in English works. (see Kerr, Islamic Reform, p. 64 ; Coulson, 
Conflicts, p. 17 ; Khan, Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 115 ) 
54 EI 2. vol. 4, p. 256, Hallaq. "Considerations", p. 682. Cf. al-I'tL am. vol. 2, 
pt, 373f. 
55 Lane, Lexicon, part 2. p. 570. 
56 Wehr, Dictionary, p. 178. 
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means "making this word perfectly declinable is approvable by way of 
preference although making it indeclinable is more agreeable with 
analogy". 57 
Although the principle of istihs an was formulated by the 
Hanafis58, they established no standard definition of it. 59 Moreover, some 
of the definitions have been criticized by the Hanafis themselves. 60 It is 
believed that the early Hanafi jurists, including Abu Hanifah and his two 
disciples, Abu Yusuf and al-Shayb n, never attempted to give a precise 
clarification of istihsan. 61 This led to a variety of definitions being 
adopted by the later Hanafi jurists. 
In this context, I would like to refer to some of the outstanding 
Hanafi jurists in order to reinforce this principle. Al-Karkhi , one of the 
eminent Hanafis, defined istihsan as " that one should take a decision in 
a certain case different from that on which similar cases have been decided 
on the basis of its precedents for a reason which is stronger than the one 
found in similar cases and which requires departure from those cases". 62 
57 Lane. Lexicon, part 2. p. 570. 
58 Esposito. "Reform ". p. 35: EI 2. vol. 2. p. 256. 
59 Ab-mad ý-Iasan, 'The principle of istijjsan in Islamic jurisprudence", in IS, 
1977, vol. 16. p. 348. (cited after as "Istjjsan "). 
60 Ibid. ; al-Mu'tamari, vol. 2. pp. 839-840. 
61 Aghnides, Theories, pp. 98-99 ; Kasim, "Sarakhsi's doctrine of juristic 
preference (istihsan) as a methodological approach toward worldly affairs 
(ah kam al-dunya)". in AJISS, vol. 5.1988. p. 194. (cited after as "Istihsar ') 
62 At-Mu'tamad, vol. 2, p. 840 ; a! -Muswaddah, p. 453. 
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Al-Karkhi's pupil, alJassas offered certain definitions of istihsan and at 
the same time, distinguished different types of istihsan. A specific type 
consists in discarding giyas to adopt a decision which is judged worthier 
(tark al-qiyas ila ma huwa awla mirth ). 63 Istihsan then is regarded as 
"particularization" of a týukm in the presence of an 'illah (takhs ig al-hukm 
ma'a wujud al-'i. Uah ). 64 Consequently, it is considered by Hanaf i jurists 
as a giyas khaf i implying a -hukrn which 
is specification of the qiyas 
jail or asl7L. 65 
Other schools of law, except the Shafi'is and the Zahiris, 
accepted this principle. 66 However, it must be noted that they regarded 
this as valid proof only in the form of a departure from usual qiyas in 
favour of either the Sunnah or yma'. Otherwise, i. e. a departure from 
such to meet the so-called giyas khafi, is highly disputable and the 
Hanafis seem to be the only school to adhere to this last prescription of 
jSfÜLLq0. n 67 
According to Abu Zahrah, the Hanafis have adopted al-Karkh i's definition as 
it embraces the essence of istillsan in all its various forms. (Usul. p. 262 
Idem, Abu Uanijah. pp. 302-303) 
63 Ai-Muswaddak pp. 453-454 ; Bernand, "jjanaf i UUu! al-figh", p. 633. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. ; Kasim. "ist san'. p. 186. 
66 Ismail, al-Adillah, pp. 238,245 ; al-Bugha, al-Adi Lah, pp. 130-133 
Khadduri, Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 39 ; Macdonald, Development. p. 106. 
Ahmad Yusuf observes that even al-Shafi'i himself did accept the validity of 
ist(Lsan as long as this principle does not rely merely on discreation of a jurist. 
( al-Shafi'i, pp. 109-110) The same applies to al-Ghazali's attitude. (see 
Makdisi, "Equity'. p. 75) 
67Kashf, vol. 4. p. 4; Aghnides Theories. p. 95. 
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The Shafi'is openly and constantly refuted the application of 
istihsan in Islamic law, arguing that this principle relies on imagination or 
on discretion of a mujtahid rather than on the texts. 68 Therefore, al- 
Shafi'i followed by al-Ghazali declared that "whoever uses istihs&t, has 
placed himself in the place of God as legislator (man istahsana fagad 
Shara' )", 69 
Since this part of the discussion does not represent a major 
element of the thesis, there is no strong reason to illustrate this principle 
in greater detail. In conclusion we might summarise that istihs an, 
subjected to severe criticism particularly from the Shafi'is, is the one 
which resorts to arbitrary personal opinion. 70 In other words, istihsan is 
being considered an independent basis for establishing law. 71 In the first 
68 Al-Risalah. para. 1464 ; idem, Ibjal al-Isti1]san. p. 301 ; idem. Jima' al-, Ibn. 
pp. 276-277 ; al Mustaifa. vol. 1, p. 274. 
Al-Shafi'i 's point of view on this question was clear. He fundamentally 
rejected istihsan claiming this attitude may open for arbitrary decision, "... for if 
analogy were abandoned it would be permissible to any intelligent man, other 
than the scholars, to exercise isti_hsan in the absence of a narrative. But to 
give an opinion based neither on narration nor on analogy, as I have already 
stated in the discussion of the Qur'an and the Sunnah, is not permissible 
according to the rules of analogy". (al-Risalah, para. 1458) 
69A1-Mustasfa, vol. 1. p. 274. 
Al-Ghazali considers both al-istihsan and al-istiSlah as purely speculative 
methods of reasoning (u_ýul mawhumah ). (ibid, vol. 1, pp. 274,284). 
70 Al-Baj i. Ihka n. p. 52, note no. 3; Ahmad Yusuf, al-Shafi'i, pp. 109-111 ; 
al-Fla- al-Sa. m i, vol. 1, p. 89 ; Aghnides, Theories, p. 97. 
71 Coulson, Conflicts, pp. 6-7. 
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stage, it was not clear what the principle of istihsan is. 72 Criticised by 
the Shafi`is, the Hanafi jurists felt themselves compelled to maintain that 
istihsan is not a free opinion or a jurist's discretion but is propagated as 
a type of giyas, called giyas khaf i or giyas mustaljsan or simply istUjsan. 73 
Accordingly, they use two different names i. e. qiyas and istillsan which 
represent two contradictory giyos. Istitjsan, however, is preferable owing to 
its greater effectiveness, 74 or its strong reason. 75 
At this stage, it is certain that istihsan is no more than a 
method of tad 7h but restricted only to cases where two qiyas are claimed to 
be contradictory. 76 Therefore, istihsan is also known as qiyas mustahsan 
carrying the meaning of preference77 which might suggest that it is only a 
form of tarj ih in giyas conflict. Even in giyas conflict, istihsan is not 
the only form of tarj ih because, as will be elaborated later, there are other 
72 See Jalal al-Din, al-9a. di al-Bay¢awi, p. 293 ; al-Dasugi, "al-Ijtiha. d", p. 
1109. 
73 Aghnides, Theories, pp. 97-98. Also see al-Zarga'. al-Madkhal. vol. 1. p. 86 
(note no. 1) ; Kasim, "Istiljsan', pp. 188f. 
74 Al-Nasafi, Kashf, vol. 2, pp. 293-294. 
75 See al-Zarga', al-Madkhal, vol. 1, pp. 77,84: al-ffafnawi, al AdUta. h, p. 9: 
Kasim, "Istiisan', pp. 87-88. Cf. Aziz el-Azmeh, "Islamic legal theory and the 
appropriation of reality; in Islamic Law, Social and Historical Contexts. ed. Aziz 
el-Azmeh, p. 258. (cited after as "Islamic legal theory") (He regards istijsan as 
the rejection of a more obvious or 'canonical' judgement in favour of a more 
appropriate one) 
In the English law the way in which equity developed side by side with the 
common law to abate the rigour of law: istibsan developed in Islamic law in 
the same manner to remedy giyas. See Khan, Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 130. 
For more comparison between the two, see Makdisi, "Equity", pp. g5 ff. 
76 Al-Nasafi, Kashf, vol. 2, pp. 290-291. 
77 See note 73. 
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ways of deciding preference in giyas contradiction. 78 Consequently, we 
may note that when istihsan is compared to tarjih the former has a 
restricted area of application in usul al figh which is only in qiyas 
contradiction, whereas tarj ih has a broader role to play in any cases of 
legal conflicts. 
Naskh 
Since naskh can be roughly translated as " the later supersedes 
the earlier pronouncement, to the extent that they conflict", 79 it may be 
confused with tad ih or vice-versa. Moreover, in some cases, contradiction 
was removed by the application of naskh instead of tarj ih in the sense 
that when two texts are in conflict, the one earlier in date is taken to have 
been repealed by the one later in date. 80 These facts have given us a 
strong reason to consider naskh more precisely so that a clear distinction 
could be achieved. 
Nonetheless, the present study does not attempt to open up the 
entire subject of naskh in detail but will concentrate only on the essential 
outlines of naskh which could provide a proper basis to distinguish 
between naskh and the main subject ; tarj i h. Therefore the first few 
78 In giyas conflict, more than one form was established by the jurists to 
remove the conflict such as ist hsan, preference by virtue of 'iUah mannusah, 
simple 'illah. etc. (see the details in part b of chapter six) 
79 Burton, The Sources, pp. 2,3. 
80 Mizan, pp. 696,698; Burton. Abu 'Ubayd, p. 2. 
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paragraphs will throw some light on the background of naskh such as its 
origin, meaning, types, validity as well as its application in Islamic law. 
As far as origin is concerned, it is interesting to note that there 
was no single reported instance in which the Prophet said a certain ruling 
was abrogated. 81 Accordingly, we can assume that this principle emerged 
in the later age of the history of Islamic law. However, no clear consensus 
seems to have emerged concerning who was the first to put this principle 
into writing. Names such as al-Zuhri, al-Shafi'i and Mugatil b. Sulayman 
are among those who have been claimed to be the first to put this principle 
into writing in a book. 82 
Literally, naskh is taken from the root n. s. kh. which indicates 
annulment such as in "nasakhat al-shams al-till ", the sun annulled the 
shade. 83 Not only that, but the meaning should be "the sun annulled or 
superseded, the shade and took the place of it". 84 That clearly signifies 
the changing of a thing by substituting for it another thing. 8 5 
Contrasting slightly with the first, the second meaning indicates an 
annulment but without being replaced as "nasakhat al-ri h athar al-dar ", 
81 Ahmad Hasan. The Early, p. 67. 
82 Al-I'tibar, , p. 5; Rippin. 
" AI-Zuhri : Naskh al-Qu'an and the problem 
of early tafsir texts ". in BSOAS, 1984, vol. 47, pp. 24-25. 
83 Al-Rani, al-Siha&l p. 656 ; al-Arnidi, al-I lkam, vol. 2, p. 236. 
84 fie, Lexicon. part 8. p. 2788. See also al-I'tibar, p. 8: Ibn jjazm, at-Nasikh 
wa al-Mansukh, pp. 6-7. 
85 Ibid. 
Accordingly, nasakha ayah , means, He (Allah) abrogated or superseded 
the 
verse of the Qur'an by another verse. (ibid) 
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means the wind changed or altered the traces of the dwelling. 86 In 
another context, naskh refers literally to transcription and its standard 
expression is nasakha al-kit-ab ; "he copied or transcribed the writing or 
book". 87 This meaning however, indicates that something has been 
transferred from one place to another while its essence remains 
unchanged. In this sense, naskh has been used in the Qur'anic verse; 
"verily we write (nastansikhu) all that you do". 88 However, the common 
meaning which occurred in relation to both the man and the Sunnah is 
supersession of the ruling not the wording of the texts. 89 
Naskh as one legal solution of contradiction, is basically confined 
to the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Whenever there seemed to be a conflict 
between one Qur'anic verse and another or between a Qur'an and a 
hadith9o or between one hadith and another, the jurists frequently 
selected the later in relative date of revelation and rejected the earlier of 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. ; Ibn ManZur, Lisan. vol. 3, p. 61 ; al-Razi, ca-(bah, p. 656 ; al-Amid I 
al-Ibkarm vol. 2, p. 236. 
88 Ai-I'tibar, p. 8; Mus,, afa Zayd, alNaskh, vol. 1, p. 55. 
This meaning, however. Is not intended in legal discussion of naskh (see al- 
pamin, the editor of Arba'ah Kutub ft ai Nasikh wa al-Mansukh li Qatadah 
wa a1 Zuhri wa U Ibn al, Jawzi wa U Ibn al-Barizi, (introduction), p. 9. ) 
89 Ibid., p. 8 and 58 ; Ibn jjazm. alNasikh wa al Manstlkh. p. 7. 
90 The application of naskh on this type of conflict is approved by all the 
advocates of naskh except al-Shafl'i . (see a1-Tab$irak p. 264, note no. 2) 
Al-Shir z, the author of the book, shares his imam's I. e. al-Shafl'i view, and 
then gained the support of the editor of al-Tabgirah, Muhamad lasan Hi tu. 
(Ibid). 
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the two conflicting texts. The selected is the nasikh ; the rejected is the 
mansukh while the process of repeal or abrogation is known as naskh. 91 
As a matter of fact, the jurists have recognized three types of 
naskh which are as follows: 
(1)Naskh al-hukm duna a1-tilawah (the abrogation of the ruling but not the 
wording) 
(2)Naskh al-ti&wah duna al-jukm (the abrogation of the wording but not 
the ruling) 
(3)Naskh al-hukm wa aI-tiiawah (the abrogation of both the ruling and the 
wording). 92 
On this occasion, I will have an opportunity to examine the 
validity of the alleged naskh. It is claimed that the validity of naskh has 
been approved by the jumhur 93 ; one who denied it, is presumed to be 
against gma' 94 because the occurrence of naskh in the Qur'an is proven 
beyond dispute. 95 
91 Burton, Abu 'Ubayd, p. 3, ; al-gamin. (introduction) Arbaah Kutub. P. 
10; Hughes. Dictionary of Islam. p. 431. 
General agreement exists among the jurists as to the requirement that 
the abrogating evidence ( nasikh) be of later date than the evidence it 
abrogates. See al-1'übar, p. 9: al-Amidi, al-Ibkam. vol. 2. p. 245. 
92 Itgan. vol. 2. pp. 22-24. 
These classifications are disputed. See al-Muswaddah4 p. 198 ; Burton, Abu 
'Ubaiyd p5; Mu afa Zayd. al-Naskh, vol. 1, p. 383ff. 
93 Al-Mustqafg vol. 1. p. 111 : al-Amidi, al Ihkam. vol. 2. p. 245 ; al-Zuhayli, 
UUul, vol. 2, p. 947; Jalal al-Din, al-Naskh, p. 20. 
94 Al-MustasJa. vol. 1. p. 111 ; Aghnides, Theories, p. 90. 
95 Al-Mustafja. vol. 1, p. 111. 
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In contrast, some scholars argued the applicability or even 
the occurrence of naskh in the Qur'an, arguing from different points of 
view. 96 Abu Muslim al-Asfahani (d. 322 A. H. ), who denied the cases of 
abrogation in the Qur'an altogether97, relied on the same Qur'anic 
verses used by the jumhur to establish the principle of naskh. 98 
According to Abu Muslim, the word "ayah " which occurred in all these 
verses, is to be understand as meaning "miracle" or "sign" and not a 
portion of the Qur'anic text. 99 Moreover, he argued that naskh is 
equivalent to ibtal which has no place in the Qur'an since Allah has said 
in Q. 41: 42 ;" Falsehood cannot come at it from before it or behind it. (It 
is) a revelation from the Wise, the Owner of Praise ". 100 
96 Some tend not to accept the validity of naskh from the very beginning 
while others, having approved this principle, argued on the actual applicability 
of naskh from different standpoints. Accordingly, when, for instance, it was 
claimed naskh takes place in a particular case between two verses, this was 
often objected to by others. For details, see Mugafa Zayd, al-Naskh, chapter 
three (passim) ; al-Itgan, vol. 2, p. 22 ; Hahn. "Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's 
the controversy over abrogation (in the man) : an annotated translation", in 
MW, vol. 64.1974, passim. (cited after as "Abrogation" ) 
97 Abu Muslim al-A. fahani, Jarni' al-Ta'wil li Mui kam al-TanziL Since his 
work is not available to me, my knowledge is quoted from al-Zuhayli's U. Sui. 
vol. 2, pp. 947,953. 
Mujafa Zayd has pointed out, however, that Abu Muslim's concern was 
merely to dispute the fact that the gw'an contains abrogated verses for all the 
verses of the QLu an are effective. In turn, it was the Qur'an that abrogated 
the previous teachings and laws constructed by the previous divine books. (al- 
Naskh, vol. 1. pp. 50-51) 
98 These verses are frequently quoted to show the occurrence of naskh i. e. 2: 
106 and 16 : 101. 
99 Al-Rani. oL-Tafsir. vol. 3. p. 144 ; al-Amidi. a[-IF; karn, vol. 2. p. 249. 
100 Ibid. ; TYutgiF1. p. 306. 
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Other opponents of naskh have argued that the word " ayah " 
quoted by the jumhur refers to previous codes of law before the Prophet. 101 
In this sense, Islam or more precisely the Qur'an, the final revelation, 
abrogates all previous scriptures for it contains the final and most perfect 
solutions for all questions of belief and conduct. This is supported by the 
fact that all these verses were found within Banu Israil addresses. 102 On 
the other hand, some have expressed the view that the verses which 
claimed to be included under abrogation are rather instances of 
postponement of promulgation of the full law of Islam because of 
unsuitable circumstances. 103 
Al-Shafi'i, who has also been credited with being the first person 
to write on naskh, however, has a distinct idea of naskh. He declared that 
naskh is not a form of annulment ; it is rather a suspension or 
termination of one ruling by another. In other words, naskh is simply a 
form of bayan i. e. to explain that an end has been put to a particular 
ruling. 104 Futhermore, al-Shafi'i has his own principle concerning naskh 
such that neither the Qur'an abrogates the Sunnah nor the Sunnah the 
Qur'cut 105 
101 Grunebaum, Islam. p. 85 ; Hahn, "Abrogation". pp. 124 (note no. 1) and 
132. 
102 Ahmad liasan, The Early, p. 70. 
103 Bell, Introduction, p. 98. 
104 Nihayah, vol. 2, pp. 224-225 ; Abu Zahrah, Usul p. 185 ; al-Zuhayli, Usul, 
vol. 2, p. 931 ; Jala1 al-Din, al-Naskh, p. 4. 
105 Al-Risalah, para. 314 ; idem, Ikhtilaf al-Nadi th4 pp. 483-484 ; Khadduri, 
Islamic Jurisprudence, pp. 29-30 ; Mugafa Zayd, al-Naskh. vol. 2, p. 838. 
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Regarding the actual cases of naskh, the jurists are divided 
among themselves on the precise cases of naskh. Al-Suyuti, for instance, 
claimed that twenty instances of naskh in the Qur'an which are recorded 
in his book, "al-Itgon " are binding and undisputable. 106 These instances, 
however, were reduced to only five by Shah Wall Allah as the only genuine 
cases of naskh for the rest can all be reconciled. 107 This is frequently 
quoted to show the uncertainty and inconsistency in applying the principle 
of naskh. Some of the jurists have attempted to clarify the origin of this 
uncertainty in Islamic legal history. They said that in the early period. 
naskh was used to denote a wider meaning to include abrogation, 
qualification, specification and even the additional ruling instituted by the 
Sunnah over the Qur'an. 108 This fact has led one scholar to say that 
"some of the oldest exegetes included indiscriminately under naskh all and 
every verse where they noted a degree of contradiction however slight". 109 
This remark has been clearly manifested by the so called " verse of jihad 
or sword-verse ". This single verse alone has been claimed to have 
abrogated more than one hundred verses in the Qur'an which urged the 
106 At-Itgar, vol. 2, pp. 22-23. See also Bell. Introduction, p. 98. 
As a matter of fact, these twenty cases of al-Suyuji 's were reduced from what 
were thought to be more than five hundred abrogated verses. ( see Hahn, 
"Abrogation", p. 124. note no. 1) 
107 Shah Walt Allah, al-Fawz al-Kabir (urdu translation), quoted by Alimad 
flasan, The Early, p. 68. Similarly, MuAlafa Zayd himself came to conclude 
that only five cases were genuinely abrogated. (al-Naskh. vol. 2. p. 848 ) 
108 Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami', vol. 2, p. 289 ; al-Damin, Arba'ah Kutub. p. 11 
Wafa', Ahkam al-Naskh fi a! -Shari'ah al-Islamiyyah, p. 168; al-Thagafi, 
" al-Ziyadah ", pp. 253.255. 
109 Burton, The Sources, p. 2. 
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Muslims when they were in Mecca not to fight the unbelievers. 110 Again, 
one can see how the uncertainty arose in applying the principle of naskh. 
For the sake of distiction between naskh and tarj i h, we may 
begin by saying that both are used to eliminate one contradictory piece of 
evidence but naskh is restricted to text conflict since naskh is confined, in 
terms of time, to one period only i. e. the life time of the Prophet. 111 Tarjih, 
as shown before, operates on the entire range of legal evidence including 
that which is established through Ytihad in which no text is provided. 112 
Another fact worthy of note is that naskh depends totally on the concrete 
knowledge of relative dates of revelation to the extent that naskh cannot 
be proven by mere possibility of the time discrepancy between two 
conflicting texts. 113 This is usually hard to determine while tarj ih, on the 
contrary, is not subject to such conditions. 
It seems also that naskh, is in fact, merely an historical method 
in Islamic legal theory i. e. being no longer operative in recent times 
because the revelation ended with the demise of the Prophet. 114 In 
110 Ahmad Hasan, The Early. p. 69: al-Qarsjawi, al-Madkhal, p. 146 ; Hibat 
Allah. p. 46, as cited in Burton, The Sources, p. 1. 
In this regard. Musgafa Zayd has devoted one of his chapters "claims of naskh 
which are unaccepted". Moreover, he has given a long discussion on the so- 
called "claims of naskh by sword -verse". (see al-Naskh, vol. 1, pp. 551-692 and 
vol. 2, pp. 693-813). 
111 Al_Luma'. p. 33 : al-Baj i, 11ikam4 p. 359. 
112 For details, see the second part of chapter six (i. e. qiyas conflict) 
113 Al-Barbar, vol. 2. p. 1160 ; Ibn Hazm, al-Ihkam, vol. 4, p. 458; Nayl al- 
Awtar, vol. 5, pp. 292,299.331 ; al Muswaddah, p. 230. 
114 Al-Zuhayli, Usul. vol. 2, p. 931. 
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addition, cases which are strictly confined to naskh, even without 
considering the view of Shah Wall Allah, remained limited in number 
compared to cases in Islamic law which are applicable to tarj i h. Also these 
cases of naskh are already fixed and decided upon to the effect that no 
more can be added if one wishes to do so. By this, tarj ih position is more 
progressive, relevant and applicable to the modern study of Islamic legal 
theory particularly to practical purposes of studying usui al-figh 
For both these points, I would like to propose, as advanced by the 
j x115, that tarjih is favoured over naskh because the latter 
constitutes cancellation of a particular verse or tradition while the former 
expresses merely a preference. Tarj i h, as is suggested by its function, does 
not necessarily indicate that a particular evidence is abandoned, rather it 
displays that one of the conflicting pieces of evidence is better in many 
respects such as in the hierarchical order of the evidence, the nature of the 
wording, etc. When khass is preferred over 'amm , 
for example, this is 
due to the degree of strength of the wordings involved in conflict. 
Obviously, there is no cancellation at all of either of them. Thus, to assert 
that a particular verse or tradition has been abrogated solely on the basis 
of presumption is considered as misguided for it would render many legal 
texts void in terms of validity. 116 This does not apply to tarj i h. 
115 Seepage 144. 
116 Ibn JIazm, a[-Ihkam, vol. 4. p. 458. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PART C 
THE POSITION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF TARJIH 
The Position of Tarji h 
Another problem related to tarj ih that has been extensively 
debated by the jurists is the position of each method employed to remove 
contradiction. The dispute simply arose when some of the jurists had 
utterly contrastive points of view regarding the priority of a certain 
method to be applied when there appears to be a conflict. A minute 
examination of this problem, however, demonstrates that it is too hard to 
make a solid conclusion on the issue owing to its complicated and 
sometimes confusing discussion. Thus, the following paragraphs attempt 
to simplify this question. 
Initially, we may point out that our discussion concerns 
particular methods namely jam' (reconciliation), naskh, tarjih, takhyir, 
tawaqquf and tasaqut. I These methods, as claimed by the jurists, are the 
legal solutions that could be adopted to remove legal contradiction. 
However, they had their own opinion in applying these methods 
hierarchically. Some jurists, probably the jumhur2, have placed jam' 
between two conflicting pieces of evidence at the top of the list in all 
1 AI-fbhaj, vol. 3, pp. 210-214 ; al-Muswaddah. pp. 449-450 ; al-Taqrir, vol. 
3, p. 3; Hitu, al-Wajiz, pp. 474-476. 
2 This point of view is based fundamentally on the fact that the only recorded 
opinion which opposed the applicability of jam' as the first priority was 
referred to the Hanafi jurists alone. (see Badran, Tarjiij. p. 36-37) 
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cases of contradiction. 3 Their arguments are based upon a great deal of 
proof but their key view is simply the fact that legal evidence was revealed 
to be fully applied and jam' is the best means of achieving this view 
compared to the other methods. 4 Since jam' provides for the possibility 
that both of the two contradictory pieces of evidence could be 
implemented in such a way that they are no longer contradictory, jam' 
must be given priority in tackling any contradiction in Islamic law. 
For this we need an example. The case under discussion 
concerns the waiting period ('iddah) enforced on those whose husbands 
have died. Two texts are involved, one of them prescribing that 
widows must observe four months and ten days5, another stating that 
they must be provided with a year's maintenance (nafaqah) and residence 
or lodging (sukna ). 6 These two texts are said to be contradictory since 
they concern the same subject i. e. widows. In response to this, some 
jurists contend that the earlier revelation is abrogated by the later.? In 
consequence, a widow must observe only four months and ten days 
instead of one year because the former is the later in terms of the date of 
revelation. 8 As previously indicated, whenever there is the possibility of 
reconciliation between two conflicting texts, a resort to any other 
3 Ibid. p. 38: Nihayah, vol. 3. p. 215 ; Ibn ffazm, al-J. m. vol. 2. p. 151-154 
aL-Ibhaj. vol. 3. pp. 210-213; Irshad, p. 276. 
4 Al-1'tibar, p. 9; Ghayat al-U§ul, p. 141 ; Ibn Badran. al-Madkiuil, p. 197. 
5 This refers to Q. 2: 234. For details on legal precription, see al-Qurlubi, al- 
Jami', vol. 3. pp. 186-187. 
6 This refers to Q. 2: 240 and for details, see ibid.. pp. 226-227. 
7 Ahkam, vol. 1, p. 491f ; al-Sarakhsi. al-Mab sul., vol. 6, p. 30 ; al-Qurjubi. 
al-Jami', vol. 3, pp. 226-227: at-Itgan, vol. 2, p. 23: al-1'tibar, p. 8. 
8 Ibid. See also al-Zuhayll. U. -Sul, vol. 2, p. 965 ; al-Mad, Usul, p. 259. 
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solution is unnecessary. This applies here. Though both texts are 
concerned with widows they differ in respect to the ruling. The first verse 
(Q. 2: 234) constitutes the period of 'iddah while the second (Q. 2: 240) 
explains only the duty of the former husband to provide maintenance for 
one complete year. Jam' provides room for both to be applied 
respectively. Therefore it is said that "al; jam' yamna' at-naskh". 9 
Moreover, naskh is unacceptable here for the present conflict is not 
genuine and the relative dates of revelation are not precisely known. 
As a matter of fact, jam' has a variety of forms that should be 
thoroughly considered in applying reconciliation to legal evidence. 
Ta'wf 110, takhsis 11, tagy id 12, bayan 13, etc., are among the dominant 
forms of reconciliation in Islamic jurisprudence. 14 Therefore, it is not 
surprising that al-Shawkani has clearly stated that the application of 
9 See LLujjat Allah. vol. 1. p. 139. As regards the case in question, see al- 
Qurjubi, ahlami'. vol. 3. p. 226. 
Surprisingly, Wahbah al-Zuhayli, a distinguished contemporary scholar on 
ftgh and its u, 2ul, has considered naskh as one of the forms of reconciliation. 
(U, jul. vol. 2, p. 931) 
10 Ibn Qutaybah's Ta'wil Mukhtalaf at- Hadith Is the best example of this. 
In his Ta'wil , he deals at 
length with the arguments adduced against the 
upholders of tradition by different groups before he proceeds to his main 
subject which is to reconcile traditions which seem to be contradictory 
through 'ta'wil 
11 See al-Risalah. paras. 629fC. 
12 See pages %J %V 
13 See al-Siba'i, at-Sunnah. pp. 376-378. 
14 Al-Hafnawi, al-Tarjif. pp. 270-272. 
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tarp' i tj must be subject to the failure of reconciliation. 15 If not. tad ih is 
not a permissible part of removing legal conflict. 
Some scholars, on the contrary, have considered the time of 
each revelation as a turning point in legal conflict. They believe that if 
the dates of two conflicting pieces of evidence are known and provided 
that they are gat'i, naskh must be applied instead of jam' . 
16 As a 
result, the later evidence will supersede the earlier which makes the 
earlier no longer valid. In cases where there is no knowledge of the 
relative dates of both conflicting revelations or both are Zanni, tarji t 
is applied immediately without any consideration of the possibility of 
jam'. 17 
In my opinion, it is clear that in the course of conflict, jam' 
must be given the first priority because it is better to reconcile than to 
neglect either of them as resulted from naskh. In his support for jam', 
Ibn Hazm declares that one is obliged to reconcile, because legal texts 
have no double standard by which one can be preferred over the other. 18 
Naskh or even tarjih in general, indicates that one of the conflicting 
15 Irshad, p. 276 ; idem, Nayl al Awtar. vol. 5, p. 292. 
16 Al-Sarakhsi, U. Sul, vol. 2. pp. 12.13 ; Fawatijj. vol. 2. p. 189 ; al-Bayyawi 
as cited in Nihayah. vol. 3. p. 217; Zaydan. al-Wajiz, p. 393 ; al-Zuhayli, 
USuI, vol. 2. p. 1176; al-As'adi, Uaul, p. 256. 
17MusaUarm vol. 2, p. 189. Cf. al-Tagrir. vol. 3, p. 2; al-Baj i, Ihkam p. 646. 
Al-As'adi, a Hanafi scholar, claims this is the official opinion of the Hanafis 
i. e. naskh, tarjih and followed by jam'. However, he also notes that this is 
not unanimously agreed upon among the Hanafis. (UUul. pp. 257-258. note 
no. 2) 
18 Ibn Hazm. al-Ibkam, vol. 2. p. 151. 
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pieces of evidence is not operative. Therefore, it is unacceptable to resort 
to any method unless an attempt at reconciliation has failed. 19 
Until now, the position of tarjih has not been certain. It is only 
at this stage that tarj i h. becomes a serious concern. According to many 
jurists, tarj ih must take second priority in the discussion after the 
failure of reconciliation and in the meantime, it takes precedence over. 
other methods particularly naskh. 20 The jurists, however, did not clarify 
why tarjih is superior at this stage. The reason behind this, according to 
my opinion will be mentioned later. For the moment, I will summarise 
this disagreement briefly. For this, we can say that, again, the jurists 
disputed two matters, namely the knowledge of the revelation date and 
the degree of every evidence. All of them agree that tarj ih is superior 
only if the conflicting pieces of evidence are zanni or when a zanni is 
confronted by a gat'i. 21 In turn, if both are gat'i, the jumhur held that 
tad ih must be applied first, while some jurists preferred naskh provided 
that the dates of revelation are certain. 22 
Totally contrary to the above two opinions, some jurists have 
held another opinion. According to them, when both conflicting pieces of 
evidence are gat'i or when the dates of revelation are uncertain, both 
19 Irshad. p. 276 ; Hu, lat Allah. vol. 1, pp. 138,139. 
20 Al-Zuhayli. Uýut. vol. 2. p. 1184 ; al-Mawsuahal-Flghiyyah. vol. 2. p. 303. 
Ibn Badran asserts that reconciliation is always superior as long as the 
rationale of reconciliation is easy to understand. If. however, it is too 
complicated and confusing, the precedence goes to tarjilh. (al-Madkhal", p. 197) 
21 Al-Ibhaj, vol. 3. p. 214 ; Nihayah. vol. 3. p. 219. 
22 Ibid. ; al-Tagrir, vol. 3, p. 3: al-Zuhayli. UUul, vol. 2, p. 1176. 
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are rejected (tasaqut ). 23 If this happens, they argue, the conflicting pieces 
of evidence are set aside and other element of evidence, particularly the 
one which comes immediately after these pieces of evidence hierarchically 
should be referred to. 24 Also, it is suggested by other jurists that, in this 
case, instead of referring to another evidence, one is free to choose any of 
the conflicting pieces of evidence he wishes. 25 
For a clear and immediate judgement, we may state that tarjilb 
should prevail over naskh in all cases of contradiction provided that jam' 
has failed to harmonize the two conflicting texts. For one thing, naskh 
is too complicated to be accurately determined26 and it is frequently 
confused with takhsis, tagyid and istithna' 27 which are part of 
reconciliation. 28 Morover, in many cases, tarj ih is employed to support 
an alleged naskh particularly when there is more than one report 
concerning either nasikh or mansukh 29 which gives the impression that 
tarj ih is more workable in whatever case of conflict. An opinion which 
23 See Nihayak, vol. 3, pp. 217-219; al-Mahsul, vol. 2, p. 450-451. 
24 Al_Baj i, IJ)loam. p. 664. 
25 Ibid. ; al-Badakhshi, Manahij, vol. 3. p. 204. 
afa Zayd, al-Naskh. vol. 1. p. 4; al-F1kr al- 26 Al Muswaddali, p. 230 ; Mus - 
Sam i. vol. 1. p. 39. 
27 Muajafa Zayd, al-Naskh. vol. 1, pp. 8-9. 
28 Ibid. pp. 68,71,73-74 ; Hitu, a! -Wajiz. pp. 241-244. 
29 Hi tu, al-Ijtihad, p. 22. 
Al-Hamdhani points out that in order to apply naskh in hadith conflict, one 
must be certain that the nasikh is the most authentic form of isnad 
compared to mansukh. (aI-I'tibar, p. 71) It gives an impression that tarjili I. e. 
to distinguish and to prefer accordingly only the most reliable tradition, is 
prior and superior to naskh for the latter depends on the former. 
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permits one to choose from the conflicting pieces of evidence whatever 
evidence he wishes is also rejected because as long as tarji h can be 
applied, there is no necessity to resort to choice. The same argument is 
directed to those who suggested that all of the conflicting pieces of 
evidence are to be rejected owing to their contradiction. Finally, it is 
certain that tarj ih is the most effective method after jam' to remove legal 
contradiction as will be shown clearly in the following chapters. 
Nevertheless, we have to say that tarj' ih is liable to rejection 
only if all the attempts made by the jurists either to reconcile or to prefer 
one piece of evidence over the other have proved to be inapplicable. 30 
Given this possiblity of irrelevancy of tarj i h, some of the jurists have 
suggested two means in order to remove the conflict. They said that a 
jurist may either resort to a general principle of Islamic law such as al- 
ibihah al-asliyyah, meaning that it is the principle that everything is 
considered as valid until the contrary is proved, or he may resort to other 
evidence, that of lower status of the two conflicting pieces of evidence. 
That is, should two Qur'anic verses contradict each other, a resort should 
be made to find another provision in the Sunnah or other legal 
arguments. 31 
On the other hand, there is another discussion regarding the 
position of legal solutions but in respect to giyas contradiction. 
Obviously, giyas does not have the relation to the date of revelation that 
the texts have. Therefore, the proposed legal solution is quite different 
30 'Iwad, "al-Ta'arud ", p. 278. 
31 Ibid. ; al-Badakhshi, Manah j, vol. 3, p. 204; Musallam, vol. 2, p. 188. 
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from that discussed previously. There is an agreement amongst the 
scholars that if one qiyas can be preferred over the other giyos, this must 
be done without any hesitation. 32 However, when tcujih is inapplicable, 
the jurists have disagreed. In short, two points of view are recorded on 
this problem; one consists in an obligation to choose one of the two 
conflicting qiyas 33 for otherwise, it would cause legal problems to be 
abandoned without having reached a solution which is unacceptable in 
the formation of Islamic law. 34 Another view suggests that one should 
avoid giving any judgement until the balance and accordingly the 
superiority of one of them is clear. 35 
It is possible at this stage, therefore, to note that tarji h is 
applicable to legal text contradiction only when it is impossible to 
reconcile. Compared to naskh or other legal solutions, tarjih must be 
given full authority after the failure of reconciliation in terms of 
removing any legal conflicts whether in legal text or in other legal 
evidence. If tarj ih failed to do so, another solution is referred to. This 
order of position to remove legal conflict will be adopted consistently 
throughout the following studies. 
32 Al-Sarakhsi. UIUL. vol. 2, pp. 14-16 ; Fawatib, vol. 2, p. 193 ; al-As'adi. 
Ujul. p. 258. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. ; al-Zuhayli. Uhu[. vol. 2, p. 1181. 
35 Al-Hafnawi, al-Tarjif,. p. 220. 
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The Significance of Tarji h 
It is now relevant to show how significant tarj tj is in ujul al- 
figh For this, I propose to treat two points that, to my mind, constitute 
the key to a sound understanding of the significance of tarj i h. The first 
point deals with how valuable tarj ih is in the entire usui al figh and the 
second displays a specific function of tar, jih in legal conflict. 
To begin with, one needs to know whether tarj ih is equivalent 
to yfih d or not. The latter constitutes taglid : unquestionable acceptance 
of a given doctrine. 36 One who applies tagiid is known as a muqallid 
who memorized the doctrine of the school and understood its details but 
was incapable of mastering the methodology that the eponym and older 
teachers applied in order to reach their legal reasoning. 37 Hence, it is 
certain that tarjih is not taqlid ; rather it is a sort of Utihad since the 
muraljih must be a qualified person capable of ytihad. 38 
However, it remains undetermined what kind or rank of ytihad 
tarj ih refers to. For one thing, it is agreed that the independent kind of 
mujtahid who could set up his own school of law had became extinct 
after the formation of the four schools of law. 39 This was confirmed by 
36 Al-Shawkan i, al-Qawl al-Mufid fi Addlat at-Ijtihad wa al-Taglidt p. 19 
al-Muswaddah, p. 462 ; Rawjah, p. 205; al-Mustafa. vol. 2, p. 387 ; El 1, 
vol. 4, p. 630. 
37 pbu Zahrah, Ujui, pp. 398-399. 
38 Ibn Badran, aI-Macikhal, p. 196. 
39 A1-Mugaddimak vol. 3. pp. 8-9 ; Hitu, al-ljtiha . p. 17; El 1. vol. 4. p. 630. 
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al-Zuhayli. 40 The latter prescription of mujtahid is also known as mujtahid 
fi al-madhhab ; one who is well versed in one school's legal system and 
can discover the law of any case of any kind at any time in all domains of 
law within the framework of that school. 41 In short, two major types of 
ytgiad have been distinguished; independent and restricted ytthad. 42 
Considering the fact that tarjih is applicable to more than one 
school of law, the so-called ytihad muqayyad is not the one that tar 
j74 
refers to, because tarj ih involves a considerable Ytihad, though it is 
relatively limited and does not go beyond the existing legal opinions and 
arguments. However, it was only at a later period, precisely in the 
seventh century of Hyrah that the number of ranks reached five and by 
the tenth century, seven ranks of mujtahidun were distinguished. 43 The 
ashab tarjih, one of the seven ranks, are those who were competent in 
making comparisons and distinguishing the correct (iahi, li) and the 
preferred (arjah or rajih) from the weak. 44 This type of ijtihad was 
regarded as of lower rank than the two mentioned Utihads and frequently 
put together with the ranks of the ashab at-takhrij and ashab al-tass ik 
45 It should be noted that these three categories overlap somewhat 
40 A]-Zuhayli, al-Figk vol. 1. p. 47. Cf. al-Suyuti, al-Radd. pp. 112-116. 
41 Tawana, al-Ijtihad, pp. 364-372 ; Abu Zahrah, Usu1. p. 395 ; Aghnides, 
Theories, p. 122. 
42 Hitu , al-Ijtihad, pp. 
37-47 particularly p. 42. 
43 See Hallaq, "The Gate of Ijtihad :A Study in Islamic Legal Theory ", Ph. D 
dissertation. University of Washington, 1983. p. 84. (cited after as "ljtihad ") 
44 Abu Zahrah, Usul. p. 396; Aghnides, Theories, pp. 122-123; Introduction 
to al-Mawsu'ah al-Fighiyyak vol. 1, p. 35 ; Ma'sumi, "Ijtihad through fourteen 
centuries", in IS, vol. 21.1982, p. 63. (cited after as "Ijtihad'). 
45 Ibid. 
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and could be unified in one category to comprise all those who drew 
comparisons and evaluated the strength and weakness of the existing 
views. What is clear is that tarj i h, on the whole, relied somewhat on 
gtiha. d. In other words, we can say that ijtihad particularly the first two 
ranks of ytihad, are primarily concerned with legal interpretations from 
the very beginning while tarjih as a proper study occurs at a later stage 
to re-interpret the already existing rulings in the light of tarj h 
methodology (as will be fully discussed later). 
Nevertheless, we can also see that tarjih, neither as a proper 
methodology nor as a term to distinguish between certain categories of 
the rank of ytihad, already existed even before the technical names of the 
rank of ytUmd started to occur in usul-oriented work. This is so simply 
because tarj ih is an inevitable resort on which every jurist must rely 
particularly after the failure of reconciling two contradictory pieces of 
evidence. Generally speaking, all types of mujtahid can be considered as 
mura11ih including great jurists or the founders of Islamic legal schools in 
the first and second century of Hijrah. 46 As legal studies developed, the 
works of the third century onwards were principally devoted to studying 
and re-examining carefully legal writings of those in the earlier stage in 
more systematic juristic discussions. The nature of the study in this 
period of time involved a comparative study not only between two or more 
46 See Jalal al-Din. al-Qadi al-Baydawi. p. 577; Nadiah. Ittihad, p. 180 ; 
Humphreys. Islamic History, p. 212. 
It is best evident from the definition of an independent mujtahid itself. Hitu , 
for example, writes that independent mujtahid is one who is not only of 
ability to set up his own school on his own principles of law but also of 
capacity of preferring conflicting indications. (see al-Ijtihadd, p. 17) 
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schools of law but also between two authorities or more in a single school 
of law. Accordingly, scholars in this age especially after the formative 
period, were better known as murajjih and no longer as mujtahid. 47 
Later, the title of murajjih is of restricted use. Tarjih is applicable only 
within one school of law in order to arrive at the most authorised view in 
that particular school of law. The jurists often classify this rank of ijtihad 
by providing names of the jurists that qualified to be the murajjih in every 
madhhab such as al-Nawawi in the Shafi'i madhhab, al-Mirghaynani in 
the Hanafi school of law, Khalil in the Maliki madhhab and al-QaIfi 
'Ala, al-Din al-Mardawi in the Hanbali madhhab. 48 
After this explanation, it seems to me that modern writers who 
attempted to classify the rank of ytihad or in particular to attribute the 
position of tarj ih to this rank have confined themselves to the later 
stage of legal studies where murajj ih was a quite distinguished rank of 
mujtahid ; restricted to application of preference in one madhhab. This 
contention, in my opinion, contains two errors. One error consists in not 
giving any considerable attention to the application of tarj ih in the pre- 
formative period. We have already shown elsewhere that tarjih is an 
integral part of legal studies and of ytihad in particular. The other error 
appears when tarj ih application is said to be restricted within one 
madhhab. Moreover, the names of some jurists and their respective works 
have been cited to support the idea. It is true, in my opinion, that al- 
Nawawi, for example, is a murajjih in the Shafi'i school of law49 but at 
47 See al-As'ad 1. USul, p. 270, note no. 1; al-'Alwan i. 'The Crisis". p. 332. 
48 See al-Zuhayli, al-Figh, vol. 1, p. 48. See also Nadiah, Ijtihad, p. 190 ; 
Mahmasan i, Falsafak p. 94. 
49 Ibid. ; Juynboll, " Law ". p. 860. 
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the same time, he is also a well-known jurist in comparative study 
between madhahib. His distinguished book entitled al-Majmu' Sha. rh al- 
Muhadhab is a clear evidence for what has been said. 50 In conclusion, 
we can say that although tarj ih as a proper study has been placed at the 
bottom of the rank of ytihad, the list is unable to suggest that tarjih is 
less important than the first rank of ytihäd in the list because tarj ih is 
a central key to all types of ytihad. 
Nowadays, the materials of figh, the results of ytihad, have been 
systematically collected, composed and arranged in innumerable numbers 
of volumes. Unfortunately, this huge mass of materials is always 
contradictory as is evident from the books of fiqh. Not only that, how 
these materials were derived through Utihad was also familiar to the 
students of Islamic legal theory. Therefore, tarji h is an important 
instrument in the entire usul ai jigh, in my opinion, for the following 
reasons: 
(1)To re-examine the reliability of every single method or principle of 
interpretation which has been adopted by the ancient scholars, e. g. 
ramm 
and khass, 'amal ahl al-Madinah, 'illah mustanbatah, etc., in establishing 
legal rulings. 
For more details, see al-Nawawi. al-Majmu' (introduction), vol. 1. p. 4. 
50 See al-Nawawi. al-Majmu' (introduction), vol. 1. pp. 5-6. 
He describes his book as "sharp li al-madhhab kuU-ih; bal li madhahib al- 
'ulama' kuUihjin . (ibid) 
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(2)To re-organise the maratib al-adilak (hierarchy of legal sources) where 
most legal disagreements are due to the lack of knowledge of these 
maratib. 51 
(3)Tarj ih provides the possibility that only the best legal opinion with 
respect to methodogical considerations will be advanced. 
(4)Also significantly, it offers a proper basis for the so-called "comparative 
study of fiqh". Many books concerned with figh have adopted the 
methodological considerations of tarj ih which make these books full of 
arguments and counter arguments in order to reach the arjah opinion 
according to the authors' point of view. 52 
(5)To contribute to the codification of Islamic law across several Muslim 
countries. This is done by selecting the opinion preferred by considering 
the one most suited to modern life, particularly in cases which have no 
textual evidence53 and sometimes by selecting the opinion preferred by 
most where tarjih is a form authorised to do so. 
In the light of the above outlines, we can understand that the 
study of tarjih has occupied an important position next to usul al-fugh 
itself. In other words, we may say that the study of tar, jih is not only 
directed at Islamic law i. e. to the so-called faro' ; but also to a far greater 
extent, at the methodology of ujul al figh, the rules for the deduction of 
the fora' from the canonical sources of law. It serves, to some extent, as 
a cross examination of the reliability of every single principle of 
51 The problem of maratib al-'adillah or the hierarchical order of the sources 
is a significant cause of legal disagreements in Islamic law. See page 
52 See al-Sarakhsi, al-MabsuL passim ; Ibn Rushd, Bidayah, passim ; Ibn 
Qudamah, al-Mughni, passim, etc. 
53 See Anderson, "Recent Development", p. 244. 
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interpretation adopted by the jurists. The direct consequence is that only 
the principle which is more accurate and consistent will be put forward 
as an appropriate principle to govern the establishing of legal rulings to 
new cases in the contemporary Muslim world. 
The significance of tarji h in legal conflict has another 
explanation. Since more than one method was employed by the jurists 
to remove contradiction such as naskh, takhy i r, etc., tarj ih must be 
shown to be the most practical and applicable method for removing any 
contradiction. Our previous discussion of the position of tarj ih as a 
legal solution is quite clear in showing that tad'ih is the most systematic 
and effective way to eliminate any conflict after the failure of 
reconciliation. 
Istihsan for instance, has a limited function in removing 
contradiction while naskh is argued about in terms of validity and 
sometimes of its application. 54 Ta'wil as well as tafsir as shown before, 
are merely part of tarj ih methodology. 55 Talfiq, however, does not 
concern the methodological arguments rather than the maslahah in 
selecting the most perfect opinion. 56 All these suggest that tarji h is 
always upheld and prevails in terms of removing legal conflict. 
54 See pages 132 and 136-141. 
55 See page 122. 
56 See pages 126-127. 
In addition, Ahmad Hasan has rightly argued that talfiq might produce 
dangers saying that " .... by exercising the principle of 
talfiq we may 
unconsciously build an edifice with a mixture of rules based on conflicting 
principles enunciated by various schools of law which may fit in their system 
and thought. but not In the system of others. In the wake of such an 
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It is hoped that tarj ih could play a significant role as a workable 
instrument to remove whatever conflicts exist because the knowledge of 
tad ih is not only important in re-examining the existing legal 
disagreements57 but also in establishing rulings for new and 
unprecedented cases58 to the extent that a mujtahid, among other 
requirements, has to be familiar with how to apply tarj i h. 59 By these two 
advantages and for all practical purposes, tad iih is eminently superior to 
other principles discussed above. Therefore, this interesting topic has 
been chosen because it gives an excellent opportunity to examine, or more 
precisely to re-examine, the phenomenon of contradiction 'in Islamic law 
with special emphasis on tarjih methodology. 
endevour. a new legal school may emerge devoid of any solid foundation, 
principles and methodology". (A review on . 
1ddigi's Profit-Sharing in 
Islamic Law. IS. vol. 25.1986, pp. 231-232) (cited after as "Review"). See also 
Chafik Chehata. Droit Musulman: Application and Proche-orient. Paris, 1970, pp. 
121,122 (cited from Layish, "The Modernists", p. 273) 
57 Al-Qardawi, Madkhal, pp. 286-287. 
Tarjih. in this context. Is called al-ytihad al-intiga'i (ibid) 
58 See Nyazee, "Taglid'. p. 26. 
59 See 'Iwan, DirasX pp. 5-8 ; Introduction to al-Mawsu'ah al-F ighiyyah. vol. 
1, p. 14 ; Hitu, "al-Ijtihad wa anwa' al-mujtahidin", in MajaUat al-Shari'ah wa 
al-Dirasat al-Islamiyyah. vol. 4,1985, p. 227. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE METHODOLOGY OF TARJIH IN MATH CONFLICT 
Part A: Introductory Remarks : 
It is widely acknowledged that Islamic law is extracted foremost 
from two sources namely the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Accordingly, an 
interpreter, whatever the title attributed to himl, is required to obtain a 
high standard of knowledge of the language in which the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah were revealed and pronounced. 2 Thus a legal interpreter is a 
person knowledgeable in the classification of Arabic words and their precise 
implications in addition to the methodological aspect of interpretation, 
called usul al figh. 3 Therefore, it is obvious that rules which govern the 
origins of words, their usages and classification are of prime importance in 
usul work and this sort of discipline is well known in usul terminology 
as nass or matn. 4 
Though nass or math is commonly used in the sense of text as 
opposed to sanad or chain of transmission, the word matn will be used in 
1A legal interpreter is called a mujtahid by al-Ghazali while al-Jurjani used 
the title faq ih to refer to a legal interpreter. See al-Mustas%a. vol. 2. p. 350 and 
al-Juijani, Kitab al-Ta'rifat, p. 8. 
2 AL-Risala. h. paras. 143f ; al-Burhan. vol. 1. p. 169 and vol. 2, p. 1330f 
Khalifah, Manahij, p. 27. 
3 A1-Mustas_fa, vol. 2, pp. 350-351 : Hitu, al-ljtihad. pp. 27,31 ; Nadiah, Ijtihad, 
pp. 83-93. 
4 The language discussions are found in both the mutakallimun and the 
jurists method of writings. Nevertheless, the location and classification of 
discussion vary from one method to another. (see Khalifah, Manahijl, p. 29, 
55-56) 
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the entire chapter instead of nass. The central reason behind this is that 
al-nass, as a term in usul, has a variety of meanings that are common in 
usul study. Apart from its dictionary meaning, that is, the text or the word 
(al-lafz), it is also used to represent a category of wording in relation to the 
degree of clarity. 5 Moreover, this category of clarity varies from one school 
to another particularly between the Shafi` i and the Hanafi schools of law. 6 
To avoid any confusion and since our present discussion will involve this 
category of wording, it will be easier to use the word math, instead of nass, 
to refer to the text in both the Qur'an and the Sunn. ah. Matn or mutun in 
plural, is derived from the root matana which comprises several literal 
meanings such as beat (the back part of the body), oath, stay, etc. 7 In 
technical use, it still conveys many meanings but the most dominant is 
described as a hard or elevated piece of something e. g. matn al-ard (the 
surface of the earth). 8 
For academic purposes, matn simply signifies the original text as 
opposed to any commentary. 9 Matn al-hadith, for example, constitutes the 
wording of the hadith which provided the meaning. 10 On the whole, the 
jurists have used this word of a legal text to refer to its total original 
5 See page 200. 
6 See Khalifah. Manaluj. pp. 20-22. 
7 Al-Muyam al-Was (f, vol. 2. p. 859 ; al-Bustani, Muijii vol. 2, p. 1946. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
Goldziher notes that the word matn is pre-Islamic and did not originally 
signify liadith-text. In old Arabic it had been used to denote 'written text'. 
(Muslim Studies, vol. 2 p. 20) 
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wording and linguistic structure as distinguished from isnad or sanad or 
even from footnotes, annotations and commentary as well. I l 
Despite the ability of a matn to provide some legal provisions, 
disagreement still arose as to the precise meaning of a word or a sentence 
in a legal text. Possession of a text, does not mean that a disputation 
cannot arise. 12 This is because, as stated by one scholar, "the whole 
process of Muslim jurisprudence from the definition of the sources of law 
to the derivation of substantive rules, was a speculative effort of the 
human intellect". 13 
The statement shows that the matn is in need of interpretation 
through the so-called Ytihad. According to one scholar, an attempt to 
interpret legal texts correctly is crucial since the greater use of legal texts 
is classified as speculative. Thus, this large number of speculative texts is 
open to a variety of interpretations as is actually the case in the 
overwhelming number of discussions in Islamic law. 14 Even if the texts 
are clear cut i. e. definitive, one must also resort to Ytihad in order to 
distinguish where a text applies and where it does not. 15 Hence, conflict 
may arise and accordingly, tarj ih should have a significant role in this 
11 Wehr, Dictionary. p. 890. 
12 Al-Dart n1. al-Marsalu; /, pp. 7-12. 
13 Coulson, Conf I. icts, p. 23. 
Another scholar has maintained that "law contained in the great jurist works 
of sonn i Islam is at most a human approximation, albeit a close one, to the 
ideal law of God". (Weiss, "Interpretation", p. 205) 
14 Weiss, "Interpretation", p. 203. 
15 Kerr, Islamic Reform, p. 110 ; Ahmad Fasan. The Early, pp. 117-118 ; 
idem, "The Sources", pp. 115,119; al-Darini, al-Manahij, p. 12. 
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area of conflict and the present chapter is an attempt to investigate this. 
Before that, I would like to outline how matn or the wording of the legal 
texts is conventionally classified in terms of usul study. 
Broadly, matn is divided into two main categories namely the 
word classification and implication. The word implication is then divided 
into two main indications known as gat'i and anni while its classification 
is again divided into different groups owing to different clues. 16 With 
reference to the degree of clarity, the word is classified into clear and 
unclear which involves many degrees of clarity and ambiguity as well. 17 
On the other hand, by referring to the limitation or scope of the word 
covering, it is often classified into certain types such as 'amm, khass, 
mushtarak, etc. 18 The last classification however, is based on the usage of 
the word whether it is used in its original, secondary, literal, technical or 
customary sense. 19 Obviously, the knowledge of these classfications and 
indications of either the word or the sentence in legal texts assists a 
mujtahid in his efforts at resolving cases of contradictory legal texts which 
is the bulk of this part of the study. 
16 tali, Islamic Jurisprudence. pp. 26-36 ; Weiss, "Interpretation", p. 206. 
17 Al-Sarakhsi, U§uI. vol. 1, pp. 163-169 ; Abu Zahrah, U§ul. pp. 118-135; 
Khalifah, Takhsi. E, p. 14, note no. 3. 
The clear word is divided into four categories and in contrast. the unclear 
word is equally divided into four categories as well i. e. zahir, nan, mufassar. 
muhkam. khafi, mushkil, mujmal and mutashabih. (ibid) 
18 Al-Sarakhsi, UsuZ, vol. 1, pp. 124-127; Khalifah, Takhsis, p. 14. 
19 At-Mu'tamad, vol. 1. pp. 19-22 ; a1ý. 1aja5, U§u1. vol. 1, p. 359ff. 
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Part B: The Methodological Aspect of Tarjih in Matn Conflicts 
1. Ta jih Within 'Amm - Khass Contradiction. 2 
As far as legal texts are concerned, in deriving legal rulings, the 
knowledge of 'amm and khass is a prerequisite since some verses or 
Prophetic statements are general and others are particular. From a 
historical point of view, it is reported that al-Rani , one of al-Shaii'i's 
biographers, has claimed that the terms "general" and "particular " 
were introduced for the first time by al-Shafi'i. 3 The above illustration, 
in fact, apparently conflicts with what follows. Fatimah, the daughter of 
the Prophet, has been reported to have made a claim to inherit the 
Prophet's property based on the generic sense of understanding the Qur'an 
4: 11 , "Allah chargeth you concerning 
(the provision to) your children: to 
the male the equivalent of the portion of two females..... ". However, the 
claim by Fatimah was rejected on the ground that the verse has been 
particularized (talchs isi. e the act of excluding a specific member from the 
members of the class or group) by a tradition from the Prophet, saying, " 
1 With reference to tarjilh in main conflict. al-Amidi has listed 51 modes of 
preference ( a[-Ij3kam. vol. 3, pp. 265-273 ). Nevertheless. not all of these 
methods will be examined here. 
2 From the viewpoint of the scope or capacity of covering, words are primarily 
classified into 'amm (general) and khass (specific). However, terms like 
mujlaq, muqayyad and mushtarak are brought together in discussion for they 
are always confused with 'amm -khans implication. See al-Sarakhsi. U2ui, 
vol. 1, p. 124 ; Kashf, vol. 1. p. 28. 
3 Al-nazi, Kit-ab Adab a[-Imam a! -Shafi'i wa Manaqibuhu. p. 57, cited from 
Khadduri, Islamic Juuipsrudence, p. 129. See also al-Khatib al-Baghdadi, al- 
Shafi'i, p. 38 ; al-Nawawi, al-Majmu, vol. 1, p. 10. 
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We, the Prophets, can not be inherited from and whatever we leave is for 
charity (sadagah) '. 4 
This incident concerns us for two purposes. First, it shows that 
the principle of 'a-mm and khans as previously evident, was in existence 
in a practical case even before the time of al-Shafi'i. Then, it clearly 
displays how easily 'amm conflicted with khans since each of them 
opposes the other in the scope of the word's implication. 5 Accordingly, 
this phenomenon has been seriously dealt with by the jurists 
particularly after the appearance of the Risalah. Our aim in this part of 
the study is to tackle this well-known contradiction with a sufficiently 
consistent methodology of preference. 
Amm in usul has been variously defined. On the whole, 'amm 
may be defined, as stated by a1-Jassas, as a word that pertains to, includes 
or affects the whole of a class or group. 6 In other words, it is a word 
which applies to many things, not limited in number and includes every 
thing to which it is applicable.? The word "al-mutallagat " (the divorced 
women) which occurs in Q. 2: 228 is an example of 'amm. The verse reads 
4 A1-Mankhul, pp. 174-175 ; Kashf, vol. 1. p. 308. 
For another example of conflict in the Companion period. see al-gurjubi. 
aLVami', vol. 3, pp. 174-175. 
5 According to one scholar, " generalisation and particularisation (as well as 
abrogation) afford scope for differing interpretation as wide as that provided by 
the establishment of analogical connection". See Aziz el-Azrneh. " Islamic 
legal theory p. 255. 
6 AI_Ja aý Ujul vol. 1, p. 31. 
7 AI-Mustnj, vol. 2, p. 32 ; al-Itgan, vol. 2, p. 16 ; al-Mu'tam4 vol. 1. pp. 
203-204 ; Irshad p. 112; Taysir, vol. 1. p. 190. 
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as follows; ' Women who are divorced shall wait, keeping themselves apart, 
three (monthly) courses.. ". In consequence, all those who have been 
divorced, regardless of whoever they are, are required by the Shari'ah to 
wait for three quru' as an 'iddah (waiting period) before they can be 
remarried to another person. 8 To identify the 'amm in legal texts or even 
in the Arabic language, one must observe certain linguistic patterns laid 
down by the linguists or jurists. 9 
Khasi as opposed to 'amm, is frequently defined as a word used 
originally to indicate a specific reference. 10 In other words, it is a word 
that pertains to, includes or affects only certain members of a class or 
group. 11 Even though it is restricted to specific matters, it still includes 
everything to which it can be applied. For the sake of clear example, the 
word "al-mutallagat " is again exemplified but this time as a khass word. 
Quoted as an example is Q. 33: 49, "0 ye who believe! If ye wed believing 
women and divorce them before you have touched them, then there is no 
period that ye should reckon.. ". In this particular case, those who are 
divorced prior to consummating the marriage are excluded from the 
requirement of observing the 'iddah. This exclusion applies specifically to 
certain divorced women: those divorced before any sexual intercourse (gabl 
al-duktutl ). 12 Although it is restricted to such divorced women, it includes 
all who have been divorced without sexual intercourse. With respect to 
8 Khalifah, Takhsis. p. 44. 
9 See for example ibid. pp. 13-24; al-Luma', p. 15 ; al-Sarakhsi. U5u1. vol. 1. 
pp. 154 M. at-Itqan. vol. 2. p. 16. 
10 A1-Sarakhsi, Usu1. vol. 1, p. 124: Kashf, vol. 1. p. 30. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Kh al i fah, Takl si jj. p. 44. 
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patterns of identifying khans, the jurists have also outlined some which 
do not represent all the forms of khass in Arabic. 13 
As shown by the jurists, conflict usually occurs between 'arum 
and khass in two situations namely before and after the process of takf 
i. 
(particularization). Regarding the former case, these two types of words 
may oppose each other under four circumstances. 14 The first of these 
being when the specific verse is revealed after the general verse and after 
the possibility of acting on it has passed. 15 For the Hanafis, the later of 
the revealed verses in terms of dates, abrogates the earlier, provided that 
both are equal in strength i. e. gat`i, and refer to the same subject matter 
i. e. equal in generality. 16 They argued that since 'amm is earlier in 
practice than khass and there is a gap in time between 'amm and khasa, 
it cannot be considered as specification since specification is actually a 
form of excepting. '? It is an abrogation, they argued, rather than a 
specification but it is called a partial abrogation in which the text subject 
to partial abrogation is abandoned while the remaining part of the text 
continues to operate. 18 Some scholars, on the contrary, criticised those 
who applied naskh to this particular case. They argued that a mere 
13 See for example al-As'adi, UIu1, pp. 71-72. 
14 Al-Jaý, U. 2u4 vol. 1. p. 381. 
15 Ibid., p. 383. 
16 Ibid. ; Kashf; vol. 1, p. 291. 
17 Ibid. ; al-Muswaddauk p. 134 ; al-Bai i, Ibkam. p. 158, note no. 1; Irshad. 
p. 163. 
18 Fawatih. vol. 1, p. 345 ; Mustafa Zayd, al-Naskh. vol. 1, p. 73 ; Khallaf. 
U§uI, pp. 186-187; Tagnin, p. 179. 
To see clearly how specification differs from partial abrogation, see al-Darini, 
ai-Manahi, j, pp. 567-570. 
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discrepancy in time does not justify the conclusion that takhjii changes 
its character into abrogation. 19 
The incident of Hill b. Umayyah who had accused (qadhf) his 
wife with Shurayk b. Salhma' is the best illustration of what we have 
discussed. It is unanimously acknowledged that Q. 24: 4 was earlier in 
revelation compared to the next verse in the same chapter i. e. Q. 24: 6.20 
The earlier verse (i. e. Q. 24 : 4) is as follows, "And those who accuse 
honourable women but bring not four witnesses, scourge them (with) 
eighty stripes and never (afterward) accept their testimony... ". Then, after 
one verse, came the verse, "As for those who accuse their wives but have no 
witnesses except themselves: let the testimony of one of them be four 
testimonies, (swearing) by Allah that he is of those who speak the truth". 
According to the Hanafis, the li'an case (Q. 24: 6) which is proved 
to be later in revelation date abrogates the earlier verse (Q. 24: 4). 21 Other 
jurists did not agree with this conclusion and in turn, removed this 
apparent contradiction by applying takhs i s. As a result, the punishment 
for qadhf is valid in general or in other words as long as qadhf did not 
come from a husband upon his wife. Otherwise, when a husband accused 
his wife and charged her with adultery. Wan is implemented. 22 The 
second view, indeed, seems to be preferable on the grounds that takhsis 
19 A]-Baj i. Ihlaam p. 162. al-Tabbirah, p. 152. 
20 In showing the gap in time between these two Qur'anic texts, see a! -Durr 
al-Mantiur, vol. 5, pp. 20-21 ; al-Shawkan i. al-Fach al-Qadir, vol. 4, p. 10. 
21 AI-Jaýsas, Usul, vol. 1, p. 384 ; idem, Abkam, vol. 3. p. 35 If. See also al- 
Khin, al-Ikhtilaf, pp. 216-217. 
22 Ai-Risalah para. 426. 
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grants the possibility for both verses to be applied together on the 
account that khans only limits the application of 'amm and does not 
invalidate it as naskh would do. Moreover, to make the application of 
takhsis approved and accepted, takhs is which is a form of bayan, does 
not need to be in any particular chronological relation with 'amm. 23 Thus 
takhsis can be applied even though the khass did not come immediately 
after `amm or in the same context as required by the Hanafis. 
Before we move to the second situation of ' amm-khans 
contradiction, I would like to re-examine the first case more precisely to 
understand the cause of the conflict. To begin with, we may note that the 
jurists have held two contrary views regarding the diialah or degree of 
implication of each of ramm and khass. The Hanafis maintained that 
ramm provides a definitive (gat'i) reference to all its individual elements in 
respect both of coverage and rulings. 24 Accordingly, when an 'am m is 
applied, it should be regarded as definitive until there is a proof to show 
the contrary, because a word implication must be first based on its lexical 
application (mantiq lughawi) instead of involving any other 
consideration. 25 To support their argument, the Hanafis have cited the 
practice of the Companions in which a total adherence to 'amrn 
23 AI-Itgan, vol. 2, p. 17 ; al-Bwham vol. 1. pp. 403-406. 
Regarding reconciliation through takF ij, see al-Baja. Ifjkam. p. 161 and al- 
Tabsirah, p. 150. 
24 Al-Sarakhsi, U. Sul, vol. 1. p. 132 ; Kashf, vol. 1. p. 291 ; al-Nasafi. Kashf. 
vol. 1, p. 161. 
The jurists unanimously agreed that khass implication is gat'i. (see al-As'ad1. 
Usul. p. 72 and al-Zuhayli. Usul, vol. 1, p. 205) 
25 Al-Sarakhst, Uaul. vol. 1, pp. 136-137 ; Fawatii1, vol. 1, p. 265 ; Kashf, 
vol. 1, p. 305. 
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implication was clearly demonstrated by those Companions. 26 However, 
the main foundation of such thought, I believe, as put by al-Sarakhsi 
himself, was the consideration that this legal theory has been the official 
view of the early jurists in Hanafi school of law. Al-Sarakhsi simply said 
that" wa 'ala hadha dallat masa'd 'ulama'ina ". 27 
The Shafi'is view, relatively speaking, is totally different from 
that of the Hanaus. 'Amm, according to them or generally the jumhur, 
brings only zanni or probable proof whether it is before or after takhsis. 28 
This means that the rule attached to 'amm is applicable to every 
individual element within its meaning but only to the degree of speculative 
probability. Their argument is a brief one. Since 'amm is liable to 
possible specification, its certainty (qat' i) no longer exists. 29 In addition, 
the jumhur have also based their attitude on their personal observation 
that almost all instances of 'amm in legal texts were particularized. 30 
26 Al-Sarakhsi, Usul, vol. 1, p. 135 if. See also Kashf, vol. 1, p. 294. 
27 Ibid.. pp. 132-133. See also Kashf, vol. 1, pp. 291,308. 
Though this is the official viewpoint of the Hanafis, Abu Hanifah, in many 
places, was criticised when he always made specification of general texts 
even without a proper evidence of specification. (see al-MankhuL pp. 180- 186). 
28 Kash, ', vol. 1, pp. 298.304 ; al-Sarakhsi, Usul, vol. 1, p. 132; al-Taqrir, 
vol. 1, p. 238. 
It should be kept in mind that 'amm is of three categories. namely (i) 'amm 
which is absolutely general ; (ii) 'amm which is meant to imply khan and (iii) 
'amm which is not accompanied by any indication to show either the first or 
the second. The disputation over the degree of 'amm implication (as In the 
present case) confines merely to the last category. See Khallaf, Ujul. pp. 185- 
186 and Khalifah. Takh is, pp. 33-34. 
29 Ali vol. 1, p. 304 ; al-Thagafi, " alZiyädah'. pp. 266-267. 
30 Faujatith, vol. 1. pp. 265-266 ; Rawdah, p. 129: al-Talw ib. vol. 1. p. 40. 
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Hence, they said that what is intended by the Lawgiver when He uses 
ramm is most likely some of its reference even though takhs fs did not 
actually take place, for it is so common that anything general can be 
particularised that it becomes a legal maxim known as " ma min `amm 
Ill i wa qad khussisa ". 31 
Obviously, the above disagreement does not produce anything 
contradictory in Ah as long there is no khass evidence. In other words, 
`amm should refer to every individual under its coverage. The disputation 
arose when 'arum was contradicted by khans. The Qur'anic injuction (Q. 
6: 121), "And eat not of that whereon Allah's name hath not been 
mentioned, for lo! it is abomination", for example, which clearly prohibits 
the Muslims from consuming the flesh of animals slaughtered by a 
Muslim, if for whatever reason, he has not mentioned the name of Allah 
consciously, has been claimed as a general provision in contrast to the 
following specific tradition i. e. " The believer slaughters in the name of 
Allah whether he pronounces the name or not". 32 
Since hadith ahad is regarded as zanni, it is not capable of 
particularising the 'umum conveyed in the Qur'anic text. In consequence, 
one is totally prohibited from eating such flesh by virtue of the general 
Qur'anic provision. 33 It was the Hanafi jurists who held this view arguing 
that a tann hadith cannot specify the generality of the Qur'an 
because takhs is is applicable only between two equal pieces of 
31 At_lbhaj, vol. 3. p. 230 ; al Itqan. vol. 2. p. 17. 
32 Badran, Usul, p. 383. 
33 Kashj; vol. 1. p. 295; al-Hidayah, vol. 4, p. 394. 
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evidence. 34 On the contrary, the Shafi'is have clearly declared that it is 
permissible to eat any flesh as long as it has been slaughtered by a 
Muslim. Of course, the tradition for them is a valid proof in 
particularising the Qur'an since both, according to them are 
probable ; the Qur'an in terms of its 'umum and the tradition on account 
of its ahad. 35 
Despite the acknowledgement by some scholars that the above 
conflict is merely apparent36, the problem remains disputed among the 
jurists. Without trying to open the entire arguments of the conflict, it is 
adequate, in my mind, to show that as far as hadith is concerned in 
explaining the meaning of the Qur'an, it is appropriate to do so, irrespective 
of the degree of the hadith provided that it is a valid and reliable hadith 
For one thing, most of the Prophetic traditions are ahad and accordingly, 
any inclination to neglect them as in the previous case would render most 
of the Prophetic traditions pointless. 37 By applying takhsis, however, 
both legal texts could be jointly implemented, for takhsis signifies only the 
specification of one category within a group of related categories. 38 
Moreover, the determination that such and such is qa. t'i or Zanni is 
questionable and sometimes baseless. But those who did not admit the 
possibility of takhsis, have in fact, led themselves into a complicated 
situation in justifying their legal view. As in this case, they said that the 
verse abrogates the tradition, although it is widely known that the verse is 
34 A1-Sarakhsi, Ugul, vol. 1. pp. 133-134. 
35 Al-Khin, Ikhtilaf,, p. 211. 
36 Khallaf, Ug4 p. 185. 
37 Ibn Qayyim, I'Icun, vol. 2, pp. 287-288 ; Abu Zahrah, USuI. p. 161. 
38 p1_Baji, Ihkanm p. 161: al-Turks, Ikhhlaf, p. 155. 
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Meccan and the tradition apparently belongs to the Medinan period. 39 
Moreover, naskh is inappropriate if applied because naskh is inapplicable 
unless in gat'i -gat'i conflict. 40 From this explanation, we come to know 
that partial abrogation as claimed by the Hanafis in the case of Wan, is but 
a natural consequence of the Hanafi's legal theory that both 'amm and 
khans are gat`i and therefore applicable to naskh 
The following three situations however, display how dispute 
exists not only between the Hanafis on the one hand and the Shafi'is on 
the other but also within one school of law especially among the Hanafis 
in order to maintain these contradictions. The second case is when the 
specific verse is revealed before the general verse. The Hanafis held that 
`amm abrogates khass. 41 In other words, 'amm is favoured in such a 
way that khans is abandoned because 'amm is later with respect to the 
time of the revelation. Therefore, in the Hanafis' view, khass is totally 
rejected and unimplemented. According to the other jurists, however, 
`amrn should be particularized by khans and in consequence, some 
individual cases of `amm are excluded by takhsis but others which are 
not subject to takhsis remain operative. 42 
Many examples have been put forward by the Hanafis to show 
how 'amm abrogates what is indicated by khass and the same examples 
have been used by the jumhur to show the contrary. However, I believe, 
one example might be sufficent in this context. Abu Ha ni fah, as 
39 Bidayah. vol. 1, p. 448 ; al-Turki, Ikhtilaf, p. 156 ; al-Khan, Ikhtikaf, p. 212. 
40 Al-Mustaýfa, vol. 2, p. 393. 
41 Al-Jassas, Usul, vol. 1, p. 385 ; Kashf, vol. 1, p. 291 ; Irshad, p. 163. 
42 See al-Matju1, vol. 2, p. 453 ; Irshad. p. 163; Badran, Tarjij3. p. 76. 
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reported by al-Jassas, claimed that Q. 47: 4; "... when ye have routed them, 
then make fast bonds and afterward either grace or ransom till the war lay 
down its burden... " is abrogated by Q. 9: 5; "Then, when the sacred months 
have passed, slay the idolaters whenever ye find them... ". According to 
Abu Hani fah, the first verse which gives the head of the state an absolute 
choice whether to free the defeated idolaters through ransom or grace is 
earlier in revelation while the verse which urges the Muslims to kill all 
idolaters is later. Hence, the later in time abrogates the earlier in the 
sense that all idolaters must be killed and there is no room for release. 43 
Naturally, the Shafi'is, in accordance with their principle, held 
that khass (Q. 47: 4) was not abrogated by the later 'amm but was khans 
that specified the general provision indicated by 'amm. As a result, 
defeated idolaters are entitled to be freed either by grace or ransom. 44 By 
this, both texts could be implemented together. 45 
43 Al-Jassas, Usul. vol. 1, p. 385. 
Other examples can be found in al-Sarakhsi's Usus, vol. 1, p. 133. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Badran, Tarj i h, p. 76. 
If one wishes to apply the argument of Abu IIanifah to other cases relevant 
to the question of dealing with unbelievers, one will notice that this 
argument is not accurate. In other words, if the obligation to kill all 
unbelievers is taken as valid on the basis it was the later in revelation. it may 
invalidate not only the freedom given to the head of state in dealing with 
defeated believers but also other matters such as the permissibility of making 
treaty between Muslims and unbelievers, the law of jizyah. etc. It is not a 
surprise that Abu jja nifah has been criticised for his inconsistency in 
applying his principle. (see note no. 27 ). 
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The third case of 'amm - khass conflict is when both are revealed 
together in the same statement which might suggest that there is no 
separation in the time of revelation between them. To this kind of 
contradiction all the jurists agreed to apply takhs i s. 46 No disagreement 
occurs because this is the only form which is recognized by the Hanafis 
as takhsis because takhsis, according to them cannot take place unless 
both 'amm and khass are in the same text or speech, not separated. 47 
For the Shafi'is, there is no doubt that in this case, one is obliged to 
resort to takhsis because takhsis is applicable whether by an independent 
or dependent clause of speech regardless of whether they are in the same 
text or not. 48 
Therefore, it is agreed that 'amm which occurs together with 
khi in the same verse is specified in the sense that 'amm is no longer 
applicable to all its individual cases rather than to some of them. For 
example, Q. 5: 3; "Forbidden unto you (for food) are carrion and blood 
and swine-flesh.... " is said to be specified by a clause which comes 
afterward but still in the same verse which is as follows, "Whoso is forced 
by hunger, not by will, no sin (for him) lo! Allah is Forgiving, Merciful". 
46 AI-Muswaddak p. 137 ; al- Ja arz, UUuZ , vol. 1. p. 406. 
47 Al-Sarakhsi. UJut vol. 1. p. 133; Kashf, vol. 1. p. 306 ; Fowatib. vol. 1. p. 
303; al-Ja aa. UUul. vol. 1. p. 406 ; Badran. USu1, p. 376; a] Thagafi, " al- 
Ziyadah', p. 263. 
Al-Sarakhsi says, "idha kana al-kalam mausulan kana akhiruhu bayanan 
liawwalihi, wa idha kana maffulan kana naskhan ". (ibid) 
48 Al-Lwna', p. 19 ; al-Darini, al-Manahij. p. 555; Abu Zahrah, al-Shaft'i. p. 
179. 
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Hence, one who is in such a condition is allowed by a specific indication 
that occurs in the same text to eat what has earlier been prohibited. 49 
The fourth and final case exists when it is not known which one 
came first, the general legal proof or the specific legal proof. The Hanafis, 
however, held different views which can be summarised as tawaqquf from 
practising both until the dates of revelation are known50 ; preference for 
one of them51 and finally, both are abandoned and in turn, other elements 
of evidence are referred to. 52 However, another opinion which was 
personally expressed by al-Bukhari, the author of Kashf al-Asrar, suggests 
that 'amm should be applied on the grounds of precaution. 53 
The Shafi`is, in accordance with their principle, together with the 
remaining jurists, gave the preference to khans without any hesitation for 
more than one specific reason. Al-Amid, for instance, has listed three 
reasons why khans should prevail ; it is stronger and more specific in 
indication ; to prefer 'amm means to abandon khan while the opposite 
action does not bring the same result where both could be jointly applied 
and the possibility that 'amm is subject to specification is greater than 
that khass be interpreted as having a metaphorical meaning. 54 
49 See al-Qurjubi, a -jami. vol. 6. pp. 64-65 ; al-Ja as. U vol. 1. p. 406. 
50 See al-Jasia-q, Usul, vol. 1. p. 407. note no. 1; Irshad p. 163. 
51 Ibid. ; Kha] i fah. Takhu is. p. 40. 
52 Al-Ja a5. UUu1. vol. 1. p. 407. 
53 uhf, vol. 1, p. 299. 
54 Al-midi, al-IFl/aam vol. 3. p. 269. See also Irshad, p. 163. 
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For an immediate conclusion, we may say that the Shafi`is point 
of view in all cases of `a-mm -khans conflict is sound and reliable because 
recourse to abrogation in some cases of conflict is often found to be 
unnecessary. Futhermore, by applying takhs i s, both can co-exist in their 
respective spheres which is better than neglecting either of them. 55 
Consequently, the application of Iran as an exceptional form of qadhf 
punishment, freeing the defeated unbelievers either by grace or ransom and 
eating the prohibited things in darurah situations are all valid cases by 
virtue of takhsis. These three rulings are upheld for they are more specific 
and contain no cancellation of general provision. 
To complete our discussion of tarj ih in 'amm -khass conflict, I 
shall examine the possibility of contradiction after takhsis. It is said 
that when a fresh 'amm i. e. unspecified, contradicts the specified 'a-mm 
('amm makhsusJ, the former prevails. 56 Those who adhered to this 
preference have claimed that 'amm makhsus is weaker for two reasons; 
its degree of indication is disputable and it became majaz after takhsis. 57 
However, this sort of argument has been disapproved by some of 
the jurists arguing that `amm makhsus is preferable because it is more 
dominant (al-ghalib) compared to the one which is not yet specified. 58 
55 In fact, in modern law too, one often notices that the particular usually 
specifies the general whereby both can co-exist. See Abu Zahrah, Uhu[. p. 
168. 
56A1-Amidi, al-Ihkam, vol. 3, p. 270; al-Muswaddah, p. 313: Tangijl, p. 422: 
Muntafui, p. 224: al-Mahsul, vol. 2, p. 463. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Irshad p. 278. 
Al-Shawkan i attributes this view to al-Safi al-Hindi (ibid). 
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This view they owed to the fact, as we have already stated, that 'arum 
which remains with its generic meaning is very rare to the extent 
supported by a legal maxim; "ma min 'amm illa wa qad khusisa ". 
Subsequently, 'amm makhsus predominates because takhhis has made it 
more specific than the one which has not yet been specified. 59 
The claim that 'amm makhsus is considered as majaz and 
therefore 'arum ghayr makhsus which is regarded as , 
tiagiqah should be 
preferred, in my opinion is baseless and questionable. 60 Even if this claim 
is accepted, it is the majaz which is supposed to be upheld, owing to its 
more dominant nature, and as we shall see, that dominant majaz always 
prevails. Supporting the view which gives more credence to 'amm makhsus, 
I should like to note that the jurists, in this particular case, did not 
attempt to provide even a single example, which might suggest that the 
above discussion is theoretical rather than practical. 
Similar to 'amm and khass conflict, 61 mutiaq and muqayyad are 
often found in contradictory situations. 62 Hence, it is not surprising that 
59 Ibid. 
60 This is due to the maxim cited above. In other words, 'amm ghayr 
maIc1 t§ is of very rare of occurrence and accordingly, the conflict between it 
and 'amm makhhu§ is unreal. 
61 Although muu1aq and muqayyad are apparently identical to 'amm and 
khan i. e. with reference to the scope of covering, the former is different from 
the latter in that the latter comprises all to which it applies whereas the 
former is applicable to any one of a multitude, not to all. (see Badran, UUul. 
pp. 351 and 371 ; al-As'ad 1. U§ul. p. 109) 
62 pl_Khin, Ikhtiaf, p. 2466. 
This phenomenon is known as " haml at-mu, (laq 'ala al-mugayyad ". See al- 
Zuhayli. USuI, vol. 1. p. 210. 
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one can easily find the methodology of tarj ih in mutlaq and muqayyad 
discussion since both not only differ from, but contradict, each other. 
Mutlaq as well as muqayyad have been variously defined but still offer a 
standard definition. A word which is neither qualified nor limited can be 
considered as mutlaq 63 while muqayyad is a qualified and limited 
implication. 64 A standard example used by the jurists is the word 
raqab4 (a slave) which occurs as mutlaq in Q. 58: 3; "..: (the penalty) in 
that case (iha. r) is the freeing of a slave". The same word occurs on 
another occasion but as a qualified word i. e. in Q. 4: 92; "He who hath 
killed a believer by mistake must set free a believing slave ". One must set 
free a Muslim slave as a kagarah for the latter case i. e. accidental killing, 
while in the first case, it is sufficient to release any slave regardless of 
whether he is Muslim or not. 
Generally speaking, the texts have no conflict since each of them 
has a different cause i. e. zihar and accidental killing, even though the 
word `slave' occurred in both texts. However, when some of the jurists 
maintained that the slave required to be freed in both cases is one who is 
Muslim65, it prompts us to study the relation between mutlaq and 
mugayyad in more detail. Those who held that view have qualified a 
mutlaq slave in the first verse by the second verse and as a result, it is 
obligatory to set free a Muslim slave in order to fulfil the requirement of 
kaffarah in both cases. 
63 Al-pmidt. al-lhkam. vol. 2. p. 162: al-Baja. Ihkam. p. 48: RawLIah. p. 
136; Irshad p. 164 
64 Ibid. 
65 Bidayah4 vol. 2. p. 111. 
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The case, indeed, is one of the four circumstances where mutlaq 
and muqayyad are said to oppose each other. On this occasion, I shall 
examine all of those situations for the purpose of preference methodology. 
To begin with, it is said that mutlaq and muqayyad are expected 
theoretically to contradict each other in (1) the ruling as well as the 
cause; (2) the ruling alone; (3) the cause alone and (4) not in either of 
them. Of the four, the jurists reach the same conclusion only in the first 
and final cases of conflict. 66 
The first case exists when mutlaq and muqayyad conveyed the 
same ruling as well as having the same cause. To this effect, mutlaq must 
be qualified by muqayyad in a way that mutlaq is applicable only to the 
matter qualified by a muqayyad. 67 This is commonly demonstrated by 
quoting two Qur'anic texts, namely Q. 5: 3 and Q. 6: 146. The first verse 
reads as follows, "Forbidden unto you( for food) are carrion and blood and 
swine-flesh... " , while the second verse reads as , 
"Say: I find not in that 
which is revealed unto me aught prohibited to an eater that he eat thereof, 
except it be carrion, or blood poured forth. or swine-flesh... ". In this case 
namely the consumption of blood, the jurists noted that the verses refer to 
the same ruling namely the prohibition of eating and they have the same 
cause namely the consumption of blood. According to the principle stated 
66 AI-Marilchul. p. 177 ; al-As'adi, Ujul, pp. 105-107. 
67 Al-Amidi , at-1>kam, vol. 
2. p. 163 ; Irsha . pp. 164-165. 
One may argue why did the Hanafis apply qualification between two texts 
that are separated while they had abstained from making specification 
between two texts which are separated. Obviously, they have their 
justification for that, since qualification, in their opinion, differs from 
specification. For details, see al-Dari ni, al-Manahi; j, pp. 573 -574 ; Khal i fah, 
Takh§-ij, p. 51. 
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earlier, the muqayyad qualifies the mutlaq and makes the implication of 
the muqayyad prevail i. e what is prohibited from the above two texts 
(concerning blood) is only blood poured forth. 68 
The jurists are also in agreement in situations when both are 
contradictory and have different causes and rulings. Unlike the first case, 
the jurists in this case declared that each of them should be implemented 
independently since they differed totally from each other. 69 Two 
Qur'anic verses are quoted to illustrate the above. A mutlaq word which 
occurs in Q. 5: 38 , "As for the thief, 
both male and female cut off their 
hands ", is said to contradict the muqayyad in Q. 5: 6; "0 ye who believe! 
When ye rise up for prayer, wash your faces and your hands up to the 
elbows... ". Obviously, though these two texts convey the word "hand", they 
are not related to each other and must be implemented independently i. e. 
the hands in the case of theft should not be cut up to the elbows. 70 
The remaining two cases are cause of disputation among the 
jurists. One is when mutlaq and muqayyad have the same rule but 
different causes. We have shown before that the order to set free a slave as 
kaffarah is based on different causes. Freeing a slave is caused by zihar 
while freeing a Muslim slave is kaffarah for an accidental killing. 
According to the majority of the Shafi'is, the muqayyad i. e. the Muslim 
slave, qualifies the mutlaq implication. 71 Thus, one who committed zihar 
or particularly an erroneus killing must set free a Muslim slave because 
68 Abu Zahrah, Usul, p. 171 ; al-Khin, Ikhtilaf, p. 202. 
69 AI-Amid-i, al-Ibkam, vol. 2, p. 162 ; Irshad p. 164. 
70 Badran, Usu1, p. 359; al-Khan, Ikhtilaf, p. 202. 
71 Irshad p. 165. 
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''a slave" has been qualified as one who believes in Islam. Having proposed 
this preference, they based their argument on the unity of the Qur'an 
(wihdat al-Qur'an) ; the Qur'an explains what is intended by itself e. g. 
fatahrir ragabah and fatahrir raqabah mü minah72 
The Hanafis have a contrary point of view; they said that each of 
them must stand separately. Qualification (taq yi d) of mu tlaq by 
muqayyad is not approved by them because each of the verses stands 
independently on its own. 73 Moreover, they claimed that by qualification, 
some meaning is added to a mutlaq text. To add some meaning to the 
text, according to the Hanafis is considered as naskh 74 and naskh in this 
particular case is invalid because naskh in the form of taq yid is 
unapproved. 75 
The third point of view is the view of a group of leading Shafi'i 
usulists. They contend that qualification could take place only if both 
serve a similar idea and objective. 76 As in the case of freeing the slave, 
the whole idea, they argue, is to release a Muslim from slavery as often as 
possible, which is the intention of the Shari'ah. Hence, there is a 
common idea between both cases which leads the way to qualification 
accordingly. Otherwise, each of mutlaq and muqayyad must operate 
72 Al-Zuhayli. Usul. vol. 1. pp. 216-217. 
73 Fawatifj, vol. 1. p. 365 ; Abu Zahrah, Usul. p. 171. 
74 See at-Mankhul, pp. 178-180 ; al-Sarakhsi, Usut vol. 2, p. 82. 
For details, see al-Thagafi. " al-Ziyädah'. passim. 
75 Fäwatijj. vol. 1. p. 365: Badran, Usul. p. 452 ; al-Zuhayli, Usul. vol. 2, p. 
945. 
76 Irshad, p. 165. 
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respectively. 77 This view is the more acceptable among the overwhelming 
majority of the Shafi'is. 78 
The other and final situation comes from the fact that mutlaq 
and mugayyad have the same cause but different rulings. For some of the 
Shaf'is, the muqayyad qualifies the mutlaq which gives the impression 
that one should observe only the mugayyad requirement instead of the 
mutlaq. 79 On the contrary, the Hanafis have stated that the mutlaq as 
well as the muqayyad must operate in their respective areas without any 
qualification. 80 The problem of tayammum or more precisely the required 
part of the hand to be wiped in tayammum is said to be qualified by 
another Qur'anic verse which speaks of " washing the hands" in ablution. 
With reference to tayammum, the relevant verse is as follows (Q. 4: 43) 
".. and if ye find not water, then go to high clean soil and rub your faces 
and your hands (therewith). Lo! Allah is Benign, Forgiving". As regards 
ablution, "the hand" however, is limited by 'up to the elbow' in Q. 5: 6; " 
O ye who believe! When ye rise up to prayer, wash your faces and hands 
up to the elbows". 
Although both texts have a common cause, namely purity for 
prayer, they differ in their respective rulings ; wiping in tayammum and 
77 Al-Amid-t, al-Ihkam, vol. 2, p. 164 ; ai-Lwna', p. 26. 
78 Ibid. 
Al-Shawkani cites al-Rani, the author of al-Mat ul who has described this 
view as the intermediate opinion. (Irsh . d, p. 165) 
79 Tangij. pp. 266-267 ; MusaUam, vol. 1. p. 361 ; Zuhayr, Ujul, vol. 2, p. 
326. 
80 Ibid. 
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washing in ablution. Consequently, according to some of the Shafi`is, 
one is required even in tayammum to wipe the hands up to the elbows 
because the word "your hands" has been qualified by limiting it to the 
elbows as implied by the other verse. 81 Other jurists, however, did not 
accept such an action in tayammum because mutlaq cannot be qualified by 
muqayyad owing to the ruling difference. 82 For some scholars, the word 
"your hands" is qualified but by a hadith from the Prophet which 
explains that one must wipe the hands in tayyamum up to the elbows. 83 
As regards qualification by the hadith, it actually refers to the first case 
of mutlaq-muqayyad conflict where both have the same cause and ruling 
and not to this last type of conflict between both. 
In conclusion, I believe that muqayyad is more specific 
and obvious than mutlaq in all cases of contradiction on condition that 
both have the same cause and ruling. In other cases, one is advised, 
however, to refer to other sources before trying to qualify mutlaq because 
they differ, as we have seen, in either ruling or cause which may affect the 
soundness of the qualification. The problem of qualification of "the 
hands" in tayammurn is the best evidence to show that qualification 
might be based on other elements of evidence taken from outside the 
conflict. The Sunnah of the Prophet is of great help in doing so, for the 
Prophet's role is to explain the ultimate meaning of the Qur'an as shown in 
many other cases. 84 
81 Al-Zuhayli, Usul. vol. 1, p. 21 ; Zuhayr, Usul, vol. 2. p. 333. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Al-Flkr al-Saat i, vol. 1, p. 46. 
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The last task to be undertaken here is related to the problem of 
mushtarak. 85 This problem is to be discussed for it creates conflict in 
figh. 86 Differences of view in the fixation of words such as "quru' " (Q. 
2: 228) and "sultan" (Q. 17: 33) are belived to be the product of mushtarak. 
The word quru' (plural of qar' for example, i. e. periods, divided the jurists 
; some opine that it refers to the period of menstruation and others 
contend the opposite meaning i. e. purity-87 As the word "sultan " which 
can be translated into two equal meanings ; power and right, may signify 
gisas (retaliation) as well as compensation or blood money (diyah) in case 
of murder. Again, for the same reason, the jurists have arrived at two 
contary rulings. 88 By this, we can safely conclude that mushtarak applies 
equally to either of its two (or more) meanings. 89 
The only difference between mushtarak on the one hand 
and 'a-mm as well as mutlaq on the other is that the former is applied to 
more than one meaning from the very beginning and all of them bear the 
original meaning. 90 Contrary to this, 'amm and mutlaq, have each a 
single meaning only but this applies to an unlimited number of 
individuals relevant to this meaning. The word " 'ayn ", for instance is a 
85 Since it is difficult to render the Arabic word into English. I shall use the 
word as it is pronounced in Arabic namely mushtarak instead of its common 
translation such as compound and homonym. 
86 See page 61$. 
87 See page 6'. 
88Bidayah, vol. 2. p. 402 : al-Mughni, vol. 7. p. 752. 
For details on this question, see al-Zanjani. TakhrU. pp. 314-315. 
89 See Lane, Lexicon, part 4, p. 1543 ; al-Sarakhsi, Usul, vol. 1, p. 126 ; Irsho4 
p. 20. 
90 Al-Dar-I n, al-Manahjj . p. 
194. 
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mushtarak word for it comprises more than one meaning such as eye, spy, 
gold, water spring, etc. 91 
Discussion should be made to examine conflict caused by 
mushtarak. Relatively speaking, it corresponds largely to principles laid 
down by the jurists when dealing with a rnushtarak word which has more 
than one meaning. These can be summarised into three opinions. The 
majority of the Shafi'is contend that a mushtarak word may be interpreted 
as having more than one meaning provided that they do not contradict one 
another to the extent that both could be possibly and jointly understood 
whether in the positive or negative form. 92 On the contrary, as held by 
some of the Hanafis, only one meaning should be assigned to a mushtarak 
word, irrespective of whether the statement is positive or negative. 93 The 
last opinion which is expresed by the other Hanafis tends to propagate 
the view that mushtarak may convey both possible meanings provided 
that the statement is in the negative. 94 
Not to prolong the preliminary explanation, I shall quote one 
example of figh in order to match the theory discussed with the actual 
case. A primary instance which comes to mind is the dispute concerning 
the interpretation of the word "nikah " in Q. 4: 22, "And marry not those 
whom your fathers married (wa ma nakaha äba'ukum)". The word "nik h" 
carries three possible meanings which in turn may point to three contrary 
legal rulings accordingly. The verse could mean, " and do not marry those 
91 Lane, Lexicon, part 4. p. 1543; al-Sarakhsi, U, -uI. vol. 1, p. 126. 
92 Nihayah. vol. 1. pp. 313-314 ; Irshad. p. 20; al-Zanjan i, TakhrUU, p. 313. 
93 Al-Sarakhs , US-UL, vol. 1. p. 126; KashJ, vol. 
1, p. 39. 
94 Kashf, vol. 1. p. 41 ; Irshad, p. 21; Tagnin, p. 185. 
186 
women with whom your father had sex"; and it could mean, "with whom 
your fathers married ('aqd)" or "with whom your fathers married and had 
sex". 95 If the first meaning is chosen, then a son is forbidden to marry 
any women with whom his father had sex but not women his father 
married if he did not have sex with them. If the second meaning is chosen, 
then a son is forbidden to marry women with whom his father married even 
though he did not have sex with them. The last interpretation of the verse 
forbids a son to marry women with whom his father had married and had 
sex. 
Owing to this variety of meanings indicated by the word "nikah", 
the jurists are divided amongst themselves and each has his own 
argument. Al-Jassas, for example, who deduced the first ruling mentioned 
above, stresses that "sex" is the original meaning of nikah and 
therefore should prevail. 96 Some of the jurists select however, the second 
ruling arguing that marriage is the common meaning implied by the word 
"nikah " in both the Qur'an and the Sunnah. 97 The last ruling is drawn by 
Ibn al-'Arabi because of his principle that both the literal and figurative 
meanings must be taken together, barring a legal proof. 98 It is evident from 
this discussion that the jurists have, to some extent, regarded mushtarak 
as identical to hagiqah and majaz discussion. Therefore, the basis of 
selecting one of the above views is grounded on that principle as shown 
by a -Jassas and Ibn al-'Arabi's argument respectively. 
95A1-Khin, Ikhti(af, p. 81. 
96 Aljkam, vol. 2, p. 112. 
97 Al-Zuhayli, al-Flgh. vol. 7. p. 30. 
98 Ibn al-'Arabi. Abkam al-Qur'an, vol. 1. pp. 368-369. 
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To select only one as the correct legal opinion is rather difficult, 
for each of these views is well grounded in the Qur'an ( as well as in some 
of the works on Arabic). 99 To use the word "nikah. " to refer to sexual 
intercourse is implied by Q. 4: 6, "Prove orphans till they reach the 
marriageable age (haha idha balaghu al-nikah )". The capability of having 
sexual intercourse is identical to what is meant by marriageable age. 100 
As regards the second meaning i. e. the contract aspect of marriage, it is 
argued on the basis of Q. 33: 49, "0 ye who believe! If ye wed believing 
women and divorce them before you have touched them, then there is no 
period that ye should reckon ....... 
101 Ibn Manzur asserts that this is the 
preferable meaning of nikah. 102 The last meaning which comprises both 
marriage and sexual intercourse meanings, bases itself on Q. 2: 230, "And 
if he hach divorced her (the third time), then she is not lawful unto him 
thereafter until she hath wedded another husband". According to many 
authorities, those who have been irrevocably divorced (mabtutah) are not 
allowed to be remarried by their former husbands unless those women had 
been married and covered by another man through a complete legal 
contract of marriage. 103 This view is supported by many traditions where 
the Prophet instructed those women not to return to their ex-husbands 
until marriage and sex have genuinely taken place between them and their 
second husbands. 104 
99 See al-Khin. Ikhtilaf,, pp. 81-84. 
100 Ibid. See also al-Rani, a! -Tafsir al-Kabir, vol. 9, p. 188. 
101 Ibid. See also Q. 4: 3 ; Q. 24: 32. 
102 Ibn Manzur, Lisan, vol. 2, p. 625. 
103 Nayl al Awjar, vol. 6. pp. 275-277. 
104 Ibid. 
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At this stage, I cannot point to any one of these three views as 
preferable. What I can do is merely extract from the preceding discussion 
one remarkable feature known as gari nah. In legal theory, the concept 
of garinah plays an important role in linguistic interpretation of the 
texts. 105 Qarlnah, in short, is divided into two basic distinctions 
namely verbal and circumstantial. 106 It is of great importance 
particularly in problems dealing with words having two or more meanings. 
The function of gari nah is to determine the precise meaning of such a 
word or perhaps a sentence. In mushtarak, therefore, garinah reduces 
ambiguity and pinpoints the object intended. We may realise that the 
jurists have resorted to a kind of garinah. Some of them observe that the 
word nikah is used throughout the Qur'an and the Sunnah to indicate 
the meaning of marriage as a contract procedure only. In case of conflict, 
the common usage should be favoured. In contrast, the argument of Ibn 
al=Arabs might correspond to qarinah lafziyyah i. e. the sentence of 
=hatta tankiha zaujan akhar (until she hath wedded another husband)". 
Since the meaning of marriage is implied by the word "zaujan " i. e. 
husband, the word "nikah " should indicate another meaning other than 
marriage, that is, sexual intercourse. 107 Furthermore, this result is in 
line with a hadith from the Prophet that such a woman cannot return to 
her ex-husband unless sexual intercourse has taken place between her and 
her new husband. 108 The hadith indeed, offers another garinah to be 
further considered. These arguments are of great significance in 
105 Hallaq, "Notes on the term of garina in Islamic legal discourse", in JAOS. 
vol. 8,1988, passim particularly p. 475. (cited after as "Qarind' ) 
106 Ibid. ; Irshad p. 24. 
107 See Bidayak vol. 2, p. 87. 
108 AI-Darari, vol. 2, p. 275 ; a! -Muwaj a' (S). p. 196. 
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conflict and tad ih and the details of qar nah will be supplemented in the 
following discussion. 
2. Tarj ih in Contradiction Between Haq igah and Mgjazl09 
As previously mentioned, in terms of textual interpretation, 
determining what meaning is intended in a given text is crucial and 
sometimes difficult. Therefore, rhetorical considerations constituted'the 
major part in textual implication because rhetorical principles are believed 
to have a principal role in legal reasoning. 110 For this purpose, the 
principles of haqiqah and majaz will be examined as they are put together 
in usui as indicating different and conflicting implications. Our aim is 
merely to seek a strict methodological preference in their conflict because 
many words have two meanings, a hagiqah (literal) and majaz (figurative) 
and it is possible for two or even three meanings to be intended at the 
same time ; the hagiqah, the majaz or both. 
It is useful to point out that haqiqah -majaz discussion is too 
wide and too complicated not only in usul literature but also in other 
disciplines where the subject of majaz is common such as rhetoric, 
theology and logic. Moreover, it has always been connected to other 
discussions like sarih and kinayah which also play a significant role in 
textual interpretation. Therefore, any part of the discussion which is not 
109 With reference to the usage i. e. whether a word is used in its primary. 
secondary, literal, technical or customary sense, the word is commonly 
classified into haqiqah and majaz as well as to sarih and kinayah (al- 
Sarakhsi, Usul, vol. 1, pp. 170-183,187-199) 
110 Modarressi, "Majaz ", p. 787. 
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a priority in our present concern will be left aside even though it may be of 
importance in other fields of discipline or even in usul study itself. l ll 
Historically, the hagiqah -majaz discussion did not exist in the 
early literature of usul at fIgh or in other fields of study. 112 It is of 
interest to note that their discussion as a terminological usage did not 
exist even in the works of the great scholars such as thöse of al-Khalil, 
Sibawayh and Abu 'Amr b. al-'Ala. 113 In the field of usul al, gh, al-Jassas 
(d. 370 A. H. ) has been credited as the first who introduced this subject in 
legal methodology. 114 Alongside these efforts, there are a number of works 
on the same subject but in the different fields of discipline such as Ibn 
Faris (d. 395 A. H. ) in lexicology i. e. the theory of words and their 
meanings, in his book, al-Sahib i ft fF iqh at-Lughah and 'Abd al-Qahir 
al-Jurjani (d. 471 or 474 A. H. ) in rhetoric in his well known book called 
Asrar al-Baiaghah. 115 At the later stage, however, this variety of works is 
narrowed down to only two basic approaches namely, usul al-figh and 'iim 
al-bayan. 116 
111 Problems such as determining those who are qualified to distinguish 
majaz from J3o. giqah or examining the existence of majaz in the Qur'an and 
the like are purposely omitted since the Immediate concern of the present 
study is to arrive merely at methodologies of removing conflict between rngjaz 
and bagiqah 
112 Ibn Taymiyyah, Fatawa , vol. 
20, pp. 400-403. 
113 Ibid. p. 404. 
114 Heinrichs, "On the genesis of the agiqah- majaz dichotomy". in SI. vol. 
59,1983, p. 114. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid 
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Although hagiqah -majaz terminology has existed since the 
third century of Hijrah, the scholars have no common definition of either, 
particularly of majaz. According to Abu 'Ubaydah, for instance, majaz is 
used in the exegetic sense of the word i. e. the ideas which are not 
explicitly explained. 117 For al-Jurj ni, majaz is any word which is used, 
because of some relationship, in a sense other than the original 
lexicographical one. 118 Majaz definition in Usul a1-Ja,. C2 is similar 
to what has been defined by the bayaniyyun. First, he began to 
explain ljagiqah by saying that it is the original meaning of a word, the 
meaning for which the word was initially coined (ma summiya bihi al- 
shay'). 119 Majaz, he simply defined as "that by means of which its initial 
literal usage is disregarded so that the name it is given is not its literal 
one". 120 As usual, he has quoted his teacher, al-Karkhi's, opinion in this 
matter and both are of the same opinion. 121 
The standard example of majaz used by the scholars is the 
sentence "So and so is a lion" (fuian asad) in the sense of a brave man. 122 
Al-Jaffas, however, quoted a Qur'anic verse (Q. 2: 228) in showing an 
example of majaz. It is the word quru' which is as follows ; 'Women who 
1171bid. See also Cooper. Introduction to al-Tabari's Jami' al-Bayan 
(translated). p. xiii. 
118 AI- Jurjan i. Asrar al-Balaghah, ed. H. Ritter, Istanbul, 1954, p. 325. (cited 
in Modarressi, "Majaz", p. 788) 
119 AI-Jassas, Usul, vol. 1, p. 359. 
120 Ibid. 
For details, see Khali fah. Manahij, pp. 72-73 (note no. 7 ). 
121 Ibid. 
122 Al-. Jurjan i, Kitab al-Ta'rifat p. 214. See also al-Sarakhsi. Usul. vol. 1. p. 
170. 
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are divorced shall wait, keeping themselves apart, three quru' ". The 
word "qur i"', plural of "qar'" has two meanings in Arabic namely the 
menstruation and the clean period between two menstruations or simply 
the purity. 123 According to al-Jassas, menstruation is the original meaning 
called hagiqah and the purity is majaz. 124 This example has been rejected 
by other jurists on the ground that it actually demonstrates the principle 
of mushtarak and not the haqiqah - majaz principle. 125 For us, this 
reveals that a strict distinction between these terms is still absent which 
would create more complexity in the following discussion. 
The first matter to be noted is that should there be any conflict 
between haqiqah -majaz, most of the jurists have held that hagiqah 
always prevails because majaz is weaker than hagiqah. 126 There are 
many reasons why majaz is weaker than hagiqah. First, majaz is in 
need of a garinah to be correctly understood while hagiqah has no need 
of that because it is the original meaning. Then, the meaning of haq igah 
springs to mind faster than the majaz. 127 According to al-Jaffas, since 
majaz is used as inappropriate meaning i. e. not with its original linguistic 
usage, it is not reasonable and permissible to have recourse to what is 
123 Al-Ja aj, U§uL vol. 1. p. 47. 
124 Ibid. ; idem, Ahkam. vol. 1. p. 432. 
125 Al-gur, tubi, al-Jami'. vol. 3, pp. 113-117. 
For details, see al-Nashami's comment in Usul a1, Ja a, F, vol. 1, p. 47, note no. 
1. 
126 gl-Amid i al-If kwn. vol. 3, p. 267: Rawdah. p. 90 ; Nayl alAwwar. vol. 5, 
p. 292 ; Gibb, Islam, p. 64. 
127 Ibid. ; Nihayah, vol. 1, p. 372-373; Irshad, p. 25. 
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inappropriate instead of appropriate. 128 Therefore, when an expression 
has two meanings, one of them majaz and the other hagiqah, it must be 
construed in a literal sense until a legal proof indicates that the figurative 
meaning is intended. 129 
On the contrary, al-Rani, favoured majaz over hagiqah arguing 
that the meaning of maja2 is more established and dominant compared to 
the hagiqah meaning. 130 The sentence, " so and so is an ocean" is 
employed by him to support his viewpoint. 131 The word "ocean", according 
to others must be understood in its literal sense, i. e. ocean is a sea. Al- 
Razi, in contrast, stressed that the use of the word 'ocean' in the sense of 
a generous man is more obvious in the meaning (ablagh) and therefore, 
should be inclined towards whenever it contradicts hagiqah meaning. 132 
A further examination of the above case displays that the 
disagreement is an apparent one. It is true that majaz prevails in the 
above conflict but due to the effect of garinah which makes its balance 
heavier. To this effect, the jumhur said that hagiqah always prevails in 
all cases of conflict unless the word or sentence in question is supported 
by garinah (as in the previous case) or when majaz is dominant ( al-majaz 
128 AI Ja a. *, Ujut vol. 1, p. 46. 
129 Ibid. 
130 AI-Ma hui. vol. 2, p. 462. See also a1-Talteil vol. 2, p. 266. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. 
For details on various degrees of majaz in contradiction to fhagiqak see Ibn 
al-Lall am, al-Qawa'id, p. 123. 
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al ghalib), that was clearly metaphorical. 133 In other words, majaz as 
an independent style of speech does not carry any strength at all against 
ijagiqah. This conclusion leads us to discuss the contradiction between 
two rnafaz in greater detail where the garinah and the dominant usage of 
mqjaz will be treated seriously in order to acquire a solid measure of 
preference in majaz contradiction. As regards the example of hagiqah 
-majaz conflict, however, it will be only pointed out together with sari1h- 
kinayah conflict, for both conflicts, to a considerable extent, are typical 
and overlapping. It is hoped that a single example may shed light on 
both. 
The jurists in majaz conflict, generally speaking, hold the same 
opinion. They clearly viewed that whenever two majazs appeared to be 
contradictory, the one whose meaning is nearer to the original meaning is 
preferred. 134 Some scholars called this particular majaz the common 
majaz which is stronger than the uncommon majaz. 135 This, indeed, gives 
the impression that haqiqah continually prevails not only in haqiqah 
-majaz conflict but also in majaz -majaz conflict where the one which has 
more common meaning is likely to be preferred because it links to haqiqah 
meaning which is easier and more common to understand. 
133 Bidayah, vol. 1, p. 38 : al-Ljafnawi, Athar, p. 18 (note no. 2). An 
excellent example of dominant majaz is Q. 4: 43 ; ".. or one of you cometh 
from the closet (al-gha'jt )" 
For details, see Ibn al-Arabi, Ahk= al-Qur'an, vol. 1. p. 443. 
134 
-Tahsi1, vol. 2, p. 267: al-Hafnawi, Afhar, pp. 27-28. 
135 Ibid. 
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The saying of the Prophet, "la sal-at li man la yaqra' bi fatihat al- 
Kitab (there shall be no prayer for whoever does not recite the Fatihah of 
the Scripture)" 136, could be a clear example of the above clarification. 
What is obvious from this Prophetic saying is that the denial intended by 
"la " (no) does not refer to non-existence of any action which is considered 
as the literal meaning of the sentence, "la salat". Simply because the 
occurrence as well as the non-existence of any action including prayer 
does not rely on the recitation for being or not. 137 Therefore, it must be 
understood metaphorically. As regards the hadith, there are two possible 
meanings constituted by the sentence "la saIat "; one is the denial of the 
validity and the other tends to deny the perfection of such prayer which is 
performed without Fatihah. Comparatively speaking, the denial of the 
validity is more common and parallel to the original meaning on the 
grounds that the invalid prayer is equal to the absence of that prayer as far 
as legal conclusion is concerned. 138 Consequently, the above hadith 
informs us that any prayer, performed without reciting the Fatfhah is 
invalid and unacceptable. 139 
A problem which is frequently discussed together with hagiqah 
-majaz is the so-called sari h and kinayah. 140 Sari h, literally is a noun 
which indicates an obvious meaning to the listener in an explicit way and 
136 Muslim, Sahit 1. vol. 1. p. 295. 
137 A1-ffafnawi, Athar, p. 31 : al-Khan, Ikhtilaf,, p. 276. 
138 Ibid. 
139 See Nayl al-Awjar, vol. 2. pp. 229-230. 
140 From the standpoint of whether a word is used to denote its meaning 
explicitly or implicitly, the word is categorised to jariFj (explicit statement) 
and kinayah (implicit statement). See al-Sarakhsi, USu1, vol. 1, p. 170. 
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its meaning could be rapidly understood by anyone. 141 If a master or a 
husband, for example, informs his slave or wife in such expressions as " 
you are free" (anta hurr) or "you are divorced" (anti taiiq), their sayings are 
considered sari h and therefore, the slave and the wife are free from any 
legal ties. In other words, sari h is a word or a sentence which clearly 
discloses the speaker's intention. In the case of divorce, if a husband tells 
his wife " you are divorced" the divorce would take place regardless of the 
husband's actual intention. 142 
Contrary to sarih, kinayah is a form of speech which does not 
clearly disclose the intention of its speaker. 143 Thus when a husband tells 
his wife " you are forbidden to me" or when he ask her to 'join your 
relatives", it remains indeterminate whether this particular husband wants 
to divorce his wife or not. As a result, no divorce will take place unless 
there is evidence to show that the husband actually intended a divorce. 144 
In this context, the gari nah will play an important role in textual 
interpretation. As mentioned before, qarinah has two distinct categories, 
namely the verbal (garinah lafziyyah) and the circumstantial (garinah 
haliyyah). Both are necessary in determining the precise meaning of 
kinayah (as well as majaz). 145 
As noted before, both conflicts of hagiqah -majaz and sariir 
kinayah will be provided with the same example for they co-incide with 
141 Al-Zuhayli, L suL vol. 1, pp. 308-309. 
142 paid. ; Kamal i, Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 150. 
143 mid. 
141 Ibid. 
145 Irshad p. 25. 
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each other. It is hoped that the problem of touching a woman in 
connection with ablution may serve our purpose. The case is taken from 
Q. 4: 43, "And if ye be ill, or on a journey, or one of you cometh from the 
closet, or ye have touched women.... ". We are concerned with the last 
phrase only i. e. "or ye have touched women". Touching or larnasa in Arabic, 
may imply two different meanings namely, haqiqah and majaz particularly 
when it is understood from a legal viewpoint. Touching a woman by hand 
is regarded as hagiqah while sexual intercourse as implied by lamasa 
falls under the category of majaz. 146 Not only that, at the same time, 
lamasa is also alleged to be an allusion (kinayah) to sexual intercourse. 147 
By this, we know that the verse is not only related to haqiqah -maja2 
conflict but also to sarih-kinayah conflict for they are overlapping. Owing 
to this, it is difficult to reach a clear distinction between them. 148 
For the Shafi'is, the literal meaning is intended here and 
therefore the verse necessitates the performance of ablution to remove a 
minor impurity resulting from touching a woman. 149 In other words, 
whoever touches a woman with his hands, his ablution is null and a fresh 
ablution is needed. The Hanafis follow, however, the allusive meaning for 
it is supported by legal proofs that show that the original meaning is to be 
146 Bidayab, vol. 1. p. 38. 
147 Ibid. 
148 See note 125, page (q2, 
Alga as regards the conflict as between sariFj and kinayah (USuL vol. 1. P. 
48) while Ibn Rushd views this as the conflict between ijagiqah and majaz 
(Bidayah. vol. 1. p. 38) 
149 pl_Zuhayl. al-Figh. vol. 1. p. 277. 
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abandoned in favour of the majaz meaning. 150 In other words, they 
manage to acquire a strong gari nah to make the figurative / allusive 
meaning of the word 'touching' preponderate over its original and sarih 
meaning. Among other things, they quote ahadith indicating that the 
Prophet kissed his wives and afterwards performed the ritual prayer 
without another ablution. 151 Then, al-Jassas, one of the leading Hanafi 
jurists, asserts that to argue that touching a woman would require an 
ablution is contradictory to the principle, arguing that since impurity 
applies to both sexes i. e. male and female, there should not be any 
distinction between the two as far as touching is concerned. In other 
words, since touching between men does not require ablution, the same 
should aply to touching between man and woman. 152 
By virtue of these qara'in, we can conclude that the view of the 
Hanafis seems preferable. It must be pointed out therefore, that this 
preference is not due to the consideration of majaz or kinayah but rather 
to the help of garinah. For garinah may add, reduce, explain, specify and 
define words and sentences. 153 Dealing with ambiguous legal texts, 
qara'in might offer a valuable help to lending clarity and credibility to 
interpretation as in this case. As regards our case, the meaning of majaz 
or allusion is superior for it is indicated by, apart from what is adduced by 
al-Jassas, two obvious qara'in. First, we may notice that Allah never 
mentioned the word Jima' as denoting sexual intercourse in His Book. 
Instead, He usually used the words such as lamasa, bäshara, massa, etc., 
150 Alga a5, UsuL vol. 1, pp. 48-49. 
151 Bidayah, vol. 1, p. 38. 
152 Abi Vol. 2, p. 455. 
153 Hallaq. "Qarina". p. 477. 
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to imply sexual intercourse obliquely. 154 These words are used 
metaphorically or allusively, for Allah did not use the direct expression for 
sexual intercourse. 155 Second, if we understand 'touching' to mean mere 
touching by hand, therefore, one word would have two meanings namely 
touching by hand and sexual intercourse. Two meanings intended at the 
same time is disliked or perhaps unacceptable in Arabic. 156 Nonetheless, 
I must say that in the absence of any relevant and adequate garinah, 
the preference should go to the haq igah and sari h for they are the over- 
riding intended meanings in any language. Only the existence of 
obvious gari nah, will change the meaning to metaphorical or allusive 
meaning accordingly. 157 
3. Tar, j ih on Conflict Between Clear and Unclear Words. 
In the Hanafi legal theory158, there are four degrees of clarity and 
four of ambiguity. Moreover, each of them represents a particular degree 
of clarity or ambiguity. In other words, some words are clearer than 
others. The same applies to ambiguous words. This condition, as could be 
154 Bidayah, vol. 1, P. 38. 
155 Ibid. 
156 See al Jaasaa, Usu1, vol. 1. pp. 48-49; idem, Abkam. vol. 2.452-453, al- 
Zuhayli. Usul, vol. 1. p. 305. 
157 See Bidayah, vol. 1, p. 38 ; al-Jassas, Usul. vol. 1. p. 48. 
158 I have purposely selected the classification of word as established in the 
jianafi school of law to be thoroughly discussed because it is more 
comprehensive (aslam min al-tadakhul) and has an immediate concern with 
legal conflict (abyan Ind a1-ta'aruf ). See al-Darini, al-Manahy, pp. 158-159. 
161 ; Khali-fah. ManahjJ, p. 22. 
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expected, would make contradiction possible within these degrees of 
clarity and ambiguity. 
As far as conflict between clear and unclear words is concerned, 
we are primarily confined to four terms known as al-Zahir, al-nass, al- 
mufassar and al-muhlcam and the corresponding contrary terms namely al- 
khafi, al-mushkil, al-mujmal and at-mutashabih. 159 Naturally, a brief 
explanation of these terms is a pre-requisite before we embark on a 
consideration of how conflict could exist between them. AI-zahir is a word 
or a sentence that can be understood by merely hearing it without any 
contemplation. That is the first meaning to come to mind for it is 
obvious and conventionally used for the meaning it carries. 160 The 
common example of this is Q. 2: 275, "Allah permitteth trading and 
forbiddeth usury". This part of the verse indicates clearly the validity of 
sale and on the contrary, the prohibition of usury. 161 Both meanings are 
easily understood by anyone who reads the verse. Though its meaning is 
clear, it accepts the possibility of ta'wil, that is the second meaning other 
than previously implied. 162 
The following rank in terms of clarity is at-nass. 163 It is what is 
made clearer in meaning by a garf nah associated with the speaker's effort 
159 See al-Sarakhsi. Uiul, vol. 1, pp. 163ff ; Kashf. vol. 1 . pp. 46- 51 ; al- 
Darini, al-Manahij, p. 40: 1tha11af. U§u1, pp. 161-168. 
160 Al-Sarakhsi, U. -uI. vol. 1, pp. 163-164 ; Kashf, vol. 1, p. 46, al-Dart n i, 
ai Manahij, p. 43: Khal i fah. ManahJ, p. 21. 
161 Al-Sarakhsi, U2u1, vol. 1, p. 164. 
162 AI-Dari ni, al-Manahjjj, p. 47. 
163 pl_Sarakhsi, U2u1 vol. 1, p. 163 ; Kashf, vol. 1, pp. 46-47. 
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for without this, the word would not be so clear. 164 Some have 
contended that al-nass applies to the text associated with the cause 
implying the context of the text in question. 165 Hence, we may conclude 
that a text is zahir by reference to the form of speech and on the other 
hand, regarded as nass by considering the garf nah on the basis of which 
the context is formulated. 166 A clarification of this is Q. 2: 275, "Allah 
permiteth trading and forbiddeth usury". The verse is zahir with regard to 
general permissibility of sale and it is nass in respect of distinguishing 
between sale and usury in terms of permissibility and impermissibility. The 
latter consequence is considered nass for the text is originally formulated 
to serve the purpose of distinguishing, since it was revealed as a reply to 
those unbelievers who alleged that sale and usury are alike as in Q. 2: 
275, "That is because they say; Trade is just like usury". 167 The degree of 
clarity between both becomes obvious when both are compared with each 
other which will be the main concern of the following paragraphs. 
Then, a word or a sentence is known as mufassar when the 
clarity of its meaning is gained through either an internal or external 
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid. 
There is no conflict between these two prescriptions of at-naU. Altough al- 
na indicates primary meaning of a legal text, this knowledge is often based 
on the context of the text or on a particular occasion on which the Qur'an 
and the Sunnah was revealed or pronounced. (See al-Darini, al-ManahiJ. p. 
51) 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid. 
Altough al-nass, like al--ahir. . opens to ta'wil , the possibility of ta'wil is 
relatively lesser in al-na52 than in al--ahir. See al-Darini, al-Manahij, p. 53. 
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explanation to the extent that it accepts no further possibility of ta'wiL168 
Therefore, in theory, al-mufassar is superior to both al -ahir and a1-nas, ý, 
for the latter are liable to ta'wii or could be variously understood. 169 An 
excellent example of mufassar word is Q. 15 :. 30 , "So the angels fell 
prostrate, all of them together". The name angel is general, accepting the 
possibility of specification whilst the saying "all of them" exhausts this 
possibility. Moreover, the saying "together" denies the uncertainty over 
whether the prostration is collective or partial. 170 For this reason, al- 
mufassar is 'heavier' than both al-zahir and al-nass. even though the 
possibility of al-mufassar being abrogated remains, that is in the life time 
of the Prophet. 171 
With reference to aI-muhkam, it is clearer in meaning for there is 
no possibility whatsoever of either ta'wil or abrogation. As far as naskh is 
concerned, it is applicable only to al-mufassar and not to al-mutikam ; the 
perspicuous text of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. A text of this nature is 
often worded in such a way as to preclude the possibility of abrogation. 172 
Q. 5: 97; "And Allah is Knower of all things", for example, is a muhkam. 
For it is known that this attribute i. e. the most knowledgeable, Is 
permanent to the extent that it accepts no possibility whatsoever of 
cancellation. 173 
168 Kashf, vol. 1, p. 49; al-Sarakhsi, U, 2u1. vol. 1. p. 165 ; al-Darini. al- 
Manahij, pp. 55-56. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Al-Sarakhsi, U§ul, vol. 1. p. 165. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Al-Muswaddah. p. 573; al-Baj i, IFjkam, p. 48. 
173 Ibid. 
203 
The difference in the degree of clarity between these words would 
become obvious when they contradict. 174 As a logical consequence, the 
less clear or the weaker among them in terms of clarity is overruled. 175 To 
know precisely how this is done, some cases of conflict will be brought 
forward. The purpose behind this is to show that the first concern in any 
cases of wording conflict, is to enquire closely into the degree of clarity of 
each statement. If a murajjih is clever enough, he could remove this type 
of conflict on the grounds that a text which is clearer should take 
precedence over another which is of lesser clarity. 
We may begin with the conflict between al-zahir and al-nass. 
This can be illustrated in the following two Qur'anic passages, one of 
which is nass as regard the limitation of the number of wives 
permissible in marriage and the other zcihir with regard to the 
permissibility of marrying women in general. Q. 4: 3 corresponds to the 
former that reads; "... marry of the women, who seem good to you, two or 
three or four.. ". The latter is represented by Q. 4: 24; "Lawful unto you are 
all beyond those mentioned.. ". 176 
The limitation of the number of wives is the theme of the first 
text. Therefore it is a nass. The permissibility of marrying any women 
without any restriction is not the main purpose of the second verse. It is 
rather to clarify that marriage is permissible. As already noted, should 
there be a conflict between the two, al-nass prevails over al-zahlr. As a 
174 Al-Dart nt. al-Manahij. pp. 41-42. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Kashf. vol. 1, p. 49. 
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consequence, the permissibility to conclude a marriage contract should not 
violate the limitation laid down by the Law giver. It is the latter that must 
be adhered to by a Muslim for its text is nass, that is stronger than zahir 
i. e. in terms of clarity. '77 
Regarding the conflict between al-nass and al-mufassar, we may 
cite the case of the bleeding of a woman as if menstruating. There are two 
reports that are contradictory to each other owing to different wordings. 
The first reports that a woman of such condition is merely obliged to 
perform ablution for each prayer ('ind kulli sal-at). 178 It is known through 
many reports that a woman during her period is forbidden to perform 
prayer and she must take ghusl when her menstrustion is ended. 179 But 
when she is still bleeding after this period, according to the report cited 
above, she must do ablution for every single prayer. Those who adhere to 
this report contend that she has to renew her ablution if she wishes to 
perform another prayer, though the subsequent prayer is still within the 
time of a particular obligatory prayer. 180 The second however, reports that, 
instead of performing ablution for each prayer, she is asked to perform 
ablution for every respective time of a particular obligatory prayer(li waqti 
kulli salat ). 181 This report pronounces that she can perform prayer as 
many times as she likes with one ablution as long as all the prayers are 
performed within the time limit of one obligatory prayer. Put differently, 
when she performs ablution for zuhr prayer, for instance, she is able to 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid. 
179 A1-Zuhayl1, a1-Figk vol. 1, p. 469. 
180 Ibid. p. 480. 
181 yashf vol. 1, p. 51. 
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perform other type of prayer till the last minute of the Zuhr time-band. 
After that, she must perform another ablution for 'asr prayer and so 
forth. This view is held by some jurists contrary to the above. 182 
To apply what has already been said, precedence should go to 
the second report for it accepts no possiblity of re-interpretation. On the 
contrary, the first report is susceptible to ta'wil for the wording "for each 
prayer" may raise the possiblity of another meaning. In other words, one 
is uncertain whether ablution is applicable to obligatory or supererogatory 
prayer. According to the first report, that particular woman does know 
that her ablution is considered valid for one prayer only but she does not 
know precisely whether she should or should not perform another ablution 
if she wants to perform a recommended prayer after a particular obligatory 
prayer for the word 'prayer' in the report is uncertain. However, this 
uncertainty does not exist in the second report, for ablution is required 
only at the time of every prayer and the same ablution is sufficient for any 
number of prayers within that particular time. 183 Therefore, in terms of 
tcujih, al-mufassar is superior to al-nass for the latter opens to other 
meaning. 184 
I have tried to find an appropriate case of conflict between 
mufassar-muhkam but none is available. Modern literature on usul al-figh 
however, has produced one example thought to be relevant for this 
conflict. It cites the disagreement between the Shaf'is and the Hanafis on 
the question of the repentant gadhif (slanderous accuser), that is, whether 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid. 
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he, after a true repentance, is entitled to stand before the court to give his 
testimony. 185 The Shafi'is accept his testimony while the Hanafis reject it. 
The latter argue that the order not to accept such testimony is muhkam by 
virtue of Q. 24 : 4; "And those who accuse honourable women but bring 
not four witnesses, scourge them eighty stripes and never (afterward) 
accept their testimony - They indeed are evil-doers". The verse clearly 
provides no room to accept the gadhif 's testimony for the denial is forever. 
The Shafi'is however, have quoted the following verse (Q. 24: 5; "Unless they 
repent afterward and rectify themselves", to declare that a repentant 
gadhif can give a valid testimony before the court. 186 
As hinted above, this is not a satisfactory example to reflect this 
conflict. This is admitted even by contemporary books on usul a1-figh. 187 
Furthermore, they say that the disagreement does not involve mufassar- 
muhkam conflict but rather differential interpretation regarding the clause 
"unless they repent afterward". The Hanafis thought that this 
specification refers to the title of "wrong-doer" only and not to the 
testimony. In other words, repentance would save the gadhif from the 
title mentioned in the Qur'an but his testimony in the future is 
unacceptable for he is a wrong-doer. By contrast, the Shafi'is contend 
that specification applies to both in a way that true repentance would 
free the gadhif from the title of fasiq, as well as from disqualification as 
witness. 188 By this, we can see that this conflict does not fit the present 
185 pl-Darini, al-Manahff. pp. 66-67. 
186 Ibid. See also al-Dimashq-i. IkhtUnf. pp. 420-421. 
187 Al-Zuhayl . QluJ vol. 1. p. 
325. 
Bidayah, vol. 1. p. 6, and vol. 2. p. 442 ; aL-Hidayah. vol. 3, pp. 135-136, 
Ibn al-Lahham, al-Qawa'id, pp. 259-260. 
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discussion. Moreover, as noted by the jurists, the only difference between 
mufassar and muhkam is that the former is liable to abrogation. 
However, after the demise of the Prophet, no abrogation can take place. 
Therefore, mufassar and muh/cam overlap and for this reason, I believe, 
cases of conflict between both are not available. But should there be a 
conflict between the two, muhkam always prevails. 189 
It is now relevant to point out the conflict between four degrees of 
unclear words. As previously mentioned, these four words are al-khafi, al- 
mushkil, at-mujmai and al-mutashabih. 190 They are purposely organised 
in this order of ranking, according to the degree of ambiguity that each of 
them represents. The first in rank is less ambiguous whereas the last in 
rank is the most ambiguous word. 191 Theoretically, they may contradict 
each other. However, to my best knowledge, no convincing cases of conflict 
between them are available in classical and modern works on usul al figh. 
Accordingly, I shall devote no discussion to the study of these degrees of 
ambiguity in detail even though all of these types of words are present in 
both the Qur'an and the Sunnah. 192 
4. Tarjih in Dilalat 193 (Textual Implication) Conflict. 
189 Bariran, Usul, p. 407. 
190 Al-Sarakhsi, Usut vol. 1, p. 165f ; al-Darini, al-Manahj, p. 70. 
191 Ibid. - 
192 See al-Mankht4 p. 164. 
193 What is intended by dilalat here is how the word or the text indicates a 
meaning (dilalat al-alfaz) as distinguished from language principles such as 
'amm, khan, Flagiqah, majaz, etc.. for the latter is an indication of a 
particular meaning by the word (al-dilalah bi al-lafz) See Khalifah, ManahiJ, 
p. 3. note no. 1. 
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Legal or semi-legal texts, from the standpoint of the 
interpretation viz. directly or indirectly interpreted, can be variously 
understood. A text, in other words, may imply the meaning directly or 
indirectly. The former is known as mantuq while the latter is well 
established in usul as m of h um. 194 Both may have the same legal 
consequence or may contradict each other. As far as ta'ärud and tarjih 
are concerned, we shall confine ourself to the latter case for it demands a 
solution. 
The previous outline gives the impression that mafhum, implied 
meaning, is not necessarily contrary to what is implied by the mantuq , the 
direct implication of the text. In short, mafhum may be either harmonious 
or contradictory with the mantuq. In usul terminology, the former is 
known as mafhum muwafaqah (harmonious implied meaning) and 
majhum mukhalafah (divergent implied meaning), on the other hand, is 
the label of the latter phenomenon. 195 Though we are more concerned 
with the second situation, a few paragraphs will be devoted to illustrate 
what maf um muwafaqah is. For this, we may refer to the Qur'anic text 
which forbids the utterance of "an uff ". The verse reads, "If one of them or 
both of them attain to old age with thee, say not "Fie" unto them nor 
repulse them... ". It is clear through maf hum muwafaqah, that to abuse 
one's parent physically is not only forbidden but also deserves greater 
194 The division of textual implication into these two kinds is adopted by the 
majority of the jurists except the Hanafis. (see al-Zuhayli, Usut vol. 1, p. 360) 
195 Al-pmidi, al-IFlkam, vol. 2, pp. 209-2 10 ; al-Mankh. ul, p. 208 ; Ibn al- 
Lajham, al-Qawa'id, p. 286: Wafa'. Dilaiah, p. 8. 
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condemnation from God for it is more serious in terms of injuring parent's 
feelings. 196 
Majhum mukhalafah, on the contrary, is a purely linguistic 
argument. 197 It stipulates that if an act is commanded, it is concluded 
that any act to the contrary is prohibited. Conversely, it may be argued 
that the contrary of an act which is prohibited is either recommended or 
obligatory. Therefore, it may be defined as a meaning which is derived from 
the words of the text is such a way that it diverges from the explicit 
meaning thereof. 198 To give an example, we may quote the Prophetic 
statement that; "Zakat is owed on goats which are put out to pasture Vi al- 
sa. 'imah zakat )". 199 Those who adhere to mafhum mukhalafah as a 
legitimate method of interpretation, 200 have questioned the obligatory 
status of zakat on goats which are maintained on fodder. 201 
It seems to me that conflict between mafhwn muwafaqah and 
mafhum mukhatafah is relatively personal in consideration. We can see 
from the foregoing discussion that both mafhums are nothing other than 
methods identified generally to encourage rational enquiry in the 
deduction of the rulings from the texts. If we take, for example, the 
prohibition to say "uff" to one's parent which suggests that beating one's 
parent is also forbidden through the so-called ma h7uM muwafagah, it may 
196 Al-Mankhu1, p. 208. 
197 Al-Loma'. p. 27. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Nayl al-Awjar, vol. 4, p. 140. 
200 Al-MankhuL p. 208. 
201 Ibid., p. 216. Cf. Tangif,, p. 272. 
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be conversely argued that beating one's parent is permissible by virtue of 
ma hm mukhalafah. As we shall see, conflict between both is not 
originally motivated by these two methods of reasoning and their 
implications, rather it is by the attitudes of the jurists towards the 
authority of both methods of interpretation. 
The Shafi'is and those who are in line with their opinion contend 
that mafhum mulchalafah is a proof202 provided it fulfills certain 
conditions. 203 Among other requirements. the restriction which qualifies 
a statement should be only for the purpose of proof and not for any other 
reason. In other words, the restriction stated by the Lawgiver is only to 
indicate the existence of a particular rule to the effect that if this 
restriction no longer exists, the relevant rule would also cease to apply. 204 
The following verse for example, should not be understood conversely for 
the restriction it contains proves other than what is stated above. Q. 
3: 130 reads, "0 ye who believe! Devour not usury, doubling and 
quadrupling (the sum lent). Observe your duty to Allah, that ye may be 
successful". From this may not be understood, in terms of legal studies, 
that undoubled and unmultipied usury is permissible, arguing that the 
verse's condemnation is directed only to what is doubled and multipied. 
The verse in question is not subjected to mafhum mukhalafah for the 
qualification it contains i. e. double and multipied usury, is only to create 
hatred for usury205 or to emphasise that this kind of usury was the most 
202 Irshad p. 179. 
203 Ibn al-LahJ am, al-Qawa'id. pp. 290-292 ; Wafa', Dilalah, pp. 15-16. 
204 Al-Mankhul, p. 216; Khal i fah, Manah j, p. 261. 
205 pl_Zuhayli, U§u1, vol. 1, p. 373: Khali fah, Manahfl, p. 264. 
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common usury practised in the pre-Islamic period. 206 The verse has no 
concern with an indication of the contrary meaning, that is, a little 
amount of usury is permissible. 
The following condition lies in the fact that there should not be a 
strong evidence contrary to what is conversely implied. As for Q. 2: 178, "0 
ye who believe! Retaliation is prescribed for you in the matter of the 
murdered; the freeman for the freeman, and the slave for the slave, and the 
female for the female.... ", it cannot be understood conversely that a woman 
should not be retaliated upon when she murdered a man because the 
implied consequence would violate the explicit ruling of another Qur'anic 
text (Q. 5: 45) which requires retaliation for all intentional murder on the 
broadest possible basis of a life for a life. 207 
In short, many conditions are put forward to ensure that mafhum 
mukhalafah, if applied, would be accurate. The whole idea behind these 
conditions is to ensure that the converse meaning will not be permitted to 
play a role in establishing legal ruling unless one is fully certain that the 
qualification that qualifies a particular legal text has no other impact 
than to show that the ruling depends on it and the ruling, on the other 
hand, should cease to apply if this qualification no longer exists. 
On the contrary, the Hanafis do not import any legal significance 
to maf hum mu chalafah in questions exclusively related to both the Qur'an 
206 Ibid.: Wafa', Dilalah, pp. 15-16 ; al-Darini, al-Manahij, p. 131. 
207 Al-Zuhayli, Usul. vol. 1, p. 376. 
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and the Sunnah for it is not a valid method of interpretation. 208 They did 
apply this sort of interpretation to people's written and verbal statements 
for the following reason. They believe that one cannot comprehend with 
certainty what is actually intended by the Lawgiver when He pronounces a 
text qualified by a particular restriction. One can never give the answer 
as to whether the Lawgiver does or does not tend to imply both direct and 
indirect meaning in legal texts. This task is beyond human capacity while 
this is not the case in the wordings and the writings of the people. 209 As a 
logical consequence, mafhum mukhalafah, as a way of interpretation, is 
relevant and applicable to human activities and rational proofs alone and 
not to divine texts. 
I will set forth one or two examples to illustrate the idea of 
conflict caused by these two contrary attitudes held by two major schools 
of law. In the question related to the duty of providing nafaqah to divorced 
women, there is a relevant verse (Q. 65: 6) which reads, "... and if they are 
with child, then spend for them till they bring forth their burden". 
Undoubtedly, the verse clearly provides the right of nafaqah for those 
divorced women who are pregnant. This is the mantuq of the verse whereby 
the pregnancy is an immediate reason for the right of nafaqah. The 
disagreement occurs in questions concerning those who are not pregnant 
at the time of irrevocable divorce. According to the Shafi'ls, they receive 
no nafaqah during the waiting period. This consequence is conversely 
understood from the verse. 210 The reverse consequence is adopted by the 
208 Irshad, p. 179: Amini, Ijtihad, p. 62 ; Khallaf, Usul, p. 157; Tagnin. p. 
135. 
209 Al-Taqrir. vol. 1. p. 117: Irshad p. 179. 
210 Al-Khan, Ikhtilaf, pp. 187-188. 
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Hanafis for they, as previously mentioned, did not consider legal 
interpretation through mafhum mukhalafah as legitimate. 211 
The same dispute occurs in the problem of legal guardianship of a 
girl. The Shafi'is say that the girl needs to have her father as legal 
guardian before she marries if the girl is a virgin. 212 Among other 
arguments, the Shafi'is argue on the basis of mafhum mukhalafah of the 
had i th, "A once-married girl had a better right to take a decision about 
herself (in terms of marriage) than the guardian". 213 Conversely, it shows 
that if the girl is a virgin, a guardian has more substantiated right to 
decide on his daughter's marriage. In other words, the consent of a legal 
guardian is necessary to validate marriage. 214 Rejecting this interpretaion, 
the Hanafis have imposed no such requirement. Accordingly, in the 
Hanafi school of law, an adult girl is permitted to conclude her own 
marriage contract without the intervention of her guardian. 215 
As a matter of fact, many conflicts will occur in fiqh if we 
continue to interpret all legal and semi-legal verses conversely. Having 
preferred the Hanafi method of interpretation, I have to say that, as far 
as mafhum mukhaiafah is concerned, this superiority is not due to the 
accuracy of the Hanafis' method of interpretation but largely to the 
inaccuracy of the Shafi'is method. Mafhurn mukhalafah is somewhat vague 
and doubtful to the degree that no one ever seems to have laid down clear 
211 Ibid. 
212 Ibid., p. 190. 
213 Ibid. 
214 Ibid. 
215 Ibid., p. 582, aI-Hidayati, vol. 2. p. 213: Coulson, Conflicts, p. 26. 
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and agreeable principles to distinguish the reliable from the unreliable 
mafhum mukhalafah. We should realise that on some occasions, the 
application of mafhum mukhalafah leads to a correct legal consequence 
whereas on other occasions, it does not. A tradition from the Prophet 
that, "There is no zalcat on production below five wasaq (a unit of 
measurement)"216, could be referred to the first case. Through majhum 
mukhulafah, we come to know that agricultural products less than five 
wasaq are not liable to taxation. 217 This is a correct legal interpretation 
for it does not contradict other legal pieces of evidence and it has been 
implemented throughout Muslim communities in the past, up to, and 
including, the present day. 218 
However, mafhum mukhalafah may sometimes render the 
interpretation of legal texts doubtful and confused. An excellent example 
of this refers to the prohibited degrees of relationship in marriage as 
implied by Q. 4: 23, "Forbidden unto you are your mothers,... and your 
step-daughters who are under your protection (live with you i. e. fE huju- 
rikum) born of your wives unto whom ye have gone in but if ye have not 
gone in unto them, then it is no sin for you (to marry their daughters)... ". 
This text is explicit on the point that marriage to a step-daughter who is 
under the guardianship of her step-father is forbidden to the latter if he 
has had sexual intercourse with her mother. Nevertheless the text, through 
ma, f hum mukhalafah, may suggest a contrary interpretation: those step- 
daughters who do not live under their step-father's guardianship i. e. live 
216 Al-MuwaYa' (S). p. 114. 
217 Abu Yusuf, Kitab al-Kharaj. p. 53. 
218 See Ibn Mundhir, al-Ijma', p. 12. 
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in another place, are permitted. 219 However, this consequence is not 
intended here for the verse's restriction "those who are under your 
protection (ff hujurikum)" is merely to illustrate the custom common 
among the people. That is, the step-daughter always lives together with 
her mother in her mother's new marital home. 220 The intended restriction 
in terms of marriage between step-daugther and her step-father is the 
following qualification, "but if ye have not gone into them, then it is no sin 
for you (to marry their daughters)". In short, as long as the husband did 
not have sex with his wife, irrespective of whether her daughter is living in 
the same house or not, that daughter is marriageable to her step-father. 221 
As hinted above, majhum mukhalafah is neither certain nor 
accurate for extracting legal rulings from the texts. Though many 
conditions have been laid down to ensure the proper use of this mode of 
interpretation, the problem remains for at least one major reason. As 
stated earlier, it is beyond human ability to give a precise and definite 
estimation of what is actually intended by the Lawgiver when He qualifies 
or restricts legal texts by certain conditions, restrictions or qualifications. 
The qualification, "fi hujurikum", for example, brings considerable 
problems to figh for it can be understood conversely to imply a ruling 
that, to some extent, is acceptable according to rational argument. What 
makes this interpretation void of authority is the knowledge that this 
qualification does nothing other than to show the custom common at that 
time. The same problem applies to other legal texts whereby one cannot 
219 Al-Tagrir. vol. 1. P. 115. 
220 Al-Zuhayli. Usu1, vol. 1, p. 210 ; KhalIfah. Manah J, p. 263. 
221 Al-Taqrir. vol. 1, p. 115. 
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decide once and for all whether the opposite meaning of the text is 
intended or not in legal reasoning. This is because qualification and 
restriction in both of the Qur'an and the Sunnah are widely variable in 
terms of purpose. They may be used to illustrate the custom222 or the 
dominant practice223 or for other purposes related to Arabic usage224 that 
might have no legal significance. By this, we can safely conclude that 
mafhum mukhalafah should not be given precedence in cases of conflict 
for its nature is highly doubtful. In other words, mantuq always prevails 
over ma, f hum when they conflict. 
222 See note 220. 
223 Al-Zuhayli, Usut vol. 1, pp. 373-374. 
224 See note 205. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE METHODOLOGY OF TARJIH IN ISNAD CONFLICT 
As mentioned elsewhere, the Qur'an and the Sunnah are the 
foremost sources of Islamic law. As already known also, both have two 
distinct aspects namely the matn, the text and the isnad, the chain of 
transmitters. The problem of matn conflict has been dealt with in the 
foregoing chapter which took both the Qur'an and the Sunnah into 
account for they are entirely Arabic texts. As regards the isnad, it is 
unanimously agreed that it is the Qur'an alone that was transmitted 
through a mutawatir chain and therefore no single verse in the Qur'an 
can be subjected to any challenge or further examination on its 
narration. 1 Except for a relatively limited number of legal verses 
associated with variant readings, the remaining legal verses are totally 
undisputed which naturally invites no disagreement from the standpoint 
of its transmission. 2 The Sunnah involves a contrary phenomenon, 
however. For this reason, our discussion will be restricted only to the 
Sunnah which records a critical disagreement over the isnad and its 
implication for legal issues. 
Every single hadith or khabar or athar3, as noted before, 
consists of the matn as well as the isnad, the chain of authorities 
through whom the tradition has been transmitted. As far as tradition is 
lIbn Hazm, al-Ihkam, vol. 1. p. 85: al-Muyaddimah, vol. 3. p. 25: Gibb. Islam. 
p. 63; El 1. vol. 4, p. 1055. 
2The problem of the variant reading has been basically dealt with In chapter 
two (pages 65-66) 
3 The majority have used these three terns synonymously whereas other have 
used them to refer to three different meanings respectively. See Lane. Lexicon. 
part 2, p. 696 ; al-Qasim i, Qawa'id. p. 61. 
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concerned as evidence, the chief emphasis lies on the study of isnad and 
not on the math. It is the isnad that guarantees the validity of the main 
for without isnad, matn is baseless in terms of authenticity. 4 As far as 
isnad is concerned, Muslim, in the introductory chapter to his Saljih, has 
a section entitled, "This science (the science of isnad ) is ( part of) the 
religion". 5 Among other things, he says, "(This science is a religion) 
therefore scrutinize those from whom you learn your religion". 6 Schacht 
commenting on the isnads, says that ".. the isnads constitute the most 
arbitrary part of the tradition". 7 This displays how critical the isnad is 
compared to the matn in terms of validity. 
As a matter of fact, the discussion of hadtth concerns many 
discussions such as the degree of authority it possesses, the persons from 
whom it is derived, the manner in which it has been transmitted and 
other related matters. Each of them will be of great help when we proceed 
to discuss the conflicts of hadith and how to remove them. What is 
meant by conflict here is that hadiths with different isnads require two 
contrary rules such as obligation and prohibition of the same act i. e. one 
provides a ruling which differs from that provided by the other. 
4 Robson, 'Tradition : the second foundation of Islam", in MW, vol. XLI. 1951, 
p. 26. (cited after as 'Tradition") ; Khadduri, Islamic Jurispnidence, p. 30. 
It ought to be noted that the genuineness of the isnad. however. is no proof of 
the actual genuineness of the text of the traditions to which they are 
attached. See Robson, "Isnad in Muslim tradition". in GUOST. vol. 15, pp. 
25-26. For details on text criticism, see al-Khalif, "Sunrna's role in expounding 
Islamic rulings and refutation of suspicious cast on its authenticity". in IC. 
vol. 42,1968, pp. 239ff (cited after as "Sunny") 
5 Muslim. Suh1h. vol. 1, p. 12. 
s Ibid. 
See also Shaukat, 'The isnad in had ith literature". in IS, vol. 24,1984, p. 445. 
7Origins. p. 163. See also El 1. vol. 2, p. 190. 
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Accordingly, it demands tarjih to determine which of two conflicting 
traditions prevails on the consideration of the isnad. Only in this sense, 
can one appreciate the significance of the discussion of isnad in terms of 
conflict and tarj i h. In this regard, we quote al-Shafi'i who says that 
"two contradictictory hadiths can never be equally reliable and therefore, 
we should choose the more authentic of them". 8 It is clear that a jurist is 
obliged to select only the one which has more weight than the others 
when they are conflicting provided that efforts to harmonise them or to 
ascertain the abrogating and the abrogated hadiths have been made and 
failed. 9 
The chain of transmission is therefore of importance when one 
seeks to exclude a tradition. I believe the basis of such exclusion will 
involve unlimited methods1° but we will restrict ourself only to those 
principles which are predominant in usui discussion. In turn, many of 
the methods of excluding a particular tradition discussed either by the 
jurists or the traditionists are purposely omitted, being irrelevant to legal 
conflict or of no significant legal import. " Also, factors that are not 
8 Al-Risalah, para. 588. See also Hulyat al-Awliya', vol. 9. p. 105. 
9 This conditional statement i. e. "provided that..... ". is disputed amongst the 
jurists as previously discussed. See pages 142-146. 
10 As far as methods of tarjih in hadith conflict are concerned, al-Suyuji 
in his book, Tadrib al-Rawi 'ala Taqrib al-Nawawi, has mentioned more 
than one hundred modes of preference. My knowledge of this is taken from al- 
Qari awi, al-Madkhal (p. 142) since al-Suyuti 's book is not available to me. 
Al-Amidi, however, has stated 51 methods of tarjih pertaining to isnad 
conflict. (al-Ihkam, vol. 3, pp. 259-265). 
11 e. g. The conflict between the transmission of men and women and the 
superiority of the former, etc. 
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immediately related to the problem of isnad are not discussed in the 
present chapter but will be studied in chapter seven. 12 
To begin with, we may say that the traditions are of different 
grades of reliability. Conflict and tarj ih in this area of study, therefore, 
can be carefully maintained by a detailed knowledge of those degrees of 
reliability whereby a tradition which is well attested by the more reliable 
isnad would prevail. Accordingly, a person who is able to distinguish 
the sound from the weak transmission and between reliable and suspect 
transmitters would be competent in solving the problem of conflict and 
tarjih successfully. As far as usul alftgh is concerned, however, we may 
not discuss the problem exclusively on the basis of 'ulum al-hadith. 13 
Instead, we will take both the science of tradition and usul into serious 
consideration to arrive at more satisfactory solutions, for the two are 
closely related. 
As established earlier, the jurists have indicated many murajjihat 
to be considered in terms of isnad conflict. Furthermore, they have said 
that more can be added because tarj ih may employ unlimited methods 
to reach the strongest view. 14 For our purpose, we are concerned only 
with those principles which deserve to be pointed out for the sake of an 
12 i. e. "Tarji j, based on external factors", will discuss many forms of 
preference which are, generally speaking, applicable not only to a specific area 
of conflict (e. g. isnad) but also to other areas. 
13 For a substantial information concerning the science of Fla. dith, apart from 
those books written exclusively on this area of study, see the introductions in 
the commentaries of al-Qastallani and al-Nawawi, on al-Bukhara and 
Muslim respectively. (The latter is also printed on the margin on the former) 
i. e. al-Qastallani, Irshad al-Sari Ii Sharlj Safhujj al-Bukhari, pp. 2-46 ; 2-60. 
14 AL-1'tibar, pp. 11,23; Irshad, p. 278; al-Qasimi, Qawa'id. p. 313. 
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immediate tad i h. Among other major problems discussed by the 
ancient jurists, was the problem of ahad that stands against mutawatir. 
In fact, al-Shafi'i, was the first scholar to classify isnad into these two 
technical categories. 15 According to al-Shafi'i, the isnad which contains 
innumerable trasmitters of all generations including several of the 
generation of the Companions who knew the Prophet is mutawatir and 
constitutes certainty. 16 However, instead of mutawatir, he calls a hadith 
handed down with this isnad khabar 'ammah 'an 'arnmah. '7 The isnad 
with the contrary description i. e. reported by one person or a few persons 
who do not possess the authenticity of the same scale as that of 
tawatur, 18 is called interchangeably by al-Shafi'i as khabar al-khass, 
khabar al-wahid or khabar at-infirad. 19 Only specialists are obliged to 
know and adhere to such a hadith. 20 The overwhelming majority of the 
traditions however, are of the latter type, whereas only a small part of 
them are mutawatir. 21 
If a hadith transmitted by tawatur i. e. transmitted constantly 
by a large number of people who cannot possibly agree upon a falsehood 
15 See Muhammad Ahmad Shakir in his introduction to al- Shali'i's al- 
Risalah, p. 13. 
Ahmad Yusuf, on the other hand, has considered al-Risalah the first ever 
written book on usul al figh as well on 'alum al-fadit . (see al-Shafi'i. p. 47). 
16 AL-Risala ,, paras. 961,1329,1815. 
17 ibid. para. 1329 idem. Ikhtilaf al-Had i tk p. 476. 
18 At-Luma', p. 42 ; al-Amidi. al-Ihkam, vol. 1, p. 234. 
19 AL-Risalah, paras. 1000.1010.1260,1816 ; idem, Ikhtitaf al-Hadith, pp. 
476,482. 
20 Al-Risalak para. 1260 ; Ahmad Yusuf, al-Shafi'i, p. 76; Abu Zahrah, al- 
Shaft' i, p. 160. 
21 Al-Qardaw i. al-Madkhal, p. 69 ; Weiss, 'The Primacy ", p. 90. 
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because of their huge number, geographical situation and reliability, 22 
happens to be in conflict with the solitary tradition, the preference, the 
jurists argue, goes to the mutawatir. For it is impossible to assume that 
it is a false statement since the large group of transmitters could not have 
agreed on falsifying the report. 23 Hence, mutawatir traditions are said 
to lead to certain knowledge (gat'i) and are superior in that to solitary 
traditions. 24 
In addition, the solitary tradition is disputed in terms of validity 
as evidence of figh. To this effect, Abu Yusuf, as recorded by Schacht, is 
reported to warn against isolated traditions which he considered to be 
irregular (shadh) and thus argued against accepting them. 25 Similarly, 
al-Shaybani, was quoted to remark that "because the majority is not in 
favour of isolated traditions, we do not accept them". 26 A1-Jassas 
however, distinguished between two groups of khabar wahid; "(1) There is 
the report which entails 'ilm and that occurs when the report is 
accompanied by a proof authenticating its realibility, and (2) there is the 
report which does not entail 'ilm and that ocurs when its authenticity 
cannot be proven". 27 Al-Shafi' i, on the contrary, as mentioned before, 
22 Kashf, vol. 2, p. 360 ; Irshad, p. 46 ; Abu Zahrah, Usul. pp. 107-108 
Khallaf, Usut, p. 41; Naqvi, "Prophetic Sunna in the Islamic legal framework". 
in IS, vol. 19.1980, p. 128. (cited after as " Sunna" ) 
23 Ai-Mustasfa, vol. 1, pp. 141 ; Ibn Badran, al-Madkhal, p. 197. See also al- 
A_zami. Studies, pp. 223-231. Cf. Juynboll, He said, "... that tawatur as such 
is no guarantee for the historicity of a 11adith's ascription to the Prophet". 
(Muslim Tradition, p. 98) 
24 Al-Ibhaj, vol. 2, p. 286: Irshad. p. 48 ; Badran. Usul, pp. 84-85. 
25 Origins, p. 51. For details, see Abu Yusuf, al-Radd, pp. 24-25,31,41. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Al-Jassas, Used, as cited in Marie Bernard, " Hanafi Usul al-Fligh'. p. 631. 
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opined that though khabar wahid does not constitute certainty, it is 
incumbent on scholars to accept such reports because they are mansus. 28 
Such a hadith, accordingly, is authoritative Lhuljah) and cannot be 
rejected by means of mere ta'wil of the Qur'an or of the general meaning 
of another had i th. 29 
Ah mad b. Hanbal and the Zahiris, however, not only 
unquestionably considered had as authoritative but also as having 
certain and positive authority. 30 Regarding the opinion that considers 
solitary tradition as equal to mutawatir, we can see that the exponent of 
this opinion was reported to have made two different contentions. Ahmad 
b. Hanbal opined, at one time, that ahad amounts only to probability 
and at another time, has said that the solitary tradition, like mutawatir, 
leads to certainty. 31 Ibn Qudamah, the leading usulist in the Hanbali 
school, has this to say regarding the contention of his Imam, Ahmad b. 
Hanbal. He says that, principally, solitary tradition amounts only to 
speculative meaning. He ascribes this opinion to Imam Ahmad and the 
majority of the Hanbalis. Having said this, Ibn Qudamah has explained 
that the second contention by Ahmad b. Hanbal was constructed on 
special or exceptional conditions. It was about traditions related to the 
problem of "ru'yah " i. e. to see Allah on the day of judgement. Ahmad b. 
Hanbal has been reported to opine that all these traditions, though they 
are ahad, are true and definite. Ibn Qudamah argues that the haciiths in 
28 AI-Risalah, para. 1260. See also al-Burhan, vol. 1. pp. 599-601. 
29 Al-Shall , Ikhtilaf 
Malilc, p. 195. 
30 Ibn Hazm, al-Ihkam, vol. 1. p. 107. See also al-Amidi, a[-IFjkam, vol. 1, p. 
234: Irshad., pp. 48-49; Ibn Badran, Madkhal. p. 91. 
31 See Muntaha, p. 71. 
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question are definite because they are very well-known and wide-spread. 32 
In other words, solitary traditions should be regarded as merely probable 
and cannot be regarded otherwise unless supported by a considerable 
indication that could alter their character from uncertain into certain. 33 
In this disputation, broadly speaking. I am inclined to believe 
that ahad may establish a rule of law provided it is related by a reliable 
narrator in an uninterrupted chain of transmission. 34 Though it is a 
hujjah, it remains inferior to mutawatir in case of conflict because it Is 
clearly of less authority than the mutawatir. 35 This, at least, can be 
employed as a first stage in an attempt to evaluate two contradictory 
hadiths particularly from isnad point of view. With this in mind, we 
should not ignore how the comprehensiveness of evaluation of conflicting 
pieces of evidence may reduce significantly the room for possible errors 
and inaccuracy contained in every single method of preference. In other 
words, the superiority of mutawatir over a_had should not be considered 
binding and final on its own merit. 
Thereby, we can safely conclude that mutawatir prevails over 
khabar wahid in respect of transmission (whereas khabar wahid, may 
32 Ra. wdnh, p. 52. 
33 Al-Hafnawi. Dirasa4, p. 171. 
This view is held by many leading usulists such as al-Rani, al-Amidi, Ibn al- 
Hajib, etc. See ibid, pp. 175ff. 
34 This is inspired by a lengthy discussion devoted by al-Shaf i in the first 
part of his Ikhtilaf al-Hadith which adequately shows that solitary reports 
are of full authority in establishing legal rulings though, in terms of strength. 
they are merely probable. ( See Ikhtilaf al-Hadith, pp. 475-479) See also 
Mahmassant, Falsafah, p. 74. 
35 Irshad. p. 48. 
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however be decisive in respect of the meaning of the text concerned). 36 A 
particularly interesting example of this is the problem of the legal 
controversy surrounding the rights of an irrevocably divorced woman 
during her waiting period. The Qur'anic verse with which the question is 
most frequently associated is Q. 65: 6, "Lodge them where ye dwell, 
according to your wealth, and harass them not so as to straiten life for 
them. And if they are with child, then spend for them til they bring forth 
their burden". The verse clearly provides the right of sukna (lodging) for 
those who are irrevocably divorced and who are not known to be pregnant. 
Having approved her right to be lodged in the former marital home during 
the 'iddah, Malik and al-Shafi'i assert that, no right of nafaqah 
(maintenance) is provided. 37 The Hanafis, on the contrary, contend that 
'she' has a right to both sukna and nafaqah. 38 Ahmad b. Hanbal and a 
group of the scholars deny both rights arguing solely by reference to the 
report of Fatimah bt. Qays39, which reads as follows, "The Prophet said to 
her that " you have right to neither the sukna nor the nafaqah ". 40 
Though the report is regarded as hasan sahih, 41 the 
overwhelming number of the jurists attach no significance to this report 
for it is a solitary tradition. This is clearly evident from 'Umar's denial of 
the reliability of the report when he says, "We do not accept the saying of 
a woman of whom we do not know whether she tells the truth or lies, and 
36 Al_Thagafi, "at-Ziyadah", p. 242 ; '[wad, "al-Ta'arud ", p. 273. 
37 AI-Qurtubi, al-Jami'. vol. 18, p. 167. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. ; Ahkam, vol. 3, p. 566. 
41 Al-Tirmidh i, Sunan, vol. 3. p. 485. 
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we do not abandon the Book of God". 42 In another version, the second 
Caliph is reported to have stated that "We shall abandon neither the 
Book of God nor the Sunnah of our Prophet for the saying of a woman". 43 
This reveals in one way or another that, as stated by aI-Jassas, the report 
of Fatimah is void of authority, for it is a solitary tradition that was 
further denied by one of the authorities in the first generation i. e. 
`Umar. 44 I admit that this is not an accurate example of mutawatir- ahead 
conflict45 but at least it can show that a report transmitted by one person 
is inferior to that which is transmitted by a group called mutawatir. 
Moreover, khabar wahid is always subject to a number of pre-conditions 
before it can be accepted as legal evidence. 
The later jurists however, distinguished a third type of tradition 
which they termed al-mustafid. This type holds the central position 
between the mutawatir and the ahad. 46 It is well-known also as 
mashhur. 47 The mashhur, literally wide-spread, is a report originally 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid.: al-Tabari. Jami' . vol. 
28. p. 146. 
44 AJkQni, vol. 3. pp. 566-567. 
45 The inaccuracy of this example lies in : 
a. it involves conflict between the Qur'an and the Sunnah and not 
between theeunnah and another Sunnah with which we are concerned. 
b. 'Umar did not accept Fajimah's report not because her report was 
solitary but rather 'Umar was not quite sure whether Fatimah was telling 
the truth or not. (see al-Khan, Ikhtitaf. p. 208-209) 
The reason that has led me to cite this incident as an example is that I am 
not able to find a genuine example of mutawatir - shad conflict within the 
Sunnah. 
46 At-Burhan. vol. 1. p. 584. 
47 This is found in most of the contemporary books dealing with the science 
of traditions such as the following: 
a. al-Tahhan, Taysir. pp. 22-24. 
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conveyed by an individual transmitter among the Companions but later 
spread and transmitted by a numerically indefinite group of people whose 
agreement upon a lie is inconceivable. 48 By this, there will be no sharp 
distinction between mutawatir and mashhur for both are well known to 
the later scholars. 49 According to the Hanafi view, the mashhur stands 
higher than the solitary tradition and is of a lesser degree of certainty 
than the mutawatir. 50 In contrast, the jurists other than the Hanafis, 
opine that this type of tradition stands on the same level as solitary 
tradition which supplies only probability. 51 AI-mashhur, according to the 
jwntwr, as a matter of fact, is merely one of three categories of solitary 
traditions. 52 
Thus, the mashtwr prevails over the ahad in case of conflict in 
the Hanafi point of view alone. This can be illustrated by the problem of 
one witness and the oath of the plaintiff as contrasted to the wide-spread 
hadith i. e. mashhur, "The burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff and the 
oath falls on the defendant". m The former principle however is overruled 
owing to the fact that it is based merely on the so-called solitary 
tradition which is of lesser degree compared to mashhur. 54 According to 
b., ýubhi ýalih, 'Uium aL-fadith. pp. 229-235. 
c. al-Qasim i, Qawa'id, pp. 124-125. 
48 Al-Nasafi, Kashf, vol. 2, pp. 11-12 ; lrshad, p. 49 ; al-Zuhayli, al-FYgh. vol. 
1, p. 69, note no. 2; Tagnin. p. 44. 
99 Abu Zahrah, UUul. p. 108 ; Aghnides, Theories, pp. 53-56. 
50 Badran, U§u1. pp. 84-85 ; Abu Zahrah. UEu1. p. 108 ; al-jjafnawi, 
Dit sai, p. 134. 
51 Al-Burhaa vol. 1. p. 584 ; Badran, UUul. p. 86. 
52 See al-Tahhan, Taysir. pp. 21-30 ; al-liafnawi. Dirczsat pp. 165-167. 
The remaining two types are al-gharib and al-'aziz (ibid). 
53 Kash f. vol. 3, p. 13. 
54 Ibid. 
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the jumhur, though there is an apparent oppposition between the two 
tjadiths in relation to the law of evidence, the so-called wide-spread 
hadith has no extra strength whatsoever to undermine and overthrow the 
llac ith pertaining to the validity of one witness and the oath of the 
plaintiff since the two belonged to one family i. e. solitary tradition. 55 By 
this, we may say that conflict between mashhur and aihad is of no 
significance unless it is viewed from Hanafi legal point of view. 56 
The following significant point of tarjiih is related to the problem 
of the classification of hadiths into 1alýih, Masan and ýa'if. These 
classifications are well documented in 'ulum al-hadith because they 
constitute the major task of such a discipline. 57 Though different grades 
of reliability are assigned to traditions which may serve the problem of 
conflict and tarj ih in uuu1 in a way that only the strongest form of 
hadith will be adhered to, the jurists have placed no special emphasis 
on this particular classification. In my view, that is partly because the 
problem is so well known among the usulists that sa 7k! l prevails over 
the hasan and hasan over the da'if to the extent that it demands no 
further explanation in ujul literature. In this situation, we should turn 
to the science of tradition to ascertain more of these classifications. 
55 In fact, both fhadiths. according to al-Shafi'i are reconcilable. See at- 
Umm, vol. 7, p. 8. 
56 Being equal to mutawattr. . mashhur unlike a pd. is of capacity to specify 
and qualify the general of the Qur'an. In fact, this is the only difference 
between mashhw- and alhad from the Hanafi view point. ( See Khallaf, U2ut, 
p. 42 ; Badran, UUul. pp. 85-86) 
For practical cases, see al-Hidayah, vol. 2, p. 209. 
57 See al-Tahhan, Taysir, p. 14. 
230 
From the general point of view of reliability i. e. the 
trustworthiness of the individual transmitters and the continuing of the 
isnad, traditionists came to divide the traditions into three main 
categories. The first, known as sah i h, received not only full authority 
but also superiority in case of conflict with the following kinds of 
hadith. 5 Sahih is a reliable or genuine report fulfilling all the required 
conditions. In other words, to be labelled fully reliable, it is necessary for 
a tradition of the Prophet to be preceded by an uninterrupted isnad, 
reported by the trustworthy and containing no abnormality (shadh) or 
weakness ('illah ). 59 Trustworthiness is measured by two criteria namely 
the accuracy Labt ) and 'adalah of each transmitter. 60 Of six canonical 
collections of hadith, two are especially esteemed and are labelled the 
Sahihan "the two reliable collections" which represent the highest degree 
of authority (in terms of transmission). 61 The first is the Sahih of al- 
Bukhari (d. 256 A. H. )62 and the second, the Sahih of Muslim (d. 261 
A. H. ). 63 
The next in rank is called hasan. It is a report of fair authority 
when those who transmitted this hadith do not reach the standard of 
those who transmit sahih traditions, being inferior to them either in 
58 A1-Hafnawi, Dirasat p. 300. 
59 Ibn Kath i r, a1-Ba'ilh. p. 6: al-Qardaw i, al-Madkhal, pp. 85-88. 
60 Ibid. ; Salisbury. " Contributions from original sources to our knowledge 
of the science of Muslim tradition ", in JAOS. vol. 7.1862, pp. 63-64 (cited 
after as "Muslim Tradition" ) 
61 Al_Hakim, at-Madkhal. p. 14 ; Gibb, Mohammedanism, p. 78 ; Naqvi, " 
Sunna ", p. 126 ; Juynboll, " Law', p. 559. 
62 EI 2, vol. 1, p. 1296. 
63 El 1, vol. 3, p. 756. 
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their faculty of memory or their 'adalah. 64 Da 'if (sometimes called 
saqim) is a weak report which comes at the end of the rank for it lacks 
one or more of the conditions mentioned above. 65 The weak traditions 
have been sub-divided according to the degree of defect in their reporters 
or in the texts of the report themselves. These fall into categories such 
as shadh, munkar, mudtarib, mursal, mu'dal, etc., which need not be 
elaborated here. 66 Distinguished totally from the above three 
classifications, the traditionists have also discussed the maudu' which is 
however, not considered a genuine tradition but rather fabricated and 
fictitious. From the isnad point of view, it is neither genuinely 
originated from the Prophet nor from the Companions. It was established 
in the later generations after the Companions and put into a complete 
isnad as if it came from the lips of the Prophet irrespective of what the 
purposes were. 67 Obviously, it has no legal significance or even authority 
to compete with other genuine traditions. 
64 Al-Tahhan, Taysir, p. 45 : Guillaume, The Tradition, p. 88 ; Ibn Kathir, 
al-Ba'iih, p. 19. 
There is another definition for hasan and it is originally attributed to al- 
Tirmidhi. He asserts that "every tradition which is transmitted whose isnad 
contains no one suspected or falsehood, which is not abnormal and is 
transmitted to the same effect by another line Is in our opinion a good 
tradition". (cited from Robson, ' Varieties_of the hasan tradition", in JSS, vol. 
6,1961, p. 48. ) 
65 Al-Hakim, al-Madkhal, pp. 26-33 ; lbn al-Salah, Mugaddimak p. 48 ; al- 
Nawawi, al-Majmu', vol. 1. p. 59: al-Tahhan. Taysir, pp. 89-91. 
66 For further information, see ibid. 
67 For an outline of the purpose behind the falsification on the fhadith, see 
al-fialcim, al-Madkhal, pp. 28-33: al-Tahhan, Taysir, pp. 89-91 ; al-Siba'i. 
ai-Sunnah, pp. 78-89. 
I 
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By these classifications, it is certain that a jurist can simply 
apply these degrees of authority whenever there appears to be a conflict 
between them. Though the process of tarj ih in this way sounds far 
from complex, it remains a painstaking study. First of all, according 
to many traditionists, no one should imagine that sound traditions can 
be found only in the works of both al-Bukhari and Muslim. 68 Not all 
sound traditions are recorded by both. 69 Accordingly, the matter 
deserves a comprehensive knowledge of the so-called 'ilm al-rijal or tarajim 
(the biographical science of transmitters) and 'ilal al-hadith (causes of 
unsoundness in Prophetic tradition)70 so that jurists would accept only 
those traditions which come through reputable channels. Doubtless, 
these two disciplines demand great study from the jurists. Moreover, as 
noted by al-Hakim al-Naasaburi, there may be a difference of opinion on 
many questions and among them, the problem of invalidating and 
declaring reliability (wounding and authenticating) for one imam perhaps 
declared someone reliable while someone else invalidated him. 7' Apart 
from this, it is common that one tradition may be transmitted with two 
isnads, one being reliable and the other unreliable e. g. transmitted in 
both interrupted and uninterrupted isnad. 72 These may add some 
difficulties in the course of distinguishing the reliable from unreliable 
traditions. 
68 Al-Qasim i, Qawa'ia pp. 83-84. 
Ibn al-Salah credits al-Bukhara with saying that he knew 100,000 sound 
traditions but the total said to be recorded in his 5afbi j is only 4,000 after 
excluding what is repeated under various headings and chapters. ( see 
Mugaddimak p. 10) 
69 Ibid. 
70 See al-Siba' i, al-Sunnah, pp. 111-112. 
71 Al-Hakim, al-Madiciuil, p. 12. See also El 1, vol. 2, p. 191. 
72 See al-Risalak p. 228, note no. 2. 
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Many examples may be presented to show that conflict of isnad 
is always removed by observing these grades of reliability. This means that 
sahih always prevails over hasan and particularly over da'if and never 
vice versa. One brief example is as follows (however many others are 
available). It concerns the first chapter of the Qur'an, the Fatihah. The 
jurists are divided here as to whether one is bound to recite this chapter 
in every ritual congregational prayer. The Hanafis have contended that 
every individual person who performs prayers in congregation is not 
required to do so. That is because the Prophet is reported to have said, 
"Whoever performs prayer in congregation, the recitation of the imam is 
credited also to the account of the followers (ma'mum )". 73 The vast 
majority of the jurists, notwithstanding minor disagreements between 
them, have demanded the recitation of the Fatihah in order to make the 
prayer valid arguing on the basis of another tradition but with contary 
effect. The hadith reads " There is no prayer for whoever does not recite 
the Fatihah of the scripture". 74 The jumhur argues that since the 
former hadith is unreliable i. e. da'if, 75 the preference should be 
granted to the hadith that requires the recitation of the Fatihah. 76 
73 A1hkam, vol. 1. p. 122. 
74 Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami% vol. 1. p. 119. 
75 Ibid., p. 122. 
Mention should be made that a weak hadith is not a valid legal proof except 
in the Hanbali and Zahiri schools of law. See al-Nawawi. al-Majmu'. vol. 1, p. 
59; al-Qasim i, Qawa'id. p. 113. 
76 Ibid., p. 119. 
Mention should be made that this conflict involves many pieces of evidence. 
Accordingly, a more comprehensive study should be carried out to determine 
what is "weightier" in this conflict. For details, see al-Bidayak vol. 1. pp. 125- 
128 and al-Bayhaqi. Kitab al-Qira'ah Khalf al-Imam, Dar al-Kutub 'Ilmiyyah. 
Beirut, 1984. 
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Another relevant example that can be brought in is related to 
voluntary fasting. According to al-Shafii, a person who purposely breaks 
his voluntary fasting, is not obliged to make a substitute fast for it on 
another day. It has been reported through a reliable transmission that 
the Prophet often breaks his recommended fasting when informed by his 
wife that she had cooked something for him on that particular day. 77 In 
addition, there is another reliable hadith reported by Umm Hani, 
confirming this ruling. 78 
The Hanafis hold a contrary legal ruling in the case concerned. 79 
They have based their argument on the hadith reported by al-Zuhri from 
'Urwah that 'A'ishah had said; "A lamb was given to Hafsah while we (I 
and Hafsah) were fasting. Hafsah persuaded me to break my fast. When 
the Prophet heard this, he ordered us to fast another day (as a substitute 
for what we did) ". 80 As far as tarj ih is concerned, al-Shafi' i argues that 
the hadith employed by this group is da'if owing to our ignorance of the 
biograhical information of the person who transmitted the hadith from 
al-Zuhri. 81 Furthermore, this hadith is reported in Malik's al-Muwatta ' 
in the form of suspended transmission i. e. mursal. 82 From the fore-going 
arguments, we can safely conclude that al-Shafi'i's opinion is better 
formulated, for the sahib always prevails over the da'if. 83 
77 Al-Shafi'i, al-Musnad, p. 365. 
78 At-Bidayak vol, 1, p. 311 ; al-Tah aw i. Shark, vol. 2. pp. 107-108. 
79 Al-Tahawi, Shark vol. 2. p. 110. 
80 Ibid. p. 108. 
81 Al-Shari "T, al-Musnad, vol. 2, p. 88. See also al-Bidayah, vol. 1, p. 312. 
82 Al-Muwatta', (Y), vol. 1, p. 306. 
83 Cf. al-lahawi, Sharp, vol. 1. pp. 109-110. 
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With regard to the continuity of isnad, we have two basic 
divisions, namely the continuous and the discontinuous. The first 
division may fall into one of the aforementioned classifications i. e. 
mutawatir, mashhur or ahad, and at the same time may be entitled to be 
listed in one of the three categories called salhih., 84 All hasan or da; -if. 
of these have been previously discussed. The remaining division 
therefore, to be discussed here is of the second viz. discontinued isnad. 
The mungati', in general, is the report in which continuity of 
transmission is lacking. 85 However, in relation to usul, the mursal is 
more extensively discussed to the extent of enjoying a special discussion 
in al-Shafi`T's al-Risalah. 86 
Mursal (literally, suspended) is an interrupted chain which is 
disconnected at the point between the Prophet and the one who 
transmitted from him, 87 or at any point after the Companions. 88 This 
isnad is obviously incomplete and inadequate. Nevertheless, the jurists 
84 Al-Tahhan, al-Taysir, p. 31f. 
85 Salisbury, "Muslim Tradition". p. 120. 
86 Al-Risalah, paras. 1262-1308. 
According to Ibn Kath i r, although mursal is exactly identical with munga; i', 
the former is commonly confined to those isnads which are disconnected 
between the Prophet and Successors. Otherwise, it is technically known as 
either mungati' or mu'daL (al-Ba'ith, p. 29). 
87 Ibn al-Salah, Mugaddimak p. 25 ; Ibn Taymiyyah. 'Ilm al-Jjadith. p. 99 
al-Hakim, al-Madkhal. p. 12. 
88 Ibn Kathir, a1-Ba'ith. p. 26. 
A1-Shawkani has offered a considerable distinction between these two 
pictures of mursal. The first concerns the traditionists while the second is 
propounded by the jurists. He further asserts that the cause of the conflict is 
credited to the mursal's definition held by the traditionists not by the jurists. 
(see Irshad, p. 64) 
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hold differing views. Al-Shafi'T accepts it conditionally. He restricts his 
acceptance to the mursal hadith reported by leading Successors or 
supported by another mursal version or by the opinion of the Companion, 
etc. 89 The traditionists have generally raised objections to such an 
acceptance, arguing that mursal is not authoritative. 90 The Hana is and 
the Malikis as well as some of the traditionists, on the contrary, have no 
objection whatsoever. 91 Moreover, some of them are of the opinion that 
mursal hadith is more accurate than the continuous isnad owing to the 
fact that it is customary for those who are certain about the isnad to 
link the tradition directly to the Prophet by omitting one or more link 
between themselves and the Prophet. 92 Therefore it should be 
subsequently favoured in case of conflict. 
Al-Amidi has given great emphasis to marasil (plural of mursal) 
reported by Successors, provided that they are 'adl since it is impossible 
for those who are of the quality of 'adaiah to transmit a report from the 
Prophet unless they did actually hear from the Companions that the 
Prophet said or did such and such. 93 In other words, they did so only after 
89 For details, see al-Risalah, paras. 1265-1270 ; Badran, Ugul. p. 100 ; al- 
Hafnawi. Dirasal pp. 344-346. 
90 Muslim, Sahih. vol. 1. P. 24 ; al-Nawawi. al-Majmu', vol. 1. p. 60 ; Ibn 
Hazm, al-Ihka. m, vol. 2. p. 135f. 
91 Ibn al-Salate, Mugaddimah, p. 26 : Ibn Kathir. al-Ba'ith. p. 26: Raw, jah. 
p. 64 ; al-Burhan, vol. 1, p. 634; Tanq i h, p. 379. 
92Kashf, vol. 3, p. 5: al-Burhan. vol. 1. p. 634 ; al-Taj il. vol. 1, p. 265 ; al- 
Muswaddah, p. 310 , al-Anbari, al-Lwna', p. 40 ; Irshad p. 64. 
93 Al-Amid-i. al-Ihkam, vol. 1. p. 299ff . See also al-Mu'tamad. vol. 2. pp. 675- 
676. 
Al-Bukhari , the author of Kashf al-Asrar criticises al-Shali'i 
for not 
accepting mursal as reliable since this refusal will naturally exclude many 
hadiths i. e. fifty volumes of had iths. (Kashf, vol. 3, p. 5) 
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ascertaining its soundness. This point of view seems to me highly 
preferable and this is supported by al-Shafi'i's statement, "Every hadith 
which I have recorded as mungati' (i. e. mursal), I have also heard in 
another uninterrupted version". 94 Similar to this is the common feature 
in the body of tradition that only the source of authority for a tradition is 
often given and the rest of the chain of transmitters is omitted, for a 
particular hadith was so unanimously held to be authentic that further 
verification of its origin was superfluous. 95 
The problem of ikhtilaf was therefore not originally caused by 
traditions, rather by the conflicting views toward a particular type of 
tradition in terms of acceptance or otherwise. The conflicting view on 
accepting a mursal hadith, for example, is capable of making legal rulings 
contradictory. Many cases of conflict in ftgh have been credited to this 
reason. 96 To give an example of the conflict between a mursal and a 
continued sanad, we put forward the case of laughing (qahqahah) in the 
prayer. The Hanafis are reported to have opined that laughing in the 
prayer would render both the prayer and the ablution null and void. In 
other words, one who laughs in his prayer, must repeat not only his 
prayer but also his ablution because both are affected by laughing. They 
adhered to the had i th which reports that the Prophet ordered a particular 
man who was laughing in his prayer to repeat both the ablution and 
prayer. 97 Other jurists have held a contrary assertion : that laughing 
affects only the prayer but not the ablution. Ablution remains valid 
94 Al-Risalah. para. 1184. See also Muslim, Sabib. vol. 1. pp. 24-26. 
95 See Ansari, " The authenticity of traditions :A critique of Joseph 
Schacht's argument E Silentio ", in HI, vol. 7. p. 78. 
96 j-min, Ikhtilaf, p. 403f. 
97 Al-Hiciayah, vol. 1. p. 16. 
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unless one can hear a sound or perceive a smell. 98 The majority of the 
jurists did not consider the first report as having considerable weight and 
value, for it is mursal i. e. mursal Abi al-'Aliyah, (as well as contradicting 
the general principle in terms of nullifying ablution). 99 This clearly shows 
how a mursal is overruled when it conflicts with the musnad. 100 
Before we proceed to undertake the problem of tarji h. on the 
basis of usul considerations as propounded by the jurists, we have to say 
that the traditionists have divided sound traditions into seven grades'o' 
which presented hierarchically are as follows: (1) those given by both al- 
Bukhari and Muslim, called muttafaq 'alayhi ; (2) those by al-Bukhara 
alone ; (3) those by Muslim alone ; (4) traditions not given by them but 
fulfilling the conditions of both; 102 (5) traditions which fulfil al-Bukhari's 
conditions; (6) traditions which fulfil Muslim's conditions and (7) 
traditions perfect in the opinion of other authorities. These grades, in 
fact, have been frequently taken into account and applied by those who 
wrote on sharh ahadith al-ahlcam particularly when there is a necessity to 
prefer one tradition over the other. 103 
98 AI-Ibhaj, vol. 3, p. 224. 
99 Al-Risalah, paras. 1299-1300 : Bidayah, vol. 1. p. 40 ; al-Mughni. vol. 1. 
pp. 177-178. 
100 Al-Mughn i, vol. 1. p. 178. 
101 Ibn al-Salah, Mugaddimah, p. 14. Cf. al-Hakim. al-Madkhal, p. 14 
102 The process of collecting the traditions on this basis is called mustadrak 
and the work of al-Hakim's al-Mustadrak is a typical example of this. 
Throughout the book, he collected ahadithwhich are not recorded by both al- 
Bukh ri and Muslim but fulfilling the conditions laid down by either or both . 
(see al-Tahhan, Taysir, pp. 38-39) 
103 See Nayl al-Awtar, vol. 5. p. 331. See also Irshad, p. 278 ; al-Qasimi, 
Qawa'id, p. 314. 
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In usul literature, however, one can find many methodologies of 
tarj ih which are not dealt with or even sketched in classical 'ulum al- 
tjadith. Broadly, the jurists, unlike the traditionists, have pointed out 
that whenever there appears to be a conflict between two or more 
traditions, effort should be made to ascertain the more accurate 
transmission. The accuracy of transmission can be confirmed by a 
number of considerations that subtantially vary from the tradition- 
oriented study to the jurist's. This is the task with which the jurists are 
primarily concerned. 
From the viewpoint of the transmitter's character, many 
methods of preference have been identified. However we have to admit 
that they are not necessarily applicable to all cases of conflict. These are 
nothing other than several considerable features employed in order to 
evaluate the most accurate isnad but from another point of 
consideration. Put differently, any means which leads the transmitters 
to be known precisely and acknowledged as trustworthy would 
presumably be a significant feature in selecting only the proper tradition 
in cases of conflict. To begin with, we may refer to the problem which 
concerns the cause of major ritual impurity (janabah). There are two 
traditions concerning the same question with different implications. One 
of the traditions reveals that the cause is inzai (emission of sperm) and 
this tradition was reported by Ubayy b. Ka'b from the Prophet. The 
tradition reads as follows, " the water from the water" 104 The other 
tradition shows that the cause is merely the meeting of two sexual organs 
(iltiga' al-khitanayn) even if no inzal takes place. The tradition, reported by 
'A'ishah reads, "when the two sexual organs met, ghusl (performing bath 
104 Muslim, Sahih, vol. 1, pp. 185-186. 
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for major ritual impurity) becomes obligatory". 105 Accordingly, conflict 
arises when some of the jurists inclined to follow the first tradition and 
the others preferred the second tradition. 106 
This feature offers us two principles of tarjih that deserves 
serious concern. First, it demonstrates that a person close to the Prophet 
should be taken as guarantor for the credibility of tradition in general 
cases and particularly in the Prophet's personal life. Thus, transmissions 
narrated through the Prophet's wives are superior, as noted elsewhere, to 
other contradictory transmissions in problems related to the Prophet's 
family and personal affairs or the day - to - day life of the Prophet. ' 07 
Secondly, it displays that the transmissions of those who actually 
participated with the Prophet in certain situations are given the priority 
regarding those particular situations over other transmissions which are 
not. 108 As for this case, it is evident from 'A'ishah who is reported to 
have said, "I did it with the Prophet and we bathed (performed the ghusi) 
together". 1 os Leaving aside some external factors that are in line with 
this tarj ih (which will be discussed later), we can confidently conclude 
105 Ibid., pp. 186-187. 
It is obvious that these two hadiths are recorded in the Sahih. Accordingly, 
an evaluation of both from a purely 'ulum al-hadith consideration seems 
inapplicable. Other means are sought, however, to remove the conflict with 
which the jurists are particularly concerned. 
106 Al-1'tibar, p. 31. 
107 Ibid.. p. 13 ; Ikhtilaf al-Had (Ui. pp. 495-496: al-Amid i. al-Ihkam. vol. 3. p. 
252. 
108 Ibid, ; al-Mustafa, vol. 2, p. 396 ; al-Muswaddah. p. 306 ; Muntaha, p. 
223. 
log Muslim, SahiF3, vol. 1. p. 187; al-Darari. vol. 1, p. 58. 
Other similar precedents and cases can be found in al-1'tibar, p. 13. 
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that these two aspects of transmission place the 'weight' of the second 
tradition beyond doubt. 
Also, it is worthy of remark that a report transmitted by the 
nearest person to the Prophet i. e. in terms of where the saying or the 
doing of the Prophet takes place, is of considerable superiority over the 
one whose narrator is not in such a situation. 110 For this, two traditions 
will be examined in the light of the above guideline. The first, reported by 
Ibn 'Umar, clearly contends that the Prophet performed hajj exclusively 
in one journey, al-hay bi al-irad i. e. not associated with 'umrah in the 
same journey. l ll Another version reported by Anas b. Malik, asserts that 
the Prophet performed the ha(j in a manner called giran i. e. performing 
hajj and 'umrah together in one journey. 112 Bearing these two traditions 
in mind, the jurists are more inclined to adhere to the first tradition i. e. 
transmitted by Ibn 'Umar for the reason noted at the beginning of the 
paragraph. What makes this tradition actually prevail are the words of 
Ibn 'Umar himself that "he was under the camel of the Prophet when the 
Prophet pronounced his ihram (and accordingly, he could hear clearly 
what type the ihram of the Prophet was)". ' 13 Hence, those who study 
these two transmissions carefully, would come to the conclusion that the 
transmission of Ibn 'Umar is worthier since he is the nearest person to 
the Prophet when the Prophet pronounced his ihram. 
110 Al-Amid i, al-! hkam vol. 3, pp. 260 ; al-I'tibar, p. 14. 
111 Al-1'tibar, p. 14. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
The saying of Ibn 'Umar can be found in Musnad vol. 4. p. 187. For another 
mode of preference for the same legal conclusion, see al-Ptibar, pp. 13-14 and 
al-Baj i, Iil. karn, pp. 657-658. 
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On the other hand, the transmission of those who are unknown 
(master or maj hul) are overruled. A narrator is unknown because of a 
lack of biographical information on his reliability as a narrator. In terms 
of proof, hadith with unknown narrators is considered unreliable and 
invalid. ' 14 Included under this are the reports by those who are not 
endowed with complete understanding, as in the case of minors, the 
weak-minded (ma`tuh) the careless (mughafal) and heretics (sahib al-haws) 
. 
115 Their reports are overruled since they could have been subject to 
many uncertainties and falsifications. ' 16 By this, only those traditions 
transmitted by people whose memory and precision are above serious 
controversy or void of excessive confusion will be credited with precedence 
over those transmitted by those who are not credited with the same degree 
of memory, integrity and precision. ' 17 The only way to know these is to 
know precisely who the transmitters are. The unknown transmitters 
cannot be judged as to whether they are just or impious, etc., and 
consequently their reports are left aside particularly when they contradict 
the reports transmitted by known transmitters. 
Let us examine one case of these problems. The case in point is 
concerned with two reports; one is reported by a reliable transmitter and 
the other by an unreliable transmitter who is suspect or who is believed to 
be innovator. 118 For this, the question of fasting throughout a complete 
114 AI_gardawi, al-Madkhal, p. 85. 
115 A1-Burharz. vol. 1. pp. 614-615 ; a1-Mustas/a, vol. 1. p. 156: Ibn Taymiyyah. 
'tim al-Hadith, p. 109, note no. 8; Salisbury. "Muslim tradition", p. 64. 
116 Al_Qasimi, Qawa'id, p. 314. 
117 Muslim, Sahih, vol. 1, p. 4. 
118 Al-Ibhaj, vol. 3. p. 220 ; Irshad, p. 277. 
243 
year will be brought forward. Ibrahim b. Abi Yahia has reported that the 
Prophet said, "Whosoever fasts for a complete year (al-dahr) has (certainly) 
offered (wahaba) himself (as a gift) to God". 119 No doubt, the hadith 
encourages such fasting. Having said this, we also find another version 
in which the Prophet is reported to have prohibited continuous fasting 
(. iyam al-dahr), "There will be no fast for those who fast for a complete 
year. The fasting for three days in every month is equivalent to a year's 
fasting ", 120 
Here, we have two traditions that are contradictory. Some of the 
jurists give preference to the latter owing to the fact that Ibrahim b. Abi 
Yahja, one of the transmitters in the former isnad, though he is a 
reliable (thiqah ) transmitter, is credited with innovations for he is a 
jahmi (i. e. a group of mu'tazilah who believe that a man has no freedom 
in his action, for he is majbur). 121 
With regard to this problem i. e. innovators, al-Nawawi has this 
to say, "the transmission of him who holds an innovative opinion 
(mubtadi') and whose bid'ah makes him an unbeliever is not acceptable by 
unanimous agreement. About the transmission of that mubtadi' whose 
bid'ah does not lead him to unbelief there is difference of opinion. (1) 
Some reject it absolutely because of his being a sinner (fasiq), while ta'uwil 
serves no purpose. (2) Others accept his transmission, as long as he does 
not declare mendacity permissible in order to support his doctrine nor 
119 Al-Thhaj. vol. 3, p. 220. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid.. p. 221. 
Ibrahim b. Abi Yana , infact, was one of the scholars 
from whom al-Shafl'i 
acquired his legal knowledge in Madinah. (see Abu Zahrah. al-Shafi'i, p. 37) 
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condones mendacity in others who support his doctrine, regardless of 
whether or not he is a propagandist of his bid'ah. This opinion is also 
reported on the authority of al-Shafi'i who once said ; "Accept the 
testimony of the ahl al-hawa ( except that of the Khattabiyyah) from 
among the Rafidah, because they have nothing against testifying falsely in 
favour of those who agree with them". (3) Still others say: Accept the 
transmission of the mubtadi' when he does not propagate his bid'ah and 
do not accept it when he does. This last opinion is upheld by many, 
indeed the majority, of the scholars and is the most balanced one....... 122 
Ibn al-Anbari has contended that this attitude is approved by the 
consensus of the ummah. Therefore, the ummah accept and consider the 
two Sahihs of al-Bukhari and Muslim (respectively) as reliable though 
the two contain transmision from innovators such as Qatadah b. 
Di`amah al-Basri (tabi'i) who is a gadri ; 'Umran b. Haffan who is 
alleged to be one of the Khawarij and 'Abd al-Razzaq b. Humam b. Nafi' 
who is accused of following the R afidah. 123 It seems that only the 
Khattabiyyah suffered from their theological thought in the eye of the 
jurists. 
After this lengthy explanation, we may safely conclude that the 
preference proposed earlier is fundamentally poorly defined. In other 
words, the reports of innovators are not necessarily liable to be rejected. 
Only transmission by those whose bid'ah makes them unbelievers is 
unanimously rejected. As in this case, some of the jurists, instead of 
122 Al-Nawawi, Sharlj , vol. 1, pp. 60f. 
The translation is taken from Juynboll. "Muslim introduction to his 5a bill. 
translated and annotated with an excursus on the chronology of fit na and 
bid'a ", in JSAI, vol. 5,1984, p. 271, note no. 15. 
123 Ibn al-Anbari, al-Luma'. p. 37. 
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adhering to the second tradition, have recourse to the first tradition 
which is reported by Ibrahim b. Abi Yahya. They do this by interpreting 
the prohibition in the second tradition as referring to fasting on occasions 
not permitted by Shari 'ah such as during the two days of celebration 
and three days of tashri k i. e. 13th, 14th and 15th of the month of 
pilgrimage. 124 
Likewise, the jurists declare that a report of a fagih transmitter 
may be worth more than reports transmitted by the non faq th transmitter 
for the former is competent to comprehend what he relates. 125 By this, 
we understand that transmitters are divided not only into well-known and 
unknown (as elaborated before) but also the well-known transmitters are 
of two kinds; the one who is also a fagih besides being a transmitter and 
the other who is only a transmitter. It was commonly known among the 
jurists to the extent that they know these two groups by name. Aghnides, 
for example says, 126 " those who are well-known transmitters who are 
also fagihs are the first four Caliphs, 'Abd Allah b. Masud, 'Abd Allah b. 
'Umar, 'Abd Allah b. 'Abbas, Zayd b. Harithah, Mu'adh b. Jabal, Abu Mu- 
sa al-Ash'ari, 'A'ishah and others". He further says that the traditions 
reported by those are accepted whether or not they are in accord with 
giyas. On the contrary, he says, the transmission by those transmitters 
who are not fagih like Abu Hurayrah are accepted only if in accord with 
qiyas because they may have taken a wrong record. This attitude is 
further evident from the following conversation between 'Ali b. Khashram 
and Wald'. 
124 Subs al-SaL vol. 2. p. 172 ; Nayl a! AwJar. vol. 4. pp. 343-344. 
125 AI-Amidi. al-Iljkarm vol. 3, p. 261; Niiayah, vol. 3. p. 227 ; a! -Ibhgj. vol. 3, 
. p. 
220; al-ThhgiI. vol. 2. p. 263 ; Tbnq i F,, p. 423. 
126 gghnides, Theories, p. 48. 
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'Ali b. Khashram said; Waki' said to us, "Of these two isnads, 
which is the one preferred by you ; al- A'mash - Abi Wa'il- 'Abd 
Allah ; or Sufy n- Manpur - Ibrahim - 'Alqamah - 'Abd Allah? " 
We replied; " al-A'mash - Abi Wail - 'Abd Allah". Waki' said, 
"Subl AUah 1 al-A'mash is a shaykh and Abu Wa'il is also a 
shaykh 127 (but) Sufyan is a fagih and Mansur is a fagih and 
Ibrahim is a fagi h and 'Alqamah is a fagi h too. A tradition 
transmitted by the jurists is superior to one transmitted by 
shuyukh (pl. of shaykh ). 128 
A student of the history of early Islamic law may notice that the 
Islamic law, in its earliest period consisted of little else other than the 
legal traditions (ahadith al-ahkam). Therefore it is not surprising that 
all such Companions as are reported to have related the largest number of 
ahadith e. g. 'A'ishah, Ibn Masud, Ibn 'Abbas etc., are described as fagihs 
too. 129 
Almost all the jurists who discuss the problem of tarjith have 
noted this feature but unfortunately without giving any proper examples. 
127 "Shaykh " is the title given to a transmitter whose reliability is of the third 
grade i. e. his transmission should be examined carefully. (see Ibn al-. aalah. 
Mugaddimah. p. 59). 
128 AL-1bhaJ, vol. 3. p. 220 ; al-1'tibar. p. 17. 
Another similar anecdote (i. e. between Abu Hianifah and al-Awza'i) can be 
found in al-Siba'i, aI-Sunnah, p. 423 and Hitu, al-Wajiz p. 78. 
All the technical terms used in the isnad by which the transmission method 
Is indicated are left aside without being translated. Instead. these technical 
terms such as haddathana. akhabarana. sami'tu. 'an. etc.. are represented by a 
horizontal stroke (-) between the names of transmitters. 
129 
,. 
iddigi. Hadith Literature, p. 14 ; Jalal al-Din, al-Qa¢i ai-Bay&w i, pp. 
272-273 ; al-Thagafi, al-Fiigh al-Ijanbali. pp. 24.29. 
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According to my opinion, this problem seems to be included under the 
disputation over khabar wahid. Broadly speaking, having considered the 
authority of khabar wahid, the jurists have laid down many conditions to 
be met before the reliability and trustworthiness of the transmitters 
involved in such a tradition is accepted. 130 Exactly on this account, the 
tradition of the Prophet transmitted by only one narrator is subjected to 
severe checking particularly when they are conflicting. The Hanafls131, 
for instance, have required, among others, that the narrator's action 
cannot contradict his narration. Otherwise, the transmission is left aside 
to clear the way for the practice of the narrator. 132 It is on this ground 
that Abu Hani fah, for example, does not rely on the following hadith 
narrated by Abu Hurayrah. " When a dog licks a dish, wash it seven times, 
one of which must be with clean sand". 133 Abu Hanifah explained this 
by saying that Abu Hurayrah has not acted upon it himself. Moreover, 
since the requirement of washing is normally three times, the report is 
considered weak, including its attribution to Abu Hurayrah' for it 
contradicts the practice of the narrator and the giyas. 134 
By this example, we may realise that the chain whose 
transmitters are also fagihs has some strength. This is evident when 
some of the jurists do not consider Abu Hurayrah's action which runs 
contrary to the had i th requirement as having legal effect since he is not a 
130 AI-Siba'i, at-Sunnah. pp. 404-405. 
131 Ibid., p. 440. 
Other schools of law have also required certain conditions before accepting 
solitary tradition as a legal proof. See for example. at-Risaiah, paras. 1000ff. 
132 Badran, Ustd. p. 95ff. 
133 Muslim, Sah Qk vol. 1. P. 119. 
134 Abu Zahrah. Usuil, p. 109; Badran, Usul. pp. 95,97ff. 
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fagi h. 135 This example may throw. some light on what has been 
established by the jurists in terms of conflict and tarji h: that is, a 
tradition narrated by a faqih transmitter enjoys more credibility when it 
contradicts a tradition transmitted through a non fagih transmitter. 
Similary, they also pointed out that the report that comes 
through the transmitter who is more knowledgeable or proficient in 
Arabic should be favoured simply for the same reason i. e. his report is 
more precise than the other's for the sake of both legal and language 
significance. 136 An example of this, like before, finds no place in u§ul 
books. On the other hand, the same justification of preference applies to 
that which is transmitted by those who are well acknowledged as those 
who had more memory power and precision (ahfaz and atqan ). 137 Al- 
Hamdhani, after saying this, refers the reader to a comparison between 
two reliable transmitters namely Malik b. Anas and Shu'ayb b. AbT 
Hamzah. Though both are trustworthy, Malik is credited with having the 
greater memory and precision compared to Shu'ayb b. Abi Hamzah. In 
case of conflict between two traditions which come through these two 
transmitters respectively, the superiority goes to Malik for he is a az and 
atgan. 138 As in the above, this case records no actual example. 
Having said that, the above principles i. e. preference by virtue of 
the proficiency in language and precision in the transmission of material, 
135 See Badran, Usut p. 97. 
136 Al-Tabsii, vol. 2. p. 263 ; al-Amidi, al-ItIkam, vol. 3. p. 261 ; al-Ibhaj. vol. 
3, p. 220; Irshad. p. 276. 
137 See Muslim. 5ahi h, vol. 1. p. 4; al-Vtibar, p. 11 ; al-Baja. Ihkam. pp. 
648-649. 
138 Al-I'tibar. p. 11. See also al-Risalah, paras. 771.785, idem, Ikhtilaf al- 
Had 7i th, p. 524 . 
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are lacking in terms of satisfactory examples, we may refer to one case 
which might, in one way or another, link the problem discussed with the 
'actual' case. The case in point deals with the problem of raising the 
hands at the inaug u. cation of a prayer and before and after ruku'. Two 
versions of a tradition concerning the same subject have been recorded. 
The first, reported by Ibn 'Umar, says that "the Prophet lifted his hand 
when he made takb ir (at the beginning of the prayer) and when he was 
about to bow for the ruku' and when he stood erect after the ruku"'. This 
version has been later transmitted in more than one manner. Among 
these, al-Zuhri has reported this tradition from Salim with the exact 
words which give the same legal implication. 139 There is, however, 
another version from the Prophet, originally transmitted by another 
Companion, al-Barg' b. 'Azib that "the Prophet, when he starts his prayer, 
raises his hand slightly up to his ear and did not repeat (i. e. the Prophet 
lifted his hands only at the commencement of his prayer)". This version 
has been transmitted through Yazi d b. Abi Ziyad whose transmission is 
disputed for it is mucdtarib. 140 Sufyan b. 'Uyaynah, one of the leading 
traditionists, has told us that Yazid, did transmit this version with two 
different wordings. The first time, he did not mention the phrase , "and 
then the Prophet did not repeat (thumma la ya'ud )" but when he entered 
the city of Kufah, he pronounced the tradition together with this 
phrase' 41 which subsequently gives two different impressions. 
Obviously, the first version is more accurate since its transmitters are 
139 At-Ptibar, p. 16. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid. 
For another method of removing this conflict, see al-Ibhcy. vol. 3. p. 219. 
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adbat and the words of the tradition, unlike in the second version, show 
no idtirab (i. e. inconsistency). 142 
The problem of the transmitter whose conversion to Islam is 
earlier and whose companionship with the Prophet is longer is held to be 
one of the features of preference. Apparently, those transmitters who 
acquired such a high degree of knowledge, would be more familiar with 
the Prophet's Sunnah. Precisely on this ground, some of the jurists suggest 
that the isnad by those whose conversion and companionship is earlier 
and longer gains superiority. 143 It is exactly on this basis that one 
should take Malik's assertion that "'Umar knew the hadi th of the 
Prophet better than Sa'd b. Abi Wagqas". 144 On the contrary, having 
acknowledged the advantage of long companionship with the Prophet, 
other jurists have declared that the reports of the transmitters whose 
conversion is later should be selected for it abrogates the earlier 
(naskh). 145 
To illustrate this, I cite the problem inherent in the method of 
performing prayer at a time of fear in which al-Shafi'i prefers a hadith 
related by Khawwat b. Jubajr to another related by Ibn 'Umar. 146 When 
asked for the reason for his preference, al-Shafi'i replies that Khawwat 
142 Ai-Bukhara in his Sahih says that there is no isnad more accurate than 
the one which implies the raising of the hands in doing ruku' in prayer. 
(Fath. al-Bari, vol. 2. p. 362). See also al-Manhaj al-Islam i, p. 119. 
143 Al-Risslau . para. 722f ; al-Amid 
I. al-Ihkam, vol. 3. p. 260 ; Hitu, al- 
Wajiz, p. 479 
144 Al-Shafi'i, Ikhtilaf Malik. p. 214. See also Origins. p. 25. 
145 Al-Tahgil. vol. 2. p. 265 : al-Ibhaj. vol. 3. pp. 224-225 ; Ghayat al-Ujul, 
p. 143 ; Hitu, al-Waji2, p. 480. 
146 Al-Risalah, para. 721f. 
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was senior to Ibn 'Umar in age with regard to companionship with the 
Prophet and seniority. 147 
The accuracy of this preference is subject to many objections. 
For it is possible for a senior or older Companion to have been ignorant of 
some of the traditions of the Prophet. 148 Moreover, as is familiar to the 
scholars, it was Abu Hurayrah who stood at the top of the reporters of 
hadith among the Companions though his conversion to Islam was very 
late i. e. in the seventh year of Hijrah on the occasion of the battle of 
Khaybar. 149 Hence, we may not reasonably assume that seniority is a 
suitable condition to guarantee the accuracy of one of two conflicting 
isnads. Even al-Shafi'i himself did not strictly adhere to this theory 
where on other occasions e. g. performing prayer between the 'asr prayer 
and sunset and between the fajr prayer and sunrise, he rejects the 
traditions related by 'Umar, the second Caliph and Ibn 'Umar, his son. 
Instead, he adheres to the traditions related by Companions like 'Imrän b. 
Husayn and Jubayr b. Mu'tam who were less reputed than 'Umar and Ibn 
'Umar in terms of seniority. 150 
The following issue concerns conflict and tarjih from the 
standpoint of forms of narration. Put in another way, words used in 
connection with hadith transmission also play a considerable role in 
terms of tarj i h. The first is the conflict between what is reported in a 
147 Ibid., para. 722. 
Apart from this reason, al-Shaf'i also produced other arguments for his 
preference (ibid). See also al-Ptibar. pp. 119-120 ; al-Mankhut pp. 432-433 ; 
al-Burhan, vol. 2, pp. 1179-1182. 
148 Raf at-Mulam, pp. 6-9. 
149 Al-Tabagat al-Kubra. vol. 4, p. 327. 
150 Al-Umm, vol. 1, p. 148f. 
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tradition according to the saying of the Prophet on one hand and what is 
understood by the transmitter on the other. In such a case, the 
preference goes to what is implied by the saying itself for this is more 
certain. 151 It is on this ground, for example, that the majority of jurists 
have relied principally on the saying of the Prophet, narrated by Ibn 
'Umar that the Prophet prohibited the selling of ummahat at-awlad, " They 
may neither be sold nor given as a gift where their lord can enjoy (make 
pleasure) with what is apparent from her. When her lord dies, she is 
free". On the contrary, Abu Sa' id al-Khudri has stated that "we used to 
sell ummahat al-awlad in the time of the Prophet". ' 52 Obviously, the 
latter is of no strength to stand against the former because Abu Sa'id al- 
Khudri's opinion is possibily based on his personal judgement without 
hearing the Prophetic saying which makes this action unlawful. 153 
Personal opinion, on many occasions, is doubtful. 154 
It is common also among the traditionists not only to be aware 
of but to appreciate what is technically known as " high and low 
isnad", 155 which has significantly contributed to the problem of conflict 
and tarjih. In short, high isnad may refer to the nearest chain to the 
Prophet or to that chain through whom a later traditionist has received 
one of the collections of traditions. 156 What is intended in our 
151 Al-Mustasfa, vol. 1, pp. 129-130 and vol. 2, p. 396 : al-Hafnawi, Dirasat 
p. 95. 
152 AI-I'tibar, pp. 17-18. 
153 Ibid. See also al-Risalah. para. 1225. 
154 Al-Hafnawi, Dirasat, p: 95. 
155 Ibn Taymiyyah, 'Jim al-Had i th, p. 97 ; Ibn Kathir, al-Ba'ith, p. 85 : al- 
Ibhaj. vol. 3, p. 219. 
156 Robson, "Tradition : investigation and classification", in MW. vol. XLI. 
1951, p. 107. 
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discussion is of the first kind only because tarjih is merely concerned 
with the number of transmitters between the last transmitter and the 
Prophet and not with the chain of transmission after the collections of 
the traditions. 
Obviously, a high isnad brings the later transmitter into closer 
connection with the Prophet while a low isnad creates the contrary 
situation. In case of conflict between two traditions, the jurists 
unanimously professed that the one which carries fewer transmitters 
takes precedence over the other which contains more transmitters. 157 
The reason behind this is that the possibility of error is less in the high 
isnad for its transmitters are fewer than in the low isnad. 158 
A case in point is related to the problem of the methods of how 
to perform adhan and iqamah correctly. 'Amir al-Ahwal reported from 
Makhul that Abu Muhayriz told him that Abu Mahzurah told him that 
the Prophet explained how to perform both adhan and iqamah where the 
Prophet said that iqamah is twice (i. e. every phrase of it must be 
pronounced twice). '59 In another version, Khalid a1-Hadh7a' reported from 
Abi Qilabah from Anas b. Malik that he said, "* Bilal was told by the 
Prophet to make the adhan twice and the iqamah once". 160 It is clearly 
evident that the preference goes to the latter version for it has fewer 
transmitters because only two transmitters were involved between Khälid 
157 Al-TahiL vol. 2. p. 263 ; aL-Ibhaj, vol. 3, p. 219 ; Irshad, p. 276 ; Hitu, 
al-Wajiz p. 478. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Al-I'ribar, pp. 69-70; al-Ibhaj. vol. 3. p. 219. 
160 Ibid. 
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and the Prophet. In turn, unlike the latter, the former isnad comprises 
more transmitters since 'Amir and Khalid were contemporaneous. 161 
Among others, the jurists also discuss the problem of acquiring 
a hadith by hearing on one hand and by writing on the other. Broadly 
speaking, the jurists contend that acquiring a hadith by writing is not 
equivalent but inferior to hearing. 162 In other words, when a particular 
transmitter said that he heard from the Prophet such and such, his report 
is stronger than the report gained through the Prophet's writing. The 
conflict can be illustrated here by pointing out two traditions concerning 
the consumption of carrion. Ibn 'Abbas reported that the Prophet passed 
a dead sheep (carrion) and then said, " Why don't you make use of her 
skin". 163 In contrast, Ibn Hakim (or Ibn 'Akim) said that "the Prophet 
wrote to us saying " don't make use of both her skin and nerve". 164 The 
majority of jurists have placed the tradition of Ibn 'Abbas over the 
tradition of Ibn Ha ki m simply because the possibility of error or 
falsification and miswriting (lahn wa tashif) is greater or more facilitated 
by written documents. 165 
161 AI-Ibhaj, vol. 3, p. 219. 
For a different argument of the same preferred tradition, see al-1'tibar, p. 71 
and al-Baj i. Ih-Jcam, p. 657 
162 Al-1'tibar, p. 13 ; al-Baj i. IhIcam, pp. 653-654 ; Ghayat al-Ugul. p. 142 ; 
Tang ih, p. 423 ; EfgU yat al-Sunnalz, p. 402. 
163 Al-Nasa'i, Sunan. vol. 7, p. 174. 
The continuance of the hadith runs as follow : The Companion (question the 
Prophet) saying ,"0 Messenger of Allah, it is a carrion 
(that deserves to be 
forbidden)". The Prophet replies, " Only eating is prohibited". (ibid). 
164 Ibid. 
165 Al-Amidi. al-lhkam, vol. 3, p. 264 ; al-Mustafa, vol. 2, pp. 395-396 
Tangijj. p. 423; al-Baji, lhkam, p. 654. 
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I do not think this is a clear-cut criterion on which a proper 
taijih could be based. Unfortunately, I myself have no adequate evidence 
with which to argue the accuracy of this preference. The only possiblity 
open as it seems to me is to avoid making such a preference exclusively on 
this ground. Instead, a comprehensive study and consideration must be 
carried out to determine what is "weightier" in terms of preference in such 
cases of conflict. Regarding the above conflict, I am more inclined to the 
report of Ibn 'Abbas for a reason not as attempted before. It is rather due 
to the weakness that occurs in both the text and isnad of the report of 
Ibn Hakim. I will mention only the weakness related to the isnad. The 
report of Ibn Hakim is severely questioned, for the report is suspected for 
being mudtarib (uncertain) and also for being discontinued or at 
least suspended (mursal). 166 Clearly, it re-emphasises that a 
comprehensive consideration of tarj ih is "safer" and more acceptable. In 
other words, to commit oneself solely to one single method of preference 
such as "hearing the hadith is more accurate than acquiring the hadith 
by writing" is not well placed for it might contain considerable room for 
error and uncertainty. 
Similarly, when two traditions conflict, an attempt is made to 
ascertain how these two traditions were transmitted from the Prophet i. e. 
whether both are transmitted verbatim or only one of them is 
transmitted verbatim. As for the latter situation, the jurists have said 
that the literal transmission is to be preferred over the transmission of 
the sense alone, 167 for two main reasons. First, the transmission by the 
sense alone, unlike the verbal, is disputed in terms of permissibility. The 
166 Subul al-Salam, vol. 1, p. 31. 
167 Al_Amid!, al-Ihlcam, vol. 3. p. 264. 
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second reason lies in the fact that words may have several literal 
meanings or meanings hard to comprehend or may be liable to have 
another meaning which will make this transmission subject to many 
errors. 168 
In the course of the transmission, many methods of transmitting 
have come to exist. In this regard, I will restrict myself only to eight 
methods of transmission as propounded by Ibn al-Salah. The capital aim 
is merely to show that in cases of conflict, these methods may sometimes 
be useful for they are of various degress of ranking. Thus, the following 
illustration is made to meet the hierarchical order of these methods: lss 
(1) " Transmission by words such as haddathana, akhbarana, 
anba'ana, sami'tu or qal lang John (so and so said to us) is of the 
highest form. This is done only when one receives the material by 
hearing from his shaykh. 
(2) By reading over to a shaykh what one has heard. The one who 
recites may do so from memory or from a written copy. When the 
shaykh did not raise any objection, the transmission of a particular 
hadi th from him is officially approved for those who recite and 
those who heard the reading as well. 
(3) Transmission may take place through the so-called ijazah 
(licence). A licence given for a particular individual to transmit is of 
three categories ; (a) it is given to a specific person to transmit 
1613 At-Mustasja, vol. 1. p. 168 : Ghayat al-Usul, p. 143. 
The transmission by the sense alone is highly disputed ( see al-Khalif. 
"Sunny", in IC, vol. 43,1969. p. 64) from which ten contradictory views are 
recorded. (al-Hafnawi, Dirasat, pp. 280-286) 
169 Adopted with some modifications from Ibn al- alah. Muga. ddimah. pp. 
62-87. 
The translation is taken from Robson, 'Tradition". pp. 27-29. 
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specified material, (b) it is given to a specific person to transmit 
something which is not specified and (c) it is given to unqualified 
persons such as "to everyone" or "to all who live in my time". The 
first of the three is unanimously accepted whereas the others are 
disputed. 
(4) Munawalah or handing over is the following rank of 
transmission. It is of two types. The first is associated with yazah 
while the second is not. The first takes place when the shaykh 
hands his pupil his own copy and says, "This is what I have heard, 
so transmit it from me". The pupil therefore must compare his 
personal copy with his shaylch's copy and then submit his personal 
copy to the shaykh for approval. When the shaykh says, "I have 
studied its contents and it contains what I transmit from my 
shaykhs, so tranmit it from me". the pupil is given a licence to do 
so. In the second, however, the shaykh may hand his pupil the 
book but without giving him an explicit licence to transmit by 
simply saying, " This is from what I have heard". The licence is held 
to be implied. 
(5) Another method of transmission is known as mukatnbah 
(literally correspondence). This means that the pupil acquires the 
traditions from written copy of his shaykh. 
(6) At this rank, the narrator may simply tell his pupil that a 
certain tradition is what he heard from so and so without saying 
anything about his transmitting it. 
(7) Also, a transmission takes place when a traditionist may leave 
someone in his will a book containing what he transmitted. 
(8) The last method is known as wijadah. It denotes that 
someone may find a book of traditions in the handwriting of a 
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shaykh. He may never have met him or he may have met him but 
not have heard from him what he has found in his handwriting and 
he has no explicit licence to transmit it". 
There are further attempts in different other approaches to 
dissolve contradictions within the traditions by making one prevail over 
the other when they conflict. Some of these are totally baseless and 
others are convincing. To begin with, we may discuss the so-called 
"regional preference". What is meant by this is that some of the jurists, 
when excluding one of the conflicting traditions, simply say that this 
tradition originated from such and such a city, so it must be disregarded 
because it is overruled. The commonly overruled traditions are those of 
Iraqian or Syrian origin. Presented differently, we may say that traditions 
which are of "Medinan origin" are more likely to prevail over traditions of 
"non- Medinan origin". 170 Those who support this preference argue on the 
grounds that Madinah is the home of Sunnah and other localities, on the 
contrary, are not only new to the Sunnah but also well known for 
fabricated sunan. 171 To this effect, it has been reported that al-Shafi'i 
said that every hadi th which has no origin in the Hijaz is considered 
unreliable though it may be conveyed by reliable transmitters. 172 
As said before, this is not a concrete argument of preference. 
Therefore, Ibn Taymiyyah, for instance, has strongly disagreed with this, 
arguing that the main key for accepting or rejecting a particular tradition 
170 Al-1'tibar. p. 15 ; Rafe al-Mulam. p. 13. See also al-Thaqaft. a! -Fygh al- 
Hanbali, vol. 1, pp. 42-43. 
171 Ibid. 
172 This viewpoint is recorded by al-Hamdhan i in al-I'tibar, p. 15. See also al- 
Khatib al-Baghdadi. al-Shafri, p. 71. note no. 4. 
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should be not the provincial character but exclusively the conditions 
laid down by the traditionists. 173 By these principles only, one can 
ascertain the sound tradition and accordingly, would take no other 
consideration whatsoever into account in order to select the proper 
traditions when they conflict. Moreover, al-Shafi'i is reported to have 
said to Ahmad b. Hanbal "you have more knowledge about hadith and its 
narrators then I. So if a hadith is authentic, then tell me. If it is 
authentic, I will accept it even if it is (reported by narrators) from Kufah, 
Basrah or Damascus. 174 
To illustrate another method of preference, two traditions 
which are held to be contradictory will be thoroughly examined. The first, 
transmitted by Busrah bt. Safwan records that the Prophet said, "Anyone 
who touches his sexual organ must retake a fresh ablution". 175 The 
second, transmitted by Qays b. Talq from his father shows that the 
Prophet was asked about touching sexual organs and he replied, " that 
organ is nothing other than part of you". 176 Ablution is nullified by 
touching the sexual organ according to the first and not to the second. 
The majority of jurists comply with the first tradition177 but argue - to 
remove this conflict - from different points of view. Al-Baj i, for instance, 
being himself Maliki, prefers Malik's point of view i. e. the ablution is 
void, for the first tradition is reported by a larger number of transmitters 
than the second. He says that this tradition is handed down to the 
173 Ra, f` al-Mulam, p. 13. 
174 Lu1yat a! -Awliya', vol. 9, p. 170. 
175 Al-Tibrizt, Mishkat, vol. 1, p. 71 ; Ibn Majah, Sunan. vol. 1, pp. 161-162 ; 
Bidayah, vol. 1, p. 39. 
1761bid. ; Musnad, vol. 4. p. 22. 
177A1-1'tibar, pp. 42-43 ; al-Zurqani, Shart3, vol. 1, p. 129 ; at-Muwa a', (S). pp. 
35-38. 
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Successors by a group of the Companions like Umm Habibah, Abu Ayyub, 
Abu Hurayrah, 'Arwah bt. Unays, 'A'ishah, Jabir, 'Abd Allah b. 'Umar, etc. 
The second tradition, on the contrary, has fewer transmitters with regard 
to the level of the Companions. 178 This sort of preference is well known 
as the preference by virtue of "many". 
Other scholars have come out with another basis of preference. 
They argue that the first tradition, unlike the second, received full 
recognition by a large number of mu'addilun. 179 For this reason, it must 
take precedence. In this regard, al-Shafi'i says, "We asked about 
(examined) Qays and the one who transmitted the tradition from his 
father (i. e. Talq) but we found no authorities who know him and his 
father". 180 Slightly similar to al-Shafi'i's argument, al-Hamdhani181 has 
argued in favour of what is indicated by the hadith of Busrah by simply 
producing another version of transmission (i. e. Shu'ayb - his father - his 
grandfather) saying, "all the transmitters involved in the chain are 
unanimously acknowledged as trustworthy". As for the hadith of Busrah, 
he further elaborated the full isnad which contains all reliable 
transmitters as : "Malik - 'Abd Allah b. Abi Bakr b. Muhammad b. `Amr 
ibn Hazm - 'Urwah b. Zubair - (Marwan) - Busrah - the Prophet". By 
178 Al-Shafi'i, Ikhfilaf Mulilc, p. 192; al-Baj i. /tkam. p. 651. See also al-I'tibar, 
p. 11; al-Darari, vol. 1. p. 54 ; NaylAwlar, vol. 1. p. 248. 
As stated elwsewhere, the Hanafis did not take the first tradition into account 
for a special reason i. e. 'wnum al-balwa . (see page 
7$) Likewise, they do not 
adhere to this preference since the preference lies on "many'. (al-I'tibar, p. 11) 
For other Hanafis arguments, see al-Hidayah, vol. 1, pp. 71079 ; al-Zurgani, 
Shar1h. vol. 1, p. 130. 
179 Nayl al-Awtar, vol. 1, p. 250 ; al-Hafnawi, al-Tarjih, pp. 318-319. 
180 Al-Ptibar, pp. 12,46. 
Al-Shafi i, in his Ikhtilaf Malik, described the hadith of Qays as majhuL (p. 192) 
181 Ibid. pp. 43. 
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these, it seems that the first tradition gains superiority and not only that, 
this preference is further supported by the fact that all the reliable 
narrators in the first tradition are acknowledged and used (yuhtay) by 
both al-Bukhari and Muslim in their collections, which make this 
tradition ultimately more worthy. 182 
As one can see, many methods of tarjih are relevant and 
applicable to the above case of conflict. In consequence, these relevant 
methods of tarjih are known by more than one title such as the preference 
by virtue of the large number of transmitters or by the well-known origin 
and 'adalah of individual transmitters or by other criteria which make 
the isnad more convincing as its transmitters are well-known. Al- 
Hamdhani himself, as is evident from his al-I'tibar has put forward at 
least, in this conflict, three arguments on which the proper preference for 
the hadith of Busrah may be established. His first argument is exactly 
identical to al-Baj i's point of view and the second resembles al-Shafi'i's 
argument, while the third adopts some external factors to confirm and 
add weight to Busrah's transmission. 183 Since tarj ih by virtue of "many" 
is disputed between the j umher and the Hanafis and does not only 
involve the conflict of isnad but also other elements; it will be 
discussed further in chapter seven under the heading "Tarj ih based on 
external factors". 
Bearing in mind that more can be examined on this topic, we 
end the discussion of this chapter. As previously noted, only those 
methods which have immediate and obvious relevancy to tarji h on the 
182 Ibid. pp. 46-47; Nayl al-Aw[ar. vol. 1, p. 250. 
183 A1-I'tibar, pp. 11.12 and 43-47. See also Nayl a[ Awtar, vol. 1. p. 250ff ; 
al-Zurgani, Sharma vol. 1. pp. 129-130. 
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basis of the isnad will be under review. The foregoing discussion has 
provided many impressions. First, as we may realize, most of the 
features pointed out throughout the study are more concerned with the 
authenticity of the hadith and not with its authority. It ought to be 
noted that the isnad is quoted only to prove the authenticity of the 
tradition and its correct attribution to the Prophet, not its authority. 14 
The direct impression from this is that the jurists, particularly the 
ancient jurists, were not men of knowledge on ftgh only but were also 
familiar with the isnad or 'uium at-hadith in general. Further, it clearly 
shows that the isnad has received special emphasis from the jurists 
and was frequently used as the argument for excluding an opponent's 
contradictory traditions. Unfortunately, since the vast majority of legal 
traditions (or even the whole material of the traditions) are of ahad, 
conflict is normal. This was mainly due, as explained in chapter two, to 
the various conditions laid down by the different schools of law for 
accepting a particular hadith or otherwise. 
I have to say also that much "inaccuracy" and "inconsistency" 
in applying most of the methodology of preference, (not only in this area 
of conflict but also in other areas, as shown before or to be shown in the 
coming discussions), is about to confirm the proposal that the most 
effective way to apply tarj ih lies in taking all the arguments surrounding 
any particular conflict into account in order to arrive at a more likely 
result. Otherwise, i. e. by restricting one's effort to a particular method 
only such as saki h prevails over hasan or mutawatir over ahad and 
the like, one may probably arrive at unsatisfactory or unconvincing 
results, for the method is neither comprehensive nor consistent. We 
184 Khadduri. Islamic Jurisprudence. p. 30 . a1-A'zami. On Schacht, p. 52. 
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have seen also that on many occasions, a particular case of conflict, 
instead of one, has been exposed to two or even more methods of 
preference. For one thing, it shows that preference is applicable from 
many standpoints ; some of them are widely acknowledged and are in use 
by the vast majority of the jurists while others, to some extent, are not 
only disputable but also irregular and at times baseless. The foregoing 
discussion, for my part, is credited at least, with having successfully 
provided the theoretical foundations of tarjih in isnad conflict. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
PART A 
THE METHODOLOGY OF TARJIH IN LIMA' CONFLICT 
The reader is quite disappointed when he encounters the above 
headline which suggests a degree of divergence in Yma'. For the Yma' is, 
as is commonly known, a unanimous agreement while conflict is nothing 
other than differences of ruling applied to the same particular case. 
However, as we shall see, as conflict occurs in the text and in the chain 
of transmission, so in Y ma' when two or more ij ma' are recorded as 
indicating two contrary rulings having been applied to the same subject. 
For example, each of the validity and the prohibition of nikah mut'ah 
(temporary marriage) has been claimed by the exponents respectively on 
the basis of yma'. 1 In other words, both the validity and the prohibition 
of such marriages are approved by virtue of two contrary ijma'. 
Theoretically, no conflict is allowed in or between Yma' since the 
major rule of ijma' is to unite the divergent opinions on a problem 
progressively. 2 Further, "yma' guarantees the authenticity and correct 
interpretation of the Qur'an, the faithful transmission of the Sunnah of 
the Prophet, the legimate use of an analogy and its result; it covers, in 
short, every detail of the law, including the recognized differences of the 
various schools". 3 Not only that, when yma' is established, it makes a 
1 Ahmad Hasan, lima', pp. 25-26. 
2 Bidayak vol. 1. p. 5; Origins, p. 42 ; Ahmad Hasan, The Early, pp. 54-55 ; 
Karnali, "Ray ". p. 46. 
3 Hurgronje, Selected Works, p. 157. See also Coulson, Conflicts, pp. 22-24 ; 
Gibb, Islam p. 65. 
In this context, Faruki has said, "Without ijima' all ijtihad would have been 
regarded as gann" (Jurisprudence, p. 153) 
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judgement irrevocable, not to be challenged or reinterpreted by later 
generations. 4 
In a practical sense, however, we often find that a particular ijma' 
is confronted by another contemporary or subsequent iJma'. In one way or 
another, it clearly shows how confusing and complicated the discussion of 
Yma' really is. To avoid such a complex theoretical discussion and at the 
same time, to undertake study of the problem of conflict and tarjih 
successfully, one is obliged not to go into detail or to open up the entire 
argument behind the application of Yma' in Islamic law. The following 
study must confine itself to the situations where conflict is reported to 
have occurred. Before that, some introductory remarks on the principle of 
Yma' are believed to be of great importance for they can shed some light 
on causes of conflict in yma' . 
Broadly speaking, yma' is a unanimous doctrine and opinion of 
the recognized religious authorities at any given time. 5 Literally, the word 
yma' is taken from the root jama'a which originally means to gather 
together. 6 It also implies the meaning of determination7 as in the hadith ; 
" There will be no fasting for those who do not intend (yajma' )fasting 
from the night". 8 An agreement is another literal meaning of jam'. 9 
Although both differ from each other in that the agreement, unlike 
4 Hallaq. "On the authoritativeness of Sunni Consensus", in IJMF. S, vol. 18, 
1986, p. 427. (cited after as "Consensus") 
5 EI 2, vol. 3, p. 1023 ; Hurgronje. Selected Works, p. 278. 
6 Ibn Manzur. Lisan, vol. 8, p. 53 ; Thwat j, vol. 2, p. 211. 
7 Al-Razi, al. ijjah, p. 110 ; al-Mustass a. vol. 1. p. 173. See also Q. 10 : 71. 
8 Irshad. p. 71. 
9 Ibid. ; al-Mustasf , vol. 1. p. 173. 
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determination, requires at least two sides to exist, one can see that both 
coincide with each other for an agreement requires also determination to 
exist. 10 As for the technical meaning of ijma', it records a critical 
disagreement among the jurists for each of the schools or even individual 
jurist has its or his own concept of yma'. The reasons behind this can be 
summarised as follows to the extent that only with this background can 
one fully appreciate this critical difference. Mention should be made that 
these factors would render yma' not only doubtful in its technical meaning 
but also contradictory to each other. These reasons are as follows: 
(1) Disagreement in giving the technical meaning of ijma'. In short, three 
views are recorded. A group of the jurists led by al-Shafi'i accept only the 
consensus of the whole community or the universal ijma' for it is held 
impossible that the community as the whole would agree on something 
contrary to the Qur'anic injunctions and the Prophetic words. l l They do 
not consider the consensus of legal specialists for it is of a lower level 
because it is only parallel to a solitary tradition or khabar al-khassah 
which cannot lead to certain knowledge. 12 Accordingly, the recognised 
yma' is the one that carries the consensus of every single person in the 
Muslim community. Another group, on the contrary, accepts the 
consensus of legal experts even though it lacks the community agreement, 
for those legal experts are the mediators of the community to whom is 
10 Irshad, p. 71 ; ol-Tagrir, vol. 3, p. 80. 
11 A[-Risalah, paras. 1312.1320. See- also idem Ibbal a[-Istihsan, p. 299; 
Origins, p. 92 ; F. Rahman, "Concepts Sunnah, fjtihad and Uma' in the early 
period", in IS, vol. 1.1962, p. 19 (cited after as "Concepts") 
One scholar has noted that by 'taking this position. al-Shafl'i aimed at 
bringing about uniformity in rulings and doing away with local variations". 
See Bello Daura, "A brief account of the development of the four sunni schools 
of law and some recent developments", in JICL, vol. 2,1968, p. 8. 
12 Ai-Risaiah, paras. 1328-1332. See also Ahmad flasan, The Early, p. 55f. 
268 
entrusted the task of taking the decisions in juridical matters. 13 The last 
view tends to accord to local doctrines the status of consensus. 14 In 
other words, these local legal opinions are provincial in origin but have 
eventually been claimed to have reached the status. of consensus. 
(2) Dispute over the actual subject matter of Uma'. Some of the jurists 
believed that yma' covers only agreement on legal rulings. Agreement on 
other subject matter such as logic, custom, language, etc., falls outside 
the framework of legal consensus. 15 On the contrary, others contended 
that Yma' covers legal as well as non legal affairs. 16 
(3) Disagreement on the authoritativeness of ijma'. The question whether 
Yma' is gat'i or zanni is highly disputed among the classical jurists (of 
those who approved the doctrine of ijma' to the extent that Yma' took 
widely varying and conflicting forms and degrees of strength. 17 Each 
school held a different point of view in the course of deciding what form of 
Yma' is superior and what is the less significant form of Yma' in terms of 
strength. It is clear that this, like the first two reasons, leads to the 
possibility of conflict. 
(4) The question of those who are eligible to participate in forming Yma' is 
another reason that makes y'ma' contradictory. The Zahiris and Ahmad b. 
Hanbal have confined the participants of jima' to the Companions of the 
Prophet only. The Uma' of all subsequent generations was devoid of 
13 Ai Mustas fa, vol. 1, p. 181 ; Esposito, Islam, p. 84. 
One contemporary scholar writes that this is the view of the majority of the 
jurists. (see Shahan, Dir-as-at p. 33) 
14 See a! Muswaddah, p. 331 ; a1-Mustafa. vol. 1. p. 187 ; Ibn jiazm, Maratib, 
p. 10 ; Ahmad iasan, The Early, pp. 166-168 ; Origins, p. 82 ; Juynboll, 
" Lave'. P. 863. 
15 Al Tazv¢ i f,, vol. 2, p. 86 ; Fhwatitj, vol. 2, p. 211; aL Lurna', p. 52. 
16 See Ibhaj, vol. 2. pp. 349-350; Irsha4 p. 71; Thgnin. p. 57. 
17 For details, see Shaban, Diru. sat. p. 79. 
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authority accordingly. 18 Other jurists, however, imposed no such 
restriction. To put it differently, any jurist, irrespective of his generation, 
is authorised to participate in ijma' on condition that he is competent to 
do so. 19 Apart from these two views, the third contends that the question 
of those who are allowed to take part in ijma' should be decided according 
to the subject matter of yma' i. e. the Yma' of the jurists is effective only 
on points of law and that of the theologians in matters of theology and so 
on. 2o 
(5) On the other hand, the jurists did not provide a clear cut form or 
manner of how yma' would pose itself in Muslim communities. Does ii/ma' 
take the form of assembly or it does emerge by itself through a process of 
interpretation, and create for itself a position in the community? 
These five problems constitute the major element that renders 
yma' contradictory as well as confusing. For it is difficult, for example, to 
decide who are qualified jurists and who are not and to determine how 
many competent jurists there were at any given time and to be certain 
whether they had genuinely agreed or whether one of them had 
18 Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam. vol. 1, p. 170, Ibn Hazm, Maratib, p. 11 ; al-Mustasfa, 
vol. 1. P. 189. 
Ibn Taymiyyah is believed to held the same opinion. See Sirajul Haq, "Ibn 
Taymiyya's conception of analogy and consensus". in IC. vol. 17,1943, pp. 80- 
81. 
Abu Zahrah observes that the contention of Ahmad b. Hanbal and those 
who share his idea was mainly based on the problem of the possibility to 
know with certainty the occurrence of any agreement achieved after the 
period of the Companions. (UUul, p. 202) See also Farugi, 'The development of 
Yma' : the practices of the Khulafa' al-Rashidun and the views of the classical 
fugaha' ", in AJISS, vol. 9,1992, p. 181 (cited after as "IJma" ) 
19 AI Mustasfa. vol. 1, p. 189. 
20 Al-Mahal, vol. 2, p. 93 ; Irshad. p. 88 ; Sha'ban, Dirasat, p. 107. 
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subsequently changed his mind, which would destroy the authority of 
gm. a' according to some jurists. 21 Hence, it is not surprising when Ibn 
Hazm alleges that Ibn Hanbal contends that "whosoever claims yma' , is 
a liar, for people may have differed without his knowing ". 22 
In conclusion, though yma' in theory arises when all 
mujtahids of any age agree upon a certain matter, in reality, ijma' takes 
place when the jurists look back to the generation that preceded them and 
find that a certain doctrine had gained full acceptance. 23 Therefore, we 
can say that the only criterion to decide the existence of ijma` is the 
absence of any dissenting voice regarding that opinion to which the term 
ingirad at-'asr applies. 24 This phenomenon is also quite parallel to what 
is known as yma` sukuti (silent consensus). In my opinion, although this 
type of consensus is disputable (as we shall see), it is the common feature 
in the reported cases of yma'. This has been persuasively argued by Ahmad 
Hasan. Among others, he writes, 'Thus, yma' begins with the personal 
judgement of individuals (or Utihad) and culminates in universal 
acceptance of a certain opinion by the community in the long-run. Ijma' 
emerges by itself and is not imposed upon the umnah ". 25 Esposito agrees 
21 Al-Amidt, al-Ihkam, vol. 1, p. 189 ; al-Muswaddah. pp. 320-321 ; Khallaf, 
Usus, pp. 48-49 ; Zuhayr, Usu1. vol. 3, p. 211; Sha'ban. Dirasat. p. 106 ; EI 2, 
vol. 3, p. 1025. 
22 Ibn Hazm. al-Ihkarm vol. 4. p. 542. See also al-Muswaddah. p. 315 ; Irshad. 
p. 73. 
For details, see Sha'ban, Dirasat pp. 40-42, note no. 17. 
23 Faruki, Jurisprudence, p. 71 ; Hallaq, Ijtihad p. 70. 
24 Ingira_d al-'asr means that an agreement is not counted unless all of those 
who participated in Ujma' have died. This condition has been disputed 
amongst the jurists (see Fawatilj. vol. 2, pp. 224 -225 ; aL-Thgrir, vol. 3. p. 86 ; 
Zuhayr, UsuL vol. 3, p. 211) 
25 Ahmad Hasan, The Early, p. 157. 
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with this contention because, he argues, that should ijma' survive the 
test of time and community experience, then its recognition will be 
established. 26 Otherwise, no ijma' took place which, in fact, is the 
common situation particularly after the period of the Companions. 27 This 
was facilitated by the fact that the Companions were few and it was easy 
for them to agree amongst themselves. In the later stage, however, when 
yma' was claimed to have occurred by a scholar, it was met with 
objections from others. 28 
To make our discussion straightfoward, only genuine conflict will 
be discussed. But as long as the jurists themselves did not provide any 
example of this conflict, I am obliged to examine the problem far from 
practicality except in one or two cases which might be considered the best 
possible examples of yrna. ' conflict. In consequence, whenever there appears 
to be a conflict between two or more ijJma', an attempt is made to favour 
one over the other, regardless of whether they are really genuine instances 
or not. 29 
26 Esposito, Islam. p. 84. See also Calverly, Islam. p. 72. 
27AL-Muswaddah, pp. 316-317 ; Ibn Badran. al-Madkhal, pp. 317-318 ; Weiss, 
"Interpretation", p. 209. 
28 Hurgronje, Selected Works, p. 56 ; Abu Zahrah, U. ui, p. 202. 
For details and examples, see Ibn Taymiyyah. Nagd, passim; aL-Ftkr al-Sämi, 
vol. 1, p. 65. 
29 Generally speaking, to list down genuine cases of UJma' is extremely 
difficult. Ibn Hazm, for example, declares in the introduction of his Maratib 
al- ' (p. 16) that he shall commit himself only to genuine cases of (jma' 
such as an agreement that the Ramadan is between Sha'ban and ShawwaL 
However, in practical case, he failed to do so. Many cases that were recorded 
by him as genuine gma' were liable to dispute. (For example, see ibid, note 
no. 1 and Ibn Taymiyyah, Nagd, p. 3) 
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To begin with, we may state that in case of conflict, the universal 
yma' or the consensus of the community takes precedence over the local 
yma. ' which runs counter to universality. 30 Having said that, we realize 
that this sounds unreasonable, for the universal yma' cannot take place 
unless all the regions are in agreement. To give an example on this 
point is rather difficult. The case which comes to mind is that of khiyar 
al-majlis. Malik is believed to reject the legal doctrine of khiyar al-majlis 
which gives the parties to a contract duly completed by offer and 
acceptance, the right to repudiate it during the formal negotiation of the 
agreement. Malik simply said, " There is no specified limit nor any matter 
which is applied in this case according to us ". 31 Other schools of law 
(except the Hanafis) accept it. 32 Accordingly, though it is not appropriate, 
one can conclude that the universal ijma' is challenged by the local Yma' 
referred to by Malik since Malik is understood to have justified his legal 
opinion on the basis of the consensus of the community of Madinah. 33 
In accordance with the principle stated before, the universal yma. ' 
is superior to the local yma' . Supporting 
this, al-Jassas replies that the 
Medinites and non-Medinites are all alike in this respect and there is no 
30 Malik has been alleged to grant the Jima' of the Medinese the same 
authority as the yma' of the whole community. See EI, 2, vol. 3. p. 1024 ; 
Faruki, " Disagreement", p. 134. Cf. al-Dawalibi. UUu1, p. 336. (He regards 
ijma' of the Medinese as the continuity of the method on which Yma' was 
achieved in the time of the Companions. Al-Dawalibi called this as (jma' 
wagi'i ) 
31 Al-Muwatta' (Y) , vol. 2, p. 
671. 
The translation Is taken from 'A'ishah, al-Muwatta. ' Imam Malik, p. 303. 
32 Nayl al Aw. ar, vol. 5. p. 292. 
33 Al-Muwaffa', (S), p. 277. note no. 750; al-Turki, Ikhtilaf, p. 106. 
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reason why their yma' should be considered as a binding rule. 34 For an 
apparent tarjih, it is acceptable to adhere to this preference simply because 
what is agreed by the generality is worthier than what is confirmed by a 
'minority'. The correct view, however, is that owing to differences of 
opinion that are recorded on this matter, no ijma' could be claimed to 
have materialised. 
More explanations are needed, since the ijma' of Madinah 
constitutes the major conflict in this area of study. The problem is well 
known as 'amal ahi al-Madinah or the practice of the Medinese. It is 
disputed not only in terms of authoritativeness but also in the precise 
meaning of the first two words in the phrase'amal ah! al-Madinah. The first 
comes from outsiders i. e. non Malikis. Al-Shafi'i, for example, rejected the 
contention of consensus of the Medinese as expressed in 'aml arguing 
from two perspectives. On the one hand, he argues that an authoritative 
yma' should be free from any objection and disagreement whether from 
inside or outside the city of Madinah. The other argument is that, on 
many occasions, the agreement of the Medinese is not genuine because 
this agreement (or practice) has an opposing view amongst the Medinese 
themselves. 35 
The second question i. e. technical meaning of the phrase, is 
disputed among the Malikis themselves. `Amal may imply the 
transmission or the consensus of the people of Madinah or both i. e. their 
34 The part of aas UIul al-Figh which deals with consensus is not 
available to me. This quotation is taken from Ahmad Fiasan, Ijma', p. 40ff. 
(Ahmad Hasan used MS228-229-U§ul. Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyyah. Cairo) 
35 Al-Risaiah, para. 1559 ; idem, Ikhtilaf Malik, pp. 202-203. See also F. 
Rahman. Islam. p. 61. 
274 
transmission and consensus are superior over other transmissions of 
hadith and other provincial consensus. 36 As for the word ahl, it has no 
single reference but refers to many categories of the people of Madinah. In 
short, this word refers either to the Companions in Madinah or to the 
seven distinguished jurists of Madinah. It also refers to the people of 
Madinah as a whole community. 37 
As far as the authoritativeness of the Uma' of the Medinese is 
concerned, non Malikis jurists are divided as to accepting this 'amal as 
having legal significance. In general, they accepted this 'aural provided 
that it was the practice before the assassination of 'Uthmän b. 'Affan, the 
third Caliph. Otherwise, it is highly disputed in terms of having a special 
legal import. 38 
Mention should be made that there are a lot of interesting 
discussions on 'amai ahl al-Madinah related to the problem of conflict and 
tad i h. I tend however, to examine these cases in the following chapter 
which is concerned exclusively with tarjih based on external factors since 
these regional practices, sometimes known as ijma', are challenged by 
another element of evidence such as the tradition, giyas and so on and 
not by another yma'. Nevertheless, some brief clarification of yrna' ahl al- 
Madinah might be necessary at this stage. As said by the jurists, the 
consensus coming from this part of the world is of two types. The first 
comes from transmission and the second is deduced through interpretative 
effort. As far as the transmission of the people of the Madi nah is 
36 AI-gJdi. aL-Ihkarm vol. 1, pp. 180-181 ; al-Lwna', p. 53 ; al-Khan. Ikhtilaf, 
p. 459. 
37 Al-KhIn, Ikhtilaf, p. 459. 
38 Ibn Taymiyyah. Fatawa. vol. 20. pp. 303-310 particularly p. 308. 
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concerned, their transmission is relatively superior to another locality's 
transmission but not in the whole affairs of Islam. The jurists have 
restricted this superiority to two aspects, namely the reports related to the 
determination of specific measure and places and those reports that reflect 
the continuity of a particular act which is unchangeable. Accordingly, the 
jurists have shown special consideration to legal rulings which are 
concerned with matters that came under these two principles such as the 
size or the quantity of one sa, the position of the minbar of the Prophet, 
the validity of the contract of muzara'ah, special adhan for sunrise 
prayer, etc. 39 However, when the basis of such consensus is to rely merely 
on ytihad and interpretative effort, jurists are not willing to accept this 
agreement, 40 let alone to prefer it over "other" agreement when they 
conflict. 
Another possibility of conflict, which is still theoretical rather 
than practical, is the conflict between the yma' of the Companions and 
that of the subsequent generations. The yma' of the Companions is to be 
preferred to that of the successors because the former is superior to the 
latter. 41 In this case, we have no option but to implement this preference 
for at least, one fundamental reason. It is the fact that the only form of 
yma' which received a full acceptance by all the Sunni jurists is that of 
the Companions. It is not surprising, accordingly, that examples of the 
consensus which are given in works of usul al figh are typically drawn 
39 Ibid.. particularly p. 306 ; al-Dawalibi, UUul. p. 337; al-Hafnawi, Adillak 
pp. 4,8-9. 
40 See Ibn Qayy1m. I'lam. vol. 1, p. 297 ; Irshad. p. 82 ; Abu Zahrah, UUuI, p. 
208. 
41 Muht ha. p. 225. 
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from the period immediately following the death of the Prophet. 42 Ijma' 
was possible at that time since they were still a relatively small 
community, located principally in Madinah. Ijma', in subsequent periods, 
however, was extremely difficult to achieve for the great body of the jurists 
had spread throughout the conquered Islamic territories. 43 
As an example, we quote, among others, the Yma' of the Muslims 
in 'Umar's time, the second Caliph, regarding the sawad land. 'Umar is 
reported to have consulted the Companions on the problem. Having 
disagreed on this matter in a long and open discussion, they seemed 
eventually agreed on the opinion not to distributing this land to the 
fighters though the land was conquered by force. 44 It has been reported 
that 'Umar used to consult his companions on fresh cases and announced 
the decisions in public meetings. 45 This way of achieving iUma', is nearly 
if not totally, impossible after the spread of Islam and its scholars to the 
new territories. However, in the event that another contrary ijma' is 
made by the later generations, the precedence is given to the former. 
Regarding the subsequent i/ma', the jurists have this to say. The 
idea of the "first and subsequent ijmam to some extent, makes Uma' 
contradictory. Accordingly, the problem of rejection of a particular lima' 
has been extensively debated by the jurists. This is because the ijma', 
according to some authorities amounts to certainty while for others, it 
carries only probability. To the former, rejection of Yma' amounts to 
42 Weiss. "Interpretation". p. 209: al-Zarga'. al Madkhal, p. 167. 
43 Hurgronje, Selected Works, p. 277. 
44 Farugi, " Ifma"u . p. 175. 
For details, see Abu Yusuf. Kitab al-Kharaj, pp. 26-27. 
45 Ibid. ; Khan, Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 82. 
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heresy but not to the latter. 46 Leaving aside this particular discussion, 
we proceed to ascertain whether an yma' can or cannot be repealed or 
changed by a subsequent ijma'. Bearing in mind that this discussion is 
also theoretical, we may say that the jurists are not of the same 
opinion regarding this issue. Those who held that ijma' is decisive 
(gat'i) for it is tantamount to the Qur'an and the Sunnah47, opined that 
such yma' cannot be repealed or changed by a subsequent i/ma'. 48 An 
yma' is decisive when it is transmitted by tawatur, based on a decisive text 
and verbally expressed. 49 Otherwise, the possibility of repealing remains. 
As regards abrogation, it however, does not affect Jma' because 
the subsequent yma' is either based on an evidence contrary to the 
evidence of the former or it has no evidence. The latter possibility would 
open the way to the previous agreement to prevail for the subsequent yma' 
carries no authority. The former condition will however, lead the 
subsequent agreement to run contrary to the previous consensus where 
both have their respective bases. The basis of the subsequent Uma' 
however, would be either the Qur'an or the Surnah or the giyas but this is 
impossible because yma' cannot contradict the text on the one hand and 
giyas is always inferior to yma' on the other. In other words, no yma' is 
valid if it contradicts the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Similarly, qiyas is 
unable to stand against yma. '. Hence the abrogation of ijma' by any other 
authority is unthinkable. 50 It is also said that the ijma' reached in a 
46 See Irshad. pp. 78-79. 
47 mid. , p. 70 ; al-Sarakhsi, 
Uoul, vol. 1, pp. 302-303. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Rawdak p. 78. 
50 A1-Muswaddcdi p. 203 ; al-Sarakhs , Ujul. vol. 2, p. 66 ; Irsho4, pp. 192- 
193 ; Zuhayr, UJul, vol. 3. pp. 81-82 ; Badran. Turji I. pp. 40-41 ; Madina, The 
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generation which totally passed away cannot be changed by the agreement 
of the following jurists. 51 In other words, if a group of scholars of a 
particular time have agreed on a certain matter and they all have passed 
away, where any opposition to their agreement is not reported to have 
arisen, their agreement is binding on the subsequent scholars. The 
opposite attitude is called in usui study as kharq al-ijma' which is 
unacceptable and Wegal. 52 
On the contrary, repeal and change can take place according to 
those who contended that yma' is merely speculative, such as ijma' by 
silence or Yma' preceded by disagreement or when the dissenters are in 
minority. 53 Another point of view held that yma', irrespective of whether 
it is decisive or probable, can be changed by a subsequent yma' provided 
that the first ma' is founded in consideration of public interest or 
maslahah mursalah. This yma' is allowed to be repealed with one which 
serves human welfare more. 54 In short, some types of yma' are liable to 
"abrogation" and some are not. 
At this stage, we may confine our consideration to three major 
conclusions which have been inspired by the fore-going discussion. They 
are as follows: 
(1) Verbal f/ma' (lafii) prevails over the yma. ' by silence (sukii ). 
classical doctrine of consensus in Islam. Ph. D thesis, University of Chicago, 
1967. pp. 177f; Jalal al-Din. al-Naskh. pp. 90-91. 
51 qi}j, p. 326. 
52 Ibid. 
53 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq. al-Ijma'fi al-Shari'ah al-Islamiyyah. Cairo, 1947, pp. 96- 
97. as cited from Ahmad Hasan. Jima', p. 150. 
54 Al-Zuhayli. Usu. vol. 2. pp. 974-975. 
See the weakness of this view in note 71. 
279 
Ijma' sukuti occurs when some of the jurists accept a particular legal 
opinion by verbal expression or acting upon it while the others keep silent, 
though the problem had gained wide publicity in the community and 
enough time for consideration has elapsed. 55 When such an ijma' 
conflicts . with a verbal U ma', the 
former is inferior to the latter. 56 
Although I cannot find a satisfactory explanation for this. I believe that 
this is simply because yma' sukuti is highly disputed as presumptive. Al- 
Shawk ni , 
for example, in surveying the opinions regarding the 
authoritativeness of the silent consensus, counts as many as twelve 
different opinions. 57 Moreover, as stated by both al-Shafi'i and al- 
Ghazali, no statement or action can be attributed to a silent person58 
and silent agreement is neither an ijma' nor an authority since silence is a 
doubtful indicator, for the silence of some of the jurists cannot necessarily 
be taken to indicate approval. 59 This is merely a theoretical preference on 
the assumption that there was a conflict between verbal and silent ijma'. 
As stated earlier, no genuine example is availabe in this conflict because, I 
believe, most, if not all, the alleged consensus particularly after the period 
of the Companions, recorded on the basis of natural acceptance by the 
community and not on the basis of any assembly of Muslim jurists that 
took place to express verbal agreement on legal issues. 
55 Irshari, p. 84 ; Badran, Usul. p. 114. 
56 Abu Zahrah, U. uL p. 205. 
Al-Sarakhsi or the Hanafis in general call jjma' sukuti "Jima' rukfhah". (al- 
Sarakhsi, Ug4 vol. 1. p. 303: EI 2, vol. 3, p. 1024) 
57 Irshad, pp. 84-85. 
58 Tangijj, p. 331 ; al-Dawalibi, UUut pp. 338-339. 
59 AI-Musfasja, vol. 1. pp. 191-192. See also Badran. Ujul, p. 121 ; Khallaf, 
UUul, p. 51. 
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(2) Ijma' not preceded by disagreement takes precedence over the ijma' 
which is preceded by disagreement. This conflict takes place when the 
qualified jurists agreed on two different opinions about a single disputed 
question. 60 According to many authorities, the next subsequent yma' is 
not allowed to agree on a third opinion contrary to both contradictory 
views. 61 A case in point is the problem of intention in different kinds of 
ritual purity. Some opine that intention is necessary in all kinds of ritual 
purity while others require such intention only in some forms of ritual 
purity. Accordingly, an agreement on a third opinion which would be that 
intention is not necessary in all kinds of ritual purity, would be not 
valid. The reason is that this agreement would nullify the agreement of 
the previous generation which presupposes that the community had 
previously agreed on an error which is not acceptable according to the 
classical theory of yma'. 62 From this, we know that ijma' preceded by 
disagreement is of insufficient strength to stand against the one which is 
not such, for the former ma' is itself higly disputed amongst the 
juriStS. 63 
(3) jma. ' constructed on the basis of the purely masiahah consideration is 
liable to be challenged by another Uma' which might carry a more 
significant degree of masiahah. 64 Instances such as the second Caliph 
'Umar's policy in not distributing the conquered land to the fighters and 
60 See al Musuxzdah. p. 326 ; Irshad. p. 86. 
61 Al Mustas_fa. vol. 1, p. 199 ; al-Ibhaj, vol. 2, p. 368 ; al-Amid i, al-Ihkam, vol. 
1, p. 198; Tangii,. p. 333 ; Zuhayr. Ujul, vol. 3, pp. 197-198. 
62 Al-Ibhaj, vol. 2, p. 371. See also Badran. Ugul. p. 135. 
63 Al-Sarakhsi, Usul, vol. 1. p. 319 ; al-Mustairla, vol. 1, p. 199 ; a1-Ash'ari, 
Ikhtilaf, vol. 2, p. 172. 
64 Badran. Taijih, p. 41. 
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the third Caliph 'Uthman's action in introducing the third call for Friday 
prayer and the collection of the Qur'an in a standard version are among 
the subsequent agreements of the Muslims to replace a previous consensus 
made exclusively on the basis of maslalhah. 65 This is a continuous 
practice necessary in the changing society such as to decide who is the 
most eligible to be the head of the Muslim state or to declare war or a 
cease-fire in certain circumstances which all are judged mainly to serve the 
best interests for the people for time being. It is true that in worldly 
affairs, what may appear "profitable" in one generation may be, say, 
"harmful" in a succeeding generation. Accordingly, the previous iIma' may 
be left aside in favour of the new Uma' for it serves the public interests 
most. 66 Perhaps another example will clarify this issue. It has been 
reported that the first generation of the Muslims had agreed that a 
relative can give witness for his relative before the court. However, since 
the majority of the people are no longer just as they were in the early 
Islam, the previous agreement had to be repealed by subsequent agreement 
contrary to what had been widely accepted before. Relative, therefore, is 
not allowed to give witness for relative because he may falsely witness in 
the interest of his relative. 67 This seems reasonable because the latter 
agreement could serve justice among the people more efficiently. 
(4) In respect of transmission, various categories of ijma' have been 
classified. The most authorised of them is the iyma' of the Companions 
transmitted by themselves by verbal expression. It corresponds in status 
to a Qur'anic verse and a mutawatir tradition. The second category is the 
65 Al-Muuxifagai. vol. 2, pp. 341-342 ; l3adran. USul. pp. 127-128. 
66 Shahan. Dirasat. p. 105. 
67 Ibid. 
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yma' of the Companions transmitted in part by verbal expression and in 
part by silence. The third category is the Uma' of the Successors on 
questions not disputed among the Companions. This is like a mashhur 
tradition. The last category is the ijma' of subsequent generations on 
questions already disputed among the previous generations. This is like a 
solitary tradition. 68 Should there be any conflict between various types in 
terms of transmission, these different grades of gma' could be deployed to 
arrive at the preferable. 
(5)In the course of the discussion of conflict of ijma', it appears that 
instead of tarj i h, it is abrogation that enjoys more significant discussion. 
Accordingly, though naskh is basically confined to the text, the problem 
of abrogation in yma' has been extensively debated. My point of view, 
however, is that what actually takes place in this problem is merely an 
alteration of the former agreement in the form of the subsequent ijma' 
rather than abrogation. For the people, after the death of the Prophet are 
of no capacity to determine the expiry of the term of a rule established by 
yma'. 69 Having said this, I shall discuss the relevant viewpoints regarding 
the above. In this regard, one can easily find in usul works the phrase 
that "yma' neither abrogates nor can it be abrogated itself . 70 Abrogation, 
in other words is generally not applicable to Yma'. Broadly speaking, 
most of the jurists adhere to this formulation that no abrogation can 
take place within two conflicting ijma' particularly when the ijma' is 
founded on the basis of the Qur'an, the Sunnah or giyas. However, when 
68 Kashf. vol. 3, p. 262. 
69 See ibid p. 261 ; al-Luma, p. 33 ; al-Darini, al-Manahy, 43-44; Jalal al- 
Din, al-Naskh, p. 90. 
70 See for example al-Amid-i, al-Ihkam, vol. 2, p. 278 ; al-Luma', p. 33 ; al- 
Dawalibi, Usul, p. 342. 
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it is formulated on the basis of public interest, abrogation can take 
place. 71 Others said that though the subsequent Yma' cannot normally 
abrogate the previous yma', abrogation is possible when the subsequent 
Yma' is of a similar class. In other words, Yma' of the Companions can be 
repealed only by another Yma' of the Companions ; and likewise, the yma' 
of the second generation may be abrogated by other Yma' of the same 
generation or of the following generations because the lima' of the later 
generations are all considered of equal weight. 72 
Having mentioned almost all the relevant discussions of conflict 
and tarjih in relation to yma', we still have no genuine cases to refer to. 
Apart from its being theoretical, this would suggest many interesting 
remarks. Among others, it clearly shows that when ijma' takes place 
genuinely, no conflict is expected to arise, for ijma' is a unanimous 
agreement. Secondly, many claims of yma' are made solely on the basis 
of knowledge that no divergence of opinion has been recorded 
previously on a particular matter. 73 This type of Yma' has been clearly 
rejected by al-Shafi'i. His hypothesis is that it is not sufficient merely 
to claim that yma' has been achieved on matters other than the essential 
elements of Islam such as the obligation of prayer, zakat and the like. 74 
There should be solid evidence or knowledge of the occurrence of any single 
legal consensus. Presumption is not a sufficient and accepted basis for 
71 Shahan, Dirasat, p. 122. See also note 44. 
If this happens, "abrogation", one scholar argues, is not reliable because 
"abrogation" is valid only in life time of the Prophet in which maklaJiah is 
devoid of authority. (Jalal al-Din, al-Naskh, p. 93) 
72 Kashf, vol. 3, p. 262. 
73 Ibn Hazm, Maratib, pp. 9-10: Ibn Taymiyyah, Nagd, p. 2. 
74 Al-Risalah. para. 1559. 
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yma. '. 75 The same idea was made clear by Ahmad b. Hanbal. After saying 
that "whosoever claims yma' is a liar, for people may have differed without 
his knowing", he further says that it is advised for those who do not know 
with certainty of agreement or otherwise that they should say " we do 
not know whether people have disagreed". 76 Accordingly, when an opinion 
is later known to contrast with the 'previously agreed opinion', this was 
understood as conflict while 'in fact, no consensus was clearly proclaimed 
on that issue in the first place. Thirdly, some principles of preference 
viewed by the jurists are merely their immediate response to conflict 
caused by unreal conflicts for the ij/ma' cannot contradict another Jima' 
if both are really genuine except if one or both were achieved on the basis 
of maslahah consideration. 
I am more inclined to believe as concluded by Abu Zahrah77 that 
yma' is quite imposible after the Companions. It seems to me that lima' 
in its strict technical meaning and legal requirement was only possible in 
the period of the Companions owing to certain factors that have been 
previously described. This has been acknowledged by every exponent of 
yma'. The controversy over yma' that has dominated the discussion in 
ud al-figh actually originated in the period after the Companions when 
some of them were outside Madinah. Khallaf has pursuasively argued 
that, even in the period of the Companions, iyrna' as the agreement of the 
whole community of Muslims did not take place. What really happened is 
sham i. e. collective consultation followed by the majority agreement 
contributed to by only some of the Muslims, particularly those who were 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibn Ham, al-IFjkarm vol. 1, p. 542 ; Ibn Qayyim, 1'Iam , vol. 2, p. 
228 ; Abu 
Zahrah. U§uL, p. 202. 
77 Abu Zahrah. UJui, pp. 202,212. See also Weiss, 'The Primacy", p. 101. 
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well-known to the Caliph as the cream of the Companions, not to mention 
other contemporary Muslims that were resident in localities other than 
Mad nah. 78 
On the whole, these preferences in one way or another, are the 
most significant criteria to determine the strongest form of ijrrma'. To some 
extent, they are useful for the jurist when he himself encounters a 
similar case of conflict as theoretically explained above. In other words, 
though they are highly doubted, one can adopt these methods to remove 
an apparent conflict which appears to arise between two jJma' (though 
the advised and preferred solution is to examine first the validity as well as 
the authenticity of both contradictory Yma' since it is impossible that a 
genuine yma' would oppose another genuine yma'). In this context, the 
majority agreement of specialists may however, be useful in terms of 
conflict and tarj ih in usui study but not be viewed as ijma'. 79 With 
reference to the decision of 'Umar of not distributing the lands conquered 
by force, for example, Ibn Qudamah notes that, though this decision was 
opposed by Bill, there was consensus among the Companions on this 
issue and that there is no way to achieve a stronger ijma' than this one. 80 
The "majority agreement" will be further illustrated in the following 
chapter which aims to evaluate any conflict in Islamic law on the basis of 
78 Khallaf, 'UUul, p. 50. See also al-Shalabi, al-Madkhal, p. 247 ; Ahmad 
Hasan, "The political role of (jma", in IS, vol. 8,1969, passim. 
79 See al-Ibhaj, vol. 2, p. 369; al-Nawawl, al-Majmu', vol. 1, p. 58 ; Nadwi, 
"The Shari 'a and exigencies of the time". in 1Cl g, vol. 1.1986, p. 15. 
This is the view of the majority of the jurists. Both al-Rani and al labari 
however, thought that majority agreement constitutes a valid consensus (al- 
Tagrir, vol. 3, pp. 94-95). Mention should also be made that those who reject 
this idea, do however, recognise it as a hujjah(Farugi, "Ijma"', pp. 183-184) 
80A1-Mughni, vol. 2, pp. 720-721 (as cited from Farugi, "Ijma"'. p. 175) 
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external factors in which tarj ih by virtue of "many" may suit this line of 
preference. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
PART B 
THE METHODOLOGY OF TARJIH IN QIYAS CONFLICT. 1 
No doubt giyas is the primary method of legal reasoning in usul 
al-figh to the extent that according to al-Shafi`i, it is the only authorized 
form of ijtihad. 2 Moreover, the jurists have affirmed that the great 
majority of the rulings are reached through the medium of qiyas. 3 In 
other words, we can note that except for a relatively limited number of 
cases where the Qur'an and the Sunnah offer already-formulated legal 
judgements, the great majority of furze' cases are derived through qiyas. 
This is justified simply because written texts are limited but the incidents 
of daily life are unlimited and therefore, it is impossible for something 
infinite to be enclosed by something finite. 4 
The discussion of the methodology of tarjih in cases where two 
qiyas are said to be contradictory is rather complex. Therefore this 
1 The methodology of tarjih in qiyas conflict received special attention in 
usul works. Al-Amidi. for example, has listed more than 55 methods of 
tarjil]. (al-Ijkam, vol. 3, pp. 281-292) Mention should also be made that this 
conflict seems to dominate the Hanafi uýul writings to the extent no devotion 
Is equally given to treat conflict in other subjects such as the conflict of text, 
isnad. etc. See for example Täysir, vol. 4, pp. 76-97. 
2 Al-Risaiah. paras. 1324.1326 ; idem, Iblal a! -Istibsan, p. 299f ; Khadduri. 
Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 31 ; al-Fikr al-Sam i, vol. 1, p. 67 ; EI 2, vol. 5. p. 241. 
It seems to me that the most obvious justification that underlines al-Shafi'i's 
thesis is that qiyas is the most organised form of Utihad that would 
eliminate what al-Shaß'i regards as the arbitrary nature of legal reasoning. 
(See Calverly, Islam, p. 71 ; Esposito, Islam4 p. 79 ) 
3 Al-Burhan, vol. 2, p. 743 ; al-Muswaddah, p. 520 ; Weeramantry, Islamic 
Jur sprudence. p. 41. 
4 Sha'ban, Dirasat, p. 148. 
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warrants a brief introduction to its nature, form, as well as its historical 
development. Broadly speaking, qiyas is a legal method for extending the 
law beyond what is stated in the authoritative legal sources or an 
extension of a precedent and not the establishment of a fresh ruling by 
itself. 5 To do this, it is necessary to draw a parallel or find a similarity 
between what is mentioned in legal texts and a new problem. The common 
link between them i. e. similarity, is known as 'Walt Once it is known that 
both cases, the original (asl or magis 'alayhi) and the assimilated (far' or 
maq is) share the same 'illah, the judgement Lukm) of the original case is 
extended to the assimilated. As a result, the new problem carries the 
same ruling as does the original. 
A case in point is the purity of the saliva (su'r) of the cat which 
is explained by the Prophet through a hadith ; "(the left-over of a cat is 
not unclean) for they are usually around you in the homes ( innah min 
ai-tawwafin 'alaykum wa al-tawwafat). Their domesticity or in other 
words their frequent visits to the house is the 'illah why their saliva is pure 
and water they have lapped and left can be consumed by people. 6 The 
jurists simply apply this rule i. e. purity, to the left-over of mice and other 
reptiles that frequently visit the house or reside there unless indicated 
otherwise.? The prohibition of rum or other intoxicating objects is also a 
clear example of the nature of giyas. Since wine (khamr) is prohibited for 
its intoxication, the same ruling applies to all objects that have similar 
'illah such as rum, drugs, etc., for they intoxicate. 8 
5Irshad. p. 198 ; Amins, Ijtiha4 pp. 122-123 ; Khan. Islamic Jurisprudence. 
p. 30. 
6 AI-Mu'tamad, vol. 2, p. 1036 ; Raurak p. 146. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Sha'ban. Dirasat, p. 156 ; Ken. Reform. p. 60. 
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From the foregoing explanation, we understand why qiyas is 
legally established as "judicial reasoning by analogy". 9 Literally, qiyas 
indicates measuring i. e. ascertaining the length, weight or quality of 
something. 10 It also means comparisonll, as in the expression, "Zayd 
yuqas ila Khaiid ft 'aglihi wa nasabihi', Zayd Is compared to Khälid in 
intelligence and descent. Qiyas thus suggests an equality or close 
similarity between two things one of which is taken as the criterion for 
evaluating the other. 
Though giyas as a matter of common sense, as argued by many 
jurists, already existed in the lifetime of the Prophet12, the first to 
employ it systematically was Abu Hanifah (d. 150 A. H. ). 13 It is argued 
also, however, that the semi-technical use of the term giyas was found 
early in the letter of 'Umar, the second Caliph, to Abu Musa al Ash'ari 
where in 'Umar is reported to have advised him to acquaint himself with 
the parallels and precedents of legal cases. 14 
Of the four usul of fiqh, qiyas was the last to gain general 
acceptance. 15 In the early days, giyas was not consistently applied, owing 
9 EI 2, vol. 5, p. 239. 
10 Lane, Lexicon. vol. 7. P. 2577 ; al-Rani, a- 1joij. p. 558 ; al-Anbari, al- 
Lorna', p. 42. 
11 A1-Mustasfa. vol. 2, p. 229; Sha'ban, Dirasat, p. 153. 
12 See MIzan. pp. 562-563 ; Said Allah, Introduction to al-Jas aa' al- 
Ftiul, pp. 9-14 ; Nadiah, al Qlgas, pp. 98-100. 
13 EI 2, vol. 5, p. 239 ; Aghnides, Theories, pp. 68-69. 
14 Ahmad Hasan, The Early, p. 53 ; Said Allah, Introduction to al-Ja a 
a1-FLsul. P. 13. 
15 Faruki, Jurisprudence. p. 140. 
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to uncertainty in understanding the forms as well as the elements of 
giyas. 16 Not only that, but the later jurists, as we shall see soon, are 
divided among themselves in giving a strict definition of 'iliah. It is 
noteworthy that the results after the application of giyas would vary 
owing to the fact that 'illah is open to difference of opinion. 17 This fact, 
of course, would cause the application of qiyas to contain some errors, for 
it is possibly applied to dissimilar cases or is based on an improper 'Utah 
or giyas has been pushed too far. These points make the giyas non 
uniform and contradictory. 
We may now discuss how the conflict exists in qiyas and what 
methodologies are to be followed in terms of tarjih. Nevertheless, I realise 
that a further preliminary illustration remains necessary, since the 
discussion of the nature of giyas itself is quite complicated, since it is 
purely analogical reasoning. To understand qiyas properly and in the 
meantime to avoid a lengthy discussion, we should commit ourselves to 
those subject matters which serve our study significantly i. e. how to make 
an adequate preference in qiyas conflict. Unrelated subjects are left aside 
such as the problem of the dispute over the validity of qiyas, the specific 
requirements of each element of arkan al-giyas, etc. 
16 Hallaq, "Consideration", p. 681 ; Aghnides. Theories, p. 67. 
According to one scholar. the application of giyas not only caused diversity of 
opinion between different schools of law but even within the schools, as is 
shown by divergences within the Hanafi school. (Rayner, Contract. p. 21) 
17 Hence, it is not surprising that 'Utah has been variously defined. For 
details, see Ahmad Hasan, 'The legal cause in Islamic jurisprudence : an 
analysis of 'that al-bukm", in IS, vol. 19,1980, p. 249 (cited after as "Legal 
Cause") 
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To begin with, I shall quote what has been said by al-Basra 18 in 
explaining the meaning of juridical giyos (al-giyas al-shar'iyy). He says, 
"Qiyas is establishing the ruling Lukm) of the original case (al) in the 
assimilated case (fart because both cases possess the (same) cause ('llah) 
of the ruling. This definition does not include all types of giyas but only 
the qiyas of analogy (al-Lard). Jurists also call reductio ad absurdum (at- 
'aks) qiyas. In the latter, the judgement of the original case is not 
established in the assimilated case because they possess the same cause 
for the judgement but rather because it necessitates the establishment (of 
the converse) of the judgement of one thing in another. 19 Therefore, if we 
wish to define qiyas so that both analogy and reductio ad absurdum are 
included, we must say : qiyas is establishing the quality of a thing by 
applying that thing to another owing to a cause". 20 
By this definition, we come to know that for qiyas to be valid 
and effective, four elements are necessary i. e. the original case, the 
assimilated case, the 'illah and the judgement. 21 Accordingly, the 
following discussion must not go beyond these. Of these four, we shall, 
however, confine ourself primarily to the cause since it is more related 
and relevant to our discussion in terms of tarj i 4. The remaining three 
18 A special consideration is given to al-Baari's a! -Mu'tamad particularly in 
juridical giyas since it represents one of the earliest extensive writings printed 
on juridical dialectic in Islam. See Hallaq. "Juridical Dialectic". p. 192. 
19 To see a clear example of gryas al-'aks, see a! -Flkr al-Sarni, vol. 1, p. 22. 
20 Ai-Mu'tamad, vol. 2. p. 1031. 
The translation is taken from Hallaq. " The Book of Juridical Qlyas 
(translation) ", in MW, vol. 77.1986, p. 207. 
21 AI Mustasfa. vol. 2. p. 325: al-Anbari, al-Lama., p. 42 ; EI 1. vol. 5. p. 241 ; 
al-Dawalibi, UUul, p. 436 ; Nour, "Qias as a source of Islamic law", in JIC'L. vol. 
5,1974. p. 28 (cited after as "Qias") 
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elements namely the ruling, the original and the assimilated case are 
purposely omitted for a specific reason. 22 
Nevertheless, before examining the'illah which has a significant 
role in making twj Lh between two conflicting giyasat (pl. of giyas), I would 
like to note from the very beginning that giyas is applicable only to 
cases in which legal texts are not available. 23 Otherwise, should there be 
any conflict between two qiyas. the conflict does not exist between one 
giyas and another rather between qiyas and the text (which is parallel to 
another giyas). 
Hence, recourse to qiyas is warranted only if the solution of a 
new case cannot be found in the Qur'an, the Sunnah or a definite i, jma'. 24 
For it would be futile to resort to giyas if a new case can be resolved 
under a ruling of the existing law. Thus, a view that suggests the validity 
of salam contract i. e. the advance sale of an article to be delivered at 
a fixed date, on the ground of the preferred giyas (giyas mustahsan) or 
22 It is believed that the original ruling, the original and the assimilated cases 
are not closely related to the problem of qiyas conflict. However, these three 
elements and their possible conflicts will be treated in chapter seven where 
appropriate. 
23 Said Allah , Introduction to al-Ja ad's al-kul. p. 11; Nadiah, a! -giyas, 
p. 116 ; 'Iwan, "Qawadilj al-'lllah 'ind aL-usu1iyyin ", in AS, vol. 15,1404 H. p. 
102 (cited after as "QawaclQf) 
24 Nour, "Qias", p. 29. 
Although consensus cannot be considered as a revealed source of law, the 
great majority of jurists argued that once a consensus has been reached on a 
case of law, the case Itself becomes an authoritative precedent upon which a 
further qiyas can be based. (Hallaq, "Consensus", p. 427) 
For details. see Raw ah. pp. 166-167: al-Luma', p. 60: Abu Zahrah, USul. p. 
228 ; Khan, Islamic Jurisprudence. p. 104 . Cf. Irshad p. 210. 
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the hidden qiyas (giyas khafi) known as istitjsan25 is unacceptable. Here 
is the explanation. The giyas in question seemed to be challenged by 
another qiyas i. e. (istijsan). Those who are in favour of the latter qiyas 
(i. e. istihson) argued that their giyas is superior because it is formulated 
on the basis of necessity while the former qiyas being regular, observes 
merely the general requirements of the validity of such a contract, like the 
existence of the property and the value at the time of contract. Owing to 
the stronger cause i. e. necessity, it is argued that salam contract is not 
only valid but also occupies preference over regular giyas that would 
render that contract illegal. 26 By examining the existing legal texts, we 
find however, that many traditions are available to show that this 
particular contract has been established since the Prophet's time. 27 
Therefore, the qiyas applied by the Hanafis in this case is void since the 
traditions already existed to establish the validity of salam contract. 
Naturally, no contradiction occurs here for no qiyas is allowed to operate 
independently of and contrary to the text. 
Now we shall have an occasion to examine the 'illah more 
precisely. It is necessary to do so because in the course of considering 
conflict, a jurist usually attempts to invalidate another's giyas by 
showing his opponent's giyas to be unsound and based on an improper 
'illah. 28 Having said this, we have to admit that 'Utah is not always 
explained and therefore, one may differ in its determination. 
25 Al-Shalabi. aL-Madkh l p. 259: al-Dasuqi. "al-Ittihad'. p. 1112. 
26 pl_Nasafi, Kashf, vol. 2, pp. 290-291. 
27 See Nagt aI Aw. ar, vol. 5, pp. 342-344. 
28 This feature is known as gawadiij al-'ülaft As far as gawadiij a[-'illah are 
concerned, the number of these gawadiFj varies from one jurist to another. 
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The word 'illah in its original usage means sickness. 29 As a 
technical term, 'illah is said to have been employed by Arab grammarians 
since the beginning of the second century. 30 By the time of Abu Hanifah, 
the element common to the original case and to the case to which a 
solution was required, was usually taken into account but, unfortunately, 
the jurists at that time had no name for it. 31 The jurists were not familiar. 
with the term 'illah as a technical term in legal reasoning32 even though 
they applied it in legal reasoning. Al-Shafi'i who came after Abu Hanifah, 
instead of 'illah, often uses the word ma'na and more technically asl to 
express the meaning of the 'illah in giyas. 33 This seems to be an earlier 
term for it. 34 For instance, al-Shafi'i argues that should a case arise for 
which there is no ruling, it must be decided in accordance with a case 
identical to it (in the texts) if both cases have the same meaning 
(ma'na). 35 
The highest number reaches thirty gawadiFi and the lowest does not go 
below four gawadih.. See Sha'ban, Dirasat p. 247. 
29 Al-Bustani, al-Muhit vol. 2, p. 1459 ; Irshad., pp. 206-207. 
To be more accurate, 'iliah is a factor which changes a particular state of 
affairs such as a disease which causes illness, etc. (see al-JurJani, Kitab al- 
Ta'rifat p. 134) 
30 Hallaq, "The development of logical structure in sunni legal theory". in DI. 
vol. 63,1986, p. 44. (cited after as "Logical Structure" ) 
31 Origins, p. 110 . 
Again, it demonstrates that conceptual development in Islamic legal history 
preceded the verbal one. ( see An3ari, "Islamic Juristic", p. 292) 
32 Origins, p. 117 ; Ahmad ffasan. "Legal Cause", p. 250. 
33 Origins. pp. 124-125. 
For details, see, p[-Risalah, paras. 124,1334 and 1495. 
34 Ibid., p. 125. 
35 AI-Risalah. para. 1481. 
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By the end of the third century of Hijrah and the beginning of the 
fourth, a sophisticated and detailed theory of 'illah had emerged and by 
the time of al-Ghazali the theory had reached an advanced degree of 
maturity. 36 1Uah began to be used as 'a common link' and an effective 
cause of giyas. 711ah, according to al-Basri , is "that which creates by its 
effects (ta'thir) a legal judgement". 37 By effect is meant that the property 
(wad found in the 'iilah must affect the judgement in the original case 
and subsequently in the assimilated. Any irrelevant effect may cause'iüah 
to be invalid. For al-Basri, then, 'Utah must be efficient, for without 
efficiency giyas is not possible. 38 
Al-Karkhi, as quoted by al-Jassas, distinguished two types of 
'ilah shar'iyyah Unlike the 'illah in theology, al-Karkhi says, the 'iilah in 
legal theory has no causal relationship with the law i. e. the judgement 
does not necessarily follow the 'illah. 39 To put it differently, when the 'illah 
exists, the judgement will not necessarily exist with it and similarly when 
it happens to be absent, the judgement does not necessarily cease to 
apply. For this reason i. e. no causal relationship between 'Utah and 
judgement, the 'Utah in legal theory is commonly called a sign (amarah, 
'alamah and S1 mah) . 
40 It is also alternatively referred to as manat ai- 
hukm and sabab. 41 The most comprehensive definition of 'illah is al- 
36 Hallaq. "Logical Structure", p. 44. 
37 A1-Mu'tamad. vol. 2. pp. 704-705. 
38 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 789-790. 
39 See Nabil Shehaby, "lila and giyas% p. 34. 
For mode details on this problem, see 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rabi'ah, "al-'Illah 
'ind a1-usufiyyin', in AS, vol. 11,1400 A. H., pp. 261-265. 
40 Ibid.: a1-Luma, pp. 61-62. 
41 Irshad. p. 207. 
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Ghazali's, "a thing to which the Shari'ah has attributed the rule or 
suspended (nata) on it or appointed it a sign for the rule". 42 
Each of these two definitions represents a distinct notion of 'illah 
in Islamic legal theory. The first considers 'iilah as an effective and 
efficient cause that affects the law by itself. The second however, 
contends that 'iilah is not causally connected with the ruling. It is merely 
a sign indicating the cause on which a judgement was formulated i. e. it 
does not necessitate the rule by itself. The problem of efficiency of 'Utah, 
as a requirement of 'illah, is disputable among the jurists. 43 As a matter 
of fact, there are some other conditions attached to the 'illah. I believe 
however, that the following six conditions are adequate to serve our 
purpose of tad ih in cases of giyas conflict. 44 
(1) First of all, the jumhur says that the 'Utah must be an evident attribute 
(wasfzahir). 45 Hidden considerations such an intention, consent, good 
will, etc., are not to be considered as 'Utah since they are not ascertainable. 
In other words, the 'Utah must be definite and perceptible. The 'Utah for a 
valid contract, for example, is the offer and acceptance (jab wa gabul) 
rather than the buyer and seller's actual consent, simply because consent 
Other terms that denote the meaning of 'iltah can be found in Irshad (p. 207) 
and al-Mizan. (p. 574). 
42 Al Mustafa, vol. 2. p. 230. 
The translation is taken from Ahmad Hasan, "Modes of reasoning in legal 
cause (a1-ijtilw. d fi al-'iUah)", In IS, vol. 22,1983, p. 71. (cited after as 
"Reasoning") 
43 See al-Shalabi. Ta'lil al AFjkam. pp. 198ff. 
44 These conditions vary from one jurist to another. For example, Ibn al-Ljajib 
has recorded twelve (Bayan Mukhtasar, vol. 3, pp. 25-34.67-7 1) while al- 
Shawkani has listed 24 conditions (Irshad, pp. 207-208). 
45 Irshad, p. 207 ; Khallaf, Ujul. pp. 65,68 ; Abu Zahrah, UUui, p. 238 ; 
Sha'ban, Dirasat, pp. 210-211. 
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is imperceptible. Since the offer and acceptance are evident (zahir), they 
are more accurately considered as the 'illah for the legitimacy of a 
contract. 46 
(2) Next, the 'illah must also be a constant and regular attribute (waf 
dabi, which is applicable to all cases without being affected by the 
differences of persons, times, places and circumstances. 47 In case of 
shuf 'ah (pre-emption), it is unacceptable to base this particular ruling on 
its hikmah which is to protect against possible harmful action. In shuf 'ah, 
a partner or a neighbour has priority to buy the property whenever his 
partner or neighbour wishes to sell it. The'illah, as asserted by the jurists, 
is the joint ownership itself and not the protection aspect which is not 
permanent but changeable i. e. variable according to circumstances, which 
would give difficulty in basing analogy on it. 48 
(3) It is necessary also that the 'iliah should be transient or extensible 
(muta'ddiyah) and not inextensible i. e. not transferable to other cases 
(gasirah or wagifah). 49 The requirement of the transferability of 'ülah is 
argued by the majority of the jurists in contrast to the Hanafis. 50 
Nonetheless, the dispute is insignificant because, in terms of applying 
giyas, all are in agreement that the 'illah should be extensible. The dispute 
however, is directed only to the problem of ta'lil a1-ahkam (causation) i. e. 
46 Ibid. 
47 gaya Mukhtagar, vol. 3, p. 27 Abu Zahrah, U§uI. p. 239 ; Khallaf, U. $ul. 
pp. 65-66. 
48 Ibn Taymlyyah and Ibn Qayyim, al-giyas, pp. 154-160; Irshad, pp. 207- 
208 ; Khallaf. Uqul, p. 65; Am ini, Ijtitiad, p. 140. 
49 Al-Sarakhsi, Usul, vol. 2, pp. 160-161 Irshad. p. 207; Khallaf, U. Sui, p. 
70. 
50 Al-Sarakhsi. U§ui. vol. 2, p. 158. Rawdah. p. 169; Tangifi, pp. 406.409- 
410; al-Zanjani. TakhrUj, p. 47. 
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whether such 'illah is valid as a basis of a hukm or not. 51 An explanation 
of this is as follows. 7Uah, viewed from point of transferability, is of two 
types: namely, extensible and inextensible. Extensible causes are like 
intoxicating effect in wine drinking. This cause can be extended to other 
cases that share the same 'illah. Inextensible causes however, cannot be 
extended to other cases such as illness and travelling, the two causes that 
permit the action of breaking the fasting in the month of Ramadan. 52 
The dispute exists over the latter type of 'illah whether this kind of cause 
can be considered as the foundation of a particular ruling. The jurists 
however, never disagreed that this type of 'illah is inapplicable in giyas 
because to extend an original ruling contained in the original case to an 
assimilated case, the cause must be an extensible one. 53 
(4) The 'illah should also be co-extensive (mattarid) in a way that whenever 
the 'illah exists, the rule of law will also exist. 54 If not, it is called al-kasr 
55 or al-naq . 
56 Both prevent the 'illah from resulting in a judgement. 
51 Ahmad J asan, "The conditions of legal cause", in IS, vol. 20,1980, pp. 
308,322-324 (cited after as "Conditions") 
52 Sha'ban, Dfrasat p. 213. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Irshad, p. 207; Hallaq, 'The logic of legal reasoning in religious and non- 
religious cultures : the case of Islamic law and common law", in CSLR, vol. 34, 
1985-1986, p. 89 (cited after as "Legal Reasoning') 
55 and 56 "When one of the 'illa. h 's properties is cancelled due to 
inefficiences, and it becomes clear that the remaining property cannot induce 
judgement, the 'i11ah is inflicted with kasr (breakage). The inability of 'iilah to 
produce a judgement, on the other hand, leads to its refutation (nagc. See 
aI-Mu'tamad, vol. 2, pp. 821-822. (The translation Is taken from Hallaq, 
"Logical Stricture", p. 55) 
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(5) The 'illah should also be co-exclusive (mun'akis)57 i. e. if the 'illah does 
not exist, the rule of law will also not exist. This condition, like the 
fourth, is disputed. 58 
(6) If 'illah is a derivative, it should not apply to the original case i. e. text, 
by either nullifying it or part of it or by establishing a rule which was not 
originally established by the text. 59 In other words, the 'illah in the 
assimilated case must enjoy the exact characteristics of the already 
established original 'Utah. Otherwise, it is null. The examples of the last 
four conditions will be treated soon where appropriate i. e. in preferring 
one giyas over the other by observing these conditions. 
Next to the conditions, the methods of establishing the 'illah are 
believed also to play an immediate role in qiyas conflict. These two 
features should be deliberately discussed for tarji h in 'illah conflict, 
according to al- Amidi, does not go beyond two modes namely through the 
methods of establishing the 'iliah and by close examination of its 
conditions. 60 
Regarding methods of establishing the 'illah, al-Jassas has 
maintained that extracting a cause from a basic case to be applied to the 
assimilated case is considered as the first rank of ytihad. 61 To ensure that 
only the true 'illah is extracted, one will be required to abide by certain 
prescribed methods. In this context, we often find that the jurists have 
classified the 'illah into two types - according to how it is extracted - 'Utah 
57 AL-Mustasfa. vol. 2. p. 344: Hallaq. "Legal Reasoning". p. 89. 
58 Ibid. ; Ahmad Hasan, "Conditions", p. 310. 
59 Bayan Mukhta sar, vol. 3, pp. 69-71 ; Irsfw. d p. 208. 
60 Al-Amid i, a1-Ihkam, vol. 3, p. 283. Cf al-Mustas fa. vol. 2, pp. 398-399. 
61 p1, Jassar2. a14u u1. p. 60. See also Irsha. ct p. 250. 
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mansusah and 'illah mustanbatah. 62 In this regard, al-, Jas. 5as has said that 
only in very few cases can one find an explicit statement of the reason 
why a certain judgement was adopted while the large majority of cases are 
not as positive. 63 To my knowledge, however, there is not even a single 
text that states explicitly that so and so is the 'i. Uah for a particular ruling. 
The text, in other words, never determines the properties (awsaf) which 
will lead directly to a thukrn, known as ta'iil (causation). 64 Accordingly, ' 
it is very hard to reach a true and indisputable 'illah. For this reason, it 
is said that 'Utah if attained, is speculative. 65 
An example of 'illah mansuiah is the case of asking for permission 
when entering a private house as stated in a ihad i th which provides that 
"permission is required on account of viewing (Ii ajii al- basr)". 66 The 
'Utah in this case, as claimed by the jurists is to protect the privacy of the 
home against unsolicited viewing. 67 The question that comes to mind here 
is whether this is an unchallenged 'Utah or it is possible to assign another 
element as the 'Utah instead of protection. The jurists in fact, have merely 
based their opinion on the occurrence of certain Arabic expressions such 
as Ii ajli (on account of) that provide a considerable indication as to the 
62 A1IAum', p. 62. 
The jurists have added also another method which helps a jurist to find 'Utah 
that is ijima' . (see 7bysir. vol. 4, p. 39 ; Irshad, p. 210 ; Sha'ban, Dirasat, p. 
224) 
For details, see Ahmad Hasan. "Methods of finding the cause of a legal 
injunction in Islamic jurisprudence", in IS, vol. 25,1986, pp. 12-13. 
63 Nabil Shehaby, "'Ilia and giyas". p. 37. 
6 See al-Sarakhsi, Usul, vol. 2, p. 121. 
65 See Irsha. ct p. 202 ; EI 2, vol. 5, p. 240 ; Hallaq, "Legal Reasoning", p. 86. 
66 Nihayadt vol. 3, p. 54. 
67 Al Mustasfa. vol. 2, p. 288 ; Abu Zahrah, UIu1. p. 244 ; Nadiah, al-Qiyas. 
p. 92. 
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'Wah of a given ruling. 68 Even so, in my opinion, it is possible also to say 
that such protection is merely hikmah whereas the 'iUah is something else 
for 'illah and hikmah may be overlapping. This possibility displays that 
giyas can provide only a probable degree of knowledge (ghalib al-zand. 69 
On the whole, the rules laid down by the jurists for identifying 
and establishing the true 'illah, known as masalik al-'Utah, do not go 
beyond the following three stages namely takhrij al-mangt, tangih al- 
manat and tahgiq al-manat. 7O Any miscalculation or deviation from these 
prescribed rules requires the'illah to be abandoned. Takhrij al-mangt 
(identifying the 'fllah) is the starting point in the enquiry concerning the 
identification of 'iüah. 71 It is an attempt to anticipate the relevant 'ülah 
that could be attributed to a particular case i. e. original case. When the 
Qur'an ( 5: 38) says; "As for the thief, both male and female, cut off their 
hands", one can imagine that the theft itself is the cause for the 
punishment. Similarly, when one reads the Qur'an (5: 90 ); "O Ye who 
believe! Strong drink and games of chance and idols and divining arrows 
are only infamy of satan's handiwork. Leave it aside in order that ye may 
succeed", the intoxicating effect of wine (khamr) will cross his mind to be 
68 Irshad. p. 211. For further details, see ibid. pp. 211-213. 
69 Ibid., p. 206 
In addition, even if the 'illah is certain, its application to an assimilated case 
might be uncertain. (ibid) 
70 These classifications were put forward by al-Ghazali and according to 
Ahmad Hasan, al-Ghazali seems to be the first to divide this reasoning into 
these three stages. (see al-Musta a. vol. 2. pp. 230-234 ; Ahmad Hasan, 
"Reasoning', p. 721 
71 juj/at Allah, vol. 1. p. 137 ; Kamali, Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 270; al-Fikr 
al-Sami, vol. 1, p. 72: al-Buts, al-Mcq2lajah. p. 116, note no. 2. 
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the 'illah of the prohibiting of wine drinking. Thus, it is said that ikhalah72 
and munasabah73 (imagination and suitability) are included under takhrU 
al-roan t. 74 Therefore, it is not surprising that other imaginative methods 
of finding the 'illah such as sabr75, tagsim76, tard77, dawran78, 
shabah79, etc. are all covered by takhrfj al-manat. 80 
The following step presupposes the possibility that more than 
one 'illah could be imaginatively extracted from a single text. To select 
only the proper `illah, tang i4. al-mangt is employed. Literally, tanq ih means 
purifying8 l whereas mannt is another word for 'ilah. Technically, tang i 1h 
al-mangt means connecting the new case to the original case by 
eliminating the discrepancy between them (ilh. aq at-far' bi al-ast bi Ugha' al- 
fariq). ß2 Determining the 'illah by refining it from irrelevant qualities is 
72 and 73Both indicate elimination of the improper 'illah and assignment of 
the proper 'Mah to the ruling through suitability of equality itself and not by 
the text or any other thing such as an assignment of the intoxication and 
intentional murder as the causes of their judgements prescribed in the 
Shari'ah respectively. (see Bayan Mukhýar, vol. 3. p. 110) 
74 Ibid. 
75 and 76They are designed to determine the 'illah by indicating the real 
cause of the rule after classification (taqsim) and excluding (sabr) the 
irrelevant qualities. (al-Mustasfa, vol. 2. p. 295: TangiF pp. 397-398; Irshad. 
p. 213) 
77 and 78 They simply imply that every time the attribute was present or 
absent. the ruling also was present or absent accordingly. irrespective of 
whether there is an indication in the context to show that the attribute was 
meant as the cause or not. (See Aghnides, Theories, p. 86) 
79 Shabah is an analogy by simple similarity i. e. to consider a thing in its 
similarity to others. (see al-Risalah. para. 1334 and for example of this. see at- 
Mu'tamad, vol. 2. p. 692) 
80 mad Hasan, "Reasoning'. p. 89. 
81 fie, Lexicon. vol. 8, pp. 2835-2836. 
82 Irshad, pp. 221,222 ; Abu Zahrah, U§u4 p. 246. 
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said to be another definition of tangih at-manat. 83 By this, only a true 
'illah will be put forward. 
For example, in a hadith, the Prophet imposed the kaffarah on a 
bedouin who had sexual intercourse with his wife in the daytime of 
Ramadan. 84 No doubt the cause of voidance of his fast was the 
intercourse he had. But the hadith also points out many other elements 
that might be the 'illah for kaffarah such as a definite person i. e. a 
beduoin, a particular period and month, a woman who was cohabited with 
or anything else. By employing tang ih aI-manat, a proper 'illah can be 
determined from these elements. Hence, it is concluded that deliberate 
daytime sexual relations in the month of Ramadan that lead to the 
violation of Ramadan is identified as manag of such kaffarah. This basis 
should apply to all similar cases in future where it is found, regardless of 
whoever does it. 85 
The last stage which always follows the two preceding stages is 
called tahgiq al-manat. It means nothing other than to confirm that a 
particular selected element is the actual 'illah by applying this selected 
'illah to cases that are thought to share the same 'illah. 86 The main 
83 Al-Musto.: a, vol. 2. p. 231-232 ; Ahmad Hasan. "Reasoning', p. 85. 
84 Muslim. , Ss. h1,, vol. 2, p. 54. 
85 Al-Mustass a, vol. 2. Pp. 232-233,284-285 ; al-FYkr al-Sam i, vol. 1, p. 73. 
Mention should be made that in the Shafl'i school of law, only sexual 
intercourse requires kaffarah whereas in the Banafi's, all intentional day 
time breaking of the fast of Ramadan, including eating and drinking, requires 
kaffarah, (al-Ja§ýas, al-Ftvgut p. 138 ; al-Dimashgi, Ikhti1af, p. 122) However. 
this inclusion is justified by textual indication and not by giyas. (al-Sarakhsi, 
Usul, vol. 1. pp. 244-245) 
86lrshad, p. 222 ; Khallaf. U§u1. p. 79 ; Abu Zahrah, UJul, p. 246. 
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function of the jurists at this stage is to apply this mangt to various cases 
where it applies and where it does not. As the jurists have affirmed that 
the theft itself is the cause of punishment in the Qur'an (5: 38), it is in the 
nature of tahgiq at-mangt to be certain whether a pick-pocket or grave 
thief, for instance, fall under the same category of theft or not. To this 
extent, it is considered as an everlasting ytihad for if it discontinues, the 
application of the rules of the Shari'ah to human acts would be 
impossible. 87 
After elucidation of the 'Utah whether in respect to its conditions 
or its ways of establishment, it is relevant now to discuss how tarjiih is 
working in this area exclusively. In doing so, I shall begin with what al- 
Basri has adopted in his chapter concerning the conflict of giyas. 88 For 
him, tarj ih is merely a third way to deal with the opposition of causes 
(ta'arudý. 89 The first is to prove the intransitiveness (ghayr mut'addiyah ) 
of one of the conflicting Val (plural. of 'Utah) and the second is through 
refutation (al-nagd). 90 These different ways, in my opinion are however, 
equivalent because in order to prefer one 'füah over the other, one would 
naturally employ all the relevant methodologies such as refutation, deep 
examination of 'Wah conditions and ways of establishment, etc. In other 
87 AL-Muunfagat, vol. 4, pp. 39-42 ; Abu Zahrah. UUul. p. 246 ; 'Abd al-'Aziz, 
" Ri'ayat a1-ma_4iczhah wa dar' al-mafsadah ", in AS, vol. 10,1399 H. p. 11. 
88 AL-Mu'iamad. vol. 2, p. 1046. 
89 Ibid., p. 1045. 
The opposition of a cause by another cause in the original case or the 
opposition of a whole procedure of qiyas by another complete giyas is merely 
one of the problems that render the 'illah inaccurate. The others are such as 
reasoning by names, the discord between the cause's object and the 
judgement, ineffectiveness. the inversion of giyas, refutation and breakage. 
See ibid. 
90 Ibid.. pp. 1044-1045. 
305 
words, a muraljih would consider anything which is useful in determining 
the correct 'illah. This applies to the first and the second methods 
prescribed by al-Basri since both would potentially supply a murajjih with 
adequate means to arrive at the most accurate 'illah. 
Al-Basra starts by saying, "if the cause of the original case is 
opposed by another, and the two causes (appear to be) equal, one must be 
made to prevail over the other". 91 The Klaff are contradictory when one of 
them implies a rule against what is implied by another. 92 If this 
happened, preference, according to al-Basra, can be achieved in two ways; 
"One is to examine the methods by which the cause was proved to be valid 
and the other is to examine the cause's transitiveness". 93 
The above statement by al-Basra is adopted here as a starting 
point for the following discussion. Like al-Basra, all other jurists have also 
emphasised the centrality of 'iliah in conflict and tarj i h. 94 The 'illah that 
proved to be valid, as stated by al-Basra, should be upheld. Otherwise, it 
is disregarded. As far as a valid 'illah is concerned in tarjih, it is said that 
a cause which gained consensus prevails over the other cause which did 
not. 95 When a 711ah is confirmed by such agreement, all other 
91 Ibid., p. 1046. 
92 p1. Jaasaa. a! -F ul, p. 165. 
93 Al-Mu'tamacl, vol. 2, p. 1046. 
94 The importance of 'iUah is best evident when the jurists have not only 
laid down certain regulations to detect true 'i[Iah but also to distinguish it 
from improper 'illah. See a1-MustasJa. vol. 2. p. 306 ; 'Iwan, "Qaundl", passim. 
95 Ghayat al-U. ut p. 146 ; Ibn Badran, al-Madkhat p. 200. 
306 
contradictory Vial which were thought to be possible 'Utah would be 
invalidated. 
I could not find a proper case in figh wherein a confirmed cause 
is opposed by another which is not. However, the problem of guardianship 
for a girl is perhaps the most appropriate explanation of the above. The 
Shafi'is say that the girl needs to have her father as legal guardian before. 
she marries if the girl is a virgin. Otherwise, she needs no such 
guardianship. 96 For the Hanafis, the cause is the girl's being underage. 97 
The Hanafis, in fact, have relied on an lama' that was earlier established 
on the problem of guardianship over the property of minors. 9 8 
Accordingly, the Hanafis contend that their cause should take precedence 
over the cause of the Shafi'is since the girl's age determines whether she 
needs legal guardianship or not when she sells or buys property as 
indicated by consensus. Similarly, it applies to marriage affairs. Virginity, 
on the contrary, they argue, is irrelevant in both cases, namely property 
and marriage affairs. 99 
As said before, this is not a precise example of what we are 
discussing. No doubt, disagreement is not allowed to exist in case of 
underage property with respect to legal guardianship, since it is 
constructed by the consensus of the scholars. 100 Once ijma' has been 
96g1-Zanjani, Takhrij. pp. 257-258 ; al-Iji, Sharfl. vol. 2, p. 234 ; Masud, 
"Ijba? ', p. 218. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Sha'ban, Dirasat. p. 233. 'Iwad. " Qau'adW', p. 117. 
For the alleged ama', see Irshad, p. 210. 
99 KhaIIaf, UsuL. p. 77 ; 'Iwad, "QawaLIItJ', p. 117; Kerr, Islamic Reform, p. 66. 
Cf. al-Zanjan 1. TI hr(J, p. 257. 
100 'Iwad. ' umdjU", p. 17. 
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established, no disagreement would be permitted. However, in the case of 
underage marriage, we have seen the dispute among the jurists because it 
is not covered by the alleged consensus. Furthermore, there is an 
objection towards this alleged consensus concerning underage property 
itself. 101 In any case, given that this ijma' was true, there remains no 
point to link the problem of underage property to marriage affairs for both 
are different. My point of view in this case however, is to combine both 
virginity and minority as the 'Utah in this particular case since the 
judgement may have two or more 'ilal that are compatible and we shall 
have an occasion to elaborate on this point later. 102 
Then, if one cause is explicitly stated in the text while the other 
is merely inferred through textual indications, the former is upheld. 103 
When nass exists, istinbat is of no value. Explaining these two types of 
'ilal, al-Basri says, one is conspicuous (mansusah) and generally leads to 
certainty and the other needs to be inferred (mustanbatah). 104 The latter, 
being vague and uncertain, according to Hallaq, is the major reason 
medieval jurists worked out an elaborate system of procedure for 
establishing and verifying the 'illah. 105 Hence, one is certain why 
preference is given to 'illah mansusah and not to 'Wah mustanbatah. After 
fyma', the text, indeed, is the safest means to find a true 'illah, for it may 
provide a more clear and undisputed 'Walt 
101 Hhaliaf. UjtLi, p. 76. 
102 This assertion is well supported by the fact that no such guardianship is 
required when the daughter is not a virgin and has reached her 
majority. For more details. see Masud. " IJba?, p. 221. 
103 Al-Mu'tamad vol. 2, p. 1046. See also al-Baj I. Item, p. 674 ; al-Jaasa2. 
al-FLsul, p. 198 ; Ibn Badran, al-Madkhal, p. 200. 
104 At-Mu'tomacl, vol. 2, pp. 774-775. See also Tangii, p. 425. 
105 Hallaq, "Logical Structure". p. 53. 
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Al-Baj i has illustrated the above by employing the qiyas of 
the Malikis in contrast to the Hanafis'. Nabidh i. e. made from other 
than grapes, is forbidden according to the Malikis, for nabidh, though 
different from khamr which is made from grapes, could lead to 
intoxication as does khamr. Since khamr is explicitly forbidden in the 
Qur'an (5 : 90), the same applies to nabidh. Having disapproved the 
drinking of khamr, the Hanafis have no objection to the consuming of 
nabidh simply because nabidh, like honey, is permissible to the people 
of paradise. 106 While commenting on this conflict, al-Baj i has upheld the 
Malikis qiyas for the 'iliah of prohibition is clearly mentioned in a 
tradition; i. e. "if a larger amount intoxicate, then the small amount is 
prohibited". 107 Nabidh and khamr are alike for both have intoxicating 
effect. Clearly, the 'illah of the Malakis is stated in the text while the 'ilah 
of the Hanafis is an interpretative one. Should there be any conflict 
between the two, the former prevails. 
The third preferred 'iliah, according to al-Basra, is the one known 
through textual indication as opposed to the 'Utah extracted from the 
text. Since al-Basra himself did not give any specific example of 
textual indication (maf hum al-nass, we do not know what is actually 
intended by him. I suppose it would be dilalat al-nass or al-giyas a -Jai 
which is considered as the strongest form of giycis in the view of al- 
Sh7afi'i. 108 This type of 'Utah needs no inference since it is understood 
106 AI-gaji. Dr. p. 674. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Al-Risalah, paras. 1482-1485. See also Hallaq. "Non-analogical 
arguments in sunni juridical giyas". in Arabica. vol. 36.1989. p. 289 (cited 
after as "Sunni Qiyas") 
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from the language of the scriptural statement itself (min jihat dilalat al- 
laf ). ios To know it, one is not constrained to master the reasoning forms 
rather than a simple knowledge of language. It can be illustrated by the 
following ; when God or the Prophet forbids a small quantity of a 
particular thing, we can conclude that a larger quantity of the same 
matter is also forbidden. Similarly, if the consumption of a large quantity 
of a certain foodstuff is declared permissible, then a smaller amount of 
that foodstuff would also be permissible. 110 
The Hanafis did not consider this as a qiyas simply because it is 
a textual interpretation i. e. purely linguistic and certainly outside the 
sphere of inferential reasoning. 111 Qiyas, however is an extension of the 
ruling of a given text to cases which may not fall within the terms of its 
language. A case in point is God saying (17 : 23), "say not to them uff'. 
The verse explicitly forbids saying uff to the parents. For al-Shafi'i, the 
verse also forbids insulting parents, beating parents, killing parents, 
etc., on the ground of giyas. 112 Any act which harms the parents is also 
forbidden in the Hanafi view but the ruling is known through the 
linguistic consideration instead of giyas. 113 With regard to the result 
however, the disagreement seems to be a verbal one and of no significance. 
Although I could not find any accurate example of this type of conflict, it 
appears to me that 'iliah gained through mafhum al-nah or dilalat a1-naffs 
109 pl_Sarakhsi. UOuI. vol. 1. pp. 241-242. 
110 Al-Risalatt paras. 1482-1485. 
111 Aghnides, Theories, p. 74 ; Hallaq, "Sunni Qiyas ". p. 287. 
112 This has been called by al-Shai1'i as al-giyas al-Jali. The jurists who 
came after him, including the Shafi'is. named this as mafhum muwafagah 
or faljwa. al-kh«ab. ( See Khalifah, TZzktis i-s. p. 85) 
113 
-Sarakhsi. UUu1, vol. 1, p. 242. 
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is relatively stronger than the one derived from the text. A derivation is 
always liable to many possibilities that make the conclusion uncertain. 
This does not apply to the establishing of 'illah by means of mafhum at- 
nass since it needs no inference. 
Some jurists like al-Qarafi consider the 'illah of munasabah 
(suitability) to come immediately after the cause of text ('illah mansusal) 
hierarchically. 114 Munasabah comes to exist when the'illah which suits 
the original and the assimilated case displays promotion of benefit or 
prevention of evil and therefore must be accepted provided nothing in the 
text contradicts that 'iilah 115 To make our discussion more systematic 
and organised, I intend however, not to examine the degree of strength of 
each 'Wah hierarchically for it is too complicated and may lead us to an 
unresolved discussion. For one thing, murwsabah or the appropriateness 
of 'ülah to the original and the assimilated is hard to achieve. Moreover, 
munasabah is merely one of several indications upon which a jurist can 
distinguish a true from an incorrect 'Wah. Besides, ta'thlr (effectiveness), 
ikhalah (probabality or imagination), etc., are said to have a significant 
role too for determining the more accurate 'illah. 116 
After elaborating these three stages in tarjik al-Basri proceeds to 
make a similar attempt but this time by considering the transitiveness of 
the 'illah. The majority of jurists share al-Basra's point of view that 
114 TangQk pp. 427-428: Kerr. Islamic Reform. p. 69. 
115 Al-Mastas fa. vol. 2, p. 296-297 ; Irshad, p. 214. 
116 See Ahmad Hasan. "Conditions". p. 313. 
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preference should be given to the one which has a transitive cause. 117 In 
cases where there is a conflict between transitive and intransitive causes, 
the former supersedes owing to its effectiveness i. e. being acted upon in 
the law, that suggests the validity of 'i11ah. 118 Accordingly, to the other 
extent, as a logical consequence, the one which encloses more assimilated 
cases is worthier than the other which does not. 119 It shows again that 
the more effective the 'illah is, the more it is upheld. 
One example is sufficient to illustrate these two methodologies of 
tarj i h. It concerns the prohibition of wine (khamr) drinking. The jurnhur 
have opined that intoxication is the 'ülah of such a prohibition. The 
Hanafis or more precisely Abu Ha ni fah 120, on the contrary, have 
contended that khamr is forbidden for it is made from the grape. 
Accordingly, other intoxicating objects are permissible even though they 
do intoxicate provided that they are made from other than grape. 121 
Obviously, as stated earlier, the jr mhir opinion must take precedence for 
two reasons ; their 'illah i. e. intoxication, is a transitive cause and 
accordingly, it has more assimilated cases because it is extensible to other 
intoxicating objects regardless of their sources. 
117 Ibid., p. 317, al-Mu'tamad. vol. 2, p. t ; al-Amidi, al-IIkarn, vol. 3, p. 386 ; 
al-Tahsi[. vol. 2. p. 276. al-Baji, Ihkam, p. 678 ; Ibn Badran. al-Madkhal. p. 
200. 
This method, unlike the previous one, does not receive a full confirmation by 
all the jurists but by the majority of them. (see aI-Mankhul, p. 445: al-TaJj il. 
vol. 2, p. 276) 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid ; Rau ali. p. 211 ; Ghayat al-UguI. p. 147. 
120 Al-Zanjan i, Takhr(J, pp. 69-70. 
121 Ibid. See also Ibn Taymiyyah, al-gauýx'id, p. 24. 
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On the whole, al-Basri mentions only five sorts of preference in 
respect of 'iUah conflict. To continue our discussion, I shall refer to other 
relevant references that might suggest a proper methodology of taij i th in 
giyas conflict, if not a comprehensive one. Next, it is widely proposed that 
the 'IUah which is associated with or supported by many other elements of 
evidence shall gain superiority. 122 The more the 'iliah is supported by 
external indications, the more it become certain and strong. In the case 
of apostasy, Abu Hanifah opines that a female apostate should not be 
executed, 123 arguing that the Prophet prohibited the killing of women in 
enemy teritory. 124 Al-Shafi' i however. criticises this analogy by saying 
that the killing of a woman in enemy teritory is not parallel to the killing 
of female apostates. He further argues that as a woman is killed in many 
other cases, such as adultery and homicide, likewise, she would be killed 
in case of apostasy. 125 Comparatively speaking, the giyas of al-Shafi'i is 
more sound, simply because it is supported by many other cases which 
show that women are legally killed in Islam. 126 In addition, the qiyas of 
Abu Hanifah is too weak for it contradicts the hadith ; "kill whoever 
122 Irshad p. 283. 
Tarjiji by considering external factors e. g. by virtue of "many pieces of 
evidence" will be elaborated further in chapter seven. 
123 AL-Tamhid, p. 413; al-Zanjan1. Takhr(J. p. 337; aL-Hidayah, vol. 2. p. 458 
al-Kawthari, Abu Yusuf. pp. 54-55. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ai Hidayah, vol. 2, p. 458 ; al-Shafl'i , al-Umm. vol. 7, p. 147. as cited from 
Ahmad Hasan, The Early, p. 157. 
126 According to one scholar, this Fjadith is preferable to the , 
jadith which 
prohibits the killing of the women because the former clarified the 'illah of 
doing so i. e. apostasy. (see Khalfan, Ulul, p. 362) 
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changes his religion". 127 These two factors make the qiyas of al-Shafi`i 
unchallenged. 
In the course of qiyas conflict, 'illah is always confused with 
hikmah i. e. to gain profit and to disregard evil. If a jurist. instead of 'illah, 
adopts hikmah as the cause for a particular ruling, the result of giyas 
would vary and be contradictory to another qiyas which is based on a 
'illah. Given inconstancy of hikmah and its hidden quality, the jurists 
unanimously favoured the 'illah over the hikmah . 
128 Hence, as regards the 
permission granted to travellers to break the fast in Ramadan, the 
travelling itself is the 'illah regardless of the degrees of hardship that it 
may cause to individual travellers. Obviously, to avoid hardship is the 
hikmah behind this permission. But to apply this permission analogically 
to all those who are in hardship is not approved, since hikmah is neither 
constant nor well-defined. 129 
From another perspective, when two unrelated properties 
are found to be equally strong as the 'illah, the one which proves to have 
immediate effect in terms of resulting in judgement must take precedence. 
Redness, for instance, and intoxication, are two unrelated properties 
found in wine. On the other hand, the prohibition is the judgement in 
127 The conflict between qiyas and the text is one of the matters that 
invalidate 'ilah or giyas itself, known as fasad al-Ttibar. See Wad. 
QawadiJ ', p. 100 ; Makdisi, "Is4hsan", p. 460, para. 31. 
Moreover, the qiyas of Abu Ijanifah is faulty because its premise is an 
exception to the principle governing retaliation, as for al-Shafi'i, exception 
cannot be extended by analogy. (Origins. pp. 123-124). For more details, see 
Ibn 'A4i1, al-Fl, uwn, pp. 35-37. 
128 Al Ibhaf, vol. 3. p. 238 ; Nihayak vol. 3, pp. 247-248, Khallaf, UUut p. 64. 
129 Ibid. ; BayanMukhlnoar, vol. 3, p. 26 ; Shahan, Dirasat, pp. 165-166. 
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this case. Since intoxication can be found in conjunction with prohibition 
rather than with redness, it must be concluded that the true 'Utah is 
intoxication, not redness. 130 As a matter of fact, redness could not be 
regarded as the valid 'illah for it is not co-extensive (muttarid) and co- 
exclusive (mun'akis)131 for wine is frequently white. 
In discussing tarj h on the basis of 'illah, two types of 'illah 
are usually distinguished. The first is known as the simple and 
straightfoward 'illah, while the second is the combined and mixed 'illah. 
Intoxication in case of wine drinking is the simple'illah. The mixed 'Utah, 
however, is formulated by two or more components or elements where each 
of them must relate to another. Otherwise, it is void. The intentional 
murder without any justification is said to be the 'illah for retaliation and 
of course, it contains more than one element i. e. killing, an intention to 
do so and killing illegally practised. 132 As regards the simple 'illah, being 
simple, the possibility that it contains error is relatively small compared 
to the combined 'Utah for it needs a larger scope of personal reasoning. 133 
Hence, when they are contradictory, the preference is given to the single 
and simple'iIlah_ 134 
130 Hallaq, "Logical structure", pp. 52,54. See also Idem, "Legal Reasoning', 
pp. 88-89. 
131 See al-Bai i. 11 i. p. 676. 
132 AI-Ib, vol. 3, p. 239 ; a1-Tbl il. vol. 2. p. 272. 
133 Rawid h. p. 211 ; Ghayat al-Usu4 p. 146; Hi tu, al-Wa/ iz p. 486. 
134 AI-Tab il. vol. 2, p. 272. 
This method of tarjifý is liable to many objections ( see al-Baji. IFlkam. pp. 
681-682 ; al-Mankhul, p. 446) but al-Baji, in contrast to al-Ghazal1, has 
argued in favour of the simple 'illah. (ibid). 
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Regarding the tradition which provides that " gold for gold, silver 
for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates and salt for 
salt, must be equal, hand to hand..... " 135 , the jurists 
(other than the 
Zahiris) have unanimously agreed that the above prohibition is not due to 
their particular species rather than to a specific cause. 136 Therefore, 
regarding the four last articles, al-Shafi'i maintains that such a 
transaction is unlawful because they are edible. 137 The 'illah for the 
Hanafis is the quality of such articles as being saleable by the 
measurement of weight (al-wain) or capacity (al-kayO. 138 According to 
the Malikis, the sale of such is unlawful because they are preservable and 
food which is the 'Utah for usury in barter trading. 139 Naturally, to apply 
these different 'ilal to the assimilated case would lead to conflicting results 
because the 'illah, as we have seen, is variable. The preference, however, is 
owed to al-Shafi'i's point of view since his 'Utah is more simple and 
uncombined. 140 
Also significantly, in course of giyos conflict, a jurist 
usually tends to overthrow his opponent's qiyas by showing that his 
opponent's qiyas is employed with a discrepancy i. e. giyas ma'a al fariq. 
This is so crucial because even if the 'illah is certain, it does not assure or 
guarantee that this particular 'iiiah will be applied to a proper assimilated 
case. Applying the correct 'iüah to an incorrect case is known as 
135 Bidayah, vol. 2, p. 129. 
136 Ibid ; al-Khin, Ikhtilaf. p. 496. 
137 Ibid. ; Ahmad Hasan, "Reasoning". p. 88 ; Abu Zahrah. UiuI. pp. 229- 
230. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 AL-lb hq j, vol. 3, p. 239. 
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discrepancy. 141 Accordingly, such a giyas is incapable of standing against 
the qiyas which has no discrepancy. 
The point at issue is the giyas of the Hanafis. A sane and adult 
woman, according to them, is competent and eligible to conclude a 
contract of marriage on her own behalf. They have opined so by basing it 
on the Qur'anic ruling (4: 6); "Prove orphans till they reach the 
marriageable age; then, if ye find them of sound judgement, deliver over 
unto them their fortune.... ". The verse entitles her to enter into business 
transactions of her own free will. Other jurists, however, disagree, as they 
consider this analogy to be giyos with a discrepancy i. e. marriage differs 
from other transactions whereas business is a personal matter, marriage 
concerns the family and the social status of the parents and guardians. 142 
Still related to the 'illah, the jurists have proposed that preference 
can be achieved by looking in depth at every single 'illah on which the 
conflicting giyasat are based. By a genuine search and examination, one 
can reach a solution for tarj i h. To this purpose, the case of ablution will 
be examined. In the Hanafi opinion, an ablution is null whenever najasah 
is found coming out from the human body irrespective of how it happens. 
The cause of nullifying the ablution is najasah itself whether it comes out 
from the two known ways i. e. front and hind parts, or from elsewhere. 143 
In contrast, the Shaii'is maintain that najasah itself is not the cause, 
rather how something comes out from the human body. For them, 
whether it is najasah or not, whenever it comes out from the two 
Tanq p. 403. 
142 See al-Shafi'i, al-Um vol. 5, p. 13; Masud, "Ijbw" p. 206. 
143 Bidayah, vol. 1, p. 34 ; a! -Mughni. vol. 1. p. 184: al Hidayah. vol. 1. p. 14 
al-Dimashgi. IkhtiLaf, p. 15. 
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particular ways as mentioned above, the ablution is null and void. 144 By 
depth observation, one is constrained to favour the Shafi'is qiyas simply 
because their 'illah is co-exclusive. 145 Rih (smell) and mani (sperm) as 
unanimously agreed, are capable of invalidating ablution even though they 
are not nafasah. This makes the Hanafi 'iWah not co-exclusive. In turn, 
it shows that the rule did exist i. e. nullifying of ablution, though the 'üiah 
was absent. Thus, their 'illah is not co-exclusive which subsequently 
renders their giyas void of authority particularly in the case of conflict. 146 
From a different angle, it is said that the 'illah which is in line 
with the generality of the original ruling occupies the preference when it is 
contradicted by the 'illah which is a particularisation of the general. 147 The 
jurists justify this order simply by saying that as the 'umum is the 
criterion of every thing, it should be the basis of preference. The validity 
of tayammum with gypsum (al jass and lime (al-nurah) was disputable 
owing to what we have said above. The Malikis have held that such things 
are permissible in terms of tayammum because the word said i. e. high 
clean soil (as mentioned in Q. 4: 43 and 5: 6) implies that whatever 
covers the surface of the earth may be said to be said. The Shafi'is, on 
the other side, have raised an objection to such tayammurn because 
gypsum and lime are not soil but are equal to steel and copper. 148 The 
latter giyas however, is overruled for it conveys a departure from the 
generality of the original case i. e. said. For said, as confirmed by the 
144 Bidayah, vol. 1. p. 34 ; al-Dimashgi, Ikhtilaf. p. 15 ; al-Zanjan i. Takhr(j, p. 
48. 
145 Rau ah, p. 211 ; Ibn Badran, aL-Madkhat p. 201. 
146 p detailed account of the Hanafi 's counter argument can be found in al- 
Asmand i's at-Khilaf, pp. 3-7. 
147 A]-Baj i. IFjkam, p. 675 ; Tanq ih. p. 426; a1-Jaus, a[-FLjuL p. 168. 
148 Ibid. 
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linguists is the surface of the earth (wajh a1-ard irrespective of the kind 
or the name of such a surface. 149 
In the chapter of giyas conflict, one also easily encounters the 
problem of the covering of the 'illah. This means that one 'illah might 
differ from others in respect of the scope of the covering of the elements it 
applies. When an 'iUah is proved to cover its elements completely, the- 
judgement immediately inclines towards it in case of conflict. 150 Again, 
the tradition concerning usury in barter is exemplified. As previously 
mentioned, each of the schools of law has their own tali l of the 
prohibition of the last four items. In short, being preservable and food 
according to the Malikis or being saleable by weight or capacity in the 
Hanaf i view or being edible as in the Shafi is opinion are said to be the 
alleged 'illah of a usurious transaction. Judging from the method 
mentioned above, the preference, no doubt is in favour of the Shafi'is 
711ah. 151 Only the edibility alone could be applied in all circumstances 
i. e. is found in all those articles whether the transaction involves a large 
quantity or not and whether they are generally used as food or not. 
Buying and selling one or two seeds of wheat or barley is not covered by 
the 'illah of the Hanafis because it cannot be measured by capacity or 
weight. Also, wheat or barley which are not used as food in certain 
localities are not covered by the 'Utah proposed by the Malikis. 152 
149 Ibid. ; al-Rani, al -3&h, p. 363; Ibn Manzur, Usan. vol. 3. p. 254. 
150AI-Tahsit vol. 2. p. 277; al-Baja. Ijjkam. p. 678; Khalfan, U. Sul, p. 364. 
151 Cf. al-Sarakhs I. Usu(, vol. 2. p. 265 
-1e argues that the edibility. being too general, is not a valid 'fflah, let alone a 
prevailing 'illah) 
152 AI-Mu'tamad, vol. 2, p. 1039 ; Ahmad iiasan. "Reasoning', p. 75. 
It is observed also that the 'illah of the Hanafis is not constant. (see 
Nabil Shehaby, "'Ilia and giyas ", p. 37) 
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Certainly, we have no choice but to consider the 'i lah of the Shafi'is as 
the most comprehensive for it is applicable to all cases in which usury is 
involved. 
Alongside these internal methods of tarjih, there are many 
external considerations that might help us to determine what is preferable 
when two or more giyas appear to be in conflict. These external factors 
are usually employed in a way that corresponds to what will be discussed 
in the following chapter under the heading of "tarj ih based on external 
factors"153 and to what has been already discussed in chapters four and 
five. Therefore, it is important to note that many methodologies of tad-ih 
which are sought from other elements of qiyas such as the original and 
the assimilated cases and the hukm are left aside simply because they do 
not have any immediate significance for that with which we are now 
concerned. 
Also, I would like to conclude, as many jurists have done, that 
tarj ih is an everlasting procedure 154 especially in qiyas conflict, owing 
to the fact that giyas is largely speculative and superficial to the extent 
that it amounts only to a probability. Added to this, giyas is a purely 
logical reasoning which depends heavily on mental exercises. Hence, it is 
impossible to cover all the possibilities that demand taijih in whatever 
cases in which qiyas appears to be in conflict. As a conclusion, however, 
I believe that the propriety of giyas must be measured by the degree of its 
proximity and harmony with the texts. The more the giyas or the 'illah is 
153 See pages 361-36;. 
154 aj{an, UUuI. p. 365 ; Khallaf, UUul, p. 232. 
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in line with the scriptural statements, as we have already seen in some of 
the examples, the more they become certain and unchallenged. 
A further conclusion lies in the fact that I am more inclined to 
combine or to reconcile all the conflicting Wal as long as this is possible. 
Hence, an original case will carry, instead of one, two or more Tal that 
are compatible. This point of view has, in fact, been established by many 
prominent jurists. 155 As we already know, in conflict of legal texts, to 
combine all the conflicting texts is better than to neglect one of them. 
This also applies to 'illah conflict. By doing so, many cases which were 
claimed to be in conflict are no longer contradictory. The problem of legal 
guardianship for a girl in the marriage contract, as previously mentioned, 
is an excellent case to serve our purpose. It is therefore possible to 
consider both the virginity and minority as the intended 'illah in the legal 
guardianship in terms of marriage. 156 Futhermore, in a controversy over 
the 'illah in a usurious transaction, the Hanbalis have held that the 
actual 'i lah covers all the three points of view expressed by other schools 
of law because all these three 'ilal are applicable to the original case. 157 
155 Al-Jassa-*, al-Ftisul, pp. 132-133; a! -Lcuna, p. 69; al-Ibhcl/, vol. 3. p. l 19ä ; 
TangiJj, p. 404; Zuhayr, UUul, vol. 4, p. 132H: 
For practical cases, see Ahmad Hasan, "Conditions". pp. 334-335. 
156 Even in the original case, namely the legal guardianship over the 
minors' property, it has two compatible Val i. e. marriageable age and 
maturity of the mind. This is inspired from Q. 4: 6. The Malilos, therefore. 
probably on this rationale, have considered both virginity and minority as the 
'i71ah for legal guardianship. See Masud, " Ijbae', p. 218; al-Khan, Ikhtilaf pp. 
578-579. 
157A1-Mughni, vol. 4, pp. 5-8 ; alga a2, a! -FL, sut pp. 165-166. 
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In addition, every respective 'illah as viewed by the jurists in the 
problem of usurious transaction, is supported by legal texts that suggest 
the validity of each of them that one cannot easily abandon or accept one 
instead of another. 158 If combination fails, it is the work of the jurists to 
call these conflicting qiyasat into serious scrutiny in order to reach the 
most acceptable one. Tarjih made by a murajih, however, remains 
probable. In any case, when it is impossible to reconcile those conflicting 
'ilal or to apply tarjih systematically between them, a jurist has little 
choice but to adhere to a particular giyas which is the more likely or 
most convincing to himself though it amounts only to a probability. 
158 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
TARJIH BASED ON EXTERNAL FACTORS 
This is the last chapter of our theoretical discussion of the 
methodology of tarjih in the present work. Many methodologies of tarjih 
have been studied throughout the previous chapters but on the other 
hand, many have been purposely omitted for they are more relevant for 
discussion within the present chapter. External factors are many and 
unlimited in numbers ranging from the consideration of language or 
grammar to the maslahah which is neither sharply defined nor 
constantly applied. The task of the present chapter is to cover as many of 
these external factors as possible, which in one way or another, might add 
weight to one of the conflicting pieces of evidence. 
Bearing in mind that it is impossible to point out every single 
factor which helps in arriving at the most preferred view, we maystart by 
committing ourselves to what is commonly dealt with in usul literature. 
The first and the most obvious feature is the so-called "preference by 
virtue of many". As a matter of fact, this is a controversial method of 
preference argued between two schools of law namely the Hanafis and the 
Shaf `is. The former refused to give consideration of any weight to an 
evidence which is supported by many elements of evidence to the effect 
that this method of preference had already been excluded even in their 
definition of turjih. 2 The major argument used by them is that tazjih is 
equivalent to legal testimony. Since the latter admits neither further 
1 As far as external considerations are concerned. al-Amidi has pointed out 
15 means of preference. (al-II m, vol. 3, p. 187) 
2 See page q4. 
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strengthening nor supplementary evidence, so for tarj f i., the same applies. 3 
'Many', in other words, does not offer any value for the evaluation of each 
legal testimony and the same applies to tarjih for both are equivalent. 
With regard to this argument, we have mentioned before that it is baseless 
because tarj ih differs from legal testimony in many respects4 and 
therefore, each of them must operate independently. 
The Hanafis are also reported to have argued that "preference by 
virtue of many" may approve the preference of analogies over the Sunnah 
when they conflict for the former are relatively more in number. 5 
Obviously, to prefer analogy over Sunnah is unacceptable to all the 
jurists. Accordingly, this way of preference should be abandoned and 
regarded as illegal if applied. 6 Al-Baydawi (d. 685 A. H. ), one of the 
leading Shafi'is whose book Minhaj al-Wu, ýul iIa 71m al-Usu1, has been the 
concern of later jurists, attempted to neutralise the argument adduced by 
the Hanafis. He says that many analogies may either be based on a single 
or more than one original case. If the former happens to occur, these 
analogies should be regarded as one, since they originate from one root, be 
it a Qur'anic verse or a portion of Sunnah. In consequence, the text 
should prevail over analogies. However, if these analogies were derived 
from many different "asl " or original cases, al-Baydawi insists that 
Sunnah remains superior.? Unfortunately, al-BayCawi did not give 
further satisfactory argument why he deviated from his hypothesis that 
3 AI-Amid!, al-lb knm, vol. 3. p. 257 ; Irshad p. 274. 
4 See page 105. 
5 Kash f, vol. 4. pp. 78-79. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Nihayah, vol. 3. pp. 223-224. 
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preference based on many elements of evidence should be observed in any 
case of conflict. He seems, in my opinion, to acknowledge that this 
method of preference is not applicable in all circumstances of conflict. In 
other words, should there be a conflict between a tradition and many 
analogies, the former is always superior. This is perhaps, if there is any, 
the only exceptional case for this mode of preference. 
The Shafi`is on the contrary, are famous for their proposal that 
`many' has a significant role in terms of tarj i h. 8 In had i th conflict, for 
example, they contend that it is possible to prefer a hadith reported by 
many direct transmitters to one reported by a smaller number of such 
transmitters. To this effect, with the problem of the prohibition of certain 
kinds of usurious contract, al-Shafi`i says to his interlocutor, "Since it is 
undeniable that a hadith reported by two transmitters is more likely to 
be accurate and free from mistakes than that reported by only one 
transmitter, so a hadith reported by a greater number, for instance, five 
(the number of transmitters of the hadith in question), possesses greater 
authenticity in this respect and should therefore be preferred to that 
reported by one transmitter". 9 On another question, i. e. concerning the 
lifting of the hands (takbir) in prayer, al-Shafi`i opines that one is 
recommended to do so arguing in favour of his own ahadith against that 
adopted by his opponent by saying, "we accept these ahadith and reject 
that which contradicts them because the isnad of our ahadith is more 
8 Al-Amidi, ai-Ijlkarn, vol. 3. p. 259: a! -Ta si1. vol. 2. p. 259; al-Mustagfa. vol. 
2. p. 395. 
This form of preference is also approved by other jurists except some of the 
Hanafis. (see al-Muswaddah, p. 305; Raw ak p. 208 ; TYingif. p. 420). 
9 Al-Risalah, para. 773. 
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reliable; our hadiths are reported by many first-hand transmitters and 
many transmitters are believed to remember more reliably than one". He 
further argues that, "our hadith is reported by al-Zuhri who has the best 
isnod; he has the support of reports by many transmitters which guarantee 
the veracity of what he says-. 10 He continues to argue that al-Zuhri's 
report is supported by thirteen reports "and we mutually agree that 
thirteen had i the are preferable to one". il 
Similarly, the consensus constructed by the majority is obviously 
superior to that of the minority even though the former does not 
constitute a valid consensus, for Yma' proper demands a universal and 
unanimous agreement. 12 Owing to the fact that no record on genuine 
consensus is available after the period of the Companions, it is 
reasonable to promote this majority agreement as having a considerable 
weight in terms of conflict and tarjih. This method of preference is 
justifiable, at least by two means. Broadly speaking, the agreement of the 
majority of jurists at a particular time is more 'valid' than that of the 
unanimous agreement because it is too hard if not impossible, to prove 
the latter as having taken place after the Companion period. 13 This is 
because an attempt to base consensus on a condition which cannot be 
achieved i. e. universal and unanimous agreement, is a denial of the 
10f aLJjaditk pp. 523-524. 
11 Ibid. 
12 See page .2 
85 
13 Sha'ban. Dirasat pp. 56-57. 
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consensus itself14 for a unanimous agreement is hard to achieve since the 
subject matter of the consensus is nothing other than the details of some 
regulations which have already been ... --""'. " prescribed by other sources 
such as the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Hence, though it does not constitute 
decisive consensus, it carries some authority since it is likely to be the 
more correct opinion which must be given precedence over the opinion of 
isolated individuals. In other words, though the majority agreement is not 
a solid proof, its impact on Shari'ah is relatively weightier than that of 
minority agreement or individual opinions. 15 The ifma' of a majority has 
more authority simply since the group, because of its size, is considered as 
more immune to error caused by faulty consideration and 
contemplation. 16 It is advisable therefore, to accept the majority 
agreement as one of the considerable bases for preference, but it should 
not be regarded as yma' proper. 
Also significantly, in giyas conflict, al-Shafi'i has adopted a 
similar proposal as in hadith conflict. Thus, he stipulates that if a case 
has more than one parallel, that which has more aspects of similarity 
should prevail. 17 This will be exemplified by the following case of conflict. 
In the case of compensation for an injury inflicted on a slave, al-Shafi'i 
holds that it should be a fixed proportion of the value of the slave; 
for instance, half of the slave's value for an eye and one-tenth for 
14 Faruki considers jjma' as an unworkable source of law for it requires a 
total (100%) agreement of all Muslim. (See Esposito, Muslim Family Law, p. 
297) 
15 See al-IbhgJ. vol. 2, p. 369. 
16 Madina. Consensus, p. 127. 
17 AL-Risala i. para. 1334 ; idem, Ibtal a1-Isthsan, p. 303. Cf. al-Sarakhsi, 
Usul. vol. 2. pp. 264-265. 
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an injury which reveals the bone (muwadd(hah). He bases this on analogy 
with a free man whose compensation should be a fixed proportion of his 
blood-money (half for an eye and one-tenth for muwaddihah). 18 
The Hanafis19 hold that there is no such fixed proportion and 
that compensation must be in proportion to the loss in value caused by 
the injury. They base this doctrine on giyas with property, animals and 
the like, because a slave is parallel to property in the sense that it is value 
which is taken into consideration. Furthermore, it is generally agreed that 
compensation for damage to property is the re-imbursement of the 
amount of reduction in its value caused by the damage. 20 By this, we 
encounter a conflict caused by two different grounds of giyas (maqis 
'alayhi) where al-Shafi'i bases his analogy on a free man while the 
Hanafis base it on property. Al-Shafi'i defends his opinion by saying that 
a slave is parallel to a free man in five aspects and parallel to property in 
one aspect only and it is, therefore, more appropriate to base the giyas 
on a free man. 21 
The previous discussion makes one more inclined towards what is 
proposed by the Shafi'is or the jumhur though 'many' is not an absolute 
criterion to determine the preferable view. Not only that, the Qur'an on 
many occasions, has warned the Muslims not to follow the majority for 
'they' might lead the Muslims to stray into misguidance. 22 In other words, 
18 Ibid. (As regards a1-Rtsa. Iah, see paras 1568ff, particularly para. 1597) 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid.: al-Zan jani, Ta chrU, p. 87. 
22 See Q. 6: 116 : Q. 13: 1. etc. See also al-Sarakhsi, UUul, vol. 2, pp. 24-25 
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the "truth" is not always found in majority opinion or majority's 
transmission or consensus, etc. This is evident from the dispute between 
Abu Bakr and the majority of the companions over the necessary action 
that should be taken against those who refused to pay zakat in which the 
most accurate view belongs initially to the minority eventually gaining the 
approval of the majority. 23 However, we have to admit also that, on 
many other occasions, argument is more convincing when supported by 
many indications as evident in many incidents such as with the case of 
temporary marriage (mut'ah) and interest by excess (riba al fads) where 
the overwhelming number of jurists prefer the opinion of the majority of 
the Companions which disapproves of these two contracts. 24 In addition, 
many ahadith can be found that urge the Muslims to commit themselves 
with the majority (al-sawad al-a'' am) or the group (jama'ah) and in turn, 
blame those who do not do so. 25 
It is acceptable therefore to suggest that tarjih by '"many" 
consideration is of great help in deciding the more preferred piece of 
evidence when there appears to be a conflict. This is highly reasonable, 
for the purpose of tar. jih is merely to select what is most likely and more 
probable. To reflect this accuracy. I would like to re-examine the case 
which has been dealt with in chapter five namely the dispute over whether 
23 See Faruqi. ". Jma ", p. 175. 
24 Nay[ al Aw. tar, vol. 5, pp. 298-299 and vol. 6, pp. 270-271 ; a1 Mustafa 
vol. 1. p. 186 ; Fawaf 1. vol. 2. p. 222. 
25 Irshacd p. 274. 
Though each of these two approaches has its shortcomings. a jurist "must opt 
for the one which leaves the smallest number of exceptions and which covers 
most of the propositions related to preference . See Meron, 'The 
development 
of legal thought in flanafi texts', in SI. vol. 30,1969, p. 107. 
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the cause of major ritual impurity is inzal (emission of sperm) or merely 
the meeting of two sexual organs. We have shown before that the ijadith 
which argues in favour of the meeting of sexual organs as causing janabah 
is more reliable on account of this hadith being reported by one of the 
Prophet's wives, which makes her narration more acceptable since the 
subject matter of the thadith concerned the Prophet's family affairs. 26 
In addition, we have produced the words of 'A'ishah that, "I did it with 
the Prophet and we bathed together". 27 This report does nothing other 
than support the relevant hadith in question since it is the report of 
'A'ishah, the closest person to the Prophet particularly in this personal 
matter. 
Not only that, the ha di th has been supported by many 
external considerations. Among others, it is supported by the 
interpretation of Q. 4: 43, "0 ye who believe! Draw not near unto prayer 
when ye are drunken, till ye know that which ye utter, nor when ye are 
polluted, save when journeying upon the road, till ye have bathed.... ". The 
verse obliges one who is in the state of major ritual impurity ' 
(junub) not to perform a prayer until he performs a major ablution. In 
this context, al-Shafi`i asserts that the Arabs understand junub to denote 
sexual intercourse alone and not necessarily inzal. 28 Furthermore, it is 
supported by what is well established in Islamic law that , 
ihadd must be 
implemented on one who commited unlawful sexual intercourse even if 
26 Seepage : 14 0. 
27 See page 140. 
28 Al-Shail'i, Abkam al-Qur'an, vol. 1, p. 47 ; idem, Ikhtiiaf ai jjadith, p. 
496. 
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inzal did not take place. 29 Owing to these indications, I believe that it is 
absolutely clear that janabah comes to exist by mere sexual intercouse 
even if the inzai did not take place. More significantly, this discussion 
demonstrates that by considering other elements of evidence as support to 
original evidence, one can achieve the most reliable interpretation. 
The second problem extensively debated by jurists is related to 
the question of what should be done if two pieces of evidence, say, two 
Qur'anic verses or two ahadith, etc., are found to contradict each other. 
This situation concerns the conflict of two elements of evidence of equal 
level e. g. Qur'an vs. Qur'an or thadith vs. hadith. As for the contrary 
opposition i. e. Qur'an vs. half th or Qur'an or Sunnah vs. ijima' and the 
like, it will be examined only in the following discussion. When the 
Qur'an is found to contradict itself, the preference goes to what is 
supported or explained by another verse which is of very rare occurrence30 
or by a reliable tradition since nobody was more knowledgeable in the 
interpretations of the words of Allah than the Prophet himself. 31 I will 
cite one example to illustrate how the Sunnah can play a significant role 
in removing the conflict between two Qur'anic injunctions. This is not 
strange since the Sunnah is entrusted to explain the ultimate meaning of 
the Qur'an as clearly indicated by the Qur'an itself. 32 The case in mind 
is related to the hukrn of fasting in Ramadan as to whether it is optional 
or obligatory. As a matter of fact, these two rulings are respectively implied 
29 lbid. 
30 The Hanafis did not approve this form of preference because it depends 
on "many ". (see Kashf. vol. 4. p. 79) 
31 Gibb, Islam, p. 63. 
32 See Q. 16 : 44. 
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by two Qur'anic verses. The optional ruling of fasting is taken from Q. 
2: 183-184, "0 ye who believe! Fasting is prescribed for you, even as it was 
prescribed for those before you, that ye may ward off (evil). (Fast) a certain 
number of days; and (for) him who is sick among you or on a journey, (the 
same) number of other days; and for those who can afford it there is a 
ransom; the feeding of a man in need - But whoso doeth good of his own 
accord, it is better for him: and that ye fast is better for you if ye did but 
know"; while the obligatory ruling of fasting is derived from Q. 2: 185, "... 
and whosoever of you is present, let him fast the month, and whosoever of 
you is sick or on a journey, (let him fast the same) number of the days". 33 
However, many traditions are available to explain that the first was 
abrogated by the second. In other words, in the first stage or before 
fasting became strictly imposed by the Shari 'ah, it was only optional: 
those who do not fast even without a proper excuse can replace it by 
merely feeding the needy. At the later stage, the excuse is given only to 
those who are unable to fast. 34 
With regard to conflict between two ha di ths, the general 
criterion to be employed, as mentioned elsewhere, is an examination of the 
reliability of the isnad. However, where the isnads are equally reliable, 
the jurists are divided amongst themselves. Al-Shafi`i has his distinct 
method of preference. In such conflict, according to him, choice should 
be made of the hadith that has the support of (a) the Qur'an ; (b) 
another hadith of the Prophet ; (c) the doctrine of scholars and (d) the 
33 A Tm vol. 1. pp. 210-211 . al-Qurjubi, al-Jarni', vol. 2. pp. 289-290 . al- 
Suyut i, al-Dorr o1-ManUwr. vol. 1, p. 176. 
34 Ibid. 
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opinion of the majority of the Companions or (e) and the one which is 
more consistent with giyas. 35 
The problem of appropriate time for morning prayer could 
exemplify the above. Two hadiths are said to be the kernel of this 
problem. The first, reported by Räfi' b. Khadi j, tells us that the Prophet 
said, "Start your dawn prayer at day-break (isfar) for it is most pious that 
you do so at that time". 36 Another tradition with a contrary impression 
was reported by 'A'sihah that "They, the Muslim women, used to perform 
the dawn prayer with the Prophet and then they dispersed to their homes 
wrapped up in their robes and unrecognized by anyone because of the 
darkness (ghalas )". 37 Al-Shafi'T prefers the dawn prayer to be performed 
during the ghalas as advocated in the second hadi th. He bases his 
preference on the grounds that the hadith which stipulates ghalas is 
more consistent with the meaning of the Qur'an and with several other 
ahadith of the Prophet. To be more precise, he maintains that his hadith 
is parallel with Q. 2: 238, "Carefully observe the prayers including the 
middle prayer" holding that the 'middle prayer' is the dawn prayer. 38 To 
perform the prayers properly and carefully, one needs to perform them at 
the beginning of their scheduled time and this is supported by many other 
hadith where among others, the Prophet is reported to have said "To 
pray at the beginning of the appointed time is to gain God's approval; to 
pray late (i. e. when the time has expired) means that one must beg His 
35 Ai-Risalalt paras. 777-802 ; idem. Ikh ilaf al Ijadith. pp. 522-523. 
36 Ibid. para. 774 and p. 522. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
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pardon". 39 Not only that, to show the accuracy of this preference, he 
further contends that the majority of Companions are reported to have 
agreed in theory and practice that dawn prayer should be performed at 
ghalas. ` 0 
Al-Shafi` i has taken an external consideration to argue that his 
hadi th is more reliable. To this effect, it resembles the first 
consideration discussed before i. e. preference by virtue of many. In spite 
of this, I believe this form of conflict should be examined here to clarify 
some cases and problems which affected two schools of law namely the 
Hanafis and the Malikis i. e. the allegations that both have abandoned one 
or both of the conflicting ahadith and confined themselves instead to 
other elements of evidence such as giyas, istihsan or 'amal (practice of the 
Medinese). 41 The claim however, demands a critical examination for it is 
not only related to our present discussion but also to the purpose of being 
certain of the actual attitude adopted by the ancient jurists who were also 
credited with having established schools of law in Islamic legal history. 
This discussion will lead us to another unavoidable related discussion 
which is the conflict between two pieces of evidence of unequal level such 
as the Qur'an vs. the Sunnah and the like. Both concerns therefore, can 
be treated jointly in one form of discussion as follows. 
39 Ibid. See also Raurak p. 208. 
40 Al-Risalah, paras. 799-801. 
41 See pages 131,272 and Origins, pp. 23,64. 
Ibn Hanbal, on the contrary, is famous for his personal inclination to remove 
any conflict within the framework of traditions. If he cannot do this, he 
prefers not to answer at all. For details, see Spectorsky, "Ahmad Ibn flanbal's 
figh", in JAOS. vol. 102.1982, passim. 
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The Hanafis who are also called ahi al-qiyas or ahl al-naaar, 42 
have been alleged as considering giyas superior to khabar al-wahid when 
they conflict. However, this is not true for the following reason. As 
required by a genuine examination, we have to examine this allegation by 
looking solely into their own literature and not into their opponents' 
writings. 43 Al-Shafi`i, one of their opponents, on many occasions, has 
criticised the Hanafis (as well as the Malikis) because they did not adhere 
to the taa. dith but to other evidence such as giyas. 44 Al-Shafi'i repeatedly 
says that no giyas is valid when a relevant Sunnah is available45 or 
"reasoning and questioning are irrelevant in the face of the tradition of the 
Prophet". 46 So, that which comes after a Sunnah (in the hierarchy of 
sources) constitutes a proof only if a Sunnah is lacking. In order to 
show his opponent's tendency, al-Shafi'i, among others, has brought 
forward the case of a slave belonging to many masters who has been 
manumitted by one of them. Both al-Shafi'i and the Hanafis held that 
this master should pay the other masters for their share in the slave and 
the slave becomes a totally free man. 
42 IkhtUaf at -j[adith. p. 563. 
G. Makdisi has pointed out that sources are contradictory with reference to 
the understanding of the terms ahi a[-liadith and its atonym; ahi al-ray or ald 
al-giyas or aht al-rw&ar. See Makdisi, 'The significance of the sunn i schools of 
law in Islamic religious history". in MMES. vol. 10.1979, pp. 3-4. 
43 Al-A''ami, On Schacht, p. 47. 
44 Origins, pp. 23,110. 
45 Al-Risalak para. 1817 ; idem. Ikhtilaf al- Hadith, p. 563. 
46 Ikht f at_Hadi pp. 479,484-485. 
336 
However, if the master cannot afford to pay, the slave, according 
to the Hanafis, must be given the opportunity to earn so that he can buy 
his freedom from the other masters. According to al-Shafi'i, the Hanafis, 
in this legal view have rejected the concept of partial freedom contained in 
the tradition which was the view of al-Shafi'i himself i. e. (faqad 'utiqa 
minhu ma 'ataga). Al-Shafi`i further argues that they (the Hanafis) 
formulated this conclusion on the basis of analogy with the problem of 
inheritance. In the case of three slaves whose master had died, they 
became partially free, for only one third of every slave is considered 'free' 
from slavery. This is so because, in terms of inheritance, more than one 
third of a property (i. e. the slaves as in this case) of a deceased cannot be 
distributed to outsiders namely the slaves. Accordingly, each of them 
should work to earn some money to buy his freedom of the amount of the 
remaining two-thirds of the value. In this, the Hanafis were said by al- 
Shafi'i to prefer qiyas over the Sunnah which is reliable and should be 
adhered to. 47 
I think this is an inappropriate example from which to argue 
that giyas is superior to khabar al-wahid in the Hanafi school of law. 
As far as the case of partial freedom of a slave is concerned, it should be 
noted that arguments put forward by those who do not accept the concept 
of partial freedom were not solely based on giyas. Apart from this, there 
are some reports which assert that that particular slave should be allowed 
to work and to buy his freedom from the other masters. Moreover, on the 
last sentence of al-Shäfi` i's hadith, that is "fagad 'utiga minhu ma 
'ataqa", there has been dispute as to whether it is originally from the 
47 Ibid., pp. 562-564. 
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tongue of the Prophet or from one of the hadith' s transmitters. 48 This 
shows that those who disagree with al-Shafi'i's opinion cannot be 
considered as those who put the qiyas over the Sunnah, as alleged by al- 
Shafi'i. As we shall see, al-Shafi'i and the Hanafis are alike in this 
regard; the former, on many occasions has himself rejected one of two 
conflicting hadiths by adopting giyas. It is quite clear that al-Shafi'i 
who is credited to have been the first jurist to put legal sources in a 
proper hierarchical order, 49 opines that giyas should not contradict the 
text since al-Shafi'i does not consider qiyas to be one of the ujui but 
merely far'. In other words, the result of qiyas should be derived solely 
from the usul called khabar lazim that is the Qur'an, the Sunnah and yma` 
. 
50 Any contradiction between giyas and these sources is valueless for 
the former is not independent by itself in terms of authority, let alone able 
to contradict these usul. In practice, however, al-Shäfi`i himself uses giyas 
" to judge between contradictory tjadith and to suppress the one which 
he rejects, arguing that the one which is adopted by him is more 
consistent with giyas. 51 For example, there are two conflicting ahadith of 
the Prophet on tayammum reported by 'Ammar b. Yasir and the other by 
Ibn al-Sammah. Rejecting the former hadith, al-Shafi'i argues that Ibn al- 
Sammah's hadith is more consistent and in agreement with the Qur'an 
and qiyas. 52 
48 Ibid. ; idem, Ikhtitaf Malik pp. 197-198. See also Nays al Awl . r, vol. 6, pp. 
208-209. 
49 Abu Zahrah. al-Shaf'i. pp " 16 3 -163 
50 pl_ShaB'i, Ibtal a! -Istibsan, p. 302. 
51 Idem, Ikhtilaf a1- Llad i th, p. 487. 
52 Ibid. pp. 496-497. 
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As mentioned elsewhere, it is a natural and common practice in 
legal study that every jurist must provide an argument for his opinion. 
Otherwise, it is baseless and worthless. This applies also to the case in 
question in which the Hanafis have based their interpretation of the 
hadith on an analogical approach. The case therefore does not genuinely 
link to the so-called "abandonment of khabar al-wahid" rather than to 
different ytihads and arguments in determining the precise meaning of 
the hadith in question (particularly of the last part of it). Leaving aside 
the polemical writing by al-Shafi`i, we should confine ourselves to what is 
actually proposed by the Hanafis. One example may be sufficient. 
Holding that a burst of laughter (qahqahah)53 in prayer renders both the 
prayer and the ablution void, the Hanafis remark that if there was no 
tradition on this point in question, giyas requires what is implied by 
other schools of law that only the prayer becomes void and not the 
ablution. 54 This shows that the Hanafis are concerned with the hadith 
which is heavier than giyas in this particular case. Al-Sarakhsi adds 
that it is exactly on this ground that Abu Hanifah has opined that nabidh 
Calder writes that "the problem of conflicting khabar a1-wahid emerges in al- 
Riscilah (para. 1250) where it is confused with the problem of a single khabar 
permitting two possible meanings (para 1251). A rudimentary scheme of 
preference has been brought forward (para 1251) but whether it would be 
sufficient to ensure that all jurists would always prefer the same badith (or 
the same interpretation of an ambigiuous hadith) might well be doubted". 
(Calder "Ikhtilaf ", p. 60) 
53 For the lhadith. see page 234 
54 A1-SarakhsI. UUu1, vol. 2. p. 153. See also Ibn Badran's al-Madkhal. p. 43 
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of dates is permissible though it is intoxicant because Abu Hanifah has 
relied on the hadith instead of giyos. 55 
We are not concerned now with whether or not these are the 
correct legal consequences, rather to show that these arguments have 
clearly displayed the overriding authority attached by the Hanafis to the 
Sunnah of the Prophet. Moreover, they contend that there is no extension 
of analogy in the presence of a tradition and adherence must be shown to 
the tradition. 56 Al-Sarakhsi, for example, said that qiyas is always 
inferior to khabar wa hid when conflicting. 57 To end the discussion 
concerning the Hanafis, I would like to quote Hurgronje who says, "Again 
I should like to emphasise that it is unjustifiable to regard Abu Hanifah 
as a despiser of traditions. The Waraqat and its commentaries state 
explicitly that, whereas Ibn Hanbal is inclined to accept weak traditions 
(shad) as arguments and Shafi`i relies only upon those with complete 
isnads (mutawatir or musnad), Abu Hanifah and Malik regard a whole 
class of traditions (mursan which al-Shafi`i had considered unreliable, as 
valid arguments Lhujjah)". 58 
55 Ibid. See also Kashf. vol. 1. p. 309: Ibn Taymlyyah. Fatawa. vol. 20, pp. 
304-305. 
For more details, see "al-Sunnah in the School of Opinion " in al-Qar&iawi. 
al-Madkhal pp. 47-50. 
56 Abu Yusuf, Kitab al Athar. p. 28. as cited in Atjmad Jjasan's The Early, p. 
143. 
57 Al-Sarakhsi, Ujul. vol. 1, p. 144. See also Khan, Is[amic Jurisprudence, p. 
109. 
58 Hurgronje, Selected Works, pp. 286-287 (note no. 4) 
Mention should be made that even al-Shafl'i. who is according to many 
scholars. the champion of the Sunnah, has been charged by Ibn 'Abd al- 
Hakam of neglecting the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet in a work 
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On the other hand, of the Malikis, it has also been alleged, 
particularly in the writings of al-Shafi'i that 'amal or the practice of the 
Medinese prevails over khabar al-wahid when they conflict. 59 Let us take 
the case of khiyar at-majlis as a way of testing the soundness of this 
allegation. As far as the hadith " parties to sale are entitled to retract 
until they separate. ( ma lam yatafarraqa)", is concerned, Malik b. Anas is 
charged with rejecting the hadith arguing that the hadith implication is 
'contray to what is established or practised by the people of Madinah. 60 
Again, it is not appropriate to conclude from this that Malik, in his 
legal thought, gives precedence to 'amal over khabar al-wahid if they 
conflict. Regarding khiyar al-majlis, the Malikis (as well the Hanafis) are of 
the opinion that when a contract is completed by offer and acceptance, 
both the buyer and the seller are bound to all legal consequences arising 
from that contract. Both have no right to repudiate that contract. 61 To 
support this interpretation, probably, we find Malik in his al-Muwatta ' 
arguing in favour of this, by saying simply "Here in Medina we have no 
such known limit and no established practice Lhadd ma'ruj) for this 
matter". 62 
entitled "a! -Racld 'ala al-Shafi'i fima Khalafa fihi al-Kitab wa al-Sunnah ". Al- 
A'zami further asserts that , "if we were to 
believe every scholar's accusation 
against his fellows, few would be found who were total adherents of the 
Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet. (On Schacht. p. 90) 
59 Origins. p. 64 : al-Jjafnawi, Dirasat: p. 6; a! Fikr al-Sams, vol. 1. p. 50; 
Coulson, "Doctrine and practice in Islamic law : one aspect of the problem". 
in BSOAS, vol. 18,1956, p. 225. 
60 A1-Shafi'i, Ikhtilaf Malik pp. 219-220 ; al-ffafnawi, Dirasdt. p. 276. 
61 Nagt al Awtar, vol. 5, pp. 289-293 particularly p. 292. 
62 Al-Muwaaa ', (YJ . vol. 2. p. 273 ; al-Shaf'i, 1khtilaf Malik, p. 220 
Origins. p. 64. 
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However, this is not an adequate proof from which to suggest 
that Mälik gives priority and precedence to 'aural over the hadith. The 
Malik quotation that no established practice was found in Madinah in 
favour of khiyar al-majlis is merely, as is evident throughout his argument, 
to support one of two possible interpretations implied by a particular 
Kadi th or to select one of two conflicting aha df th. 63 There is a 
disagreement in giving the precise meaning of two words in the hadith 
namely the meaning of separation (tafarruq) and two parties (al- 
mutabayi'ayn). Malik thought that what was meant by separation in this 
case is only separation by word. Hence, he did not permit any party to a 
sale contract to change his mind after acceptance, even if both parties 
were still at the place of contract. 64 As regards ' two parties ', it was 
meant by Malik as two bargaining parties (mutasawimayn) and not 
two parties of buyer and seller (mutabayi'ayn). 65 It is only to support his 
doctrine, according to my opinion. that Malik resorted to the practice of 
the Medinese for it reflects the continuous practice by the early Muslims 
starting from the Prophet's time. It seems that 'amai is nothing other 
than a means to confirm and to support a particular argument and not to 
be put over the Sunnah when they conflict. 66 
The translation is taken from Coulson, A History, p. 46. 
To see the comment of Schacht on Coulson's translation, see Schacht, 
"Modernism and traditionalism in a history of Islamic law". in MES, vol. 1, 
1965, p. 397. 
63 See a1 A! ami . On Schacht, pp. 56,58-61 ; al-Uafnawi. Dirasat p. 7. 
64 Nayl a! Aw. ar, vol. 5, p. 292 ; Bidayak vol. 2, p. 170. 
65 Ibid. 
66 See al-Muswaddah. p. 207 ; al-A'Zam1, On Schacht. p. 58. 
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It appears to me also that the 'rejection' of khiyar al-majiis by 
Malik might be grounded on one of his principles that is, khabar al-wahid 
should not be taken into consideration as bearing legal impact when it 
contradicts a particular legal principle which is certain and definite in 
character. In another case, he did not rely on the hadith that " when a 
dog licks a dish, wash it seven times, one of which must be with clean, 
sand", arguing that the hadith, being solitary, contradicts a definite legal 
principle stated clearly in the Qur'an that one is permitted to consume 
what has been hunted by a trained hunting dog (mukallabin). 67 Likewise, 
it is a principle in Islam that one cannot change his mind after giving his 
acceptance in any transaction. This attitude, relatively speaking, 
corresponds to what has been reported that both 'A'ishah and Ibn 'Abbas 
had ignored the hadith that requires a Muslim who just woke up from 
sleep to wash his hand three times before putting his hand in the basin 
for any other purposes such as ablution simply because this hadith was 
undertood as standing against the principle of lifting hardship in Islam. 68 
On the other hand, the details of the manner in which Mälik 
applied his doctrine of 'aural have been the subject of a major study by 
67 Al-Mudawwanah, vol. 1, pp. 5-6 ; al-BuLi, al-Maulahah, pp. 188-190; 
Athmad Jiasan, 'The Sources". pp. 126-127. 
An illustrative explanation of ikhtilaf between the Shafi'is and the Malikis on 
the question of cleanliness and uncleanliness of the dog can be found in 
Ebied and Young's "An unpublished legal work on a difference between the 
Shafi'ites and Malikites", in OH, vol. 8,1977, passim. 
68 Al-Thagafi, "aI Ziyadah ", p. 258. 
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one scholar69 which might offer a more detailed exposition of 'amal in 
Maliki legal thought. For example, he has brought forward two distinct 
cases to show the manner in which 'amal was adopted by Malik. In the 
question of judgement on the basis of the oath of the plaintiff supported 
by a single witness; Malik cites ha di th and athar to support the 
continuity of this precept. None of these texts, however, provides 
fundamental information such as the limitation that this procedure is to 
be applied only to money matters and not in cases of libel, criminal cases, 
punishments and so forth. All of which Malik provides from Madinan 
'amaL Similarly, Malik cites texts which report that the Prophet and his 
Companions performed mash occasionally when performing ritual 
ablutions. None of these texts, however, describes how mash was 
performed, the information for which Malik provides from 'amaL7O 
As regards the practice of the Medinese, relatively speaking, it 
receives a considerable account from other schools of law for it may add 
weight to a particular argument particularly in cases of conflict. Without 
any hesitation, al-Ghazali who belongs to a school of law which strongly 
criticised the 'am. al, has propounded that a tradition which is supported by 
the practice of the Medinese should be preferred for Madinah is the city of 
the hijrah and the city of the revealed abrogating verses. 71 Likewise, Abu 
Yusuf has changed a number of his opinions when he learned that the 
69 U. F. 'Abdullah. "Malik's concept of 'amal in the light of Maliki legal theory 
". Ph. D dissertation. University of Chicago, 1978 (particularly chapters 3-8) 
(cited after as Ama ) 
70 Ibid., pp. 398-399. See also F. Rahman. "Concepts", p. 17. 
71 Ai-Musts., vol. 2, p. 396. 
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practices of the Medinese were contrary to what he had been holding as 
valid. 72 
We can note that the Sunnah as the second material source of 
Islam is undoubtedly upheld by every school of law73 in all cases of 
conflict provided it is reliable. This is an agreed notion among them but 
problems occur when the authenticity of a particular hadith in question 
is suspected for one reason or another or it is susceptible to many possible 
interpretations. In cases in which conflict takes place either between two 
possible interpretations of one hadith or between two hadiths, the 
jurists must resort to means that they thought to be the most accurate 
way of preferring one over the other after the failure of reconciliation. The 
jurists, as ordinary people, were not bound to follow a standard scheme of 
preference. If Malik is charged with resorting to 'amal in selecting the most 
preferred view, likewise, other jurists should be equally criticised for they 
also have resorted to their own criteria of judging between two 
contradictory ahad i th or interpretations. We have already pointed out in 
chapter five that al-Shafi'i does accept the authority of hadith mursal 
conditionally. Among others, he is willing to accept the interrupted isnad 
which comes from leading tabi'in only. Interrupted isnad from other 
tabi'in, al-Shafi'i argues, might carry greater room for uncertainty. 74 
This reveals that the attitude held by al-Sh 'i is only a matter of 
personal consideration. It becomes obvious when al-Shafi'i did not accept 
all the marasii (plural of mursal) reported by leading tabi'in. He accepts 
72 Ibn Taymiyyah. Fhtawa. vol. 20, p. 304 ; al-A'gami. On Schacht, p. 56. 
73 Ai-Tagrir, vol. 2, p. 225 ; Musa. llam, vol. 1. p. 17 ; al-Zuhayli, al-Figh. vol. 
1. p. 9; fujjiyat al-Sunnah. p. 21. 
74 Al-Risalah. paras. 1277,1286. 
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the marasii of Ibn al-Musayyib but he does not accept the marasil of al- 
Zuhri though both are the leading tabs n. 75 
Supposing that it was true that Malik did ignore some solitary 
traditions in favour of the contrary existing practice of the Medinese, one 
should understand this controversial problem in a manner that was 
perceived by Malik. Only on this condition, can one appreciate the legal 
thought of Malik. This has led Abu Zahrah to note that the practice 
was upheld by Malik, not solely on account of the practice of a group of 
people but rather on the basis of a pre-dominant and widely accepted 
tradition (called practice) over solitary traditions when they conflict. 76 As 
far as Malik's contention that 'aural prevails over tradition is concerned, 
mention should be made that from nine hundred or so traditions from the 
Prophet quoted by Mälik, no more than ten are neglected in favour of 
practice or for other reasons. 77 Accordingly, this is not an adequate basis 
from which to argue that Malik and the Malikis considered practice more 
authoritative than the traditions of the Prophet. 78 Although Malik 
frequently quotes many authorities which reflect, to some extent, the 
75 Al-Bayhagt, Ma'rifat al-Sworn wa al-Athar, vol. 1. p. 82. (cited from 
Ahmad Yusuf, al-Shafl'i, p. 79) 
76 Abu Zahrah, Malik, p. 265. See also al-Shalab i, al-Madkhal. p. 190. 
Shah Walt Allah noted that" when Imam Malik uses the word al-Sunnah in 
the Muwaa' he means the established fundamental principles". (al- 
Musawwa minAhadith al-Muuxkffa'. Mekkah, 1315 A. H.. pp. 15-16, cited from 
Guraya, Origir%p. 13) 
77 Al-A _zam i, On Schacht p. 61. 
78 Ibid. See also Doi, "The MuwaJa' of Imam Malik on the genesis of the 
Shari'ah law ;a western confusion", in HI, vol. 4,1981, p. 39. 
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practices of the Medinese, he may or may not follow these authorities. 79 
Yet, if we examine the contentions made by al-Shafi'i against Malik in 
Ikhtilaf al-Hadith, "these contentions pertain almost exclusively to hadith 
which Malik himself has transmitted in the Muwatta' on the authority of 
the most highly regarded Madman transmitters. The difference between 
al-Shafi'i and Malik, therefore, is one of theory. Malik studies hadith 
against the background of Madman'amal and al-Shafi'i studies Madman 
'areal against the background of hadith. If a legal text is ambigiuous, Ma- 
"lik removes its ambiguity by placing it within the semantic context of 
'amalwhereas for al-Shafi'i, it is the apparent (zahir) or literal meaning of 
the text itself which one is to follow. He no longer regards Madman 'amal 
to be a valid semantic context to the hadith'. 80 
By this, we have seen that external consideration may play an 
important role in achieving a proper legal judgement. The Sunnah of the 
Prophet, the practice of the Companions or rather the practice of the 
Medinese, the result of or the consistency with giyas and so forth are 
extremely useful in this regard. In other words, we can also say that the 
more a particular evidence is supported by many other acceptable 
arguments, the stronger it becomes in terms of preferring one over the 
other. 
In concluding remarks, I have this to say. Relatively speaking, 
al-Shafi'i did not impose many pre-conditions on acceptance of a 
79 'Abdullah, Amal , pp. 328-329. 
80 Ibid. 
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particular khabar al-wahid as did the other opposing schools of law. 81 As 
for al-Shafi'i, "a hadith from the Prophet is self-validating, requiring 
confirmation from no other quarter. It is neither reinforced nor weakened 
by a report from any source. Should it be reported that one of the 
Companions acted otherwise, it is incumbent upon people to follow the 
report from the Prophet, ignoring all other reports. It is possible that one 
of his oldest associates, well - versed in the Prophet's way, may yet have 
been unaware of some element of his practice known to another". 82 
Others, however, have set particular conditions to confirm the reliability 
of traditions83 and on many occasions, these conditions are believed to 
bear a significant strength in case of conflict and preference, for which, 
this matter has been included within the present discussion. 
At this stage, we should devote time to a separate re-examination 
of the conflict between two unequal pieces of evidence more carefully. In 
the previous discussion, we have hinted that hadith from the Prophet, 
even a solitary hadith, must take priority over other elements of evidence 
such as the opinion of the Companions, the practice of the community, 
giyas, etc. However, in the absence of a hadith from the Prophet, the 
jurists undoubtedly followed the precedent of the Companions. 84 The 
opinions and practices of the Companions were taken into consideration 
81 Al-Siba'i, al-Swtnah, p. 440. See also jjujjiyat al-Sunnah, pp. 246-247 ; al- 
ffafnawi. Dirasat. pp. 297-299. 
As far as the condition of al-Shafi'i is concerned, see al-Risalak paras. 10008 
82 1khtUaf al-jIadjth, p. 479. See also idem Ikhb2af Malik p. 191ff. 
The translation is taken from Burton. The Sources. p. 14. 
83 See page 78ff. 
84 jju, jjat Allah, vol. 1, p. 145. 
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owing to the fact that they participated with the Prophet in applying divine 
orders and were intimately acquainted with the Qur'an, its spirit and its 
promulgation by the Prophet. In other words, they were better informed 
than those who came later because they had known the Prophet and were 
thus capable of interpreting what he had said. 85 In cases where they 
themselves differed, the subsequent jurists might differ from the 
Companions' opinions and practices. 86 In order to prefer one opinion over. 
the other, many means are taken into consideration. Al-Shafi'i, for 
example, preferred the opinion of the first four Caliphs over others. 87 
Some of the jurists, to a certain extent, have placed the preference 
according to the subject matter of dispute. If dispute falls in the so-called 
"haram and halal", the opinion of Mu'adh should be given more 
adherence. 88 Similarly, the fatwas or the opinions of Zayd b. Thabit in 
cases of inheritance should be upheld for he was the person among the 
Companions to best comprehend the law of inheritance. 89 Although many 
other considerations can be added to this discussion. I will devote no 
further study to them for they have either been discussed or are of no 
significance in terms of an accurate tarj i. 
85 Raurah, p. 84, al-A_zami, On Schacht, pp. 9,83. 
86 p 'Alwan i, UsuI, p. 26. 
87 Origins, p. 18; F. Rahman, "Concepts", p. 19. 
Other jurists are holding the same way of preference. See al-Muswaddah. pp. 
85.86-87,314. 
88 Subul al-Salcun. vol. 1, p. 119 ; al-Mankluut p. 450. 
89 Ibid. 
For the basis of this preference, see al-Bayhagi's Sunan al-Kubra . (vol. 6, p. 
210) in which the Prophet is reported to have said, 'The best among you (in 
terms of knowledge) in inheritance, halal and liaram and legal judgement are 
Zayd, Mu'adh and 'Ali (respectively)". 
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The most difficult aspect one confronts throughout the foregoing 
discussion is the problem of setting up a proper hierarchical order of legal 
sources. As previously mentioned, the absence of this order would create 
many points of ikhtilaf in figh. 90 The intention of the present discussion 
is to ensure that every jurist has the same priority of sources in his mind. 
Though it is not an easy task and a painstaking study, we should, at 
least, try to open up the relevant arguments in order to lay down a proper 
order of hierarchy of sources, if possible. 
Al-Shafi'i has been credited by al-Razi, as the first to put the so- 
called "mamtib al-adillah" in a proper scheme that could be useful reference 
to the jurists. 91 It was clear that al-Shafi'i has placed al-Qur'an together 
with the Sunnah and iJma' as the usul (roots) leaving qiyas to be considered 
as merely a branch of these usul. 92 At the same time, he has argued that 
the order, as put by himself, must be observed in terms of supplying 
evidence in legal arguments for the sake of maratib al-adiffah i. e. the one 
that should come first is the first in the list. 93 
After al-Shafi`i, al-Ghazali seems to be the first jurist to have 
put legal sources in a proper list of priority. He says, "a mujtahid should 
look first into gma', followed by the Qur'an and the sunnah mutawatirah 
where both are equal. Then, he should observe the generality of the Qur'an 
and its 'apparent' meaning. The following stage is to investigate among 
90 Seepage 4, 
91 Al-Raz i, Manaqib al-Shaft' i. p. 57. cited from a1-Manaur. Um4 p. 25. 
92 Al-Shafi'i, Ibtal al-Istitisan, p. 302. 
93 Al-RisalaLk paras. 1815-1818. See also AJJmad Yusuf, a! -Shafi'i, p. 46. 
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khabar al-wahid, the relevant traditions that could specify the 'umum of 
al-Qur'an. The last stage is to consider qiyas .... if two qiyas or two umuni 
or two traditions are conflicting, he must resort to tarj i th". 94 Al-Ghazali 
and some of the jurists have exaggerated the value of iyma' so much so 
that they consider it prior to the Qur'an and the Sunnah. In favour of 
this view it is argued that both the Qur'an and the Sunnah are liable to 
abrogation and interpretation whereas ijma' is infallible and decisive. 95 
There is no room for doubt if a rule is supported by lima'. It is also prior 
to giyas because the latter is always liable to error. It is worthy of remark 
that the yrna' which is considered prior to the Qur'an and the Sunnah is 
the kind which is decisive, verbal, visible (mushahad) and reported by 
tawatur. As regards speculative ijima', the Qur'an and the Sunnah are 
prior to it. 96 Supporting this viewpoint, al-Isfahan i remarks that ijma' is 
superior to all sources of law (adülah) and no authority can be basically 
compared with it. He ascribes this view to a large number of scholars. 97 
94 AI-MustcQfa, vol. 2, p. 392. 
95 Ibid, ; Raute p. 208 ; Ibn Badran, al-Madkhal, p. 196; EI 2, vol. 3. p. 
1023. 
96 p}1mad jjasan, Ijma', pp. 149-150. 
Al-Shafi'i. on the contrary. places Uma' after the Qur'an and the Surmah i. e. 
Uma' cannot be placed on an equal footing with the Qur'an (al-Risalah para. 
1815f. ) 
It appears to me that al-yma' which is not equal to both the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah is the consensus of legal specialists which is not accepted by al- 
Shafl'i. This is so because al-Shafl'i. on other occasions, has placed (fma' 
as equal to both the Qur'an and the Sunnah provided it is the agreement of 
the whole ummah, both specialists and non-specialists. (see a[-Risalak p. 599 
note no. 10 ; Ahmad Yusuf, W-Shafi'i, p. 91) 
97 Irshad p. 78. 
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This method of preference however, is theoretical rather than 
practical. No single genuine example has been produced to confirm this 
particular conflict which could be followed by a genuine tarjih simply 
because no genuine Yma' would contradict the Qur'an. The famous 
example given in this area of conflict is related to the prohibition of 
marrying one's wife's maternal or paternal aunt concurrently. 98 It is 
true that the Qur'an did not prohibit such a marriage whereas in turn, 
through implied meaning of the phrase "wa uhilla lakum ma wars' dha. -- 
. kum", the Qur'an has no objection to such a marriage. The prohibition is 
merely established through a tradition of the Prophet which notes that 
such a marriage would break the ties of good relationship between one's 
wife and her relatives. 99 The gma' has been alleged to have taken place in 
terms of including such a marriage in the prohibitory list of marriages as 
prescribed by the Qur'an. 100 Therefore, it is unacceptable to regard this 
conflict as a conflict between gma' and the Qur'an. It is rather the 
conflict between the Qur'an and the hadith that can be successfully 
removed by takhsis. 101 
Likewise, in the controversy over the status of the Sunnah 
compared to the Qur'an, at least three contrary orders can be found. 
Al-Shafi'i holds that the (reliable) Sunnah and the Qur'an are equal, 
arguing that both are divinely revealed. 102 By contrast, the Hana is 
98 A[-FTkr al-Sami , vol. 1, p. 45. 
99 Muslim, Sahib, vol. 4, p. 135. 
100 Shahan, Dirasal pp. 51-52. 
101 Ai-Risalah, para. 629 ; al-Siba'i, ai-Sunnah, p. 378. 
102 , gl_Burhan, vol. 2, p. 1186. 
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assert that the Qur'an is superior to the Sunnah. 103 Among others, they 
argue on the basis of the tradition of Mu'adh on the eve of his departure 
to Yemen as a gadi and a teacher. The tradition clearly organises the 
order of sources into a proper manner in which the Qur'an was given 
the first priority. This order was then confirmed by the Prophet's 
approval. 104 It is not strange, therefore, when one finds two terms used 
by the Hanafis, unlike the jumhur, to indicate two contrary implications 
namely fand and wajib. This is due to their notion that obligatory order 
instituted by the Qur'an is considered as fully obliged known as fare, 
whereas it is called wajib if it is constructed through the Sunnah. 105 
Ahmad b. Hanbal, on the contrary, prefers the Sunnah over the Qur'an 
when they conflict, for the Sunnah always explains the Qur'an. l06 
As mentioned earlier, no definite solution is available on this 
dispute. Moreover, this attitude is not explicitly stated by each imam ; 
rather it is a conclusion or observation made by the subsequent jurists 
which is further attributed to a particular imam. This observation, as a 
matter of fact, was personal in consideration. It is evident when the imams 
.... 
themselves were not consistent with this attitude in their procedures 
in passing fatawa e. g. the Qur'an or the Sunnah having been 
interchangeably put at the top of the rank of evidence. Furthermore, both 
103 A1-Nasafi. Kash f. vol. 2. p. 51. 
Al-Shatibi is believed to have the same contention. In his al-Muwafagat 
he argued the primacy of the Qur'an over the Sunnah. See Hallaq. " The 
primacy of the Qur'an in Shajibi's legal theory". in Islamic Studies presented 
to Charles J. Adam, ed. W. Hallaq and D. P. Little. 1991. p. 78. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Nayi aL Aw. ar. vol. 2. p. 230. 
106 A1-Muswaddak p. 311. 
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are, in fact, inseparable as the Sunnah explains and clarifies the Qur'an 
and - most importantly- applies its teachings and methodology. 107 I believe 
however, this dispute and the like should be comprehensively and not 
partially judged. For a partial attempt at examination and judging would 
lead the whole legal sources in terms of a proper hierarchical order into an 
extreme and unsolvable conflict. 
On the other hand, some of the jurists attempt to give the first 
priority in a contrary order. Neither the text nor the yma' should be 
regarded at the top of this order. Al-Tuff, for example, stipulates and 
defends the view that regard for human welfare has or must have priority 
of consideration above all forms of religious texts (that is, above all texts 
considered as legal or semi-legal, whether in the Qur'an or in the Sunnah) 
or other sources regarded as legal by the jurists such as yma' and giyas 
when they conflict. 108 He argues that the Qur'anic texts and the 
Sunnah are divergent and contradictory to each other and that the latter 
is self-contradictory in its texts and sources of transmission. This does 
not apply to maslahah. 109 In short, maslahah or regard for human 
welfare, is, according to him, the highest and strongest legal source or 
principle, which consitutes the very aim and objective of religion. 110 He 
further argues that sources other than ma 1ahah are not valid unless they 
display promotion of benefit or prevention of evil. In other words, 
107 . plwani, 'Towards a proper reading of the Sunnah', in The Qur'an and 
the Sunnah; the time-space factor. Virginia and London, 1991, p. 28. See also 
al-Zarqa', al-Madkhal, vol. 1, p. 64. 
108 Al-Tuff, a[-Risalah fi Uhu[ aL-Malikiyyah, as cited in BuLi. al-Mc 1aJah. 
p. 202ff. See also 'Abd al=Aziz, " al-MgSlafjah ", p. 105 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
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ma. 2lahah is the aim while other legal sources, be it the Qur'an, the 
Sunnah or yma', are merely the methods. Should there be any conflict 
between them, maslahah takes precedence. 111 
Again, we are not able to provide a final and clear-cut answer to 
this proposal for many reasons. First of all, as repeatedly stated, a 
comprehensive judgement is more acceptable than a narrowed and partial' 
judgement for cases are variable according to subject-matter, times, 
places, customs, circumstances, persons, etc. A correct legal view in a 
particular case does not necessarily prove applicable to the same case in 
another time, place and circumstance. As regards maslahah, though Islam 
strongly recognised human welfare, it was left to the scholars and 
specialists to offer the details where Islam provides only fundamental 
principles of maslahah. 112 As a logical consequence and more 
importantly, maslathah itself would give rise to a variety of views for it is 
not sharply defined. The second reason is that maslahah is strictly 
directed to matters of human relationships, that is, in legal, social or 
political matters. This is acknowledeged even by al-Tuff himself 113 
Hence, to prefer what is only in conformity or harmony with the regard for 
human welfare is not appreciated for the maslahah is not only highly 
111 Kerr, Islamic Reform. p. 100, Abd a1=Aziz, "a! -Ma kdlah ". p. 114. 
However, it should be noted that the priority of masto, hah over both texts 
and (Jma' (as argued by al-7I jfi ) is constructed on the ground of bayan and 
taki i, a ; not by abandoning both. See Mu , afa Zayd, al-Maalahah 
fi at- 
Tbshri' al-Islams , 
(p. 289) as cited in al-Zuhayli, UUul, vol. 1, pp. 803. note 
no. 3; Mahmasani, Fblsafah, pp. 16-117. 
112 See Bannerman. Islam, pp. 196-197. 
113 'mod al-'Aziz, "al-Ma laihah ", pp. 98,100,166; al-Dasugi, "al-Ijtihad', p. 
755. 
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variable, as previously said, but also because of its limitation to those 
laws that are concerned with transactions only. Since other parts of law, 
although contradictory such as personal worship are not applicable to 
maslahah, this consideration of tarjih ought not to be generally adopted. 
Moreover, al Tuff himself did not give further details on how to achieve a 
valid maslahah and accordingly to prefer it over other sources when they 
conflict. This gives the impression that his theory does not fit the 
practical case for the maslahah, as previously said, is unfixed and flexible 
as well as variable according to unlimited considerations. 115 
As a conclusion of this discussion, I would like to re-assert that 
a general attempt to organise the order of the hierarchy or priority of 
sources e. g. the Qur'an always prevails over the Sunah or vice-versa, is 
neither an accurate nor a consistent way of preference, for every single 
case of conflict should be treated exclusively on its own backgound and 
problems. To apply this order to every single case of conflict may render 
legal consequences more conflicting for legal sources, indeed, are 
substantially concurrent and complement each other. 116 To put, say, the 
Qur'an or the Sunnah or ijma' or maslahah or other sources and 
considerations always at the top of the list is inaccurate. Nevertheless, 
the question remains as to what is the proper solution of this? 
However, if a comprehensive order of legal sources remains 
necessary, I would like to suggest what has been propounded by Sobhi 
Mahmassani, a modern Muslim lawyer. He says, "Effort must be made to 
reconcile all hearts and unite the various schools. This, in my opinion. 
115 M .. BZ . aI-Ma slabah. p. 214. 
116 mad jjasan. "The Sources", p. 127. 
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can be achieved by a return to the same and only original sources of law. 
Such a return should take into consideration the following bases: 
(a) To adopt the provisions of the Qur'an as the first basis for Islamic 
teachings and jurisprudence ; to distinguish in this respect between 
compulsory and voluntary or directive provisions on the lines already 
attempted by interpreters of the Qur'an and scholars of the science of legal 
sources ; and then apply these provisions in accordance with their 
respective significance. 
(b) To adopt the Sunnah in all obligatory religious provisions, provided that 
this Sunnah is authentic and acceptable in the various Muslim schools 
and that it is consistent with the text of the Qur'an. 
(c) To adopt the rest of the Sunnah, that is to say the traditional 
teachings and precepts whose authenticity had been disputed by reliable 
leaders of the schools, provided they are consistent with reason and 
acceptable to jurists and scholars of the science of legal sources (71m ai- 
usul) on the basis of the principle mentioned above, namely the truly 
traditional is always consistent with the truly rational. 
(d) To choose from the legal rules based on the interpretations of jurists 
those which are most suitable for the needs of modern society, public 
interest and principles of justice and equity". 117 
Although this proposal remains doubtful, it at least, offers a 
significant principle in terms of the hierarchical order of sources where 
legal texts still occupy the first priority. Masiahah or human welfare must 
therefore be constructed in the sphere of legal texts for 'the truly 
117 Maw ni, " Renassaince", pp. 196-197. 
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traditional is always consistent with the truly rational'. 118 In short, this 
proposal is indicative of the primacy of revelation over reason and yet it 
is, in the meantime, an embodiment of the significant role that reason 
must play side by side with revelation for both are complementary to each 
other. 
A muraljih may also employ language or linguistic principles to 
arrive at the most preferred view. It is not strange to do so since both the 
(Qur'an and the Sunnah are totally Arabic in character. A significant 
example of this lies in Q. 6: 122, "And eat not of that whereon Allah's 
name hath not been mentioned, for lol it is abomination (wa innahu 
lafisq)". Basing themselves on this verse, Abu Hanifah and Malik contend 
that Muslims are forbidden to consume flesh of animals slaughtered by a 
Muslim who has not mentioned the name of Allah purposely. 119 By 
contrast, al-Shafi'i sees no objection to that provided that it is 
slaughtered by a Muslim; whether he pronounces the name of Allah or 
not, purposely or unconsciously for the reciting of the name of Allah is 
merely recommended. 120 
What makes al-Shafi'i permit the absolute slaughtering by a 
Muslim is his interpretation of the verse in question. The verse, 
according to al-Shafi'i, prohibits merely what is immolated in the name of 
118 pl_Zuhayli, U, UuI. vol. 2, pp. 811-812 ; Coulson, Conflicts, p. 19 ; Ahmad 
jiasan, "Rationality of Islamic legal injuctions - the problem of valuation 
(ta'LiO ", in IS, vol. 13,1974, pp. 105-106. 
119 Bidayak vol. 1, p. 448. 
120 Ibid. 
358 
idols. 121 Among others, the Shafi'is as well as the Hainafis have 
defended their legal views respectively by considering the phrase 'wa 
innahu lafIsq' for it is believed to be the 'iWIah of that prohibition. The 
Hanafis regard the 'waw' (and) in the verse to denote new meaning (lit al- 
istt"naf) i. e. the consuming of that slaughtered animal is considered as 
abomination. The Shafi'is on the contrary, undertand 'waw' to imply an 
adverb Lhaliyyah) which would make the meaning of the verse 'do not eat 
a slaughtered animal which is an abomination'. 122 The Shafi'is 
continue to argue that if one wants to know exactly what is intended by 
the word fisq, one should do this by looking at another verse in the Qur'an 
which might clarify its exact meaning. Q. 6.146, " Say: I find not in 
that which is revealed unto me aought prohibited to an eater that he eat 
thereof, except it be carrion, or blood poured forth, or swineflesh - for that 
verily is foul - or the abomination which was immolated in the name of 
other than Allah ... " is said to offer a considerable explanation to the 
former verse. By matching these two verses, it is clear that the flesh 
prohibited to the Muslims is merely of those animals immolated in the 
name of other than Allah. 123 
We can safely conclude therefore, that linguistic principles may 
play a significant role in tar, fih as shown. This feature is related to what 
is known as garinah for the garinah might be constructed on the basis of 
the language as well as on other grounds of indication as previously 
121 Al_Qurjubi. al-Jams' . vol. 7. P. 75. 
122 Badran, Bayern. p. 101. 
Al-Dar ini considers" waw " to be a mushtarak. (See al-Manahij, p. 91) 
123 Ibid. ; al-Darini . al-ManahU. pp. 91-92. 
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shown. 124 Accordingly, precedence should be given to al-Shafi'i's view 
for it is not only supported by qa ri nah that is language 
considerations, but also by a Phadith which points out that a believer 
slaughters in the name of Allah whether he actually pronounces the 
name of Allah or not. 125 
Another method of preference in conflict between two alhadith 
by considering external factors, is to prefer the one whose content exceeds 
that of the others. 126 We have already pointed out in the first chapter 
that in conflict concerning different forms of tashahhud, al-Shafi'i 
declares his preference for the one reported on the authority of Ibn 'Abbas, 
saying that it contains more words than the other versions, which implied 
that it is the most complete one. 127 According to the Shai3'is and the 
majority of the jurists, additional matter by a reliable transmitter is 
accepted. In case of conflict, the one whose content or ruling exceeds that 
of the others would prevail. 128 On the other hand, the Hanafis provide a 
detailed explanation of this problem. If the additional matter is found in 
another transmission, it is accepted, provided that the second report is 
124 Barman. gages pp. 102-105. 
125 Sft Page 1-40. 
As a matter of fact. al-Shafi'i's opinion deserves to be favoured for many 
reasons. Apart from the language consideration and the jladith that clearly 
support al-Shafi'i's opinion, his opinion is also a reconciled legal view 
between the clash between the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Undoubtedly, 
reconciliation is always superior. (see Bidayah. vol. 1. p. 448). 
126 If faitk p. 489. 
127 See page 33" 
128 Ikhli7af al-Had ith. P. 527 ; aL-Burham vol. 1, p. 662. 
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transmitted by the same person who transmitted the first. 129 
Nevertheless, if the additional detail comes from another transmitter in 
another report, both should be jointly applied if possible. The reason 
behind this is the possibility that the Prophet might have regulated two 
matters at two different times. 130 
Al-Shafi'i's main argument in this conflict is to the effect that 
"when two ahad i th contradict each other and one of them contains 
additional detail, it should be preferred for it requires what is not required 
by the other (report)". 131 It is precisely on this justification, that al- 
Shafi'i holds that prayer on the occasion of the eclipse of the sun or the 
moon should be two raka'at, each of which comprised two ruku' ; he bases 
this requirement on a hadith of the Prophet reported by many 
authorities such as Ibn 'Abbas, 'A'ishah and 'Uthman b. 'Afian. 132 Some 
of the jurists hold that the prayer should be performed in two raka'at, each 
t45 one ruku' like ordinary prayers. They argue that the transmitter of the 
report i. e. Nu'man b. Bashir, reported that the Prophet performed the 
prayer without mentioning these two ruku' for each raka'ah. 133 
It is relevant also to study the conflict between two atjadith, one 
of them providing an affirmation of a particular ruling and the other its 
negation. Al-Shafi`i and some of the Hanafis such as al-KarkhT, prefer 
the former on the grounds that the affirmative implies that its 
129 A1_Sarakhsi. U vol. 2. p. 25. 
130 Ibid., p. 26. 
131 Ikftlilaf al jjad i th, p. 527. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid. 
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tranmsmitter had a more reliable memory and suggests that the first 
reporter of the hadith himself witnessed the incident which occasioned it 
whereas the negating hadith carried the contrary impression. 134 Al- 
Juwayni has ascribed this view to the majority of the jurists. 135 Al-sdi, 
however, tends to give a contrary priority136 while other jurists such as al- 
Ghazali and `Isa b. Abban consider both as equally strong whereby 
preference between them should not be sought from this point but from 
other standpoints of consideration. 137 
An example of this occurs over the question of the manner of 
lifting the hands in prayer. There are two conflicting ahadith ; one states 
that the Prophet lifted his hands parallel to his shoulder when he 
commenced his prayer, when he was about to bow for the ruku', and 
when he stood erect after the ruku' whereas the other reports the Prophet 
as having lifted his hands only at the commencement of his prayer. 
Adopting the first hadith, al-Shafi'i says to his interlocutor, The hadith 
which is affirmative (about lifting the hands on two other occasions) is 
preferable to that which is negative". 138 
134 Ibid., p. 524 ; idem. Ikhtilaf Malik, pp. 200-201 ; al-Sarakhsi. U5ul. vol. 
2. pp. 21-24 ; 'Iwaj. Dirasat, p. 490; Origins, p. 14. 
135 Al-Burhan. vol. 2. p. 12. pp 
136A1-pnildi, al-Ihkarm vol. 3, pp. 274-275. 
137 Al Mustc /a. vol. 2, p. 398 ; al-Sarakhs i. UUui. vol. 2, p. 21. 
138 I mf al_Haditk p. 524. For other examples, see idem. Ikhtilaf Malik, p. 
193. 
Al-Shafi'i also considers many narrations of this had ith as one of the 
murajjfhat. (ibid) 
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Theoretically, the jumhur's opinion seems to be more reasonable. 
However, as repeatedly proposed in cases of conflict, a muraijth is strongly 
advised to consider all relevant arguments from all standpoints of tad-ih 
before giving any preference. Other factors such as the word's 
classification, the reliability of tsnad, etc., might offer a considerable 
balance of weight in favour of one of these two methods of preference. 
To presume that two texts happen to be genuinely in conflict and 
can in no way be distinguished by any previous means of preference, then, 
the prohibitory text is to be given priority over the permissive, 139 this 
seems to be a philosophical rather than a legal point of argument. 
Accordingly, it is not surprising when the jurists are in disagreement upon 
the accuracy of this mode of preference. One group of the jurists hold 
that precedence should be given to the prohibitory text or ruling. 140 while 
another group of the jurists contend the contrary. 141 The third group 
however, differ from both arguing that this type of conflict has no possible 
solution for both conflicting principles are equal and admit no possibility 
of preference. As a result, both texts are abandoned when they 
conflict. 142 
The first group produces two main arguments in favour of their 
opinion. First, they quote what is believed to be the saying of the Prophet, 
139 A1_Mankhul, p. 434: al-Mawsu'ah al-Fiighiyyah. vol. 2. pp. 100-101. 
140 Kashf, vol. 3. p. 95: Ahmad flasan. "A Review". p. 231. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid. 
This view is attributed to Abu Hashim, 'Isa b. Aban and al-Ghazali. See 
'Iwaj. Direr sak p. 486. 
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reported by Ibn Masud, which reads as "whenever halal and tharam clash 
with one another, it is the latter that should take precedence". 143 
Although this report receives many severe criticisms by the traditionists 
which subsequently makes it doubtful whether it is a reliable report or 
not144 , it gained popularity among the jurists to the extent that it has 
become one of the legal maxims known as 'where prohibitions conflict 
with an obligation, the prohibition shall take precedence'. 145 They add to 
this, saying that to follow what is prohibited instead of what is permissive 
is in conformity with the so-called precaution. In other words, it is 
preferable or more advisable to abstain from doing what seems to be 
forbidden though the case, in fact (but unknown), is actually permissive 
because to avoid mafsadah (evil) embodied in Karam is better than to 
gain maalaljah preserved in , 
Faalal. 146 This is also supported by a legal 
maxim, 'repelling an evil is preferable to securing a benefit'. 147 In short, 
though the case has two possible rulings, as a matter of precaution, one 
should avoid anything that is prohibited. 
The second group appears to justify its opinion by similar 
adherence to the consideration of legal maxims. In short, they argue that 
to prefer the permissive over the prohibitory ruling is nothing other than 
to confirm what is widely established in the Shari'ah that everything is 
143 A1-Suyuji, a! -Ashbah, pp. 105-106. 
144 A1-Zuhayli, UjuL, vol. 2, p. 1195. 
145 AI_Suyu7i, alAshbak pp. 105-106. 
146 pl_Sarakhsi, UUul. vol. 2. p. 21 ; Tbngif,. p. 418; 'Iwad. "a! -Ta'aru¢", p. 
307. 
147 Al-Zar qa'. Sharil a[-Qawa'id al-Flghiyyal7, p. 205. 
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originally permissible unless a contrary condition is proven. 148 In fact, 
this has become one of the legal maxims i. e. "it is a fundamental 
principle that a thing shall remain as it was originally" known as al-iba- 
lhah a1-aaliyyah. 149 Obviously, if one is uncertain of the prohibition, he 
should confine himself to this principle which renders everything 
permissible as long as a particular act or thing is not found to be 
prohibited by a clear evidence. 150 
The previous arguments offer an easy conclusion to the third 
group of the jurists who said that since both arguments are equal in 
strength, the two should be discarded for it is impossible to prefer one over 
the other in the absence of any convincing justi ication. 151 As far as 
tarj ih is concerned, we can conclude that a mura., jih must take all the 
relevant considerations into account. But if both conflicting pieces of 
evidence happen to be equal on all these relevant points of tarjiij, then, he 
should search for any other considerable indication outside the relevant 
discussions which might add weight to one of the conflicting arguments. 
To adopt the superiority of permissibility over its antonym, namely 
prohibition or vice-versa, once and for all, is quite irrelevant and 
inaccurate. In turn, I believe, to consider a broader basis of preference 
seems to be more reasonable and 'safe' in terms of arriving at the most 
preferred view. 
148 'Iwad. "a! -Ta'aru ". p. p. 306-307. 
149 AI-Suyuii. al Ashbah, p. 60. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Kas}i vol. 3. p. 95. 
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One example of Ah will be presented here to examine the 
accuracy of what has been said above. Two ahadi th are found to 
contradict each other. In the first, the Prophet is reported to have said 
(concerning approaching a menstrual wife) that one can do so provided it 
is not between navel and knee (laka min a1-ha'id mafauqa al-izarj. 152 The 
second hadi th narrates than one can do everything except sexual 
intercourse (isna'u kulla shay'i üla al-nik x. 153 Those who give the 
precedence to the prohibitive ruling such as Abu Hanifah, Malik and al- 
Shafi`i adhere to the first tradition for it is more 'precautionary'. 154 
Sufyan al ThaWri and Dawud al-Zahiri, on the contrary, follow the second 
hadith arguing that the permissive ruling should prevail over the 
prohibited ruling. 155 
Although these two ahadith are apparently contradicting each 
other, there should be a way to remove that conflict. An external 
evidence might be of help in doing so. It is exactly on this ground that 
the later jurists have accepted the opinion that one can approach his 
menstrual wife as he wishes as long as he abstains from having sexual 
intercourse with her. For it is clearly implied by Q. 2: 222, "They question 
thee (O Muhammad) concerning menstruation, Say: It is an illness, so let 
women alone as such time and go not in unto them (fi al-mahid) till 
they are cleansed..... ". Many jurists have argued that al-mahid, literally 
the name of menstruation place and time, refers to the vagina alone i. e. 
the place from which menstruation comes. As a legal consequence, what 
152 Al_lahawi. Shart vol. 3. p. 37; al-Zurgan I. Shartj. vol. 1. pp. 168-169. 
153 Ibid. ; Bidayah, vol. 1. p. 57. 
154 Ibid. 
155 A1_Zurgani. Sharjj vol. 1. p. 69. 
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is prohibited in terms of approaching a menstrual wife is merely to have 
sexual intercourse with menstrual wife for the "illness" is restricted to the 
place of the blood. 156 Obviously, no consideration to either prohibitive or 
permissive ruling has been made to arrive at this preference since this line 
of consideration is not reliable. 
On the other hand, an attempt is also made by the jurists to 
examine a conflict between two rulings; one in favour of al-ibaihah al- 
asliyyah and the other is an alteration to the original status of 
permissibility. Some scholars hold that the evidence which suggests the 
continuance of the original status of everything should be preferred157 
whereas the majority of the jurists contend that the evidence which alters 
this original status is more to be favoured. 158 
Two ahadith which have already been mentioned earlier are cited 
here again to illustrate the conflict in question. The first is the Prophet's 
saying that 'whoever touches his penis, must retake a fresh ablution"159 
and the second is the Prophet's response to a question asked by one of the 
Companions regarding touching the sexual organ, where the Prophet is 
reported to have said that "this sexual organ is nothing other than part of 
your body" which gives a clear impression that to touch one's penis, does 
not render ablution void. 160 It is obvious that the first tradition, unlike 
156 gl_gur ubi, al-Jami'. vol. 3, p. 87 ; Bidayah, vol. 1. p. 57 ; al-Zuhayli, 
UUu1, vol. 1, p. 286. Cf. al-Tabari, Jami', vol. 2, pp. 383-384. 
157 A1-Sarakhsi, U. uL vol. 2. pp. 20,21 ; Nihaya4i, vol. 3, p. 178. 
158 'Iwad, Dirasa , p. 490. 
159 See page 1501. 
160 See page 259, 
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the second, requires something which Is not originally established. In 
other words, the first tradition enjoins a liability after one is free from 
such obligation. 
Those who adhere to the principle of al-ibahah al-asliyyah, 
consider the second tradition as superior for it is in line with the 
fundamental principle acknowledged by the Shart'ah. 161 On the contrary, 
other jurists refused to consider al-ibahah al-asliyyah as more accurate 
when it conflicts with another ruling which obliges an action. Their 
argument, like that of their opponent, is rather philosophical. They argue 
that al-ibahah al-asliyyah would give no significant import to the Starrah 
because its implication is already known to the people even without the 
occurrence of the second tradition. What deserves to be taken into 
consideration, they argue, is the one which offers new meaning or ruling 
for the Shari `ah's task is to clarify the relevant ruling in every individual 
case. Therefore, to oblige one to renew his ablution after touching his 
penis is preferable in this regard-162 
Now it is relevant to embark on a discussion of the so-called 
Islamic legal maxims and their significant contribution in terms of tarjih. 
These legal maxims represent the most accepted principles, if not 
absolutely agreed upon among the jurists, on which individual cases of 
figh can be cross-examined. On many occasions, every single one of these 
maxims is originally derived either from the Qur'an or the Sunnah or 
both. Maxims such as 'necessity renders prohibited things permissible', 
161 AL-Daraii, vol. 1. p. 55 (note no. 1) ; al-Hafnawi, al-Tarji-b. pp. 361-362. 
162 Ibid. ; Nays at Awlar, vol. 1. p. 250. 
368 
'certainty cannot be dispelled by doubt', etc., are obviously rooted in both 
the Qur'an and the Sunnah. 163 As regards the first maxim mentioned 
above, this includes many derivative rulings such as the permissibility to 
eat carrion, blood or to drink alcohol whenever one is forced to do so i. e. 
to avoid death. Similarly, one is allowed to take another's property 
without the latter's permission on the latter's refusal to pay a debt. Also, 
to injure or even to kill another in order to defend oneself from the 
other's violence is permissible according to the said maxim. 1M 
For legal maxims are so significant, it is not surprising that they 
are codified in the so-called Ottoman MajaUa, as an immediate reference 
and guideline for the judges throughout the Ottoman empire for executing 
justice in the courts. 165 It is a fact worthy of remark that these legal 
maxims may contribute in selecting what is more appropriate between two 
conflicting pieces of evidence and argument. For instance, the maxim 'it 
is a fundamental principle that words shall be construed literally'166 may 
be employed in conflict between hagiqah and majaz. As previously 
shown, haqiqah always prevails unless the contrary is proved. 167 
Similarly, the maxim "freedom from liability is a fundamental principle" 
can offer a clear cut basis for some conflicts in figh. According to this 
163 See al-Burno, al Wcijiz p. 23. 
164 Ibid., pp. 143-146. 
165 See Onar, "The Mojalla ", in law in the Middle East. p. 296. 
The Mojallah has listed down 99 articles on legal maxims as the introductory 
code of law for these maxims are the general principles applicable to many 
detailed cases of law. (see ibid) 
166 Al-Suyuj, aI Ashbah, p. 63. 
167 Seepage 113. 
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maxim, "if one person destroys the property of another, and a dispute 
arises as to the amount thereof, the statement of the person causing such 
destruction shall be heard, and the onus of proof as to any amount in 
excess thereof is upon the owner of such property". 168 
The aim of the present part of the discussion is merely to show 
how legal maxims can be adequately deployed to determine what is more 
consistent with the spirit of the Shari'ah and accordingly enjoys 
superiority in cases of conflict. 169 Any conflict of law in the Shari'ah, 
according to my opinion, should be examined in the light of these maxims 
for they constitute the comprehensive contents of the texts and the spirit 
as well as the objectives of the Shari'ah. 170 It is very rare, however, to 
find that a particular ruling in figh is against these maxims. If this 
happens, it would be included under the so-called 'exceptional ruling of 
the maxim'. The occurrence of some exceptional rulings does not affect 
the general accuracy of these maxims, however. 
An example of this is that when a wife and a husband claim the 
ownership of the furniture in their house, and no evidence is available, the 
case should be settled according to 'urf for it is stated in Islamic legal 
maxim that 'custom ranks as stipulation'. Thus, if what is usually 
brought to the house by the woman is by 'urf considered hers and vice- 
versa, that is the rule to be applied. 171 By this, we can see how legal 
168 Hooper, The Civil Law, p. 17. 
169 Ma$masani, F ilsafah. pp. 149,151. 
170 See el"Awa. "The place of custom ('urn in Islamic legal theory". in IQ, vol. 
17.1973, pp. 180-181. 
171 Ibid. 
370 
maxims represent the 'true' spirit and objective of the Shari'ah which 
should be seriously considered by a murajjitj.. Although legal maxims offer 
no clear cut basis of preference, they might make an attempt at tarjih 
easier and to some extent, safer. 
As we already know, maslahah is something strongly maintained 
by the Shari'ah and therefore, there is no need to argue its validity or 
even its priority in Islamic law. Nevertheless, we have seen also that 
maslahah which differs according to time and place always brings the 
jurists into opposition. 172 Briefly, ma lahah is an expression for seeking 
something useful or removing something harmful. 173 In other words, 
maslahah is the preservation of the magajid (objectives) of the law which 
consists of five safeguards for human beings; their faith, their life, their 
intellect, their posterity and their property. What assures the preservation 
of these five principles is maalahah and whatever fails to preserve them is 
mafSadaIL174 
Accordingly, in the course of conflict and tarjitj, a murajjilj should 
consider the one which most serves the maslatjah as preferable. A simple 
example will explain this. Although the following case produced by al- 
Shafi'i is not directly used to show a strict preference by virtue of 
maaiahah, it remains relevant to that with which we are now concerned. 
Faced with different transmissions regarding the performing of prayer in 
time of fear, al-Shafi'i prefers the tradition reported by Khawwat b. 
172 See page 85 . 
173 A[ Musfasfa. vol. 1. pp. 139-140 ; al-Darint, al-Manaiuj, p. 32 ; al-Buts, al- 
Ma laljal t p. 119. 
174 Ibid. 
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Jubayr, for this form of performing prayer in such times is more capable of 
protecting the fighting believers from a sudden attack which may destroy 
the life as well as the property of those fighters. Khawwat's transmission 
seems to be more appropriate to follow for it serves masiahah most i. e. in 
terms of protection and precaution. 175 
To give preference to a particular ruling on the consideration of 
maslahah is highly regarded in Shari'ah. An example that comes to mind 
is concerned with collective murder i. e. a person murdered by a group of 
people. The majority of the jurists contend that all of those who 
participated in that crime irrespective of the number involved, must be 
punished according to the law of gisas. 176 By contrast, Dawud and his 
followers, the Zahiris, did not approve this form of punishment arguing 
that, since several hands cannot be cut as a retaliation of one hand, the 
same applies to the case of murder by a group. 177 In terms of tarjih, 
apart from the reported judgement that 'Umar had carried out giaq on a 
group of seven that murdered a single man178, the contention of the 
jurnPurr should be favoured for it serves the maslahah more. As already 
stated in the Qur'an (2: 178), gisas is deliberately enjoined on mankind for 
the sake of life i. e. to protect people's lives by enjoining severe and equal 
punishment on those who purposely violated another's life. The reverse 
175 Ai-Risalah, para. 728. See also al-Darari. vol. 1. p. 164. 
176 Bidayah vol. 2, p. 399: a1-1'tiam, vol. 2, p. 361. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibn Kathi r, Ta/s ir. vol. 1. p. 210. 
The author asserts that the judgement of 'Umar received no objection from 
the contemporary Muslims at his time, and therefore it deserves to be 
considered as (/ma' . (ibid) 
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contention, however, is nothing other than to encourage the people to 
commit collective murder for they will be excused from giaas. 179 From this 
explanation, one would not hesitate to attach more weight to the jumhur's 
opinion in order to maintain justice and equal treatment; whosover kills, 
should be punished by gisas. 18O 
There is, however, another tendency in removing legal conflict 
which was first established by Ibn a- Mugaffa' and followed by many 
jurists and contemporary scholars. This attempt is not exclusively related 
to Islamic legal theory rather than to the so-called siyasah shar'iyyah 
Ibn al-al-Muqaffa' who was dissatisfied with the divergent views of the 
lawyers, insisted upon assigning full authority to the Caliph. 181 On the 
grounds of much confusion even within one city - Kufah - where the 
judgements were not unanimous, he advised that: "Thus if the 
Commander of the Believers should see fit to decree that these cases and 
different norms (siyar) be brought before him in a book together with the 
explanation and argument of every scholar on the basis of the Sunnah or 
giyas, the Commander of the Believers could examine them and give his 
decision in each case according to the inspiration". 182 
179 g ah, vol. 2, p. 400 ; a1-I't(jaim, vol. 2, p. 361. 
180 Abkam, vol. 1. pp. 169-174 ; al-Qurjubi. ahlami' . vol. 2. pp. 251-252. 
See also at-I'tL am, vol. 2, pp. 125-126; al-Huts, al-Maslahah, pp. 141-142. 
181 Lampe, Ibn al Muga., Q'a' . pp. 62-64,86-89. 
182 Ibn al-Mugaffa', Risakxt al, Sahabah, p. 354, as cited in al-A'7, ami, On 
Schacht, p. 42. See also Endress. An Introduction to Is(am, pp. 64-65. 
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Forty years after Ibn al-Muqaffa' wrote his Risalaf: al-, ajjabah, 
Abu Yusuf, Chief Qadi, came with a similar proposal. 183 He suggests that 
the Caliph may adopt any opinion out of the different opinions on a 
problem which he thinks best in the interest of the Muslims and in 
harmony with Islam. In his Kitab al Kharaj, he recounts in several places 
the views of different jurists on a problem, then concludes with the 
following remarks: "Adopt 0 Commander of the Faithful any of the two (or 
more) opinions which you like and follow the one that you think better for 
the Muslims. This is because you are allowed to do so in this respect". 184 
Relatively speaking, more pages in this chapter should be 
devoted to the proposal raised by Ibn al-Muqaffa' for it could offer an 
immediate solution to legal conflict because the Caliph is the most 
powerful authority in giving a final decision in cases of conflict for he has 
a right to enact legislation even though his right is not absolute in terms 
that that legislation is valid only if it falls into one of two categories: 
1. Execute legislation intended to guarantee the implementation of 
the provisions of Sh . ri'ah. 
2. Organisational legislation intended to organise the society, 
protect it and meet its need in accordance with Shari'ah085 
Jurists like Ibn al-Mugaffa`, Abu Yusuf and many others were 
promoting an authority that should be given to the highest authority in 
the state in order to unify the law or in other words, to achieve a 
183 spe, Ibn aL-Muga,, (ja', p. 71 ; Ahmad liasan. The Early, p. 161. 
184 Abu Yusuf, Kitab al-Kharaj, pp. 19.58, etc. See also Onar, "Vie mq/alla i 
p. 295. 
185 Dot. Shari'ah, p. 468. See also Schacht, " Legislation". p. 111. 
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unification of the law in place of the existing diversity. In doing so, public 
welfare i. e. in securing the interests of the people and ensuring justice, 
would be the principal consideration in the enactment of such a code 
which would respond to reason not only in the absence of any appropriate 
text from both the Qur'an and the Sunnah but also in the case of two 
contrary interpretations caused by both the Qur'an and the Sunnah. 
However, it should be noted that, since the present work has no interest 
or concern with this political and administrative method of preference, it 
will be left without a proper treatment and readers are referred to other 
typical works that deal exclusively with this issue-186 The reason is that, 
though the Caliph is allowed to select what is apparently preferable to 
him, he should consult an expert in this task. Even Ibn al-Muqaffa' 
himself, as already quoted, suggested that a Caliph should be presented 
with a book along with the explanation and argument of every respective 
jurist. Again, the task is more directed to usul al Ah - oriented study to 
comply with this suggestion. For this reason, the present study might 
offer valuable guidelines in the contemporary endeavour to codify Islamic 
law throughout the Muslim countries. Nevertheless, we should return to 
this discussion in the last chapter in order to relate the findings or the 
results of the study with the practical purposes in the contemporary 
administrations and judicial institutions of justice and fatwa 
186 Among the profound books on sisayah shar'iyyah are : 
a. Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Siyasah al-Shar'iyyah fi IIlah al-Ra' i wa al- 
Ra'iyyah, Cairo, n. d. 
b. Ibn gayyim. aI _Tlu-uq aI juIm iyyah fi al-Siyasah al-Shar'yyah. Beirut. 
n. d. 
c. Khallaf, al-Sisayah al-Shar'iyyah aw Nigarn at-Dawlah al-Islamfyyah 
fi al-Shu'un al-Dusturiyyah wa al-Kharijiyyah wa al-Maliyyah. Beirut. 
1984. 
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I admit that more are available for inclusion under the present 
discussion. Even so, I believe that the foregoing discussion, to some 
extent, has sufficiently laid down most of the common and capital 
methods of tarjih by considering external factors. It is relevant now to 
summarise or more precisely to suggest what deserves to be exclusively 
concluded particularly for practical purposes. 
It appears throughout the previous discussion that the most 
influential methodology of tarj ih is to consider 'many' or other supporting 
elements of evidence. It is highly reasonable and acceptable since the 
purpose of tarjih is to strengthen the accuracy of a particular argument. 
The more it is supported by or consistent with other elements or pieces of 
evidence, the more it gives the impression that a particular argument is 
stronger and more relevant to the intention of the Lawgiver. There seems 
no reason not to accept this method of preference as valid. Moreover, the 
resistance of the Hanafis to accept this way of strengthening eventually 
became insignificant. In other words, the accuracy of 'many' in terms of 
tad ih has influenced some of the leading Hanafi jurists to adhere to this 
consideration irrespective of whether it is explicitly or implicitly 
acknowledged by them. 187 
To give an example, Abu Yusuf, finding contradictions in some of 
the ahadith, has chosen one which has more weight than the other. 
187 Mention should be made that it was not the opinion of the entire Jjanafi 
school of law in refusing preference by virtue of "many". Only Abu ljanifah 
and Abu Yusuf are reported to stand against this mode of preference. (See al- 
Sarakhsi. Usut vol. 2, p. 24) 
376 
Speaking about the partnership in farming (musagat ), he says, "The best 
we have heard in this case - and Allah knows best - is that it is allowed 
and right (to do so). We have followed the traditions which came down 
from the Prophet regarding the partnership of the Land of Khaybar. For 
these traditions are more trustworthy and akthar (more in number) and 
general (in rules) than the traditions which have been related against 
these (traditions)". 188 This quotation shows that among the bases of 
preference adopted by Abu Yusuf was a consideration of many supporting 
ahadith. Moreover, it also appears to me that the dispute between these 
two major schols of law is merely verbal and far from practical. It is 
evident from the statement of each of Abu Hanifah and al-Karkhi that no 
preference is permitted by virtue of "many" unless they are widespread 
(ma lam tablugh hadd al-shuhrah ). 189 To put it differently, when a 
particular argument is supported by many pieces of evidence : to the effect 
that it gained considerable strength, this argument, according to them, 
should be preferred, not because of the account of many supporting 
elements of evidence but because of the strength gained by that argument. 
In short, the only acceptable element that can favour one piece of 
evidence over the other, according to the Hanafis, is strength and not 
virtue of many pieces of evidence. 190 Hence, the reluctance to accept this 
preference is baseless and no genuine dispute exists between the Shafi'is 
and the Hanafis for strength can be known through several indications 
where many pieces of evidence is one of them. It is clearly expressed by al- 
Shaybani who contends that a report transmitted by two is more reliable 
188 Ahu Yusuf. Kitab aL Kharaj . P. 89. 
189 Fcavatib. vol. 2, p. 210 ; a! -ThlwiIj. vol. 2, p. 222 ; al-As'adi, UUu4 p. 257. 
190 AI-Zuhayli, UUul. vol. 2. p. 1189, note no. 2. 
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and acceptable in terms of confidence compared to a report transmitted by 
one. 191 Moreover, the disagreement between the Hanafis and other jurists 
seems to be increasingly superficial by the statement of Sadr al-Shari'ah. 
He says that preference on the basis of many pieces of evidence is 
acceptable to some of the Hanafis, contrary to the contention of both Abu 
Hanifah and Abu Yusuf. 192 
Therefore, consideration of many elements of evidence should be 
seriously consulted in an attempt to give preference to one over the other 
when they conflict. 193 The clarity of word, the reliability of isnad, 
maslahah influence and the like should be jointly examined in every single 
case of conflict in the Shari'ah. Also, an attempt to interpret the 
passage within the context of the entire body of sacred texts and its 
objectives is necessary to ensure that the "final" decisions will accord 
with the whole content of legal texts as well as with the spirit of the 
law. 194 Other methods, though they are highly disputable, remain useful 
in order to support and to complement one another in terms of gaining 
what is more convincing to a muraijih when he confronts any conflict in 
Islamic law. 
191 See al-Sarakhsi. U., $td. vol. 2, p. 24. 
192 Al_al-TaiwijL. vol. 2, p. 232 ; 'Iwad, Dirasat, p. 437. 
As far as Abu Yusuf is concerned, we have pointed earlier that even he 
himself tend to rely on "many" for preference purposes. See page 3-16. 
193 The rationale behind this is most evident when the usulists concluded 
that the very aim of tarjiii is arriving at the most probable conclusion. Any 
principle leading to this purpose should be seriously considered. See Ghayat 
al-U§ul. p. 147 and Irshad p. 284. 
194 See al-Darini, olManahij. p. 30. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
Of all the pages in this work, this is the easiest and in many ways 
the most important part to be completed. To begin with, I can say that an 
attempt has been made to give a comprehensive exposition of certain 
logical and methodological approaches taken by the usulists in respect-to 
conflict of law with special emphasis when possible on the authenticity of 
certain arguments leading to preference. Although I cannot pretend to 
have discovered all the methodologies of tarj i h, it is my hope that I have 
succeeded in presenting a comprehensive picture relying heavily upon a 
careful study of the primary as well as the secondary sources. 
Since the discussion of conflict and preference is viewed from an 
usul al Ah perception, some preliminary considerations of ujul al figh were 
deemed necessary. Moreover, tarjith is an integral part of ujul alAh from 
which tarj i h. originated. To this end, the first part of chapter one is devoted 
to a brief account of usul al figh which covers most of the essential 
foundations of ujuL In a limited number of pages, I have been able to 
introduce usul al figh in a brief but comprehensive description. Topics like 
the emergence and the development of ujul al- igh have been elaborated 
followed by the explanation of the definition, the subject matter, the 
functions, the contents and structure as well as the methodological 
approaches to documenting ujul al-figh. Each of these topics pertains to 
the problem of conflict and preference in one way or another and this 
relation has been revealed clearly in some of the chapters whenever 
appropriate. 
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The first part of chapter one also discusses the historical 
treatment of both ta'arud and tarj i 1j in the hope that the reader would 
be able to know when and more importantly how these two different but 
related issues have been dealt with by the jurists. It is, as a matter of fact, 
a necessary introduction to the topic of the thesis. Through this section, 
we are able to state that tarjih, existed not only in law study proper or Its 
usui, but also in other fields of study where conflict may take place. 
However, the treatment of tarj i tI in those fields is carried out differently. 
In tafsir, for example, a mufassir, after citing various opinions pertaining 
to a particular interpretation, will go further and try to show that one of 
the opinions should be given more credence than the others. However, as 
far as tafsir is concerned, a mufassir usually expresses his own preferred 
opinion in the form of a paraphase of the whole or part of the verse in 
question although he does not always give systematic reasons for his 
preference. ' Although this is not the case in uuuI study or in legal study 
proper where ta'arud and tarj ih are treated more systematically, tafsir, 
particularly the tafsir of legal verses2 will provide considerable information 
from which preference should be sought. The same applies to other 
disciplines in Islam such as the study of the hadith and related matters, 
the study of legal works or even the study of modern codifications in more 
recent times. 3 
The second part of chapter one i. e. part b, consists of three major 
tasks, namely to explain the purpose and the scope of the present study, 
'Cooper. Introduction to al-labari's Jarni' a! -Bayan (translation). p. dv. 
2 This type of tafsir is known as al-tafsir al fighi, which from historical point of 
view, existed after the formative period of madhhab in Islam. See Introduction to al- 
Kaya al-Harnas i's Abkam a1-man, p. 1. 
3 See al-Zuhayli. Tagnin. passim. 
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the need for the work and the sources and methodology of the study. These 
three elements I considered as crucial in order to lay down a framework in 
which the discussion of conflict and preference should take place. 
As said elsewhere, if there is no conflict there is no question of 
devising methods to remove such conflict. As far as tarjih in concerned, 
the problem of conflict should first be understood. Therefore, chapter two 
was designed to highlight the meaning of the conflict with which the 
usulists are concerned. Not only that, the hukm of conflict is also 
discussed to see whether the disagreement is or is not approved in the 
Shari'ah. We have seen that the varying opinions on this issue are rather 
theoretical because the condemnation of disagreement and conflict by some 
jurists is directed towards a conflict that cannot be removed that is, 
tan qud i. e. mutual cancellation, an opinion shared by other jurists who 
approved the existence of conflict in the Shari'ah in the first place. In 
other words, ta'arud is permissible in the Shari'ah while tanaqud is not 
approved since ta'arud is merely apparent while tanaqud leads to genuine 
conflict not only in the eyes of the jurists but also in reality. 4 
The chapter also discusses the causes of legal conflict which are 
of two types, namely those which inevitably exist and those which are 
relatively "man-made". Five causes from each type have been elaborated to 
reveal that. conflict did not come from nowhere but was actually caused by 
certain factors, some of which were beyond human will while others were 
"man-made". Regarding the latter, the jurists are not to be blamed for 
this, since their aim was to provide the Shari 'ah with a reliable way of 
interpretation. As humans, they vary from each other in legal 
4 See page 60 
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interpretation. In addition, the provisions of Islamic law are based less on 
the texts than on interpretations by the usulists. The texts form the bases 
of the principles and universal rules; whereas most details and particulars 
are based on the interpretation by way of ijtihad thus through human 
involvement. 
Therefore, if there appears to be conflict, one or the other piece.. 
of evidence has been incorrectly understood or applied, for the conflict is 
largely caused by our very human inability to estimate correctly the precise 
implications of legal texts and their attendant problems. The principles 
laid down by the jurists, should be viewed from the point that every jurist 
is required to base his argument on a proper foundation acceptable in 
Islamic legal theory. Whether these principles actually lead to something 
more accurate is another question the point is that great efforts were made 
to work out methods of interpretation which were presumed suitable for 
application to Islamic law and its sources. This is very common, as said 
elsewhere, not only in fiqh but also in modem law, for both assume, 
though on different grounds, that men are capable of learning the true 
nature of right and wrong and that having done so, they can elaborate 
their knowledge rationally and apply it to concrete situations. 
In chapter three, I have made a substantial elaboration of the 
meaning of tarjih by dividing the chapter into three parts. The first part 
discusses the meaning of tarj ih in both literal and legal senses. Tarj ! -11 
broadly speaking, indicates preponderance which made the balance of one 
thing heavier than the other. The first part of the chapter is completed by 
the discussion of the ijukm as well as the conditions of tarj i h. From these 
three elements, I suppose that the reader will be certain of what tarjilh is. 
However, I did not end the discussion of tarjijj at this stage but instead, I 
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introduced another discussion of tarjih from another angle to draw a 
distinction between tarjih and some terms similar to it in order not to 
confuse the word tarjih with others bearing the same concept of 
preference. The discussion of each of ta'wil/tafsir, tail q, istihsan/istiglaj 
and naskh has been carried out to detect not only the dissimilarity 
between them and tarjih but also, to some extent, the similarity. Through 
this brief comparison, tarj k, as a term in u-Lul al figh, is clearly 
distinguished from other confusing terms. In the last part of chapter three, 
both the position and the significance of tarjih in usul al-figh, particularly 
in the conflict problem, have been studied. Both discussions have clearly 
displayed that the issue of tarjih deserves a proper detailed study to which 
the present work aspires. Generally speaking, this part of the study has 
shown that although tarjih has been treated for centuries (like other legal 
solutions mentioned above), it remains an important subject of study not 
only for abstract reasons connected with academic investigations but also 
for practical purposes. More significantly, it has also shown that tad ih, ih, in 
the practical sense, already existed in the formative period because in most 
cases, great jurists had to resort to tarjih to prefer one piece of evidence 
over the other when they conflict. 
As one knows, both Qur'an and Sunnah are written in Arabic 
since they were revealed in the language of the Arab. The written part of 
these two sources is known either as naffs or main. This textual part 
stands side by side with the transmission of both Qur'un and Sunnah. In 
the study of conflict and preference, it is necessary to look at both to 
ensure that conflict is tackled from the same angle i. e. text conflict will be 
removed through study of the text and similarly, isnad conflict will be 
examined through isnnd consideration. To meet this logical requirement, I 
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have devoted two separate chapters to deal with the problem, namely 
chapters four and five. 
Regarding textual conflict, the nature of the text and its 
interpretation in Arabic has been studied in relation to conflict and 
preference. The results of this extensive study will be displayed in the 
following tables. Mention should be made that since the study has 
explored four aspects of wording conflict, each of them will be presented in 
a separate table. (A - D) 
Table A: Conflict in the Wording; Scope of Cover 
Conflict Preference Reason 
Arnm vs. Khass Rhaa More specific and gaa'i 
Arnm maklus vs, 'Amm Amm makttufi Less speculative 
ghayr makhhhuu 
Mutiaq and Mugayyad Muqayyad (when it is More qualified and more 
appropriate) specific 
Mushtarak Determined according to All the meanings are possi- 
the qari nah attached. ble whereby the determi - 
ning key is the garinah 
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Table B: Conflict in Wording Usage 
Conflict Preference Reason 
klagiqahvs. Majaz Jiagiqah (except when Original and more 
mq az is dominant) probable 
Ma, jaz vs. Majaz Majaz that is closer to More parallel to the 
the original meaning original meaning 
Sari_4 vs. K&wyah Sariij (unless kinayah is More direct statement 
associated with gari nah) 
Table C: Conflict Between Clear and Unclear words 
Conflict Preference Reason 
Zahir vs. Nash NaM More likely 
Nam vs. Mufassar Mufassar More explained/clarified 
Mufassarvs. Muhkam Muhkam More certain/permanent 
Table D: Conflict in Textual Implications (D ilälat) 
Conflict Preference Reason 
Manjuq vs. Maj um Majhwn particularly 
(both muu)afagah and Man uq majhwn mukhalafah is 
mukhalafah) neither certain nor accurate 
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Mention should be made that this attempt is merely a tentative 
order of the text proposed by the present researcher. Should there be a 
conflict between two texts either in Qur'an-Sunnah conflict or Sunnah- 
Sunnah conflict, the ultimate decision, at this stage, goes to the selected 
text as shown in the list for it is more clear, precise, direct, specific, 
accurate, etc. according to the nature of the texts in which conflict has 
taken place. A summary of a more comprehensive framework of tarj jj, 
however, will be made later after giving all the details of tarj i tj in each 
respective area of conflict. 
The transmission of the Sunnah and its conflict has been dealt 
with in chapter five. Conflict regarding the transmission of the Qur'an is 
omitted because all scholars agreed that Qur'an was transmitted in the 
form 'mutawatir' which is beyond any dispute. In the Sunnah, however, 
conflicts of isnad resulting from many different considerations, have been 
identified and given serious examination. The same procedure as in 
conflict of text would apply to isnad conflict since the study has revealed 
that the isnad is of different grades. Should there be a conflict between 
two hadiths, their respective fsnads would provide proof on which a proper 
preference could be achieved. That is, the credence should be given to the 
more reliable of the two isn&ls involved in a particular conflict. The 
finding of this chapter is also displayed in the following tables (E -H) 
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Table E: Tarjih Based Exclusively on 'UTum ai-Hadith 
Conflit Preference Reason 
Tawatur vs. Afjad TYuuatur More reliable in terms 
of isnad 
Mashhur vs. A had Mashhur (according Mashhur in the opinion of 
to the Hanaßs whereas the Hanafis stands higher 
the jumhür attached than obad and below 
no superiority to it since tawatur. 
both are alike) 
Satjiij vs. Hasan / Da'if Sahib More reliable. 
Musnad vs. Mursal Musnad = Mursal Though theoretically, 
musnad prevails over 
mursal, the latter on some 
occasions is as reliable as 
the former. 
General rules of preference in relation to fladith such as muttafaq 
'alayhi always prevails followed by the second rank. namely hadith reported 
by al-Bukhara alone and so forth. 
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Table F: Tarjih by considering Narrators' Personal Characteristics 
Conflict Preference Reason 
Narrator participated (or Transmissions are more relic 
as close to the Prophet) Jjadith transmitted by those ble since they participated or 
vs. narrator who did not who participated in or were close were the nearest person to the 
participate (or was far to the reported action. Prophet in the action reported 
or absent from) the 
reported action. 
Well-known vs. unkown Transmission of well-known The lack of biographical infor- 
narrator narrator mation for a narrator will 
make his transmission sus- 
pect. This includes the trans- 
mision of weak minded, the 
careless and heretics. 
Faqi h narrator vs. non- The transmission of faq ih No accurate reason is available 
faq ih narrator narrator ?? since this preference is 
doubtful. 
Knowledgeable narrator The transmission of those who No accurate example is avai- 
in Arabic vs. un- are more knowledegable in lable and this conflict found 
knowledgeable narrator Arabic ? 'T no example in t. ul book 
Accurate memory vs. The transmission of those whose The possibility of (¢tirab does 
inaccurate memory memorisation is more accurate not occur in accurate memo- 
(abfaz wa atgan) risation. 
Senior narrator vs. The transmission of senior Subjected to many objections: 
junior narrator narrator?? forgetfulness and ignorance 
afflicted both transmitters. 
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Table G: Tnrjih Within Forms of Narration 
Conflict Preference Reason 
The word of the Prophet The original wording of the More certain 
vs. what is understood Prophet 
by the narrator 
High isnadvs. low isnad High isnad Subject to less possibility of 
error. 
Verbal narration vs. Verbal narration ?? Lain and ta§ if said to be 
written narration greater in written documents? 
Verbally transmitted vs. Verbally transmitted Nonverbal transmission is dis 
nonverbal transmission puted as well as open to errors 
Other forms of narration with different degrees of strength that could be appealed to in 
settlement of conflict such as gala, sami'tu 'an, etc. 
Table H: Tarji h on the Basis of Regional Preference and "Mang" 
Narrations 
Conflict Preference Reason 
Madi nah-origin vs. No accurate preference The authenticity of the 
non-Mad i nah origin badi th does not rely on 
region x or y. 
Many vs. few narrators or "Many " More convincing 
ways of narration 
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At this stage, two sources of Islamic law have been discussed in 
relation to the problem of conflict and preference. Naturally, the remaining 
two sources of Islamic law deserve the same treatment. Therefore, after a 
lengthy discussion of both Qur'an and Sunnah, I have attempted to examine 
closely the problem of conflict and preference in both ijma' and qiyas. 
Broadly speaking, one can easily understand why conflict should take place 
in giyas since this form of legal deduction is rather speculative and 
doubtful. As far as ijma' is concerned which is reckoned third in 
importance, the problem of conflict seems to be unfounded because Yma' is 
a unanimous agreement while conflict reveals a degree of divergence in 
yma'. Nevertheless, the study has shown that the conflict in Yma' was 
commonly due to the fact that yma' was frequently reported to exist solely 
on the basis of knowledge of a particular or a group of jurists that no 
divergence of opinion has been found on the case in question. Therefore, 
when an opinion is later known to contrast with this alleged yma', this was 
understood as conflict while in fact, no consensus was clearly proclaimed 
on that issue. The various degrees of i/ma', as shown by the study, will be 
displayed as below (table I) 
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Table I: Conflict and Preference in Ijma' Conflict 
Conflict Preference Reason 
Universal (jma' vs. local Universal (jma' (acceptable Obviously, no Jima' can exist if 
Yma' (particularly the merely in theory) one jurist disagreed (let alone 
iima' of the Medinese) the jurists of the Madinah). 
Jima' of the Companions Ijma' of the Companions Relatively more facilitated to exist 
vs. i/ma' of the subse- 
quent jurists. 
Ijma' lafzi vs. Yma' Jima' lafji (altough in reality. Free from any dispute regarding 
sukuti most of the reported cases on Its validity (even though lima' 
yma' originated from yma' sukuti is more common in 
sukutO. practice) 
Ijma' preceded by dis- Jima' not preceded by dis - Ijma' preceded by disagreement is 
agreement vs. ijma' not agreement disputed amongst the jurists. 
preceded. 
Ijma' based on nia. Stalph Determined according to what It is liable to alteration since the 
vs. lima' based on the serves mquIahah more basis of fjma' was human welfare 
same consideration which is changing in character. 
As hinted above, the conflict in giyas is relatively acceptable since 
its application is somewhat vague and doubtful. To treat the problem of 
conflict successfully, I have devoted some pages to illustrate what qiyas is. 
On this occasion, I have explained the general concept of giyas. the 
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historical development followed by the definition of al-giyas al-shar'i. This 
introductory discussion of qiyas has been completed by a lengthy 
explanation of the conditions and the the methods of establishing 'illah, 
upon which most of the methodologies of tarj i 1h in giyas conflict rely. In 
examining how tarjih is operating in qiyas conflict, I have come to identify 
certain methodologies of tar, ji ih as will be shown in the following table (J). 
Table J: Tarjili in Qiyas Conflict 
Conflict Preference Reason 
'IUah confirmed by yma' YUah confirmed by ijma' More certain(although no actual 
vs. 'ülah which is not case of conflict has been found) 
'Mah mart§uýah vs. 'lUah martguuah More certain 
'tliah musta. nbatah 
Wah known through 'lUah known through textual ore obvious (although no accu- 
textual indication vs. indication (mafhwn a! -nah) rate example is found) 
'illah extracted from text 
Transitive 'illah vs. in- Transitive V ah More effective and has more 
transitive 'W ah assimilated cases 
YUah supported by ex- 7lah associated with many More strong and certain 
ternal considerations vs. supporting pieces of evidence 
'Wah which is not. 
'Mah vs. fjikmah 'Mah Fkjilvnwh is a hidden quality 
'lllah which has irnme- 7lah with immediate effect More reliable 
diate effect vs. 'illah whic 
has not. 
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Simple vs. mixed '91ah Simple Vah More certain 
Qiyas vs. qiyas Qiyas with a discrepancy is The overruled qiyas is not valid 
overruled and authoritative 
'RIah mun'alcisah vs. Uah mun'akisah More co-exclusive 
V ah ghayr mun'akisah 
'IUah in accordance with 'Mah which is line with Closer to the original intended 
generality vs. 'i1lah generality meaning 
which is not 
'lUah which covers all 7llah which is applicable to all More accurate and logical 
its elements vs. 'ülah its relevant individuals 
which does not. 
As regards chapter seven, the last chapter of the methodological 
aspects of tarj i th, I have examined many areas of conflict in the hope that 
appropriate external factors which, in one way or another, might add 
weight to one of the conflicting pieces of evidence, could be identified and 
utilised in removing conflict. These external factors, as identified in the 
work, are displayed in the following table(K) . 
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Table K: Tarji h Based on External Factors 
External Factors Comment 
Supported by many pieces of 
evidence 
Highly acceptable since it is more convincing 
To consider Companions' fatawa Acceptable (in fact, it is one 
supporting piece of evidence) 
To consider the hierarchical order 
of legal source / evidence. 
Acceptable in theory but still disputed in 
in terms of practical sense. 
A comprehensive order of tarjib The most systematic method of tarjih 
o consider language role in textual 
implication 
Highly acceptable since both the man and 
the Sunnah are Arabic in wording. 
To consider the text whose 
content exceeds that of the others 
Disputed 
To consider affirmative or negative 
text 
Disputed 
To consider prohibitory 
or obligatory rule 
Disputed 
To consider ibahah a 1iyyah or the 
one that alters this ibäjah agliyy 
Disputed 
To consider legal maxims Highly acceptable 
To consider siyasah shar'iyyah Highly acceptable 
To consider rna laliah Highly acceptable 
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The summary account of the principles of tarjih gives us some 
idea of the area of legal theory dealt with by the jurists. It also points out 
certain logical and systematic methodologies which are useful to remove 
conflict in different situations ; each is applicable only to a particular 
condition of conflict which suits this method of tarjih. In other words, 
methodologies of tarjih should be consulted within the table in which 
they are listed. On the other hand, the study has revealed many relevant 
and applicable methods of tarj h which had been identified, examined and 
approved or otherwise. These methods are many in numbers but the most 
significant methods, in terms of convincingness, as far as I am concerned, 
are three. These three methods have been inspired through or suggested by 
the examination of certain cases discussed throughout the work and 
particularly in chapter seven. If we take for example, the dispute over the 
prescribed punishment for collective murder, we will see, as we have seen 
earlier, that the preference goes to the opinion of the majority for the 
opinion they hold is supported more by many pieces of evidence as well as 
by the appreciation of maslahah. The decision of `Umar concerning 
retaliation in this case, which constituted one of the supporting pieces of 
evidence in favour of the majority opinion, "was also based on the 
rationale that the lives of the people would be exposed to aggression if the 
participants in murder were exempted from gigas. Public interest thus 
dictated the application of gi, Ta, 2 to all who took part in murdering a single 
individual". 6 The three following major conclusions of the methodology of 
twj i tb are derived from this case and many other cases discussed before. 
5 Throughout the work. more than seventy methodologies of tarjih have been 
identified; some of which are highly acceptable and others are disputed. 
6 Kamali, "Have we negeleted the Shari'ah law doctrine of ma lajlah'. in IS, vol. 27, 
1988, p. 2 qj. 
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The first of these three methods lies in the fact that the Shari'ah 
is a comprehensive legal system for maintaining the welfare of people not 
only in the Hereafter but also in wordly affairs. Therefore, every legal 
conclusion should be viewed through the broad objectives of the Shari'ah 
that are not questionable amongst the Muslims. The Arabic word 
"maslahah" represents the notion of objectives contained in Islamic law. It 
is an expression for seeking something generally useful or removing 
something generally harmful. To maintain maaiahah is to maintain and to 
preserve the magaid (objectives) of the law which consist of five safeguards 
for human beings ; their faith, their life, their intellect, their posterity and 
their property. What assures the preservation of these five principles is 
mallahah and whatever fails to preserve them is mafsadah i. e. evil and 
wrong-doing. Accordingly, should there be any conflict between two pieces 
of evidence with the two considerations of maalaihah and mafsadah on the 
one hand or between greater or additional maglahah and individual or 
ordinary maslalhah on the other, a jurist should give more weight to the one 
which serves masiahah more or the most. 
The second obvious method of tarji h has to do with the 
methodology of how to give preference to one piece of evidence over the 
other when they conflict. Instead of a narrowed perception of preference, I 
am more inclined towards the comprehensive examination of conflict and 
its related discussion.? A narrowed treatment of conflict and preference, it 
appears to me, would produce an unsatisfactory legal construction. That is 
to say that it is safer and more reasonable to base the preference on 
considering the whole contents of legal arguments from many different 
standpoints, as long as this is possible and appropriate, rather than by 
7 See pages 225,233 (note no. 3), 255.261,262-263.353,354,362,364 and 377. 
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limiting our investigation to one or two basic and general legal procedures 
in establishing the law. There seems to be no reason for not accepting this 
as completely valid because the source of the Shar-i'ah is a combination of 
text, spirit of law, consensus, rationality, linguistics, transmission system 
i. e. isnad, personal reasoning, maslalhah, etc. Texts and legal reasonings 
must therefore be equally observed for the truly traditional is always 
consistent with the truly rational. This method, in fact, is an embodiment 
of the significant role that other parts of evidence must play side by side 
with revelation for all are complementary to each other. 
The third and the most influential methodology of tarjiFh is to 
consider "many" or other supporting pieces of evidence. This is reasonable 
and acceptable since the purpose of preference is to strengthen the choice 
of a particular legal conclusion and its argument. The more it is supported 
by, or consistent with, other pieces of evidence, the more it gives the 
impression that a particular argument is stronger and more relevant to the 
intention of the Lawgiver. Again, there seems to be no reason not to accept 
this method of preference as valid and valuable. Moreover, as one can 
realise that the most satisfactory conclusion that one can feel in applying 
tarj ih is the fact that a particular preferred opinion is being supported by 
various types of argument which renders uncertainty and doubt overruled. 
Finally, to tackle the problem of legal conflict systematically, we 
have to have a comprehensive knowledge of ujul alJIgh and other subjects 
related to the business of interpreting the laws. For the solutions and 
answers for conflict of law cannot be plucked from the sky or sought from 
any source one wishes. As the conflict arises from Islamic legal theory, it 
398 
should be diagnosed and cured within the same laboratory and procedure. 
Equally, it should not be solved with mere whims and fancies. 
The jurists have left for Muslims a complete and comprehensive 
body of theory for answering the problem of conflict. Whether we agree or 
diasgree with their methods and answers, many of the questions they 
considered important for their times do not lose their importance today. 
In other words, the jurists have treated the doctrine elaborately, discussing 
at length most of the theoretical issues which would arise under what is 
known as "conflict of law". But their efforts remained individual and 
personal in character. At no time was there a body of men ever formally 
designated for such a task. Nor do we find a recognised authority to call 
such a body to meet - whether it be ad hoc or periodically. In brief, 
Muslims have had the theory elaborated by individual endeavours but they 
never had the adequate machinery by which to apply it. 
This procedural defect is a fundamental weakness in applying 
tarjih as an effective way to neutralise conflict of law. The whole principle 
of tarji h has suffered from this defect. Without adequate machinery 
through which the community could arrive at a preferred opinion, it is 
doubtful whether tarjiih would be able to materialise at a practical level in 
Muslim communities. 
The problem of the codification of Islamic law in the form of 
modern codification has its exponents as well as opponents amongst the 
Muslims. 8 The fundamental objection raised by the opponents is a 
principal one. They say that codification would stand against the creativity 
8 Al-Zuhayli, Tagnin. pp. 26-28. See also al-Qarýawi, MadktaL pp. 305-308. 
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of ytihad. In other words, ytihad is no longer as necessary as it was since 
all the problems pertinent to the law are then codified in the fixed articles 
which permit no other interpretations. 9 As far as tarji_h is concerned, I 
should say that once it has been shown to be practical, codification would 
immediately follow which in turn will affect the future of ijtihad. 
Therefore, to overcome the problems of both the impracticability of tarj i th 
and the limitation of ytihad, I would like to offer the following suggestions, 
organised hierarchically according to the stage or scope of its immediate 
importance : 
1. As far as the faculties and departments of Islamic law in Muslim 
communities are concerned, efforts should be increased to base every 
branch of Islamic law on a broad comparative study of figh. The same 
should apply to Islamic legal theory which should be treated as 
comparative legal theory (usul al figh al-mugaran) and no longer as U§ul 
al ftgh of X or Y. This comparative study would, in my opinion, offer 
some of the practical fundamental lines which will lead to the 
unification of Muslim law. 
2. From my reading, I have noticed that the jurists were emphasising 
the significance of the knowledge and appreciation of mallaJah in 
Islamic law and its role in conflict and tarj ijj. 10 Therefore, alongside the 
traditional study of uuui alffigh, more emphasis should be devoted to a 
careful study of ma. Sialhah. Accordingly, a student in Islamic law 
particularly in legal theory should be equipped with high quality books 
on the subject. 
3. Since tarj i tt is closely related to the administration of both fafwa and 
justice, both the mufti and the judge should be provided with a code of 
9 Ibid. 
10 See e. g. Bagby. 'The issue of ma 1a iah in classical Islamic legal theory', in IJIAS. 
vol. 2.1985. passim. 
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how to apply tarj i th systematically when there appears to be a conflict 
of evidence in a disputed case. Relatively speaking, a judge's position is 
more critical since his judgement is binding and authoritative. In this 
context, codification might help him but on many occasions, what is 
stated in the codification does not cover the broad objectives of the 
Shari'ah in which a judge might feel that strict adherence to what is 
stated in the codification would lead to injustice. How tarjih can 
release this tension is a question that the following lines will attempt 
to answer. 
3.1. Every judgement passed by a judge or even a fatwa by a mufti 
should be presented in writing explaining the conflict and the basis of 
tad7kih i. e. the selection of verdict or legal opinion. This written verdict 
orfatwa should be made public in order that it can be re-examined by 
other jurists inside and outside the justice office. An opposite finding 
and conclusion (if any) will be useful either in an appeal stage of the 
same case or in future cases. 
3.2. To arrive at the most approximate law intended by the Lawgiver in 
a disputed case, it is suggested that every verdict and fatwa should be 
passed by the majority of the jurists and muftis. This idea has been 
raised and promoted by many contemporary scholars in what they call 
a collective ytih&I. (ytihad jama'i). 11 When there appears to be a serious 
conflict of evidence in a disputed case before the court, a committee of 
judges should be appointed to study the problem as their conclusion 
would be more convincing and free from errors. If necessary, proper and 
frequent meetings among the contemporary jurists (majma' fighi) should 
11 See al-Darint, al-Manag, p. 19, Badran, Tar%th, p. 7; al-Qardawi, al-Ijafhad, pp. 
263-267: Sha'ban, a! -Ijtihad ahlarna'i, pp. 91-109. 
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be tabled so as to tackle current issues with one voice leaving no room 
for disagreement or conflict. 12 
3.3. Codification of Islamic law (if any) should be made liable to 
amendment but only for serious and genuine reasons in such a way 
that to continue with the existing provisions of laws would lead to 
great injustice and violation of the principles and broad objectives of 
Islamic figh 13 
After listing these few suggestions to make the tarJlii instrument 
more applicable, I have to say that one should always keep in mind that 
the Shari `ah, "has much wider scope and purpose than an ordinary legal 
system in the Western sense of the term". 14 Therefore, anything acceptable 
in a Western point of view regarding legal process does not necessarily fit 
the text as well as the spirit and the philosophy of Islamic law. 15 
Governed by the broad objectives of the Shari 'ah and its primary principles, 
a highly trained and skilled jurist, will be able to put tarJiFh into practice 
in a manner methodologically acceptable. The present study has been 
devoted to contributing to this end. 
12 See Introduction to al-Mawsu'ahaI-F(ghiyyah. p. 62. 
13 This problem also applies to common law. See Hallaq's "Legal Reasoning" . p. 88. 
note no. 30) 
14 Coulson. A History. p. 83. See also Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 
1; Humphreys, Islamic History. p. 209. 
15 Masud, Islamic Legal Philosophy, p. 4. 
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